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ABSTRACT 
 
Land use law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the 
world around us. In doing so, it shapes our relationships not only with the people around us, 
but with the places we inhabit and encounter. This dissertation examines how land use law 
structures the relations between people and the ‘more-than-human world’ to uphold the 
ownership model of property relations and to privilege particular forms of land use. Through 
documentary and interview-based qualitative research, it presents an eco-relational 
examination of one of the most contentious land uses in Ontario – aggregate mineral 
extraction.  
 
The primacy of private ownership in land use decision-making has particular spatial, 
temporal, social and ecological consequences for the places and communities involved in 
land use conflicts. As certain forms of land use are privileged through law and legal process, 
other relations with place fall outside the boundaries of the ownership model of property 
relations and are deemed less legally significant. Nevertheless, land use conflicts continue to 
arise because people routinely assert forms of interest in land and resources they do not own. 
These ‘more-than-ownership’ relations challenge the presumptive detachment of people from 
the places they live in, work with, and love. By examining how such relations are imagined, 
articulated and asserted through a place-based relational framework, this dissertation 
demonstrates their potential to disrupt the power of private ownership to determine whether 
and how land should be used.  
 
Realizing environmentally just land use decision-making requires a transformative shift in 
legal property relations to de-centre private ownership and foreground a much broader range 
of people-place relations. This includes reconceptualizing ownership to incorporate notions 
of reciprocity and responsibility to the broader set of ecological, physical and material 
networks of relation that make up a particular place. By changing the way we think about 
ownership we can change the way we make decisions about land use. In doing so, we have 
the opportunity to reshape our relations with the places we inhabit, and with each other. 
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Chapter One: Introduction – Defining and Mapping the Project 
 
We need to take our traditional concepts like property, and ask 
what patterns of relationship among people and the material 
world we want, what patterns seem true to both integrity and 
integration. Those questions do not necessarily preclude a 
concept of property, but they imply a focus not on limits but on 
forms of interaction and responsibility for their consequences.1 
 
 
1. Prelude 
On a crisp winter afternoon in 2009, I happened upon an article about a proposal for an open 
pit gravel mine in Melancthon Township, Ontario.2 It described growing local opposition to a 
proposal to site the largest quarry in Canada in the heart of Ontario’s potato farmland, among 
the rolling highlands between Toronto and the Bruce Peninsula extending out into Georgian 
Bay and Lake Huron. I read the article at the kitchen table of the farm my in-laws own, 
realizing that the proposed site was just down the road. 
 
Before sitting down to read the article, I had never given much thought to where the materials 
that build roads and subway tunnels came from. I had noticed quarries along Ontario’s 
highways, but rarely made the connection between them and the concrete foundations of 
houses, the towers of Toronto’s skyline, or the highways themselves. I had never heard of 
aggregate minerals or karst rock and knew little about the nature of water tables or the 
different types of soil scattered throughout the province. The article piqued my interest both 
as a lawyer interested in land use and environmental issues, and as someone with these local 
landscapes imprinted on my heart.  
 
Our family spends a lot of time at that farm. Two years later, my partner and I were married 
there on a wild and stormy Labour Day weekend. But the farm was not my first experience 
with the highlands of Dufferin and Grey counties. This place found its way into my life much 
earlier. As a child I spent summer weekends just across Highway 10 at my great 
grandfather’s goat farm, where he and his partner retired after my grandfather took over the 
                                                         
1 Jennifer Nedelsky, “Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self” (1990) 30 Representations 162 at 184. 
2 Ben Rayner, “Limestone Quarry Threatens Prime Farm Land”, Toronto Star (6 December 2009), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com/news/ontario/2009/12/06/limestone_quarry_threatens_prime_farm_land.html>. 
 2 
family auto repair shop in downtown Toronto. I learned how to feed baby goats and took 
chilly swims in the forest pond. I clearly remember the smell of the porch where everyone 
took off their barn clothes and boots, and the view from that old farmhouse kitchen, with the 
golden light of late summer evenings spreading across rolling hills.  
 
It is a place I now understand to be subject to ongoing land claims by the Haudenosaunee 
Peoples, and connected to the territory of several other Indigenous nations through habitat 
and water connectivity. These intersecting and overlapping Indigenous systems of land use 
regulation are now overlaid with colonial law as a result of the establishment of settler 
farming communities and the colonial division of collective land into freehold parcels. The 
area has been a settler agricultural community for several generations, and small scale farm 
operations still characterize the Township, which has one of the lowest income levels in the 
province. However, growing populations of amenity-seeking exurbanites and recreational 
tourists like my in-laws and my family now inhabit the surrounding areas, zoned as protected 
Greenbelt and Niagara Escarpment lands under provincial land use plans. More recently the 
area has also become the site of a large number of wind turbines, itself a highly contested 
land use governed by a statutory regime structured around private land ownership. As I now 
know, it is a complex place, constantly being made and remade from messy interconnections 
of social and material relations. 
 
After I read that article, I attended a packed meeting at a community hall in Shelburne in 
January 2011, organized by the local group opposing the quarry: The North Dufferin 
Agricultural and Community Taskforce.  The formal application to dig the quarry would not 
be filed until April, but the landowner Highlands Corporation had confirmed the plan to 
“explore other land uses” with the local council in 2009, including extracting the aggregate 
limestone sitting below their fields of potatoes.3 Confusion, frustration, and outrage were all 
on display in the crowd, but a particular narrative caught my attention as a lawyer and an 
aspiring academic. Over and over at that meeting, and in later conversations, I heard people 
say the company had lied when they purchased the land and that “the law should do 
something about it”. What they meant was that years earlier, when representatives of the 
Highlands Corporation had approached farmers in the area to purchase their land, the 
Corporation told them that they wanted to create the largest potato farm in Ontario. And they 
                                                         
3 Ibid. 
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did, for a time. However, the community soon learned that this was only an interim land use 
for Highland. Surveyors on the land, tree removal, and the clearance of old farmsteads, 
roused suspicion that something else was planned. There were allegations of bullying and 
aggressive tactics to pressure farmers to sell neighbouring parcels of land. Landowners 
started to decline offers to buy their land, fearful of the consequences for the community and 
future generations. Farmer Jim Black told the Toronto Star, "Once he started talking quarry, 
there was no way he was gonna get this place. I have six grandchildren – one of them's 19 
now, two 15-year-olds – and we've got one here who just can't wait to get farming, so what 
are we going to tell them later on, our kids? We made a big hole in the ground?"4 Another 
farmer told me about a Highlands representative who approached them to say he knew they 
needed to sell since they only had daughters and therefore no one to farm the land. They 
returned the cheque he left on the table.5 
 
When the Highlands Corporation revealed that they planned to extract aggregate minerals 
from the land and create a ‘mega-quarry’ that would extend 200 feet below the water table on 
2,400 acres of the site where they had been farming potatoes, local landowners were furious 
about the proposed transformation of the landscape and their communities. The proposal 
began to draw attention from environmentalists, First Nations, and urbanites; from foodies to 
weekend and recreational land users. People described the area as the “roof of Ontario”- the 
highest point in the Province and home to the headwaters of five major river systems flowing 
into two Great Lakes. They drew attention to the highly prized honeywood soil that stays wet 
in dry weather and dry when the weather is wet, and to the water table so close to the surface 
that springs pop up in many backyards. Indeed, the unique qualities of the soil are due to the 
presence of that valuable limestone close to the surface and the ample freshwater that runs 
through it. Therefore, as Black told the Toronto Star, extraction would fundamentally 
transform this place: "It's one thing to talk about growing potatoes ... and everything, but as 
soon as you start to destroy this land there's nothing left. It'll never come back again."6 
 
I noticed an interesting tension in the narratives. People would often acknowledge that it was 
“their land”, referring to the Highland Corporation’s private ownership of the blocks that it 
had assembled. Highland could do much of what they had already done to transform the land 
                                                         
4 Ibid. 
5 Interview 9, August 13, 2014. 
6 Rayner, supra note 2. 
 4 
simply because they owned it. There was no contention that the land was public or that it 
should be. This was an area dominated by private land holders and initially many were happy 
to see large-scale investment in the area. Yet, people wanted a say in what Highland could do 
on that privately-owned land. Despite the legal boundaries of property ownership, they were 
asserting relations with the Highland sites and felt they should be able to make claims that 
extended past the survey lines and beyond their own personal interest. They felt these claims 
should be heard and considered by decision makers, and that they should matter to the 
outcome: 
It doesn't take much of a hiccup to cause a problem. We're talking about the 
generations following. It probably doesn't make much difference to me, but 
where's the good food going to come from if you don't have land to grow it 
on? What can you leave your grandchildren? Clean air to breathe, pure water 
to drink and good quality soil, secure, that you can grow food on. What else 
can you leave them that's any more important?7 
 
They looked to the provincial land use planning system to provide a space for their claims. 
The law, they told me, should do something about this. Perhaps, but I was not so sure exactly 
what it could or should do. What exactly was the role of ‘law’ in all this? 
 
Following the submission of the Highlands application, NDACT mobilized to engage people 
in the provincial consultation process and retained experts to respond to the over 3,000 pages 
of technical reports prepared by the Corporation’s 17 private consultants. During the spring 
of 2011, I assisted with some of this work on submissions as a volunteer and gained some 
insight into the complexity of the regulatory and planning processes involved, as well as the 
highly technical expertise required to understand the implications and potential consequences 
of the proposal. I was lucky enough to work alongside people with this expertise, as well as 
rich local knowledge, and heard about many concerns and frustrations with the process.  It 
was too long, too short, too complex, did not take enough into account, it was weighted 
towards development, it was hijacked by “Not In My Backyard” activists, no one was 
listening, there were too many meetings, the meetings were in the wrong place and with the 
wrong people. But what I kept coming back to was the tension between the private nature of 
the proposed quarry site and the range of interests and relations other people had with the 
place at stake – social, economic, material, and affective relations that belied the simplicity of 
either owning or not-owning the land. Would the planning and legal processes now underway 
                                                         
7 Ibid. 
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create space for these claims to be heard and meaningfully considered? Would the 
relationships that people had with privately owned land influence the outcome of decisions? 
Should such relationships influence the outcome of decisions?  
 
This is where my inquiry began: an unassuming place along Highway 10 in Southern 
Ontario, where the complex socio-ecological networks of relation were suddenly made 
visible through a planning process, and where the tensions between private property and 
public land use planning were laid bare. I have continued to return to the ancient and subtle 
landscapes of this part of Southern Ontario throughout the project for guidance, knowledge, 
and inspiration. I hope this project is part of my giving back to that place, and so many others 
I have lived with and learned from, and contributing what I can to (re)shaping our people-
place relations.  
 
2. Description of the Research: Placing Private Property 
 
Land use law structures the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the 
world around us.8 In doing so, it shapes our relationships not only with the people around us, 
but with the places we inhabit and encounter. How we live with these places is a central part 
of how we will face the challenges of contemporary environmental crises in just and 
sustainable ways – the floods and droughts of climate change, the rapid loss of biodiversity, 
as well as increasing shortages of fresh water and arable soil. This dissertation examines how 
law does this structural work to shape people-place relations, and how we might transform 
land use law to build relations of humility, reciprocity, and respect with each other and the 
“more-than-human” world.9 
 
The model of property in which Anglo-Canadian land use law is embedded centres decision-
making on the private ownership of land. We legally recognize forms of control over and use 
                                                         
8 I use “land use law” to describe the overlapping and intersection statutory and policy regimes that govern how 
land can be owned, used, and managed, including statutory and common law property, land use planning law, 
environmental law, water law, mining law and energy law. 
9 I adopt the term “more-than-human” from Sarah Whatmore who describes the effect of the “materialist 
recuperations” in geography as a “return to the livingness of the world shifts the register of materiality from the 
indifferent stuff of the world ‘out there’, articulated through notions of ‘land’, ‘nature’, or ‘environment’, to the 
intimate fabric of corporeality that includes and redistributes the ‘in here’ of human being.” See her article, 
“Materialist returns: practising cultural geography in and for a more-than-human world” (2006) 13 Cultural 
Geographies 4 600 at 602. This approach avoids defining other parts of the material world as non- or other-than 
human and reinscribing the enlightenment dichotomy between humans and nature. 
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rights to land, but we have a much more difficult time recognizing relations with the land 
premised on interdependence, reciprocity or responsibility. The primacy of private ownership 
in land use decision-making has spatial, temporal, social and ecological consequences for the 
places and communities involved in land use conflicts.  In particular, legal property relations 
play a key role in upholding hierarchical relationships of environmental injustice and 
facilitating transformative extractive development. As certain forms of land use are privileged 
through law and legal process, other relations with place fall outside the boundaries of the 
ownership model of property relations and are deemed less legally significant or simply non-
cognizable. These relationships between parties who are not legal interest holders and land 
that is owned by someone else are often rejected, ignored or invisible in traditional Anglo-
Canadian accounts of property. Nevertheless, land use conflicts continue to arise because 
people routinely assert forms of interest in, or a relationship with, land and resources they do 
not own. In regulating the use of private land, the law shapes, and is shaped by, these people-
place relations even where they are severed and obscured for the purpose of legal decision-
making. These ‘more-than-ownership’ relations challenge the presumptive detachment of 
people from the places they live in, work with, and love.10 Their assertion brings the socio-
materiality of particular places into view, disrupting the orderly management of productive 
land use through law.11 Such relations are complex, and even contradictory, yet in this 
                                                         
10 Building on Whatmore’s conception of the more-than-human world, I adopt the term ‘more-than-ownership’ 
to describe the relations to place that fall outside of the boundaries of ownership. As discussed in Chapter 
Seven, as this project developed I rejected the negative and residual category of the “non-owner” used to 
describe those outside of the private ownership relationship in property theory. Such parties or participants are 
most often defined as non-owners, third parties, or objectors, defined by their distance and exclusion from the 
primary legal relationship and the lack of enforceable interests at the outset of the analysis. Rather, ‘more-than-
owners’ is adopted to describe individuals and groups who assert direct place-relations or those who have 
indirect connections but assert related experience or interest in the outcome of a land use decision. Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, the term is not intended to privilege such relations, but rather to foreground them as 
expanding the boundaries of property relations beyond private ownership.  
11 Following from feminist work on materiality, such as Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Stacey Alaimo, I use 
the term socio-materiality to emphasize the relationality and connectivity of the social and the material, neither 
of which I understand to exist as fixed or stable categories but rather to be constantly, and co-constitutively, 
made and remade. In doing so, I reject a dualistic understanding of human social meaning and experience versus 
an inert and objectified physical world that already exists ‘out there’ without reducing the material to purely 
social construction. Rather, I emphasize the need to recognize human social experience, including law, as 
embedded in and inseparable from the material world – both are performed and produced through the dynamic 
relations between people, places, and more-than-humans. In the context of property, the focus of this project, 
Margaret Davies argues an emphasis on property’s “emergence from relations between human and non-human 
spheres” allows us to see the “thingness” of property without reducing property to the thing itself. See, Karen 
Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Jane Bennett, Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2009); Stacey Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Margaret Davies, “Material Subjects and Vital Objects–
Prefiguring Property and Rights for an Entangled World” (2016) 22 Australian Journal of Human Rights. 
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messiness they play an under-examined role in challenging the ownership model of property 
at the heart of Canadian land use planning. These more-than-ownership relations are the 
focus of this dissertation.  
 
In focusing on these relations I aim to move beyond dualistic debates between 
“anthropocentric” perspectives in which the “nonhuman world has value only because, and 
insofar as, it directly or indirectly serves human interests”12 and “ecocentric” perspectives in 
which ecological systems are presumed to have intrinsic value independent of human 
interests and are therefore of “direct moral importance.” While these may be radically 
different positions in many ways, they are both premised on the assumption that humans can 
and do exist outside and apart of ‘nature’. In this project, I reject this binary and instead adopt 
the concept of the ‘more-than-human’ in order to reintegrate humans into ecological systems 
and the material world. Rather than advocating for novel or parallel rights for ecological 
systems or entities, I seek to foreground the relatedness and interdependence of humans and 
the more-than-human world and consider how this might shape the way we construct 
property relations; and, therefore, how we make decisions about land use.  
 
Strategic challenges to the dominant narrative of property relations can be found throughout 
Canadian legal history. Constitutional rights and title claims by First Nations, Inuit and Métis 
Peoples, as well as the (re)assertion of Indigenous law in many parts of Canada, directly 
challenge colonial legal frameworks governing land use and people-place relations and offer 
place-based alternative legal orders.13 Feminist litigation has also successfully challenged 
legal and social constructions of ownership and property relations in the context of family 
law.14 These challenges have been put forward as part of broader legal strategies to address 
                                                         
12 Katie McShane, “Anthropocentrism vs. nonanthropocentrism: Why should we care?” (2007) 16 
Environmental Values 2 169 at 170. 
13 See for example, John Borrows, “Living between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning 
and Democracy” (1997) 47 U Toronto LJ 417; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010); Gisday Wa & Delgam Uukw, The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the 
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1987-1990 (Gabriola, 
BC: Reflections Gabriola, 1992); Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Law and Aboriginal Title” online: (2017) Osgoode 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series 2 182: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2825097>; 
Senwung Luk, “The Law of the Land: New Jurisprudence on Aboriginal Title” (2014) 67 The Supreme Court 
Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 289; Karen Drake & Adam James Patrick 
Gaudry, “‘The Lands… Belonged to Them, Once by Indian Title, Twice for Having Defended Them…, and 
Thrice for Having Built and Lived on Them’: The Law and Politics of Métis Title” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 1 1. 
14 Mary Jane Mossman, “Running Hard to Stand Still’: The Paradox of Family Law Reform"(1994) 17 Dal LJ 5; 
Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “No Place Like Home’: The Search for a Legal Framework for Cohabitants 
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historic and ongoing injustice. They are, therefore, both partial and vulnerable in the context 
of enduring colonization, racism and gender inequality. Nonetheless they illustrate how 
dissident voices can and do use legal processes to advocate for, and perform, alternative 
visions of property.  This project considers whether and how land use conflicts are also 
emerging as potential strategic sites for rethinking property relations.   
 
This dissertation examines how land use law structures the relations between people and the 
‘more-than-human world’ in ways that uphold the ownership model of property relations and 
privilege particular forms of land use. It demonstrates the central roles that law and legal 
process play in structuring people-place relations by examining the regulation of aggregate 
mineral resource extraction in the province of Ontario. At the same time, this research 
demonstrates how the assertion of more-than-ownership relations challenges the dominant 
legal structure of people-place relations and strategically disrupts the power of private 
ownership to determine whether and how land should be used. In doing so, this project argues 
for an eco-relational reorientation to land use law, one which foregrounds a much broader 
range of people-place relations and creates space for reciprocity with place.  
 
Aggregate mineral mining is hard rock mining for gravel, sand or limestone. These are used 
in a wide range of everyday products, from toothpaste to subway tunnels to condo towers. 
Aggregate is everywhere in the cityscape, but also in the roadways connecting rural and 
remote communities where extraction is often sited. It is quite literally the foundation of our 
built environment. As such it is intimately linked to the narratives of growth and development 
in a particular place: what we need, what is inevitable, and what we want. Aggregate mines 
are large industrial open pit mines. As such, they have significant and transformative impacts 
on the land and the human and more-than-human communities in which they are located. 
Even with the best possible rehabilitation, the site of a mine will never return to what it once 
was – perhaps a lake, perhaps a recreational area, but also, and more often, a large hole or 
even a landfill. Indeed, aggregate mineral mining, or quarrying, has become one of the most 
contentious land use issues in Ontario.  
 
                                                         
and the Family Home in Canada and Britain"(2005) 30 Queen’s LJ 715. See also, Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 
SCR 1980. 
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Like other mineral resources, aggregates are fixed resources. Therefore, although it is 
regulated as a land use planning issue in Ontario, aggregate extraction has distinct siting 
issues from other types of controversial land uses, which are dealt with through public 
planning and environmental assessment processes in which a number of alternative sites are 
considered. The rock is where it is, and that is where extraction must take place. The fixed 
nature of the resource means extraction is concentrated in particular areas, for example, the 
area around Orangeville has a high concentration of mine sites. But extraction is not only 
fixed by geography. Aggregate mining in Ontario largely occurs on private land, prompted by 
an application by an owner to the Ministry of Natural Resources and municipal governments. 
Site selection, therefore, is inextricably linked to land ownership as well as the fixed location 
of the resource. In this way, who owns the land is central to Ontario’s quarry stories, and the 
relationship between private property and public land use planning is uniquely exposed. 
 
Through documentary and interview-based qualitative research, this dissertation examines the 
way people imagine, articulate and assert non-ownership relationships with places in the 
context of aggregate extraction disputes. In doing so, it demonstrates that realizing 
environmentally just land use decision-making requires a transformative shift in legal 
property relations to de-centre private ownership and foreground a much broader range of 
people-place relations. This includes creating space for the reassertion of Indigenous legal 
orders as primary sources of land use law, as well as the recognition of the complex and 
interrelated relations within and between the more-than-human world. In this way, I argue, 
ownership can be re-conceptualized to incorporate notions of reciprocity and responsibility – 
not only with human ‘more-than-owner’ parties with relations to privately owned land, but 
with the broader set of ecological, physical and material networks of relation that make up a 
particular place. 
 
3. Chapter Outline: Mapping the Project 
 
The dissertation is published as a portfolio that combines traditional chapters with published 
articles. It is structured into nine chapters beginning with this Introduction, which provides an 
overview. Chapters Two, Three and Four are traditional dissertation chapters, containing the 
literature review, methodology, and an overview of the relevant legal and policy framework. 
Chapters Two and Three set out the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in 
this dissertation. Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of the legal and policy frameworks 
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applicable to the extraction of aggregate resources in Ontario informed by both the theoretical 
framework and the documentary and interview data. Chapters Five to Eight are published 
papers. Chapter Nine is a substantive conclusion including final remarks on the ongoing legal 
and policy reforms related to aggregate extraction.  
 
A. Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
Chapter Two provides a review of scholarship relevant to the theoretical strands woven 
together in the later chapters: property theory and critiques; legal geography; environmental 
governance; planning history and theory; and, environmental justice. It presents the key 
debates and concepts which inform my methodological approach to data collection and 
analysis in later chapters, and my argument for an eco-relational approach to land use law.  
 
Section One reviews literature on property, beginning with a brief introduction to people-
place relations in Indigenous legal orders and Indigenous jurisdiction over land use decisions 
in Canada. It explains the link between the displacement of Indigenous laws through 
historical colonial settlement and contemporary property and planning law in Canada. This 
section then traces the dominant ownership model of property relations from its historical 
roots in Lockean conceptions of property through to the Hohfeldian dephysicalized model of 
property relations and contemporary Law and Economics approaches. Three types of critical 
approaches to property are then presented: social critiques such as Jennifer Nedelsky’s 
relational framework; environmental critiques such as Nicole Graham’s analysis of abstract 
and dephysicalized property and call for reciprocity with place; and, alternative models of 
property such as Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resources. 
 
Section Two introduces the legal geography literature and explores key debates in three areas 
of critical legal geography: (1) property; (2) place; and (3) nature and rurality. It begins by 
tracing the emergence and evolution of scholarship with an interest in the relationship 
between law and space. It then notes the attention legal geographers such as Nicholas 
Blomley have given to property and the influence of feminist and relational approaches to 
property including the work of Doreen Massey and Sarah Keenan. The section reviews 
theorization of ‘place’ by legal geographers, particularly those who have built on Massey’s 
complex, negotiated and dynamic conception of space. The final strand of legal geography 
examined is work on ‘nature’ and rurality. The work of legal geography scholars examining 
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the social construction of nature is explored, such as David Delaney’s critical understanding 
of nature, building on feminist and science studies scholarship. Finally, the section examines 
related scholarship on rurality, such as the work of Lisa Pruitt exposing the distinctive 
operation of law in rural space.  
 
Section Three of the literature review brings together literature on environmental governance, 
planning, and environmental justice to develop an understanding of law as a key mode 
through which land use decisions are governed. It first introduces scholarship on governance 
generally, with an emphasis on critical approaches to understanding neoliberal modes of 
governance. It goes on to focus specifically on the environmental governance literature, 
which theorizes the complex intersection of state power and non-state actors in environmental 
decision-making. This section then examines the scholarship on land use planning, 
particularly the history of planning in Canada and the limited scholarly treatment of planning 
law. Finally this section concludes by introducing environmental justice scholarship with a 
particular focus on Canadian environmental justice scholars. It specifically considers calls for 
environmental justice scholarship to extend beyond the human world, such as Deborah 
McGregor’s vision of environmental justice from an Anishnaabe perspective, as well as 
Randolph Haluza-Delay, Michael J. De Moor, and Christopher Peet’s place-pluralism. It 
concludes by examining the need for a more attentive and complex treatment of rurality in 
environmental justice literature and practice. 
 
B. Chapter Three: Methodology 
Chapter Three is a short overview of the methodological approach used in this research 
project. It introduces qualitative approaches to research generally and then specifically 
examines place-based qualitative approaches. The chapter describes the place-based 
qualitative approach to data collection adopted in this research, including both the 
documentary analysis and interviews. It provides a detailed account of the research design, 
including the interview process and the data analysis method. The chapter notes the 
techniques adopted to ensure validity and address concerns about the generalizability of 
qualitative research. Finally it sets out the limitations of the research. 
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C. Chapter Four: The Law and Policy of Aggregate Mineral Extraction 
in Ontario 
Chapter Four provides a detailed overview of the legal and policy frameworks applicable to 
aggregate licensing in Ontario. It identifies key procedural elements of aggregate extraction 
applications and appeals, as well as substantive legal and policy requirements, and places 
these in the context of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. The chapter also 
includes documentary analysis, in particular legislative history, case law, and non-scholarly 
commentary, as well as the perspectives of expert and more-than-owner interview 
participants. The chapter begins with a historical overview of the regulation of aggregate 
extraction in Ontario, from its treatment as a largely unregulated activity, to one governed by 
a complex proponent-driven regime engaging multiple statutes and policies at all levels of 
government. A detailed review of the applicable statutory and policy regimes then examines 
the following areas of law and policy: the constitutional rights of Indigenous communities 
under s 35 of the Constitution Act and the duty to consult those communities about activities 
that may affect those rights; the Aggregate Resources Act; the Provincial Policy Statement 
that guides all planning decisions in the province; and, the other provincial, federal, and 
international regimes that intersect with these primary frameworks.  
 
The chapter then provides an overview of the participation and consultation requirements and 
opportunities available in the municipal and provincial planning processes.  Key decision- 
making powers of municipal, provincial, and adjudicative actors are then described. Finally, 
Chapter Four concludes with a brief overview of two key amendment and review processes: 
the 2017 amendment of the Aggregate Resources Act; and, the ongoing coordinated review of 
the provincial land use plans, including the Niagara Escarpment Plan. 
 
D. Chapter Five: Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, 
Environmental Rights and Land Use Planning 
Chapter Five consists of the paper Putting Property in its Place, which was published in a 
special edition of the Revue générale de droit on human rights and the environment.15 The 
paper links the legal and policy framework with key theoretical strands from Chapter Two. In 
                                                         
15 Estair Van Wagner, “Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmental Rights and Land Use 
Planning” (2013) 43 Revue générale de droit 275. 
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particular, it weaves together relational theory with critical property theory and legal 
geography to foreground the work that law does in structuring human relations with land and 
the more-than-human world.  
 
The paper introduces the legal framework for aggregate licensing decisions, and then 
examines three high profile aggregate mine siting decisions in Southwestern Ontario. Jennifer 
Nedelsky’s four-step relational approach to dispute resolution and Nicole Graham’s theory of 
reciprocal person-place relations are applied to the cases to show how a shift away from the 
ownership model of property can lead to better social and ecological outcomes in land use 
planning. By centering the structural work that law does to manage people-places relations in 
the context of these decisions, the paper demonstrates specific ways in which Ontario’s land 
use law attempts to contain people-place relations within the boundaries of private property 
ownership. In particular, the article points to the under-examined role that parties who do not 
own the land at stake play in land use disputes. It exposes law and legal actors as central to 
determinations about what is at stake, which claims are included or excluded from decision-
making processes, and which relations influence outcomes about the use of private land. At 
the same time, this chapter argues that attempts to bound property relations are incomplete 
and partial, and points to strategic openings for the assertion of transformative relations with 
the more-than-human world in aggregate mine siting decisions. 
 
Applying a relational rights analysis informed by environmental critiques of dominant 
property relations, the paper concludes by arguing for a relational reorientation of property 
ownership in land use and environmental decision-making. In doing so, it sets the foundation 
for an eco-relational approach informed by Indigenous legal orders and critical property 
scholarship. This approach, I argue, has the potential to shift people-place relations away 
from the bounded and exclusionary nature of private ownership, towards relations of 
responsibility and reciprocity between humans and the more-than-human world. By weaving 
these foundational theoretical strands together, this paper sets the stage for the analysis of the 
interview data in the following three papers. 
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E. Chapter Six: The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in 
Ontario’s aggregate extraction disputes 
Chapter Six consists of the book chapter, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in 
Ontario’s aggregate extraction disputes” forthcoming in the edited volume Contested 
Property Claims.16 This paper builds on the approach developed in Chapter Five by 
identifying specific ways ownership operates to both order actors and events, and to control 
the flows of knowledge and information that are included or excluded in the aggregate 
extraction licensing process. Ownership, I argue, works through law to assert both the 
chronological power to control the sequencing of events, as well as the substantive power to 
manage and control the relations engaged by decisions about how land can, and should, be 
used.  
 
This paper engages with key legal geography concepts and critical planning theory, 
particularly Blomley’s concept of “bracketing”17 and Valverde’s work on 
“spatiotemporalities”.18 By examining both the legal and policy framework and the interview 
data, the paper traces the spatiotemporal power of ownership from site selection through to 
the control of knowledge and expertise at the adjudication stage. It demonstrates the specific 
ways in which the law and policy of aggregate licensing attempt to “bracket” human 
relationships with land in order to produce and reinforce extractive forms of land use. By 
structuring the sequence of events to privilege and enrol private owners in extractive 
development, law creates a hierarchy of interests in relation to land with procedural and 
substantive consequences for human and more-than-human relations. Not only are other 
actors provided with limited opportunities to engage in and intervene in the process of 
decision-making, they are bound by the spatial power of owners to transform their land and to 
produce the conceptual boundaries about what is at stake in a particular decision.  
 
By exposing the specific ways this chronological power and hierarchical ordering of actors 
and interests is produced, this paper reveals specific strategic opportunities for intervention 
and transformation. I conclude that decoupling aggregate planning from private ownership 
                                                         
16 Estair Van Wagner, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate extraction 
disputes” Mikkel Thorup, Maja Hojer Bruun, Bjarke Skærlund Risager & Patrick Cockburn eds. Contested 
Property Claims: What disagreement tells us about ownership (London: Routledge, forthcoming). 
17 Nicholas Blomley, “Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing” (2014) 10 Ann Rev of L and Soc Sci 1 
133. 
18 Mariana Valverde, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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could be a first step in rebalancing the values and relationships engaged by aggregate 
licensing decisions. Through reframing the key issue from how we manage the extraction of 
the resource to a broader planning inquiry into whether we should extract this resource in this 
place, and in whose interest, this reorientation has the potential not only to influence case-
specific outcomes, but to create space for relational frameworks for land use and 
environmental decision-making. 
 
F. Chapter Seven: Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of 
People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts 
Chapter Seven consists of the paper “Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of 
People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts”, published in a special 
edition of the MIT Planning Journal Projections on the relationship between law and 
planning.19 This paper builds on the theoretical approach outlined in Chapter Two to develop 
my eco-relational framework for understanding the complex and interconnected socio-
materiality of land use disputes.  The paper uses the interview data with more-than-owner 
parties involved in aggregate mineral siting disputes to foreground people-place relations 
falling outside the boundaries of the ownership model of property. In doing so, it accounts for 
the spectrum of contested relations with, and within, the places at stake in aggregate 
extraction conflicts. In this paper, I conclude that the transformative and democratizing 
potential of planning is limited by the day-to-day operation of participation in land use 
decisions, in which ownership is upheld as the primary legal relationship to land, and the 
public interest is defined narrowly in terms of economic growth and development.    
 
The paper first presents a quantitative overview of the outcomes in aggregate siting decisions 
between 2001 and 2014, which demonstrates the overwhelming rate of success for proponent 
applications despite substantial contestation from local and other interested parties. This 
disproportionate rate of approval, I argue, indicates a structural problem, and the need for 
further inquiry into how the decision-making process produces these outcomes. The paper 
considers this finding from an eco-relational perspective. 
 
                                                         
19 Estair Van Wagner, “Law’s Ecological Relations: The legal structure of people-place relations in Ontario’s 
aggregate extraction conflicts.” (2016)12 Projections: The MIT Journal of Planning 35. 
 16 
Through analysis of the interview data, I critically assess theoretical claims that participatory 
elements of planning and environmental law have redefined property relations and 
democratized environmental decision-making. I then use the interview data to demonstrate 
the complex, and often contradictory, range of ecological relations asserted by more-than-
owner parties in land use conflicts about aggregate mineral siting decisions. Through the 
experiences and reflections of the interview participants, I specifically examine the space in 
the aggregate licensing process for the assertion of environmentally focused people-place 
relations. The paper identifies the reductive characterization of participation as ‘objection’ as 
a key limitation on the ability of more-than-owner parties to influence outcomes. It points to 
the narrow opportunities to disrupt either the proponent’s narrative about what was at stake 
and the state’s development-focused view of the public interest. The paper also examines the 
limitations of increasing reliance on proponent-led mitigation and adaptive management of 
impacts, as opposed to avoidance and prevention. At the same time, it demonstrates how 
more-than-owner parties are filling the knowledge and advocacy gaps left by the increasingly 
proponent-driven regulatory framework and the ongoing lack of due diligence and 
enforcement by governments.  
 
G. Chapter Eight: Law’s Rurality: Land Use and the Shaping of People-
Place Relations in Rural Ontario 
Chapter Eight consists of the paper “Law’s Rurality: Land Use and the Shaping of People-
Place Relations in Rural Ontario,” which was published as part of a special edition on rurality 
as a dimension of environmental justice in the journal Rural Studies.20 In this paper I bring an 
environmental justice lens to the eco-relational framework developed and applied in the 
previous chapters. By incorporating environmental justice perspectives, this paper exposes 
the role of law in constructing rurality as residual space, and examines the social and 
ecological consequences for particular places. In particular, it presents the case of the Niagara 
Escarpment Plan Area through an examination of two aggregate siting decisions and the 
interview data.  
 
                                                         
20 Estair Van Wagner, “Law’s rurality: Land use law and the shaping of people-place relations in rural Ontario” 
(2016) 47(Part A) Journal of Rural Studies 311. 
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The paper specifically scrutinizes the use of the category ‘rural’ in Ontario’s land use law and 
policy, and concludes that rurality serves as a legal category which enables extractive 
development within one of the most protected and ‘environmentally-focused’ planning areas 
in the province. The experiences and observations of interview participants are analyzed to 
examine the consequences of this legal construction of rurality for people-place relations. In 
particular, it explores the emphasis on compensation rather than avoidance of transformative 
loss or harm, the treatment of experiential knowledge in the licensing process, and the failure 
to recognize cumulative impacts.  The paper demonstrates that the current legal structure of 
relations results in a reductionist account of the embodied and complex relations of rural 
places, and reinforces simplistic accounts of rural land use politics. At the same time, the 
paper draws attention to the potential for rural land use politics to uphold dominant property 
relations and colonial land use patterns. It concludes that applying an environmental justice 
lens to rural land use movements is a necessary part of confronting and countering the 
parochial, exclusionary, colonial, and racist potential of rural politics of place.  
 
This paper argues that realizing the transformative potential of land use conflicts to change 
people-place relations in settler-colonial states requires more than creating space for 
environmentally focused relations between people and places. Environmentally just rural 
politics and legal strategies must strive to be inclusive and transformative by foregrounding 
Indigenous law and land rights alongside acknowledging the range of ecological relations 
between people and places which lie beyond private ownership and presumptive 
development. It argues that glimpses of this emerge in struggles over aggregate siting; 
however, relations of solidarity between rural and indigenous communities must be 
developed on the ground in particular places, as challenging and difficult conversations take 
place between Indigenous people and settlers involved in land use conflicts. 
 
4. Conclusion: Towards Ecologically Just Relations in Ontario’s Land Use Law 
 
The conclusion in Chapter Nine briefly synthesizes the main research findings and provides 
both theoretical conclusions about an eco-relational approach to land use conflicts and 
practical recommendations for legal reform of Ontario’s mineral aggregate regime. Returning 
to the ecological adaptation of Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis set out in Chapter Five, I 
conclude the existing legal structure of relations hierarchically privileges private land owners 
and remains closed to the broader range of more-than-owner relations engaged by aggregate 
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mineral disputes. Not only does this facilitate transformative extractive development in 
particular cases, I argue, it upholds and reinforces the dominant ownership model of property 
in Ontario’s land use law framework. I then provide a final summary discussion of the values 
and relationships uncovered through the place-based qualitative research undertaken for this 
project. Informed by these values and relationships, the conclusion then recommends both 
immediate practical reforms to Ontario’s land use law, as well as future transformative 
change to the way we make decisions about how we live together and with the world around 
us. 
 
In the chapters that follow, this dissertation critically examines how land use law centres 
private ownership and upholds the dominant model of property relations. By uncovering the 
complex and messy more-than-owner relations engaged by aggregate mineral extraction 
conflicts, I generate an eco-relational approach to land use decision-making through which 
we work towards ecologically just people-place relations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Land use and environmental decision-making are the subject of a diverse range of literature 
across many disciplines. This chapter specifically reviews the literature in three broad areas 
of scholarship: 1) Property theory; 2) legal geography; and, 3) governance, including 
planning and environmental justice scholarship. The chapter begins by reviewing property 
theory, first situating Anglo-Canadian property law as contextual and constructed by 
acknowledging the enduring role of Indigenous laws and legal orders governing land use 
throughout Canada. It then reviews the dominant ownership model of property relations as 
well as social and environmental critiques, and, finally, alternative constructions of property. 
The chapter then reviews the legal geography literature on three themes: 1) property and 
property law; 2) conceptions of place and space; and, 3) constructions of nature and rurality. 
Finally the chapter concludes with a review of literature on governance in three distinct areas 
of scholarship: 1) environmental governance; 2) planning theory, history, and law; and, 4) 
environmental justice. This project weaves these strands together to develop the original 
methodological approach described in Chapter Three; and, to inform the eco-relational 
approach generated in Chapters Three through Eight.  
 
PROPERTY THEORY 
A. Indigenous Legal Orders and Land Law 
 
A lifeworld doesn’t reflect the spontaneous ideas of those standing within it. 
Our creation stories are of something common: the earth beneath and all around 
us. What varies is how we understand it. 
 
That’s what’s at stake. That’s what I need you to understand. 
 
The trouble isn’t simply that we tell different stories which ultimately generate 
widely different bodies of law. That’s a wonderful thing. We can learn from one 
another to the benefit of us all. The trouble is that some of us don’t just differ 
but differ in the kind of stories we tell of creation.1  
 
                                                         
1 Aaron Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law : On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2016) 61 McGill LJ 
847 at 863. 
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Anishinaabe legal scholar Aaron Mills draws our attention to the foundational narratives that 
inform different systems of law in order to point to the “earth-alienation” at the heart of 
liberal constitutionalism. This “rootless” foundation for law, he argues, is a very different 
kind of story than an Anishinaabe legal order “rooted in interdependent conceptions of self-
community”:2  
Under a rooted vision of freedom, order isn’t secured through rule of law; law 
isn’t the formal obligation to respect rules (i.e., rights and correlative duties). 
Rather, law consists in the informal responsibility to coordinate mutual aid (i.e., 
gifts and needs) within particular forms of relationship: law is a framework for 
proper judgment.3  
 
Understanding particular conceptions of property as specific “narratives” or “artefacts,” 
producing and produced by specific historical, spatial and cultural contexts, opens up avenues 
to re-imagine, articulate, and recognize the range of existing and possible people-place 
relations.4 In other words, despite its dominance in Canada and other settler-colonial states, 
the Anglo-Canadian ownership model of property described below in Section B should be 
understood as specific and contextually situated – just one way of understanding human 
relations with and in relation to the world around us, particularly land and the environment. 
In examining the context of contemporary land use disputes in Ontario, my research points to 
the link between this model of property and the emergence of land use planning law. I 
acknowledge “the colonial genealogy of planning,”5 noted by Australian planning scholar 
Libby Porter and consider its ongoing influence on the people-place relations at issue. In this 
context, while Indigenous law is not the focus of this research, it is critical to recognize the 
enduring presence and jurisdiction of Indigenous legal and governance systems and the 
influence of the relationships between these legal orders and colonial property and planning 
regimes in shaping contemporary people-place relations.6 Further, both Indigenous legal 
theory and practice as well as Indigenous planning point to existing models of people-place 
relations that challenge “maladapted” 7 superimposed Anglo-Canadian property practices and 
                                                         
2 Ibid at 865. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (New York: Routledge, 2007); Carol M Rose, 
Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder, CO, Westview 
Press, 1994). 
5 Libby Porter, Unlearning the Colonial Cultures of Planning (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 
Ltd., 2012) at 151. 
6 Shiri Pasternak, “Jurisdiction and settler colonialism: where do laws meet?” (2014) 29 Canadian Journal of 
Law and Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 2 145. 
7 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011) at 206. 
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offer specific examples of place-based knowledge and land use governance in Ontario and 
throughout Canada.8  
 
In demonstrating the relevance of Indigenous laws to contemporary land use disputes, 
Anishinaabe legal scholar John Borrows points to the “ancient and contemporary stability and 
flexibility of First Nations laws.”9 North American Indigenous peoples, he notes, “developed 
spiritual, political, and social conventions to guide their relationships with each other, and 
with the natural environment.  These customs and conventions became the foundation for 
many complex systems of government and law.”10 In “Living between Water and Rocks: 
First Nations, Environmental Planning and Democracy,” Borrows describes how 
Anishinabek law of environmental planning in Ontario derived from specific knowledge and 
practices relating to plants, animals, water, fish and history.  For example, he reviews laws 
that trace the link between the appropriate scale of development and capacity of the land, as 
well as the importance of restoring and monitoring after land is used.11 This Anishinabek law 
and knowledge, he argues, would have contributed to contemporary disputes about proposed 
development on Hay Island, Ontario, not only by bringing ecological considerations into 
focus, but because of its potential to “destabilize the boundaries between humans and their 
surroundings and deconstruct the seemingly neutral and natural facade of contemporary geo-
legal ideas.”12 Similarly, in Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, Borrows describes 
Anishinabek people-place relations as involving a trustee-like relationship of interdependence 
and reciprocity in which the Earth has legal personality and agency.13 Rocks, he notes, have 
agency that requires consent and appropriate process before they can be used.14 In the Hay 
Island case, Borrows provides concrete examples of the procedural and substantive barriers to 
Anishinabek assertions of people-place relations and their legal recognition within Ontario’s 
current land use framework. At the same time, he provides evidence that more ecologically 
and socially sustainable decisions about land use and environmental planning would result 
                                                         
8 For an introduction to Indigenous planning across several jurisdictions see, Ryan Walker, David Natcher & 
Ted Jojola, Reclaiming Indigenous Planning (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 2013). 
9  John Borrows, “Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning and Democracy” 
(1997) 47 UTLJ 417 at 465. 
10 Ibid at 453-454. 
11 Ibid at 463–465; John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010) at 244–248. 
12 Borrows, supra note 9 at 443. 
13 Borrows, supra note 11 at 246. 
14 Ibid at 245. 
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from the inclusion of a broader range of perspectives and knowledge about place. In 
particular, he argues legal recognition of the Earth as a living being and the 
interconnectedness of human life flow from knowledge and recognition of place.15 This 
points to the importance of including a range of perspectives and people-place relations in 
decision-making process from both an equity and justice perspective and an instrumental 
perspective about reaching the best possible decision and outcome. 
 
Kahnawake Mohawk scholar Taiaiake Alfred’s description of the sharp contrast between 
human-nature relationships in Indigenous and Western liberal traditions provides some 
insight into the philosophical origins of the destabilizing potential of Indigenous laws.16 He 
describes Indigenous philosophies as based on a stewardship relationship with the earth, with 
power derived from respect for, and responsibility to, nature. In contrast, he argues that in 
Western liberal traditions power is derived from “alienation from nature.”17 The connection 
between social and political power and land is evident in the Gitxsan legal order and 
governance system in Northwest British Columbia, described by Gisday Wa and Delgam 
Uukw18 and by Richard Overstall19 and considered in the landmark Supreme Court of Canada 
ruling in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.20 According to Borrows, imposed colonial land 
use law “inadvertently ignored and purposely undermined” Indigenous laws based on this 
conflicting worldview.21  In Canada, he argues, colonial law “imposed a conceptual grid over 
both space and time which divides, parcels, registers, and bounds peoples and places.”22 
Complex Indigenous systems of government and law regulating both person-person and 
people-place relationships were ignored and purposefully undermined as settlers undertook 
the work of ordering and managing space.23 The resulting legal discourse of property in 
which Canadian planning law is embedded has been closed to place-based analysis. Claims 
                                                         
15 Ibid at 248. 
16 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
17 Ibid at 84. 
18 Gisday Wa & Delgam Uukw, The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en hereditary 
chiefs in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1987-1990 (Gabriola BC: Reflection, 1992). 
19 John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright, “Property Rights in the Colonial Imagination and Experience” 
in Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) at 5. 
20 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010. 
21 Borrows, supra note 9 at 429. 
22 Ibid at 427. 
23 Ibid at 445; Porter, supra note 5 at 151. 
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asserting people-place relationships, such as Alfred’s stewardship, have been understood as 
disruptive and subversive.24   
 
Borrows points to the need for more than procedural changes aimed at participatory 
inclusivity in planning decisions. In his view, better environmental planning requires the 
participation of Indigenous people, but also requires ideological change through “an infusion 
of substantive ideas” including Indigenous laws suitable to evaluate and interpret Indigenous 
knowledge relevant to specific land use proposals.25 Alfred also argues that Indigenous 
traditions offer a way of breaking from destructive patterns of thought.26 This is particularly 
relevant to land use practices associated with Anglo-Canadian property law developed in very 
different ecological and social conditions. In the land use context, Alfred argues, Indigenous 
perspectives provide a model for balancing engagement in broader economic development 
with responsibility to respect the “long-term health and stability of people and the land.”27 
This underlying principle of balance, Alfred notes, makes ecological and community health 
the goals of economic decision-making which the scale or intensity of a specific land use 
must uphold.28 The potential for a range of non-ownership relationships to be articulated and 
recognized in land use disputes depends on the potential to open up conceptual space for 
alternatives to the ownership model of property. This requires the inclusion of Indigenous 
peoples in decision-making, but as Borrows and Alfred argue, it must also go further. It 
requires substantive recognition of and respect for Indigenous legal knowledge and the 
jurisdiction of Indigenous legal orders that apply place-based knowledge about specific 
ecosystems. Rather than treating assertions of Indigenous law over land use decisions as 
Aboriginal rights claims to be adjudicated within the state-based Aboriginal law frameworks, 
this includes space for the assertion and application of Indigenous laws that challenge 
dominant conceptions of the relationship between humans and our environment even when, 
                                                         
24 Wa & Uukw, supra note 18; John Borrows, “With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)” (1995) 41 
McGill Law J 629; Tyler A McCreary & Richard A Milligan, “Pipelines, Permits, And Protests: Carrier Sekani 
Encounters With The Enbridge Northern Gateway Project” (2014) 21 Cultural Geography 1 115; Gordon 
Christie, “Discourse and Negotiations Across the Indigenous/Non-Indigenous Divide: Obligations’, 
Decolonization and Indigenous Rights to Governance” (2014) 27 Can JL Juris 259; Angela V Carter, Gail S 
Fraser & Anna Zalik, “Environmental Policy Convergence in Canada’s Fossil Fuel Provinces? Regulatory 
Streamlining, Impediments, and Drift” (2017) 43 Can Public Policy 1 61. 
25 Borrows, supra note 9 at 451. 
26 Alfred, supra note 16 at 84. 
27 Ibid at 85. 
28 Ibid at 86. 
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perhaps especially when, they may not be compatible with Canadian law and institutions.29 
As Gordon Christie argues, meaningful engagement with Indigenous laws requires us to 
critically consider the “the ability of the state (and Canadian society) to accommodate itself to 
the emergence of Indigenous legal traditions” and the reassertion of Indigenous control and 
jurisdiction as decentring state law rather than the reverse.30 In the context of this research, 
Indigenous jurisdiction over land use planning and natural resources poses particular 
challenges for Anglo-Canadian planning and property law. According to Canadian legal 
scholar Kirsten Anker, this stems from the disjuncture between colonial conceptions of “land-
as-space” and Indigenous relational conceptions of “land-as-place”, the former excluding 
“the possibility of alternative modes of imagining the relationship between people and the 
land.”31  
B. The Ownership Model of Property Relations 
This project examines the impact of dominant property relations in the context of a set of land 
use disputes about aggregate mineral extraction in Ontario. Therefore, this section sets out a 
brief description and background to this dominant model of property in Canadian law and 
Anglo-colonial legal theory and culture more broadly. Australian property scholar Margaret 
Davies argues that the dominant Anglo-colonial “ownership model” of property is “just the 
here-and-now of a cultural and political history which is still in process.”32 In doing so, she 
points to the importance of understanding why and how particular models of property achieve 
and sustain dominance, as well as recognizing the possibility of other different models. 
Similarly, American property theorist Carol Rose argues that private property regimes “hold 
together only on the basis of common beliefs and understandings.”33 This project examines 
contemporary English Canadian land use planning and natural resource management 
frameworks, which rely on a private property narrative rooted in Anglo-colonial law and 
                                                         
29 Gordon Christie, “Culture, self-determination and colonialism: Issues around the revitalization of Indigenous 
legal traditions” (2007) 6 Indig Law J 13; Glen S Coulthard, “Subjects of empire: Indigenous peoples and the 
‘politics of recognition’in Canada” (2007) 6:4 Contemp Polit Theory 437; Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New 
Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Maori Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). 
30 Christie, supra note 29 at 26–27. 
31 Kirsten Anker, “Land” in Alexandra Popovici & Lionel Smith, eds, McGill Companion Law (Montreal: 
McGill University, 2012). 
32 Davies, supra note 4 at 50. 
33 Rose, supra note 4 at 5. 
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culture.34 Therefore, it examines how the liberal “ownership model”35 is built on common 
beliefs and understandings in cultural and legal discourse about land use: property is about 
the exclusive relationship of an individual owner with a particular ‘thing’ and the resulting 
control over access to, and use of, that thing - in this case, land.  This idea of property is 
foundational to the construction of contemporary land use law as a way of organizing the 
‘bundle’ of abstract rights of ownership, control and alienation of things as between people: 
“[T]he dominant view of property, in both legal and cultural discourses, is one of abstract 
entitlements as between persons which are alienable from, rather than proper to, a person.”36 
 
While the theoretical examination of the roots of this model of property draws on English, 
American and Australian scholarship in addition to the work of Canadian scholars, this 
research also adopts the need to “locate property law” contextually and in place.37 This 
project does so in the specific social, but also material, context of the province of Ontario and 
its predecessor, Upper Canada. Canadian legal scholar Bruce Ziff argues that English 
property law was largely adopted in Upper Canada. Noting few exceptions, he links this 
adherence to English law to both practical reasons of certainty and convenience, but also to 
imperial discourse – the “resolute confidence in the superiority of English political 
institutions” and the related “belief in the right-headedness of English justice” which 
manifested in the common law.38 This normative justification exposes the deeply held 
commitments to foundational elements of property law despite departures and adaptations in 
new colonial settlements. As legal historian John McLaren observes: “Land settlement, as a 
process within the dominant culture, was closely related to that blend of order, individualism, 
and deference that has marked the history of colonialism in Canada”.39 Land, in his view, was 
viewed through the lens of “nation building and the progressive development of a 
                                                         
34 John George Chipman, A Law Unto Itself: How the Ontario Municipal Board Has Developed and Applied 
Land Use Planning Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Eran Kaplinsky, “The Zoroastrian 
Temple in Toronto: A Case Study in Land Use Regulation, Canadian-Style” in Eric Tucker, James Muir & 
Bruce Ziff, eds, Property on Trial: Canadian Cases in Context (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Legal 
History, 2012) 223. 
35 Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (New Have: Yale University Press, 2001) at 
3. 
36 Graham, supra note 7 at 27. 
37 Mclaren, Buck & Wright, supra note 19 at 2. 
38 Bruce Ziff, “Warm Reception In A Cold Climate: English Property Law And The Suppression Of The 
Canadian Legal Identity” in John McLaren, A R Buck & Nancy E Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property 
Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 106 at 113. 
39 John McLaren, “The Canadian Doukhobors and the Land Question: Religious Communalists in a Fee Simple 
World” in A R Buck, John McLaren & Nancy E Wright, eds, Land and Freedom: Law and Property Rights in 
the British Diaspora (2001) 135 at 242. 
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commercial and industrial economy.”40 The departures Ziff does note draw on American and 
Australasian reforms to property law – including free-entry mining regimes – pointing to the 
influence of other Anglo-settler colonial legal regimes on the ways property law was adapted 
to local conditions in English Canada.41 Therefore, while “a variety of local conditions in 
Canada, including those related to geography, climate, and culture, required the fine-tuning of 
English property laws for the Canadian context,” Valiante and Smit characterize the common 
law of property in Canada as remaining “grounded in the English system of property 
ownership but has its own peculiarities.”42 This review of property scholarship reflects this 
enduring influence, as well as the links with other settler-colonial property law. 
 
This section contends that the dominant Anglo-colonial ownership model shapes the ways 
that people imagine, articulate and assert their relationships with place in contemporary 
Ontario. This influence is related to three central features of property relations that are of 
particular relevance to this project: 1) the dualistic and hierarchical view of nature-culture 
relations; 2) the presumption of exclusivity and alienability of private property; and 3) the 
construction of dephysicalized property as an abstract person-person relationship.  
I. Nature-Culture Dualism 
The ownership model of property can be traced to the liberalism of English philosopher John 
Locke and his Two Treatises of Government (1689).43 His influential theory of property 
emerged in the context of the 17th century scientific revolution and the emergence of 
‘modernist’ thinking. Central to ‘modern’ thinking was the dualistic understanding of the 
culture-nature relationship associated with Francis Bacon44 and Rene Descartes.45 Cartesian 
dualism separated mind from body and culture from nature. For Descartes, men were not only 
separate from nature, but superior ‘masters and possessors’ as cultural creatures with agency 
                                                         
40 John McLaren, “The Failed Experiments: The Demise of Doukhobor Systems of Communal Property 
Landholding in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, 1899-1999” in John McLaren, A R Buck & Nancy E 
Wright, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 222 
at 242. 
41 Ziff, supra note 38 at 110. 
42 Anneke Smit & Marcia Valiante, Public Interest, Private Property: Law and Planning Policy in Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) at 9–10. 
43 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Peter Laslett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
44 Francis Bacon, Lisa Jardine & Michael Silverthorne, Francis Bacon: The New Organon (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
45 John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
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and the capacity for rational thinking.46  Modernist thinking emphasized reason and scientific 
knowledge, moving away from a view of authority as vested in religion and kings. While 
Locke clearly applied the subject-object binary in the human-nature relations he constructed, 
he rooted his theory of property in natural law. For Locke, Australian property scholar Nicole 
Graham argues, God’s nature was both the origin of law and the powerless object of cultural 
appropriation.47 
 
For Locke, land as nature was given to Man in common. Appropriation and improvement of 
nature by humans for their beneficial use was not only inevitable, it was necessary for the 
formation of society.48 According to Locke, appropriation of nature established dominion 
over the land and thus created property. In this transformative act, worthless nature was given 
value through human use: “[H]ow much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of 
things, we enjoy in this World: And the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be 
reckon’d in, as any, or at most, but a very small, part of it.”49 Neither consent nor justification 
were necessary for Locke because the commons were of no use until they were transformed 
into property: “Nature and the Earth furnished only the almost worthless Materials, as in 
themselves.”50 Almost a century later William Blackstone defined property in the 
Commentaries on the Laws of England Books 1 & 2 (1765-1766) as, “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world.”51 While 
Jeremy Bentham’s “A Theory of Legislation”52 breaks with Locke and Blackstone in 
conceiving law as originating in culture rather than in God, Graham notes that he maintains 
the anthropocentric and dualistic view of human-nature relations. 53 For Bentham, property 
emerges in the shift from the ‘savage’ circumstances of physical reality in nature where only 
“miserable and precarious” possession is possible to civilization and the creation of law.54 
Therefore, for my purposes, whether Western liberal theory accepts that private property is a 
God-given natural right according to Locke or functionally necessary according to Bentham, 
                                                         
46 Ibid. 
47 Graham, supra note 7 at 50. 
48 Locke, supra note 43, para 32. 
49 Ibid, para. 42. 
50 Ibid. 
51 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Applicable to Real Property (Toronto: Rowsell & 
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the ability to hold property rights in the natural world is the basis for legal and political order. 
This remains true within the influential contemporary law-and-economics strain of property 
theory with economic necessity and transactional efficiency having taken the place of earlier 
justifications.55 Even where there are deep divisions within law-and-economics scholarship,56 
the disputes about the nature of property relations never question the severability of humans 
from the natural world or the ability of humans to own it. Indeed, these remain the 
fundamental premises of private property as a social and legal tool.  
 
The centrality of human-nature dualism in conceptions of property can be linked directly to 
the historical role of English property law in the politics of both domestic enclosure in Britain 
and the dispossession of Indigenous land throughout the British Empire.57 In his history of 
early Ontario, David Wood describes the “mindless assault on nature” by early settlers and 
the resulting “profound unbalancing of ecological relationships by the Europeanization of the 
New World” that was justified by a vision of “progress” entirely defined by “gainful human 
activities that would increase materialistic productivity.”58 As this project argues, the 
severability of humans from the more-than-human world remains profoundly influential in 
Ontario property relations. Here I examine this both in terms of the way people imagine and 
articulate their relationship to land and how such legal and political claims are asserted and 
treated in land use disputes. British feminist legal scholar Davina Cooper points out the 
subject-object orientation of the ownership model continues to produce and perform 
hierarchical relations of control in contemporary property relations.59 She notes the legal, 
physical and emotional “severability” of the owner from the owned in instrumental property 
relationships where both are replaceable.60 In this way the “propertied subject” is produced61 
in relation to the “object” of property and other ways of constructing human relations with 
place are obscured or invisible. In this project, I examine how this arises in the context of 
                                                         
55 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 2013); Richard Posner, Economic 
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conflicts about how private land can and should be used and explore how the dominant 
ownership model of property continues to presume and enforce the separation of nature and 
culture into two separate and severable spheres. This presumption of a dichotomy between 
nature and culture, whereby people (the owners and users) are detached from places (the 
owned and used) shapes how people understand their relationship with place and the way that 
their relationships with place are interpreted by legal actors. Here, I demonstrate ways in 
which this profoundly shapes not only who participates in land use conflicts, but also how 
they participate, and how they do not. 
II. Land Use, Exclusivity and Alienability 
The ability to appropriate nature as property in the ownership model is linked to specific 
notions of legitimate use, productivity and progress. As historians such as J.M. Neeson and 
E.P. Thompson have demonstrated, land use was defined as “improvement” towards the 
realization and justification of specific political and economic ends, particularly the English 
enclosure of the commons, capitalist industrialization of English society and settlement for 
colonial expansion of the British Empire.62 Wood notes the integral link between conceptions 
of progress and the rhetoric of settlers “confronting and defeating” wilderness in creating the 
new property relations of early Ontario.63 Indeed, he argues, “the image of progress as armed 
opposition to nature” was not only “deeply embedded” in those early settlers, it “still exerts 
considerable influence, despite different conditions and much greater knowledge, in the 
current jobs versus environment debate.”64 Lockean property theory provided a key 
theoretical foundation for the transformation of a wide range of property relations within 
England and then into new settler colonies. Davies argues that Locke’s theory of property is 
“first and foremost a theory of and justification for enclosure.”65 In the context of this project, 
legal historian John McLaren’s observations about the idea of property in Canada 
demonstrates the power of Lockean property in settler colonial contexts: “In the Canadian 
mind, the dominant although not exclusive view has been that land is a commodity designed 
for the succour of and exploitation by individuals or corporations exercising dominium over 
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it.”66 He notes the “selective historical amnesia” demonstrated by those arriving from 
jurisdictions with long histories of common land rights and of resistance by those excluded 
from privatization of common lands.67 
 
For Locke, the appropriation of nature as property was only achieved through such acts of 
transformation, cultivation and industrial use of nonhuman nature for benefit and profit. 
Locke constructs property’s acquisitive potential in a particular and deliberate way. 
According to Davies, “In Locke’s state of nature the world was, to be blunt, up for grabs – as 
long as it was grabbed in the right way.”68 Graham notes that Locke’s labour was explicitly 
distinguished from the types of labour engaged in by commoners prior to enclosure.69 
Labour, as envisioned by Locke, was cultivation, not mobile or seasonal land uses such as 
grazing or harvesting associated with commoners and with Indigenous peoples. In the context 
of Ontario, the “laying of lines on the land” through the survey grid was “a prime example of 
the attempt to impose human control on the little understood non-human matrix.”70 As noted 
above in Section 1, it was also a deliberate effort to impose a new colonial jurisdiction over 
land use and natural resources and erase existing Indigenous laws.71 This “super imposed 
geometry,”72 facilitated by colonial authorities, upheld and reinscribed the efforts of 
individual settlers to transform their land into usable and productive private property once 
they had successfully transformed and recreated it.73 There is significant continuity in this 
emphasis on encouraging productive economic development through the stability and 
security of private property from Locke to Blackstone to Bentham and forward to law-and-
economics theorists such as Richard Posner.74 As will be discussed in Section 3 and 
demonstrated in this project, the link between private property rights and economic growth is 
maintained in contemporary land use law in Ontario. 
 
For Locke, the ability to appropriate property results from the ownership of one’s labour: 
“every man has a Property in his own Person,” and in the “Labour of the body, and the Work 
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of his Hands.”75  As a result of this original ownership, Locke’s man is able to remove 
something from the common and create property to the exclusion of all others.76 Locke, Rose 
observes, “is undoubtedly the most influential of the classical property theorists.”77 However, 
this exclusivity was echoed in that oft-quoted Blackstone passage noted above, where he 
went on to note dominium meant that an owner had a right of “total exclusion of the right of 
any other individual in the universe.”78 While Rose points out that this “trope” fails to reflect 
Blackstone’s in critical ways, in particular the “anxieties” he expresses about existing 
distributional arrangements,79 Blackstone’s dominium and Lockean exclusivity have 
informed the development of an idea of property that remains both legally and culturally 
powerful. In particular, the American discourse on “takings” and an absolutist position on 
property rights associated with the Chicago School and law-and-economics theorists. Thomas 
Merrill goes so far as to argue that the right to exclude is the sine quo non of property – a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of property.80 In addition to the narrow 
view of the state in relation to private property that results from an emphasis on exclusion, 
the Lockean view also relies on a particularly bounded vision of the individual as a “self-
interested rational utility maximizer” severable from broader networks of social relation.81 As 
Rose observes, neoclassical economics adopts this presumption of a self-interested and 
utility-maximizing individual in order to make predictions about society.82 The law-and-
economics movement incorporates this presumption in turning to neoclassic economics to 
explain and predict how laws work, as well as assessing laws against measures of 
efficiency.83 Indeed Merrill and Smith’s critique of the Coasean contractarian bundle of rights 
model and their (re)assertion of the absolutist exclusionary model of in rem property rights is 
expressly linked to the need for minimal state intervention: “If property has no fixed core of 
meaning, but is just a variable collection of interests established by social convention, then 
there is no good reason why the state should not freely expand or, better yet, contract the list 
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of interests in the name of general welfare.”84 As explored in this project, this ideal of the 
individual autonomous property holder severed from social relations and place by the pre-
social and absolute right to exclude has important implications for the kinds of claims that 
can be made, and can be heard, in land use disputes. 
 
Once property is legitimately acquired, Lockean theory continues, it can and should be freely 
transferable. Indeed, the law-and-economics strain of property theory builds on basic 
Lockean property to argue for a minimal state with narrow scope for regulation that restricts 
property rights.85 As Singer points out, this poses particular problems for property in the 
North American context since if the initial transaction is unlikely to have created a 
“legitimate root of title, then the whole system is placed in doubt.”86 Thus, as Singer goes on 
to argue, the neo-Lockean appeal to a chain of rightful historical transfers appeals to a 
“fictitious state of nature” rather than the history of land acquisition in the context of British 
colonial settlement and dispossession of Indigenous lands.87 Not only is the Lockean account 
ahistorical, legal geographer and feminist legal scholar Sarah Keenan argues Lockean 
property is “pre-social,” originating in the labour of the subject rather than culture and law.88 
Those who take up Lockean property today base their opposition to state regulation of private 
property on this argument that private property rights pre-exist the state as natural rights. For 
Richard Epstein, “the end of the state is to protect liberty and property, as these conceptions 
are understood independent of and prior to the formation of the state.”89  State-based law, in 
Epstein’s view, protects these natural rights rather than creates them. For this strand of 
property theory, it follows that when law limits property rights, it constitutes a “taking” of 
that property and must be compensated. While the concept of “takings” has specific and 
particular resonance in the United States as a result of the constitutional protection of 
property rights, there is a “healthy (if somewhat less vocal) property rights lobby” in 
Canada.90 As discussed in Chapter Four, the lack of constitutional protection for property 
rights in Canada results in a distinctive legal landscape in relation to regulatory 
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expropriation.91 However, a study of attitudes to private property by Canadian law professor 
Cherie Metcalf demonstrates that the difference in the public law frameworks in Canada and 
the United States is not reflected in a more favourable attitude to government interference 
with private property in Canada amongst the members of the public. Indeed, the takings 
debate is alive and well in Canadian property scholarship despite relatively little case law.92 
As this project demonstrates, naturalization of property rights also manifests in a presumption 
of the right to develop privately owned land on the part of both proponents and decision 
makers in Ontario’s land use planning framework. 
 
The right to use land for the benefit of the owner despite locally developed property relations 
and physical capacity is so integral to Locke’s model of property that it is protected even 
when a particular use may harm the land in ways that fundamentally transform or destroy it. 
While Locke does recognize “limits” on appropriation, his concern is for uncultivated land, 
which he characterizes as wasted or spoiled. He allows for accumulation and surplus value by 
conceiving of the alienation of property as productive and legitimate “use.” This, in turn, 
leads to his justification of the money economy, through which people can exchange for the 
“truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life,”93 and which provides the incentive for growth 
and development beyond provision for one’s personal needs. This system of accumulation, 
characterized by Locke as consent-based, allows for the unequal distribution of property 
without offending his sense of limitation on individual use of property. Canadian feminist 
legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky argues that this model of property constructs persons as either 
owners or non-owners not only resulting in systemic inequality, but also in fact requiring it.94 
Indeed, the reliance of contemporary Lockean theorists on the free-market to deal with any 
distributional issues maintains and deepens this acceptance of inequality.95 
 
Further, the Lockean idea of waste is not extended to land whose limits are exceeded by 
overuse through industrial agriculture or mining, as these are understood as productive forms 
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of use, producing collective benefits, regardless of the material consequences. In early 
Ontario, Wood argues the “ecological imperialism” of colonial settlement not only tolerated, 
but celebrated the re-recreation of the land from a complex forested landscape to one in 
which over 90% of the mature woodland was lost and replaced by “a more controlled, 
regimented scene of superimposed geometry that reached its zenith in the gridironed towns 
and cities.”96 John Stuart Mill’s 19th century utilitarian theory of property similarly relies on 
cultivation as the source of land’s value: “In many cases, even when cleared, its 
productiveness is wholly the effect of labour and art.”97 The value of nature is conceived of in 
purely instrumental terms, albeit utility not individual profit.98 Obligations to cultivate and 
improve land are framed as moral duties to act in accordance with the public good and state 
priorities for Mill, not to understand and develop land use in accordance with the capacities 
and limits of the land itself.99 This project examines how this emphasis on use value and a 
conception of waste that requires development rather than sustainability endures as a core 
element of Ontario’s land use planning framework. 
 
In light of distributional and environmental concerns, property scholars from a variety of 
perspectives have drawn attention to and debate the meaning of Locke’s provisos, 
particularly that the acquisition of private property is justified only where there is “enough 
and as good” left for others in the commons.100 While a complete survey of the extensive 
literature is beyond the scope of this project, examples include Singer who has argued that the 
proviso requires a democratization of property rights to provide for equal opportunity,101 and, 
Canadian environmental philosopher Peter Brown who finds the basis for sustainability and 
transformative ecological economics in the provisos.102 These are important debates with 
genuine potential to reorient the way Locke’s property upholds particular arrangements and 
distributions of property rights. However, in the context of this project, it is the dominant 
interpretation rather than debates about potential to repurpose Lockean property for 
                                                         
96 Wood, supra note 58 at 158. 
97 John Stuart Mill, “Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy”, 
CB Macpherson, ed,, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 
at 94. 
98 Graham, supra note 7 at 141. 
99 Mill, supra note 97 at 98. 
100 Locke, supra note 43 at 27. 
101 Singer, supra note 86 at 775. 
102 Peter G Brown, The Commonwealth of Life: New Environmental Economics: a Treatise on Stewardship 
(Montreal, Black Rose Books, 2008). 
 
 35 
transformative purposes that inform the decisions being made in Ontario’s land use law 
framework. In particular, law-and-economics scholars have dismissed the proviso103 or 
limited it to the avoidance of harm, thus avoiding any more radical implications.104   
 
The result of the emphasis on relations of use, alienation and exclusivity in the theory 
underpinning property law, legal scholar Craig Arnold argues, is the promotion of “alienation 
of people from the object of their rights and the environments in which those rights arise, 
including alienation from self, others, work, faith, and nature.105 In the contemporary context 
of Ontario’s planning and resource management regime, particular forms of land use linked 
with economic development continue to be prioritized in land use decision-making.106 As 
discussed below in Section C, the emphasis on use as development for economic gain and the 
justification for private property were central to the ideology of Canadian planning in the 
early 20th century. This project demonstrates that it persists in provincial land use policy and 
informs the hierarchical ordering of uses. The notion that certain types of use-based 
relationships to land are productive or progressive, particularly those linked to contemporary 
industrial capitalist development, continues to maintain and enforce the hierarchical ordering 
of person-place relations in Ontario; and, therefore, remains relevant to the kinds of claims 
about place parties articulate in land use disputes and to the way such claims are treated by 
decision makers. 
 
As explored in this research, the overlapping claims in land use disputes are complex and 
sometimes contradictory. Nonetheless, legal tools and process shape the way parties frame 
their claims, for example emphasizing instrumental relationships and economically 
productive activity rather than ancestral connections to, or stewardship responsibilities for, 
the land. In this way people-place relations are transformed from complex eco-social 
relationships into abstract entitlements recognizable by law.  
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III. Dephysicalisation 
Graham points to “dephysicalisation” as a critical conceptual development in Anglo-
American property law and a fundamental part of the paradigm of people-place relations in 
Anglocentric culture.107 Dephysicalisation, according to Graham, is “the removal of the 
physical ‘thing’ from the property relation and its replacement with an abstract ‘right.’108 
While it is generally associated with Wesley Hohfeld’s 1913 and 1917 writings on 
property,109 Graham traces the conceptual roots of dephysicalized property to Locke’s 
connection between the right to property and the improvement of land.110 Laws derived from 
this model of severable relations between people and places make certain kinds of land use 
possible, she argues, as places are valued only for their productive capacity. Land is no longer 
understood as part of a particular place with spatial or temporal limits and embedded in 
specific networks of connection and relation between humans and the nonhuman 
environment. 111  
 
Jeremy Bentham’s idea of property goes beyond the Lockean subordination of nature 
outlined above by removing the physicality of place from view entirely and assuming the 
instrumental value of nature. Law, Bentham argued, not nature, has the capacity to create “a 
fixed and durable possession which merits the name property.”112 This, Graham argues, 
marks the emergence of dephysicalized property in the Anglo-American legal tradition. 
Property was now a person-person relationship and not a people-place relationship.113 This is 
a critical development, Graham argues, as it results in a transformation of “the locus of social 
wealth from land, to law or legal right.”114 Bentham begins his discussion of property with 
the pronouncement that “there is no such thing as natural property, and … it is entirely the 
work of law”115 and famously continues, “Property and law are born together, and die 
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property 
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ceases.”116 As Graham notes, Bentham’s theory assumes the instrumental value of nature, 
“removing place from the equation altogether.”117 In his words, property “is not material, it is 
metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind.”118 The positivist conception of property 
reduces property to interpersonal relations mediated by positive law – in other words, neither 
places nor people-place relations are relevant to legal property any longer. 
 
American legal scholar, Kenneth J. Vandevelde uses the term “dephysicalized” to describe 
the conceptual shift in the idea and practice of property from Blackstone to Wesley Hohfeld 
in the late 19th century.119 Hohfeld proposed a “conceptual scheme” that became the 
dominant view of property in the 20th century. Conceiving of property as purely a set of legal 
relations between persons Hohfeld, according to Vandevelde, “banished the need for things 
from property law.”120 His property relations were a complex arrangement of rights, 
privileges, powers and immunities that were neither fixed nor absolute and could be 
disassembled into “constituent parts.”121 Through this dephysicalisation, Vandevelde argues, 
property became “the right to value rather than some thing.”122 
 
For Vandevelde, Hohfeld’s conceptual scheme meant that property lost its’ meaning as a 
legal category. As definitional boundaries about whether something was or was not property 
were no longer fixed and absolute protections were no longer tenable, the content of property 
as a legal category became purely political.123 In Vandevelde’s view, Hohfeld’s model 
resulted in judicial determinations of what counts as property purely based on public policy 
interests and opinions – there was no longer any logic or inevitability to what made property 
property. Therefore, since “property was what the law said it was,” for Vandevelde the 
resulting relations in a particular case were entirely determined by politics rather than a fixed 
legal category.124  This, he argues, fundamentally undermines the rule of law.125 Merrill and 
Smith similarly argue that the move from conceiving of property as fixed in rem to a bundle 
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of in personam rights has led to an orthodox “conception of property as an infinitely variable 
collection of rights, powers, and duties” in contemporary property theory.126 The 
consequence, in their view, is a shift from the “tried and true method of handling potential 
conflicts over resources” through the clarity and “limiting effect” of the absolute right to 
exclude towards the discretionary and variable contractual “list of uses” model that inevitably 
requires public regulation to resolve conflicts.127  However, modern property law did not 
suddenly become political, nor was there a pre-existing logical legal category of property that 
upheld the rule of law.128 Rather, property law has developed as a particular way of 
conceiving of, and producing, human relations with land, places and the more-than-human 
world, which is, and was, always a political project. Following from Graham’s argument 
outlined above, decisions about what property is, and whose relations are recognized by law, 
can be traced much further than Vandevelde suggests, justifying the political and legal 
arguments for both domestic enclosures in England and colonial dispossession of Indigenous 
lands. Indeed, the “tried and true” method of resolving conflicts was a method of upholding 
dominant property relations not a natural or pre-political distributional arrangement. 
 
Graham points to the importance of an absence of materiality in dephysicalized property, 
however, Vandevelde is entirely concerned with the loss of the conceptual fixidity and 
predictability of the category of property in the law. For him, Graham argues, it is a 
metaphysical loss connected to an ideal of government, society and the role of law.129 
Accepting Graham’s argument about the conceptual development of dephysicalisation and 
the anthropocentrism of his critique, Vandevelde’s insights about the political nature of legal 
determinations of contemporary property relations, and the role of economic interests, remain 
important to my project. What counts as property in a particular dispute, and the reasons 
particular relationships are deemed legitimate as a result, are often taken for granted in land 
use law. 
 
Vandevelde illustrates his concern by pointing to a series of American cases regarding 
trademarks, trade secrets, and oil and gas rights in which courts created limited property 
rights. In the oil and gas cases, the courts struggled to match the abstract property interests of 
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competing claimants to the nature of the owned thing, which defied ownership boundaries by 
its very nature, resulting in increasingly illogical legal outcomes.130 The struggle to apply 
property concepts to oil and gas resulted in a strange relationship between landowners 
whereby one owner could gain an absolute form of ownership over the minerals in their 
possession, but “[a]ny superadjacent landowner was legally entitled to take as much oil and 
gas as he could get by any available means.”131 As this initially lead to a race between 
potential owners to extract and exhaust the resource, courts introduced a circumstantial 
reasonableness test to be applied on a case-by-case basis. In Vandevelde’s view this 
represents a key shift away from legal categories that facilitate the logical deduction of rights 
as between parties and towards policy-based decision-making.132 
 
 In the context of land use disputes it is important to examine the embedded assumptions, and 
the complex connections and relations that are left out, both in the way parties frame legal 
claims and in the treatment of those claims. The social and environmental critiques discussed 
in the next section provide a number of useful ways to undertake this work. For example, 
Davina Cooper exposes work performed by property practices that attempt to transform 
complex sets of relationships into simplified or bounded representations, with clear and fixed 
boundaries of relation that entitle particular relations while obscuring or rejecting others.133 
However, she also exposes the potential to code, define and recognize different and 
overlapping property relations – to attend to an expanded and complex understanding of 
property as constitutive relations of “belonging” beyond formal law and rights.134 Whereas 
Cooper brings the social relationship of the individual and the collective into view in the 
production of property, Graham’s critique adds the possibility of seeing and exposing the 
material, and more-than-human, dimensions of arranging property relations in disputes about 
particular places.135 From this view, Vandevelde’s oil and gas disputes are not only about the 
economic interests and the maintenance of social order through arranging extraction rights.  
Nor can they be fully understood by conceiving of interests as contingent on or responsible to 
those of others or the community.136 They are also about seeing the physical, geologically and 
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hydrologically embedded, ecological phenomenon (here oil and gas) as not only at stake, but 
as having a stake in the transformation from relating in-place to use as severable and 
differentiated resources in zones of extractive use.  
 
C. Property Critiques 
 
A multitude of valuable and diverse critiques of the historical development and contemporary 
application of property in legal theory and practice exist within legal scholarship137 and other 
disciplines.138 For the purposes of my project, I am specifically concerned with three types of 
property critiques that are relevant to understanding people-place relationships in Ontario and 
the way decisions about land and the environment are made: i) Social critiques that point to 
the social context of the ownership model and challenge the assumptions and political 
implications of dominant property narratives; ii) Environmental critiques that point to the 
physical and material consequences of the ownership model; and, iii) Critiques based on 
alternative articulations and practices of property that demonstrate both the possibility and the 
continued existence of alternative relationships with places and the environment. In my view, 
there has been insufficient scholarly effort to bring these three together to develop a hybrid 
eco-social critique of property that attends to both the theoretical concerns raised by property 
theorists and the existing practices of alternative properties highlighted in the commons 
literature. One of my aims is to contribute to this ambitious project by considering people-
place relations and land use disputes in the context of all three. 
I. Social Critiques  
The ownership property model has been critiqued by a number of scholars concerned with its 
cultural and political consequences. While these critiques often point to conceptual problems 
or inconsistencies in dominant property narratives, their focus is on the way property 
influences, and is influenced by, social relations. 
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Jennifer Nedelsky has long advocated a rethinking of rights, and of property rights in 
particular, from a relational perspective. 139 Cooper and fellow feminist legal theorist Sarah 
Keenan have built on Nedelsky’s relational reorientation of property. Cooper 
reconceptualises property as belonging, replacing the centrality of control with a constitutive 
relationship of part and whole.140 Keenan adopts Cooper’s notion of belonging, but 
spatializes property by defining it as a “relationship of belonging held up by the surrounding 
space.”141 Legal theorist Joseph Singer’s Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property also builds 
on Nedelsky’s relational critique to develop a model of property premised on the importance 
of obligations and human relationships rather than presumptive exclusion.142 Gregory 
Alexander, one of the American ‘progressive property’ scholars, argues that attention to the 
communitarian social obligations of private property can in fact foster human flourishing.143 
Alexander, Singer and fellow American scholars Eduardo Penalver and Laura Underkuffler’s 
“Statement of Progressive Property” rejects the dominant model and argues for a new model 
of property that serves a diverse range of values and social relations.144 Like Nedelsky, the 
Progressive Property scholars also reject the atomism and individualistic model of the self 
carried forward from Locke to Bentham and the Chicago School property model. These 
broadly communitarian approaches inform my work by situating property as enmeshed in a 
much more complex, dynamic, and contested set of people-place relations. Radin breaks 
property into that which is essential to personhood, and therefore protected and inalienable, 
and that which is commodifiable and exchangeable.145 Critical race theorist and legal scholar 
Cheryl Harris has interrogated constructions of the self-possessed person as property holder, 
pointing to whiteness as a form of property both historically and in contemporary United 
States politics.146 Legal scholar James Penner’s The Idea of Property in Law attempts to 
reconstitute property as “the right to a thing” focusing on the interest in use protected by the 
right to exclusion as the essence of the property relation.147 
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In general these “socially grounded criticisms”148 maintain and enforce a dephysicalized 
conception of property. The nature-culture divide is presumed, as is the objectification of 
‘things’ and the severability of people and place.149 The material consequences of using land 
as property are rarely directly considered. Therefore, while they point to the critical need to 
rethink the complexity of person-person relations involved in land use disputes, these authors 
offer limited insight into place-based claims and human-more-than-human relations. As 
Penner suggests, “[F]or most philosophers the actual objects of property are uninteresting, 
and the real meat of the question about property is how we can justify unequal holdings.”150 
While Penner contends that his model returns the ‘thing’ to property, it is only to serve as the 
foundation for a better understanding of relations between persons. He explicitly rejects the 
notion of reciprocity with or duties towards the things that are properly deemed property: 
“The individual is not on par with the thing… control is absolute in the sense that a person’s 
influence over the thing is unbounded in principle. He may destroy, modify, or leave the 
thing, to the extent that this is actually possible.”151 Things, including land, have no agency or 
rights in property relations: “A thing has nothing to say about the relationships it has.”152 
Perhaps the most revealing of Penner’s anthropocentrism is his incredulity at the idea of an 
“unbreakable relation to a thing [that] would condemn the owner to having to deal with it.”153 
This limits the potential for non-ownership relationships to land to be articulated and 
recognized. In particular, there is no conceptual space in Penner’s model for non-instrumental 
relations linked to ancestral or cultural relationships or concerns about the capacity and limits 
of the land itself. Indeed, Penner explicitly excludes the possibility for a range of such 
potential interests and relations to be considered. As David Lametti notes, Penner “does not 
take the idea of thingness far enough.”154 Thus while Penner attends to the “thingness” of 
property, he does so primarily to argue for the importance of exclusion and the maintenance 
of the autonomous bounded self through this exclusion of others from one’s property. For the 
purposes of this research, this failure to provide for a much broader range of relations, and to 
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explicitly exclude relations with place, limits the potential of Penner’s attention to materiality 
and things in property relations. 
 
Canadian scholar David Lametti aims to bring objects “back into the property picture.”155 He 
proposes the metaphor of “a relationship between or among individuals through objects of 
social wealth” to better reflect the dual relationality of property – to persons and through 
things.156 He points to property as involving both control and exclusion and obligation and 
responsibility, including duties to the object itself.157 In this sense, Lametti allows for the 
thing itself to influence, or “condition” the property relation.158 Lametti points to the 
importance of focusing on non-ownership or lesser entitlements, as well as correlative duties 
of property holding, in order to develop a more socially accurate and functional idea of 
property and including stewardship or conservation relationships.159 Indeed, he notes the 
conceptual baggage that the term ownership carries, which, he argues, obscures the 
complexity of property relations as “contextual, flexible, fragmented and non-
hierarchical.”160 
 
As relational approaches, Lametti’s critique and Nedelsky’s relational rights model both have 
particular potential to bridge the divide between environmental and social critiques of 
property in the context of land use disputes. Nedelsky’s critique of the property-inspired 
language of boundaries embedded in contemporary notions of ‘rights’ points to the need to 
rethink what property is: “We need to take our traditional concepts like property, and ask 
what patterns of relationship among people and the material world we want, what patterns 
seem true to both integrity and integration.”161 In focusing on relationships, she is referring 
not only to personal relationships, but also to the interconnected “structural and institutional 
relationships” structured by law and rights. This structuring is the work that law and rights 
actually do, she argues, and therefore, it should be exposed and placed at the center of our 
analysis.162 Like Graham’s places, relationships are central to our material existence, yet are 
                                                         
155 Ibid at 326. 
156 Ibid at 325. 
157 Ibid at 326. 
158 Ibid at 354. 
159 Ibid at 333, 336. 
160 Ibid at 363. 
161 Nedelsky, supra note 139 at 117. 
162 Ibid at 65. 
 
 44 
obscured by the legal discourse of the autonomous and bounded individual. “A relational 
analysis.” Nedelsky argues, “provides a better framework for identifying what is really at 
stake in difficult cases and for making judgments about the competing interpretations of 
rights involved.”163 This project adopts this reorientation to attend to relationships and 
relational claims in order to understand what is at stake for those involved in land use 
disputes. While Nedelsky expressly maintains the dephysicalized construction of property as 
primarily about relationships between people, she points to the need for further development 
of her relational analysis to encompass the relationships between humans and nonhumans.164 
Nedelsky’s reconceptualization of autonomy - from requiring independence from the 
collective to being enabled by constructive relationships - opens up conceptual space for 
place as more than commodity.165 Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place 
relationship in property relations is a starting point for the future project of using the 
relational approach to articulate the responsibility of humans to the more-than-human 
world.166 This research builds on both to argue for a reorientation of property from exclusion 
and severability towards relational reciprocity in people-place relations.  
 
 Nedelsky proposes a four-step approach to resolving a particular dispute.167 Her approach is 
based on her distinction between values and rights. Values, she argues, are the big abstract 
articulations of what a society sees as essential to humanity. Rights are specific “institutional 
and rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing such values.”168 Rights, in 
Nedelsky’s model, are not rigid and universal or timeless. Rather, they are contextual, 
negotiated and evolve around the kinds of relationships we need to pursue our values. 
Presented with a specific dispute, the inquiry begins by examining how the legal structuring 
of the relevant relations is related to the conflict. Having identified the underlying context, 
the question becomes, “What values are at stake?” Once the values are articulated, the inquiry 
shifts to the kinds of relationships that would foster those values. Finally, with these 
relationships in mind, the question becomes, “How would different types of rights structure 
relations differently in the relevant context?”169 This approach to dealing with conflicts has 
the potential to radically alter the way that a particular land use dispute may play out, 
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particularly when relations between humans and the more-than-human world are explicitly 
recognized as part of both the problem and the resolution. 
 
In my view, Nedelsky’s work offers particular conceptual openness to ecological critiques of 
property. The eco-relational methodological approach outlined in Chapter Three and applied 
in Chapters Five through Eight adapts her relational rights framework in light of ecological 
property critiques. Nedelsky’s concrete framework for dispute resolution is adapted and 
strengthened by the insights from Graham and others who emphasize human-nonhuman 
relationality and mutual dependence and responsibility. Both Nedelsky’s relational approach 
and Graham’s environmental critique seek to “open space” to reorient legal discourse towards 
already existing relationships and the work they do. Both point to the current inadequacy of 
property law to recognize relationships fundamental to the material conditions of life as the 
source of dysfunction in the law, resulting in its failure to effectively respond to ongoing and 
emergent social and environmental crises and conflicts. And, while both engage at length 
with the theoretical aspects of this potential reorientation, they are also deeply concerned with 
the practical outcomes of this present dysfunction. In particular, abstract rights limit the 
ability of interested parties to meaningfully express their claims and connect their experiences 
to the formal decision-making process. As Graham observes in the context of land use 
conflicts, “courts swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into disputes 
over abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss associated 
with transformation of the nonhuman environment become “dissident voices.”170  
II. Environmental Critiques 
Graham argues, “[P]roperty law is an ideology and practice of a relationship between people 
and place.”171 In the Hohfeldian concept of property discussed above, property relations are 
categorized through ownership and non-ownership. Ownership, he argued, comes with a set 
of rights, privileges, powers and immunities. As Arnold notes, duties, responsibilities, and 
obligations are largely absent from this concept of ownership.172 Non-ownership, in the 
Hohfeldian sense, comes with a set of relations that do not include rights, but do include 
duties, disabilities, and liabilities with respect to an owner.173 As Vandevelde and Graham 
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both point out, Hohfeld’s property relations are conceived of as entirely between persons. 
The consequence of a dominant person-person model, according to Graham, is that people-
place relationships are deemed insignificant in both law and culture.174 This 
decontextualization of property, Arnold argues, results in the failure to give “meaningful 
consideration to the ecological characteristics of particular lands or waters in which rights are 
claimed.”175 This project examines the effects of this conception of ownership on land use 
law and people-place relations in Ontario. 
 
In the US context, environmental law scholar Jeffery Sax argues in Environmental Law Forty 
Years Later: Looking Back and Looking Ahead that Anglo-American property’s function as a 
structural legal category is to create an “incentive system” for environmental degradation 
through the promotion of transformative uses of physical earth systems and resources.176 In 
his view, fundamental change to our relationship with the environment requires attention to 
this structural element of the legal system and integration of environmental values into basic 
legal structures rather than layering-on increasingly complex environmental regulatory 
regimes to existing legal categories. Without such structural change, he argues, 
environmental law has little effect against the “unrelenting autonomic momentum of the 
property system and the rewards it promotes and encourages.”177 In the context of Ontario, 
Wood concludes, “[T]he battle mentality of the early days has become deeply ingrained, a 
cultural construct expressed in the values of our society; indeed, the natural environment 
remains something to be overcome in favour of development”.178 
 
Sax points to several specific concerns with the current dominant model of property. 
Individualistic concepts of ownership, he argues, equate the market-driven interests of 
property holders with the public interest leading to an “absolutist” conception of rights to use 
and exclusion.179 Indeed the “jus abutendi” right of abuse, he argues, means that an owner 
can destroy land and resources without consideration of the consequences for society. While 
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specific regulatory tools may be layered onto the basic ownership relationship to prohibit 
specific activities, there is a presumptive right to use one’s land as one wishes.180 Indeed, as 
Sax argues and as will be discussed below in Section iii, such regulatory limitations on 
ownership are increasingly interpreted as expropriation, takings in the US context, and 
subject to compensatory orders for the potential profit value of private property regardless of 
the public legislative purpose, the demonstrated social or ecological values protected, or even 
the actual private use of the land.181 As noted above, the lack of constitutional protection for 
private property rights in Canada has resulted in limited judicial uptake of American case law 
on regulatory takings and high standard for constructive takings in Canadian law182 as set out 
by the Supreme Court in CPR v City of Vancouver.183 Nonetheless, Canadian legal historian 
Douglas Harris points out that property rights are protected by statutory regimes at the 
provincial level that require market value compensation for expropriation.184 Further, as 
noted by Valiante and Smit, Canada has a “healthy” property rights movement185 supported 
by Metcalf’s study that demonstrates strong cultural resistance to state interference with 
private land.186 Sax also laments the lack of judicial imagination to conceive of “legally 
recognizable interests” in nature beyond its instrumental use value or the potential for 
“concrete injury.”187 Without the conceptual space to conceive of and protect broader 
relational interests in, for example, biodiversity conservation, Sax argues that the legal 
system functions to deny “the very possibility of environmental law.”188 As argued in this 
project, Ontario’s land use law similarly lacks conceptual space for more-than-human 
interests and people-place relations, which has important implications for the transformative 
potential of land use planning and environmental law.     
 
Also in the US context, environmental law scholar Eric Freyfogle points to a place-based 
reinterpretation of private property as both a legal and cultural institution. He highlights the 
particular potency of the dominant construction of property in relation to the power to 
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control, transform and even destroy nature.189 Linking its dominance to both the Lockean pre-
social view of property’s origins and to the individualistic construction of rights, Freyfogle 
problematizes the pervasive role of private property in American environmental 
governance.190 Based on the history of land use in Illinois, he presents a counter-narrative of 
common use of rural land combined with strong prohibitions on harmful land use to balance 
out presumptions about the centrality of exclusivity and private property to American 
identity.191 Freyfogle notes the particular strength of this property paradigm in rural areas,192 
pointing to both the historically urban focus of movements for land-use control and to the 
failure of environmental movements to “put forth an alternative vision of private ownership” 
characterized by responsibility and grounded in ecological place.193 Wood’s exploration of 
“ecological imperialism” in the colonial settlement of Upper Canada situates similar 
dynamics in Ontario,194 as do McLaren’s observations about the primacy of private property 
in the Canadian colonial settlement mentality.195  
 
Sax and Freyfogle develop alternative approaches to property rights by reorienting existing 
American legal concepts. Sax aims to demonstrate the possible elements of an 
“environmentally functional” property regime.196 Property ownership relations, he argues, 
must include inducements for the maintenance and restoration of land and water, in particular 
the “natural services” provided for human and nonhuman communities.197 Sax points to the 
decision in a 1972 riparian zoning case, Just v. Marinette County,198 to demonstrate that it is 
possible to define private property rights in relation to “the land in its natural condition” and 
to view ecological benefits as meaningful public rights.199 
  
Freyfogle proposes a practical approach to revising ownership based on familiar legal 
concepts in the US legal system, the “do-no-harm-principle” already embedded in the 
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common law of nuisance and the public ownership and trusteeship in water and wild 
animals.200 Extending the notion of harm to the land itself, as well as future generations, he 
argues, would limit the power of owners to transform and degrade land, as well as call 
attention to issues of capacity and scale in determining appropriate land use.201 This notion of 
“carrying-capacity-harms,” in his view, “could provide a strong counterpoint to the prevailing 
tendency to define private rights abstractly, as if land parcels were identical.”202 Similarly, he 
argues that focusing on the public interest in, and responsibility for, common resources such 
as water and wildlife shifts scale of appropriate decision-making from the individual owner to 
“collective governance at the landscape scale.” 203 This project explores the potential to 
reorient ownership and property in the Canadian context, specifically in Ontario’s land use 
planning framework. Sax and Freyfogle demonstrate the existing concepts can be a source of 
transformative potential and this project argues we should expose and engage with such 
strategic openings in land use law. 
 
Canadian Peter Brown adopts a “commonwealth of life” perspective to shift from the ‘natural 
resources’ framework in which ecosystems, and their constituent parts, are understood to 
exist for the use and benefit of humans towards a worldview that understands the mutual 
dependency of nonhuman species on natural systems. 204 From this perspective, human use, 
such as extraction, “must be supported by reasons” that attend to both human and nonhuman 
well-being.205 This perspective, he argues, shifts the basis on which decisions about how land 
can and should be used from economic return to the realization and maintenance of “resilient 
flourishing of life and the maintenance of capacity for self-renewal.”206 
 
Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place relationship in property relations offers 
another starting point for the future project of using the relational approach to articulate the 
responsibility of humans to the nonhuman world.207 Graham aims to (re)centre the notion of 
relationship - in her case, the people-place relationship that property law has erased and 
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excluded. In doing so, Graham rejects the dualism of either anthropocentric or ecocentric 
analyses of environmental crises:  
The concepts of network and interconnection open a space for the notion of 
inalienable relationships between people and place. The idea that relationships 
are interdependent and multilinear works against the idea that relationships are 
oppositional within the dichotomous nature/culture paradigm of 
anthropocentrism.208 
 
In fact, she notes, the etymological origins of the word “property” invoke a “mutually 
formative” relationship between property and identity.209 In the original sense, property was 
all about the interconnections between people and things, with land in particular being central 
to the formation of identity for individuals and communities.210 Graham and others have 
noted echoes of this in the way that lay persons and communities assert interests based on 
generational or other forms of connection with a particular place.211 This research examines 
such assertions in the context of aggregate mineral extraction disputes and considers whether 
and how such articulations are made, but also how they are received and considered by 
decision makers. The more-than-owners people-place relations examined here demonstrate 
the complex and even conflicting relations that exist between people and particular places, 
neither purely ecocentric or simply anthropocentric. 
 
Arnold’s conception of property as a “web of interests,” which he defines as, “a set of 
interconnections among persons, groups and entities each with some stake in an identifiable 
(whether tangible or intangible) object at the centre of the web,” brings together a number of 
elements of the critiques describe above in this section.”212 This approach compliments 
Graham’s re-centering of relationship and emphasis on the centrality of people-place 
relations. By simultaneously attending to the particular object of the interest in property, he 
argues, and to the multiple relationships between the property-holder and the object and the 
property-holder and other interest-holders, the web of interests serves as an integrative model 
of property. In his view, by opening up space for consideration of the characteristics of the 
object of property and its connectedness with a broader ecological, social, and geographic 
and temporal context, this model is preferable to the “legally centrist isolated abstraction” of 
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traditional models of property.213  Further, Arnold includes duties, responsibilities and 
relationships alongside rights, building in the space for relations such as Graham’s reciprocity 
with place.214 In my view, Arnold’s model provides conceptual space for articulation, 
assertion and consideration of the multiple, overlapping and diverse forms of people-place 
relation that emerge in the context of land use disputes.  
III. Alternative Models 
Citing “stewardship” as an emergent concept, Davies notes a shift from property law as the 
realm of fixed, presumptively exclusive individual rights, to more discretionary rights, which 
she describes as “more fragile, contextual, and limited use.”215 She argues that the 
strengthening of environmental and planning law, including the incorporation of stewardship 
concepts in jurisdictions like Australia, is evidence of law’s opening to these alternative 
visions of property.216 Cooper suggests five intersecting property dimensions of property 
practices that can help us uncover the production and performance of property; “belonging”, 
“codification,” “definition,” “recognition,” and “power.”217  Belonging, for Cooper, extends 
beyond the hierarchical and instrumental subject-object relation normally associated with 
property to include “constitutive” relations of connection between a part and whole.218 
Codification is the coding of a particular thing that “locates relations to a thing within wider 
regulatory and epistemic structures” such that it represents “a far more complex set of 
relationships.”219 While Cooper notes this includes instrumental coding of a thing as a 
severable commodity, a more relational coding of a thing as representative of the whole to 
which others belong is possible, or both may coexist and overlap. Definition, Cooper argues, 
includes attempts to fix boundaries around things and relationships to them but also a process 
of “familiarization” in which the thing is brought into focus.220 Recognition is the process of 
bestowing authoritative “recognition and entitlement upon particular relations of belonging 
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while ignoring, discounting or rejecting others,” which may flow from formal institutional 
sources or informal ones.221 Power, she argues, is whether the particular coding of property 
has the capacity to “make a difference”, both in relation to collective and individual interests 
in the thing itself but also “in promoting personal, civic and boundary norms.”222 Cooper, 
therefore, not only provides tools to examine how the dominant model of property is 
produced and sustained, she helps us to see new possibilities to produce and perform 
alternative property relations.  
 
While the emergence of ‘new’ models of property and forms of organizing property regimes 
is important, and several promising examples have been outlined above from both social and 
ecological perspectives, it is important to acknowledge the presence of existing alternatives 
and their predecessors. While the importance of understanding, recognizing and respecting 
Indigenous laws and land use jurisdiction was noted above in subsection 1.A, and engages a 
range of constitutional and social justice related concerns about Indigenous self-
determination, it is also important not to essentialize or racialize notions of ‘sustainability’ or 
perpetuate stereotypical associations of Indigenous People with nature that continue to be 
used to justify racist colonial policies both legally and culturally in Canada and elsewhere.223 
One way to guard against this is to consider a range of land use systems that depart from the 
ownership model of property across a range of geographical and cultural contexts. Indeed, 
from a historical perspective, it is essential to recall that the Lockean model influenced both 
colonial dispossession of Indigenous land and the domestic enclosure of common land in 
England for private gain of land-holders and the introduction of industrial agriculture. In 17th 
century England, the result was the displacement of complex and longstanding land use 
governance frameworks developed to both share and sustain land and natural resources.224 
Further, contemporary scholarship on “the commons,” most notably economist Elinor 
Ostrom’s Noble Prize winning work in Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action,225 unequivocally demonstrates a broad range of existing 
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and enduring approaches to defining and practicing property beyond the twin-poles of 
command-and-control state-based regulation versus private property regimes.226 Indeed, as 
commons scholars Frank van Laerhoven and Erling Berg argue, the focus of this research has 
shifted from proving that Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons was wrong, to 
demonstrating the conditions under which communities can establish and maintain systems to 
govern common pool resources on their own.227 
 
Rose argues that cultural and political recognition of alternative property relations has the 
potential to change our definition of property and property practices. In her view, the 
ownership model of property has so influenced cultural understandings of what property is 
and what it does, other forms of property such as common pool resources, or what she calls 
limited common property regimes, “do not look like property at all to us, and we have tended 
to ignore them.”228 Further, she argues, such claims are often made by persons or groups 
“somehow deemed inappropriate to make claims of entitlement.”229 The result, Rose argues, 
is that certain types of claims are recognized and others are not, with potentially violent and 
unequal material effects.230 
  
While my project does not study common pool resources, this literature is important as both a 
base of sound empirical research about the potential for property and ownership relations to 
be conceptualized and practised outside of the ownership model, particularly in connection 
with place-based and experiential knowledge. The work of Ostrom and other commons 
scholars does the very important work of viewing people-place relations in practice and 
questioning the currency and accuracy of the state versus private control dichotomy in 
environmental and land use theory practice. As Rose argues, this can have important 
implications for opening space for a wider range of claims to land and resources. At the same 
time, my work exposes the problems of conceiving of land use disputes as a particular 
‘resource,’ rather than about ‘places’ which comprise complex interconnections of ecological 
and social networks. If considered in isolation from their relationships with hydrological 
systems, soil, farmers, forests, animals, plants, hikers, and other human and nonhuman actors, 
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aggregate minerals as a non-renewable subsurface resources may be seen as ideally managed 
through a private property regime. However, the multiple and overlapping claims to the 
places in which they are situated point to the need for a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of what is being ‘managed,’ and for whom. 
Legal Geography 
Legal geography encompasses a range of interdisciplinary scholarship in which space is the 
organizing principle. Melinda Harm Benson points to the early formation of two separate 
trajectories of legal geography research, applied legal geography and critical legal 
geography.231 Below I focus on the theoretically oriented critical legal geography stream as 
an explicitly critical body of scholarship that provides important insights into the production 
of law and space.232 
  
According to Benson, the starting point for the theoretical stream of legal geography 
scholarship was the emergence of an interest in the relationship between law, space and the 
state amongst geographers.233 The work of critical scholars including Henri Lefebvre234 and 
Edward Soja235 pointed to the socially constructed nature of space and the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the spatial, the social and the temporal. Legal geography 
builds on these key ideas to explore the ways in which space and law are produced through 
social relations.236 Irus Braverman et al. describe the focus of legal geography as 
“interconnections between law and spatiality, and especially their reciprocal construction.”237 
Sarah Keenan notes that legal geography exposes the political nature of space by examining 
spatial connectivity with the legal and social.238 What is critical for legal geography is that 
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law and space are not simply brought together; they are understood as “enmeshed” and 
mutually constitutive.239 Or, as Keenan notes, “[A]ll of this shows that law operates through 
rather than upon space.”240 
 
Nicholas Blomley et al. identify the significance of this convergence of legal and 
geographical perspectives as the potential to open up the concepts of ‘space’ and ‘law’ and 
‘society’ to new questions and inquiries.241 Sarah Blandy and David Sibley describe the dual 
focus of traditional legal geography research as, “a concern with legal actions in public space, 
and, the ways in which concepts of property and jurisdiction shape material landscapes 
through legal meaning.”242 Legal geography has been the subject of ongoing internal debate 
about its limitations, potential and future possibilities. As David Delaney notes, “there is an 
increasing sense that this project has gotten stuck in its bridging phase and that inherited 
conceptual dualisms are impeding further progress.”243 He points to the persistence of 
conceptions of law as the immaterial realm of language and meaning, and space as the 
inactive material setting that “contains” what law produces.244 However, as Delaney has more 
recently argued, the emerging role of legal geography is “to investigate the contingencies and 
constraints of spatial justice.”245 
  
Delaney himself proposes a new approach to move from a law and geography binary towards 
an examination of the mutually constitutive nature of legal forms and their “lived 
geographies.”246 He argues that the focus of the inquiry should shift from what spatial and 
legal phenomenon are or their relatedness, to examinations of “how they happen” - what he 
calls the “pragmatics of world-making.” Delaney calls for scholarship that both politicizes 
and historicizes world-making through attention to performativity and the enactment of 
power through space and law. 247 As discussed in more detail below, Blomley takes up this 
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approach in his recent re-examination of his critique of property in ways that have particular 
relevance for my project.248 
 
Blomley and Mariana Valverde have directed their attention to exposing specific “legal 
knowledges” and the work of particular legal actors.249 As Delaney notes, “[l]egal 
geographers take us into the workshops where space, law and (in)justice are the means of the 
co-production of each other.”250 Braverman et al. also call for more careful and specific 
thinking about temporal dimensions and space-time conceptions. 251 Attention to 
spatiotemporalities has been taken up directly by Valverde who reminds us to “always ask 
about temporalization as well, and indeed about the ways in which spatialization affects 
temporalization and vice versa”. As discussed in Section 4 below, this project considers the 
interrelations of space and time in the context of land use disputes, in particular how private 
ownership of land works through law to assert both spatial and temporal power. Some legal 
geographers have also called for a shift away from the human-centered focus of legal 
geography to account for the “crucial legal work performed by (and with) things.”252 
Consequently, they note the importance of engaging with previously disregarded fields such 
as physical geography and economics, as well as the humanities.253 As will be discussed 
below in this section, my project also points to the importance of engagement with the more-
than-human world and with the natural sciences, such as ecology, hydrology and geology, 
and environmental history, as part of undertaking place-based research.  
 
Irus Braverman’s use of ethnographic methodologies illuminates the spatio-legal dynamics of 
“the social life of power” in socio-nature relations.254 In her, “Who’s Afraid of 
Methodology?,” Braverman points to the failure of legal geographers to adequately reflect on 
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their methods.255 Given the explicitly critical orientation of legal geography, she argued in an 
earlier version of the paper, “We should be devoting much more attention to the 
methodological question.”256 She reflects on her own experimentation with a “studying-up”, 
engaged ethnography approach.257 As outlined in Chapter Three, I take up her call for the 
application of specific and transparent methodological approaches and thus apply a hybrid 
qualitative placed-based methodology to this project. 
 
As these descriptions make clear, theoretical legal geography is broad in range and diverse in 
approach and perspective.258 For the limited purposes of my study, there are three related 
themes of particular relevance that emerge in this literature: i) the construction, 
materialization, and practice of property and property relations; ii) place-making and the 
politics of place in the context of conflicts about land and environment; and, iii) the 
convergence of legal and spatial constructions of nature and the consequences for landscapes 
and environments. 
A. Property 
British geographer Sarah Whatmore points to property as, “one of, if not, the primary 
currency of ongoing conversations between Law and Geography.”259 A consistent theme in 
Blomley’s well-known work is the need to examine and understand the concept of property 
and what it does in law and in society.260 Blomley pays particular attention to the forms of 
spatial organization and representation involved in legal arrangements and the ways in which 
these make legal power possible. Much of his research considers the work that property law 
does in ordering space in specific contexts, such as the urban sidewalk, gardening or urban 
poverty and homelessness.261 Space, in Blomley’s work, is a key element of the 
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materialization of power.262 Law not only produces and is produced by the social, it is 
spatialized and as such can reinforce power relations through processes of exclusion, coding 
or locating.263 “Law’s geographies,” he states, “materialize and visually communicate legal 
rules.” In doing so, he argues, they “produce particular forms of legal subjectivity.”264 Spatial 
boundaries take on the form of legal meanings, ascribing legal categories to both people and 
places, such as trespasser versus owner or public versus private space. In his words, “law 
does more than act upon the world: to varying degrees, it makes the world, helping to 
constitute the understanding and beliefs that make the world unfold this way rather than that 
way.”265 
 
Blomley points to the centrality of the public-private divide in liberal conceptions of 
property, serving as a “categorical boundary” for spatial ordering.266 He points out two 
fundamental assumptions that speak to the cultural blindness to alternative models of 
property noted by Rose. First, property is either private or state-based; and, second, these 
presumed domains of property are distinguishable: “On the zero-sum assumption that 
property rights cannot easily be unbundled and shared, it is assumed that one owner must be 
effectively sovereign within the spatial bounds of property. The idea of multiple owners, 
ideologically at least, is anathema.”267 In the context of disputes about the use of land, this 
places critical conceptual and practical constraints on the types of claims that parties 
articulate, and even further constraint on their recognition. As Blomley notes, the 
maintenance of the public-private divide has re-emerged as a critical site for legal 
intervention under neo-liberal governments in Canada: “A bright line is drawn between the 
owner and the state. Although the state may intervene to limit these rights if they threaten 
harm to others, such interventions are seen as secondary to the core rights of the owner.”268 
 
Much of Blomley’s past work has focused on demonstrating that property is a more 
“heterogeneous” and “hybrid” concept than this ownership model allows and exposing how 
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people produce “hybrid space” in everyday life despite the power of dominant spatial and 
legal categories in informing policy and government decision-making: “People seem to live 
in much more complicated, fluid and hybrid worlds when it comes to categories such as 
property, which relies upon clarity, order and fixity.”269 Blomley and others, such as Nick 
Jackson and John Wightman,270 and Sarah Whatmore,271 have examined alternative 
constructions of property that fall outside the individualized ownership relationship of liberal 
property theory and practice. In Flowers in the Bathtub, his study of gardening in a 
Vancouver neighbourhood, Blomley explores how acts of “encroachment” serve as a form of 
boundary crossing between public and private property. While gardening is traditionally 
associated with private activity, he shows that it can spill over into public space and 
transgress important legal boundaries. Such “interstitial activities” create an uncertainty that 
is uncomfortable for law, which seeks to resolve it and recreate the boundaries of the 
public/private divide. As with his recent book on sidewalk regulation,272 Blomley’s study of 
gardening is focused on exposing “everyday legal geographies” and the specificity of legal 
tools and logics rather than the ideological dimensions of law.273 In a later article based on 
the same data, Blomley assesses and complicates Smith and Merrill’s conception of property 
boundaries as sending necessarily simplistic messages to those outside, as discussed in 
Section 1, against detailed empirical accounts of everyday interactions with property 
boundaries: “A property boundary is a legal spatiality that is itself embedded in and 
productive of dense relational geographies (normative, practical, visual, complex, social, 
political, and so on).”274 In the context of planning and land use law, his work demonstrates 
the importance of detailed examination of the specific operation of law in place.  My project 
takes this up in the context of aggregate extraction regulation. 
 
This research is consistent with the broader body of critical property scholarship outlined 
above in Section 1 in adopting the “mismatch critique,” 275 an approach which Blomley has 
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himself recently used performativity theory to critique. The mismatch critique is premised on 
the failure of the ownership model of property to accurately represent the reality of property 
in the world:276 “Put baldly, it argues that our representations of property’s reality are 
incorrect, and that these incorrect representations lead us to make bad choices. Better 
understandings of the reality of property should lead to better representations, and thus 
improved outcomes.”277 Following from Delany, Blomley uses performativity theory to 
question the mismatch approach. Treating the ownership model as “unitary” and presuming 
its social and legal dominance, he argues, obscures the ways in which it succeeds at 
constructing property vis-à-vis other versions of property and why. Rather, he argues, the 
ownership model can be more accurately understood as multiple “performances” of property 
that successfully shape legal and social relations and practices. Performativity, he argues, 
reveals the varied extent to which a model of property relations has “performative effect” or 
success in “constituting the reality of property in particular ways.”278 Further, he argues, from 
a performativity perspective, property is not fixed in reality prior to the performances that 
constitute it as something to represent (or misrepresent). 279 
 
For Blomley, performativity is a way to trace and understand the success of the ownership 
model despite the laudable work that critical property scholars, and indeed he himself, have 
engaged in to demonstrate its flaws as well as to pose alternatives. In the context of my 
research, this is an important and worthwhile project: why do private property ownership 
relations have so much power and influence in land use decision-making despite both such 
theoretical critiques and the range of claims and interests that are continually asserted, both 
within and outside the boundaries of formal legal processes? Exposing the specific work that 
is done to make, remake, and sustain property as “certain and secure,” Blomley argues, is 
critical to understanding how the ownership model is maintained and made real in the face of 
such critiques and alternatives.280 In Blomley’s view, the critical distinction is between the 
“success” of a particular representation and its “truth”. In other words, the “felicity,” or the 
degree to which it is successfully actualized in the world is what matters. Its performative 
power does not rest on the accuracy of its representations, but its ability to enrol resources 
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and arrange other representations.281 Blomley adopts the concept of “bracketing” to 
understand the particular ways law works to organize disputes and the consequences: “[A] set 
of relations specified as legally consequential are bracketed and detached from entanglements 
(ethical, practical, ecological, ontological) that are now placed outside the frame.”282 This 
process is always partial, but nonetheless political as the power to frame the boundaries of a 
particular dispute successfully is not evenly distributed.283 Blomley is careful to note that 
bracketing does not mean simplification, rather, that it works to draw on specific and often 
complex relations while attempting to sever others and therefore to succeed in successfully 
producing law in particular ways.284 Here I adopt the concept of bracketing to examine the 
work that private property, particularly the land ownership, does through law to negotiate the 
success of specific forms of land use and people-place relations. Following from Blomley, I 
expose attempts to foreground particular relations in land use disputes while severing others. 
I attempt to expose the role of private ownership in creating a world in which particular 
extractive forms of land use succeed while other instrumental and non-instrumental uses do 
not. 
 
For Blomley, the failure of critical property scholarship to bring about change demonstrates 
that it is not enough to point to alternatives and expose the inadequacies of the dominant 
model of property relations.285 For him, scholarship should identify “new spaces of ‘property-
politics,’ such as those that seek to recover and rework the commons.”286 The question for 
Blomley is, “What sort of property do we wish to see performed?”287 My project engages 
with this notion of performativity to examine whether the people-place relations emerging in 
contemporary land use disputes contribute to broader conversations about how we live 
together in networks of human and more-than-human relation. 
 
Notably, despite performativity theory’s focus on representation, Blomley does not 
understand the performance of property as a wholly human enterprise. Drawing on Bruno 
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Latour, he argues that it encompasses both elaborate human communication, such as “words 
and ideas” as well as “relations between bodies and things.”288 To this end, Blomley points to 
the relational nature of performing property through “assemblages”, as well as the “particular 
relational arrangements.”289 However, he maintains a conceptual divide between human and 
nonhuman “objects” or “things” with humans as the “agents who arrange and assemble” and 
“things that have been arranged.”290 In my view, this kind of performative analysis would 
benefit from a richer understanding of the role of the nonhuman and the relationality of 
people with and as things. The feminist and relational theory approaches presented in Section 
2, such as the work of Nedelsky, Cooper and Keenan, have important roles to play in this 
reconception and recognition of alternative relational properties. In particular, Keenan has 
built on relational approaches and Cooper’s conception of property as belonging, outlined in 
Section 1, to argue that “property is a spatial formation that occurs when relations of 
belonging are held up by the spaces in and through which these relations exist.”291 In this way 
she seeks to shift the focus from the propertied subject, building on Doreen Massey’s 
theorization of space and place discussed in subsection ii,292 towards “the space that 
surrounds, includes and constitutes the subject”, which she understands as “multiplicitous and 
dynamic”.293 As Keenan notes, space is also produced by property through material effects 
that facilitate the continuation of particular relations of belonging.294 This temporal 
dimension, Keenan argues, is significant because property, particularly in land, tends to 
produce linear time. This temporal orientation, she argues, is dependent on the past, but also 
“tends to shape the future in the same mould as the past.”295 By constructing property as 
spatially contingent, Keenan concludes that it has “significant potential” – it can be reshaped 
to produce “alternative spaces of belonging.”296 Like Blomley’s “new spaces of ‘property-
politics”, Keenan argues that “subversive property” can unsettle and actually reshape the 
world around it.297 
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The impact of relational approaches to space on legal geography promises to be significant, 
shifting from stable conceptions of spaces as objects in themselves, towards understanding 
the “dynamic and unfolding processes” continuously shaping both space and specific 
places.298 However, as Braverman et al. argue, it is important to recognize the continuing 
performative force of static and fixed understandings of space and scale in legal knowledges 
and categories.299 Relational perspectives offer an opportunity to “trace the ways in which 
scale solidifies and is made real” and to see law’s spaces as “complicated effects” rather than 
as objects in the world.300 Work on place as relational as well as on nature, nonhuman actors 
and agency discussed below in subsections B and C also contributes to this shift towards 
relationality. 
B. Place 
Building on critical scholarship on space by Henri Lefebvre301 and David Harvey,302 scholars 
including Andrew Merrifield303 and Doreen Massey304 have theorized “place” as a socially 
constructed ‘spatialized moment.’305 Deborah Martin summarizes this concept of place as, “a 
setting for and situated in the operation of social and economic processes, and it also provides 
a “grounding” for everyday life and experience.”306  Massey’s work emphasises the “thrown-
togetherness” of places, which are made of up social and material dimensions and human and 
more-than human encounters.307 Emphasising the uncertain and dynamic nature of place, 
Massey situates place as a site of ongoing negotiation.308 For her, “multiplicity, antagonisms 
and contrasting temporalities are the stuff of all places.”309 She is careful to reject an 
oppositional approach to space and place, arguing that both are “concrete, grounded, real, 
lived.”310 Places, she argues, are events in which broader spatial and temporal networks are 
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integrated in a particular moment.311 Thus, in Massey’s view, the politics of place is precisely 
the challenge of continuing to negotiate how we will live together. They “implicate us, 
perforce, in the lives of human others, and in our relations with nonhumans they ask how we 
shall respond to our temporary meeting-up with these particular rocks and stones and 
trees.”312 Building on Massey’s conception of place, this project adopts the language of place 
in the context of land use law in order to avoid the division of networks of ecological and 
social relation into separate severable, and therefore alienable, ‘resources’ – in this case, the 
rock formations embedded in multiple and overlapping physical, ecological, and social 
systems throughout Ontario. As well, Massey’s conception of place includes the affective 
dimensions of people-place relations that are necessarily a part of the ongoing encounter and 
negotiations that make up the particular spatialized moments examined in this project.  
 
Building on Massey’s conception of place, Martin et al. use the term “place claims” to 
discuss the way people represent “attachments to, and identification with, specific places” 
and their “ideals about land use and how spatial processes should unfold.”313 The disconnect 
between people’s place claims and law, they argue, is “one of the central features of the law-
space nexus.”314  They call for more research to explore this relationship between the actors 
and networks that mediate the spatio-legal production involved in struggles over land use.315 
My place-based examination of relational claims in disputes about aggregate extraction will 
contribute precisely to this type of research. This concept of ‘place claims’ compliments 
Blomley’s work on ‘bracketing’ discussion in subsection ii above, as well as research about 
‘place meanings’ and ‘place attachment’ discussed in Chapter Three in relation to place-
based research methods. 
 
Pierce et al. introduced the concept of “relational place-making” to integrate bodies of 
scholarship on place, politics and networks towards a “networked politics of place.”316 They 
construct a multi-scalar and relational concept of place as “bundles of space-time 
trajectories”. In adopting Massey’s bundle metaphor to argue that “all places are relational 
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places,”317 they point to four key elements of place as relational. First, they argue, places are 
made up of “raw materials,” including, “physical features, individuals, coalitions, 
corporations and groups, as well as myriad parts of the built environment.”318 These raw 
materials are diverse and multi-scalar in nature.319 Second, the process of selection amongst 
these raw materials makes up the places of “individual human-environment experiences.”320 
Third, as these “bundles” are “framed” toward social and political ends, groups form shared 
understandings about places and their meaning in pursuit of collective goals.321 Finally, they 
argue, these bundles are dynamic, ongoing and change over time, each place-frame being 
only ever a negotiated and strategic “fraction of a place.”322 Critically, Pierce et al. note the 
“simultaneously structural and agentic” and “inherently political” nature of place-making: 
“common places develop from pervasive structural forces that produce particular built 
environments and values.”323 Elsewhere Pierce and Martin note, “[A] relational place 
perspective provides a flexible conceptual scaffolding for attention to the political economic 
dimensions or bundles of place without insisting on a solitary focus on the (socio)-spatial.”324 
As British geographer Jonathon Murdoch notes, spatial relations are “power-filled” and the 
spaces and relations that do not emerge are as interesting and important as those that do.325 
He points to the role of both consensual and contested processes in relational space 
production and Massey’s attention to the “power-geometry” of specific places.326 This project 
specifically interrogates the framing process in producing and upholding land use law by 
applying both Pierce et al’s relational place-making framework and Blomley’s concept of 
‘bracketing’ to the broad range of interests engaged by aggregate extraction disputes. 
 
As an analytical approach aimed at assisting researchers to, “unpack the multi-scalar, 
multifaceted place-frames enacted in contestations over competing place/bundles through 
research that focuses on relationalities between diverse people, institutions, materials and 
processes that are inscribed in, and engaged through, socio-spatial conflicts” Pierce et al.’s 
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framework is highly relevant to my examination of people-place relations in land use 
disputes. Pierce et al. argue that the concept of relational-place is “particularly relevant to 
conflicts that centre on change in and of places” and call for empirical research about the 
production of place through networked politics.327 They propose four “methodological 
hooks” for researchers: First, identify a conflict for study; second, identify and examine the 
place-frames central to the conflict; third, identify those actors and institutions key to place-
framing; and, finally, “unpack and interrogate the place/bundles” that inform the positions of 
the actors and institutions.”328 This approach informs the development of the eco-relational 
methodology outlined in Chapter Three by grounding it in as place-based inquiry examining 
the work that law does in situating actors in land use disputes. 
 
Martin et al. argue that legal geographers have focused on the framing of geographical 
concepts in the outcomes of legal process to the neglect of the process through which 
individuals and groups make legal claims and use the law: “Much of the existing literature 
implies the raising and contesting of claims, but it does not trace this process through in detail 
so as to understand the shaping influence of various actors.” 329 Land use disputes, they argue, 
expose the “discontinuity between place identity and legal regulation of place.”330 The 
relevant legal frameworks, they argue, do not account for the range of concerns and 
attachments expressed by parties to such disputes. Claims made by communities, or rooted in 
community relations to place, rather than an individual ownership model are rejected as 
unrecognizable to the law. While parties seek ways to use the law and legal process to 
advance their claims and express their concerns, as they point out, these interests do not 
necessarily translate into existing legal narratives.331 
 
Their work examines the role of lawyers and specific legal practices involved in disputes 
about land use and property: “We view lawyers as playing a critical, and largely unexamined, 
role in mediating between community concerns about geography, land use, and development 
and the legal structures through which these concerns are so often addressed.”332 In that 
study, Martin et al. are interested in place claims and place-making in land use disputes and 
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offer their case study as one example of how “strategic practices of parties” to land use 
disputes create space through law and legal practices.333 They offer questions for future 
research that I take up in my study by examining the role of parties with more-than-
ownership interests, including, “when and why are space claims legalized?” And, “[h]ow are 
place-based community-disputes articulated in legal forms, both in public policy arenas such 
as hearings, and more formal legal administrative settings such as litigation?”334 As Martin et 
al. point out, it is not clear what may be lost, gained or altered in the process of shaping 
claims to existing legal concepts and processes.335 
C. Law, Nature and Rurality 
Delaney argues that the work of human geographers on the social construction of nature has 
failed to adequately consider the role of law in this process. At the same time, he argues, the 
tendency of legal scholars to deal with nature through the categories of liberal property, in 
which it is the other and the object, has left little room for engagement with the insights of 
social theory about the concept of nature and its production.336 Delaney’s own work has 
sought to expand legal geography scholarship through examination of the role of legal 
discourse and practices in the production of nature to understand the “physicality of law”.337 
Like Blomley, Delaney points to law’s materialization of power and authority:  
What it says about nature is enforced by the organized violence of the centralized 
state. This force is frequently realized in the physical world, on landscapes and on 
bodies. Although other discourses of nature undoubtedly have material effects, this 
more direct relation to physical force makes law rather distinctive.338 
 
In particular, he notes the inherent connection between legal conceptions of property as 
the right to use and the material understanding of nature as resource for human 
exploitation. 339  Drawing on the vast literature on the social construction of nature, 
particularly within geography340 and feminist theory,341 Delaney argues that the legal 
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categorization of the world through inclusion and exclusion - ‘nature’ as excluded from 
‘human’ and vice versa – realizes these metaphysical distinctions on the material world.342 
The concept of nature as “external,” Delaney argues, illustrates the role of notions of “the 
social” or “human” as denoting the metaphysical rather than physical exclusion of the 
nonhuman world. Conceived of in terms of an externally limiting force, nature presents 
obstacles. Delaney notes critiques of notions of development and progress as conceived 
in terms of the human potential to overcome natural limits and links these critiques 
directly to the role of law and legal practices.343  
 
Poststructuralist thinking in geography has also influenced legal geography as taken up 
by human geographers, including Murdoch, Massey, and Whatmore. By looking to the 
diversity of human-nonhuman relations that make up spatial formations, these authors 
acknowledge the complexity of interactions amongst and between the social and 
ecological. 344  In doing so, they have the potential to add to and enrich Blomley’s 
performativity framework and Pierce et al.’s relational place approach by accounting for 
the connectivity and immanence of ‘more-than-human’345 worlds in which people-place 
relations are lived. Whatmore has argued that legal geographers have largely neglected, 
and therefore perpetuated, the human/nonhuman and social/material binaries in their 
examinations of property.346 Like Blomley and Delaney, Whatmore points to property as 
fundamental to the construction and enforcement of persons as distinct from things, and 
to law, as obscuring and naturalizing this distinction as self-evident.347  She turns to 
feminist ‘corporeality’ 348  and Latour’s ‘hybridity,’ 349  “[i]n an effort to articulate a 
relational understanding of ethical connectivity that does not presume or reinforce the 
cartographies of humanism.”350 In this way, she argues, she is “recuperating” moral 
claims of humanity from the universalizing autonomous human self and “redirecting our 
                                                         
and Susan Hekman, Material Feminisms (Blommington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Karen Barad, 
“Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” (2003) 28 Signs J 
Women Cult Soc 3 801. 
342 Delaney, supra note 337 at 489. 
343 Ibid at 491–492. 
344 Murdoch, supra note 325 at 19; Massey, supra note 292; Whatmore, supra note 259. 
345 Whatmore, supra note 259. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid at 61. 
348 Elizabeth A Grosz, Relational Place-Making: The Networked Politics of Place (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994). 
349 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard University Press, 1993). 
350 Whatmore, supra note 259 at 161. 
 
 69 
attention to the affective relations between heterogeneous bodies.”351 Whatmore calls for 
research that “gets up close and personal” to the mundane operation of law to “track the 
power of law…through the effacement of its own practices.”352 In particular, Whatmore 
points to methodological possibilities that complement the approach outlined in Chapter 
2, including, examination of “interpretive communities,” the specificity of language, and 
“technologies of documentation and record.”353  
 
Lisa Pruitt similarly points to legal geography’s neglect of the “rural lawscape.” In fact, she 
argues, the work of both legal scholars and critical geographers is largely “metrocentric” and 
“urban-normative.”354 In the context of my project, this urban-focus does limit the application 
of the otherwise compelling legal geography literature. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 7, 
Canadian legal scholarship has underexplored the concept of rurality and its role in land use 
decision-making. Pruitt’s work has important implications for non-urban research contexts 
where different spatio-legal relations make legal geography difficult to apply. In particular, 
she points to the need for a more complex understanding of how law works in non-urban 
places. Rurality, she notes, is often defined in relation to “emptiness” and the absence of the 
familiar markers of habitation and the built environment, producing a “perceived lack of 
materiality” despite the material presence of both human and nonhuman actors.355 This 
project examines the people-place relations of land use disputes in areas both legally 
designated as ‘rural’ and constructed as rural by various social actors. This work contributes 
to developing a more complex understanding of non-urban places in Canada, particularly the 
relationship between law and rural places in Ontario. As discussed in the following Section 
and in Chapter Eight, part of this complex understanding is exploring the application of 
environmental justice frameworks in the context of rural land use politics and to contribute to 
scholarship advocating a shift away from reductavist labelling of rural land use politics as 
NIMBY-ism.356 Rather, this project seeks to expose the complexity of place-attachment and 
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practices of belonging and exclusion that characterize rural land use while remaining 
attentive to the potential for localism and parochial approaches to place to contribute to 
depoliticizing land use decision-making.357 
 
Murdoch’s study of the role of environmental movements in constructing the urban-rural 
divide in the UK also demonstrates the need for more complex and heterogeneous 
understandings of spatial relations than traditional zoning concepts allow for: “Thus, we 
discern an ecological politics focused on the consolidation of a dynamic and complex system 
of socio-natural relations in which the urban and the rural are combined in some kind of 
‘sustainable assemblage.’”358  
 
Like Whatmore, Murdoch relies on Bruno Latour’s understanding of attempts to separate 
‘nature’ from ‘society’ as characteristic of modernity. Murdoch points to preservationist 
environmentalism as spatializing a specific concept of nature requiring distinct and divided 
spatial zones.359 The planning system, he argues, has been particularly important for 
environmental movements attempting to maintain this spatial order.360 Murdoch identifies 
multiple paradoxes resulting from environmental preservationist efforts to ‘protect’ the pure 
nature of rural England from the ‘dangerous’ effects of the dirty city. He points to the growth 
of industrialized agricultural and rural gentrification and to the growing realization that 
protecting urban nature and sound housing policy is essential to sustaining life in rural 
areas.361 In fact, he argues, maintenance of the strict classification of rural and urban zones 
facilitates the urban commodification of externalized nature in the rural. The rural, he notes, 
becomes a source of outflows of resources and inflows of waste to ensure the urban is kept 
free of ‘nature’ and the rural is defined by its presence.362 In Ontario, planning scholar 
Jennifer Foster’s study of the Niagara Escarpment demonstrated how environmentalism has 
reinforced colonial land use narratives and constructions of landscape, serving to uphold 
                                                         
“Invalid theory impedes our understanding: a critique on the persistence of the language of NIMBY” (2006) 31 
Trans Inst Br Geogr 1 85. 
357 Michael Woods et al, “‘The country (side) is angry’: emotion and explanation in protest mobilization” (2012) 
13 Soc Cultural Geographies 6 567 at 568; Jennifer Foster, “Landscape Continuity: Ecology, Power and Social 
Order in Environmental Planning” (2010) 11 Plan Theory Pract 2 167. 
358 Murdoch, supra note 325 at 126. 
359 Ibid at 109. 
360 Ibid at 110. 
361 Ibid at 115, 118, 122, 126. 
362 Ibid at 125. 
 
 71 
“social exclusion and xenophobia” in rural places and obstruct movements for environmental 
justice.363 In Murdoch’s view, urban and rural are no longer tenable as separate and 
oppositional zones, rather he argues for a set of “circular relations in which the valued natural 
assets of the city and the countryside are nurtured and sustained simultaneously.”364 This 
rethinking of urban-rural relationality and interdependence in the context of land use disputes 
provides a useful framework for thinking through the way aggregate minerals are constructed 
as both rural and urban. As I describe in this project, urban-rural relations have implications 
for a conception of environmental justice that include rurality while simultaneously rejecting 
exclusionary property practices and the preservation versus development binary. 
 
Unlike Whatmore and Murdoch, Pruitt is largely concerned with the person-person relations 
in rurality and examines a number of legal contexts in which the relationship between the 
individual and the state is displayed, such as legal responses to partner violence or the ability 
of ‘outlaw’ actors to hide in rural areas. On this basis she argues that, “rural spatiality 
mediates law’s performance such that law is less likely to seep deeply into the nooks and 
crannies of rural space – into its hollows, forests, plains.”365 Pruitt argues that there is a 
fundamental tension between the material characteristics of rurality, formal law and legal 
actors that results in a critical separation of rural residents from the state. In her view, “rural 
spatiality disables or impedes formal law and its functioning.” However, it is unclear how 
Pruitt’s conclusions about the effect of rural spatiality apply with respect to person-place 
relations and the law.  
 
Rural and remote places in Ontario, Pruitt’s “hollows and forests and plains,” are themselves 
constructed through ownership claims, legally sanctioned land use practices, and resource 
development claims and proposals that are or will transform material places through forms of 
harvesting, extraction or preservation. While law may underperform with respect to 
environmental enforcement regimes for the reasons Pruitt describes, such as distance and the 
failure to report concerns in planning and natural resource management, in some ways it 
performs more directly and visibly on rurality as places are removed or transformed through 
the mundane legal processes of permit approvals, leases and licenses. In many places, Pruitt’s 
‘emptiness’ is carved out of places with complex spatial and temporal person-place relations 
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through specific legal manoeuvres aimed at defining those places as sites of exploitation and 
extraction for human use. As Rob Nixon notes, the “invention of emptiness” is fundamentally 
linked to the imposition of Lockean person-place relations wherein only certain forms of 
habitation and land use are deemed legitimate.366  As this project argues, it is important to 
recognize the ways the materiality of those places shape and reshape law as it adapts to the 
particularities of local ecologies and, eventually, the limits of particular land use practices.367 
At the same time, it also recognizes law’s reach into rural spaces of limited human habitation 
as equally productive of people-place relations as the legal forces regulate spaces of dense 
human population.   
 
 
Governance, Planning, and Environmental Justice 
 
Law is one aspect of the broader framework through which land use, natural resources and 
people-place relations are governed in Ontario. The use of private land is regulated by 
multiple complex regimes, including a range of land use planning statutes and policies, 
environmental regulations, and the common law of property, as well as extra-legal norms and 
rules through networks of economic and civil society actors.368 In order to locate land use law 
within this broader context of economic, social and ecological relations, this section draws on 
governance and planning literatures, as well the environmental justice scholarship. While 
these literatures are vast and wide-reaching, this project is specifically concerned with 
governance in the context of land use planning and natural resource management.  The 
discussion below reflects this focus by drawing on environmental governance scholarship, 
land use planning scholarship, and the work of environmental justice scholars. As well, while 
I engage with a diversity of sources, Canadian scholarship has been the focus on this 
examination in order to situate ‘governance’ in the historical, legal and cultural context in 
which this research has taken place. 
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A. Governance 
Governance can be used to refer broadly to the governing of organizations and societies.369 As, 
Bridge and Perreault argue, the widespread adoption of ‘governance’ in social science 
scholarship demonstrates its explanatory adaptability in a range of contexts.370 Despite the lack 
of a fixed definition, as an analytical category it broadly refers to a shift away from “state-
centric” understandings of social and economic regulation and the expansion of formal and 
informal roles for non-state actors. Further, governance scholarship often problematizes 
analytical categories such as public, private, the state and government. 371  As Bridge and 
Perreault argue, “[i]n both analytical and policy approaches, the discourse of governance is 
strongly associated with social and economic change.”372 As Judy Fudge and Brenda Cossman 
argue in the Canadian context, the liberal state is undergoing a process of fundamental 
reconfiguration as a neo-liberal state.373 While the challenge of defining what is meant by 
neoliberalism, and how to best study it, has been the subject of longstanding debate,374 for my 
purposes I adopt the characteristics identified by Peck et al: “deep antipathies to social 
collectivities and sociospatial redistribution; and open-ended commitments to market-like 
governance systems, non-bureaucratic modes of regulation, privatization, and corporate 
expansion.”375 Cossman and Fudge identify ‘privatization’ as central to this reconfiguration, 
which they argue, “has come to represent a fundamental shift not only in government policy 
but also in the balance of public and private power, both globally and nationally.”376 According 
to Fudge and Cossman, in the Canadian context the practices of reconfiguration include, “the 
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sale of government assets, the transfer of government functions to the private sector … the 
restructuring of government activities to more closely emulate market norms”, and, a 
retrenchment of state social welfare programs combined with increased investment in private 
sector service delivery and reliance on familial or charitable institutions.377 They point to the 
importance of law in this reconfiguration as providing a “justificatory framework, defining and 
redefining values … for the invocation of state power.”378 In particular, they note a crucial 
extension of corporate private property rights on a global scale to restrain state-based regulatory 
power as well as a shift away from collective, public responsibility for individual welfare 
towards private individual responsibility.379 As discussed below, this understanding of the 
reconfiguration of the liberal state has particular resonance for the forms of environmental and 
natural resource regulation that are the focus of this project. 
i. Environmental Governance 
Bridge and Perreault adopt ‘environmental governance’ as an analytical framework “for 
examining the complex and multiscalar institutional arrangements, social practices and actors 
engaged in environmental decision-making.” 380  In their view, despite its “widespread, 
uncritical use,” environmental governance “can enable relatively nuanced analysis of how 
power is produced and exercised over and through the nonhuman world, and the ends to which 
power is directed.”381 As a concept that Bridge and Perreault identify as extending a “broad 
embrace,” environmental governance moves away from the problematic divisions between 
land use, natural resource and environmental issues in Ontario’s legal framework. Further, they 
argue, by asserting the centrality of political processes of decision-making, the environmental 
governance concept can open up space for creative thinking about people-place relations.382 
However, I also adopt their caution that it is a concept that can be used to mask power relations 
and therefore, “a careful examination of differing epistemological, normative and rights claims 
to and about nature should be central to any treatment of environmental governance.”383 As 
Bridge and Perreault argue, “[e]nvironmental governance is a concept more popular than 
precise.”384 For a review of the treatment of environmental governance generally see Bridge 
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and Perreault 385 and Lemos and Agrawal,386 and in geography see Himley.387Environmental 
governance has emerged as an important concept across several disciplines including 
geography,388 ecology,389 political science,390 and to a lesser extent, law.391 In their review of 
the literature, Maria Camen Lemos and Arun Agrawal define environmental governance as 
“the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors 
influence environmental actions and outcomes.”392  
 
Geographers have employed environmental governance as a “broad analytical framework for 
addressing the institutional arrangements, spatial scales, organizational structures and social 
actors” engaged in environmental decision-making. 393  Critical geography scholars of 
environmental governance, including Bakker,394 Bridge,395 and Mansfield396, have examined a 
range of governance arrangements as constitutive of the nature-society relationship and how 
these maintain particular elements of neoliberal capitalism. 397  Ecological perspectives, 
particularly studies of collective action and co-management models have focused on the shift 
towards decentralized natural resources decision-making in environmental policy since the 
1990s. 398  Political scientists have focused on questions of agency and participation in 
environmental decision-making.399 Critical accounts, such as Roger Keil and Gene Desfor’s 
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examination of environmental policy in Toronto and Los Angeles point to the importance of 
processes of decision-making and policy development as sites for contestation rather than 
technocratic or expert-driven exercises in consultation.400  
 
Political economy and regulation theory scholars such as Jessop401 and Gibbs and Jonas402 have 
emphasized the “hollowing out” of the state as well as the expanded role of non-state actors in 
regulation and rescaling of environmental policy making. In contrast, Australian legal scholar 
Neil Gunningham argues that rather than a ‘decentering’ of the state; recent environmental 
policy initiatives have remade the “regulatory architecture” of environmental management.403 
“New environmental governance,” he argues, actually demonstrates an enduring and “essential 
policy coordination role for government in encouraging, facilitating, rewarding and shaping 
outcomes.” 404 While they do not examine environmental regulation, Fudge and Cossman 
similarly argue that neoliberal privatization in the Canadian context “involves a reconfiguration 
of the form of state regulation rather than deregulation”, what they refer to as “reregulation”. 
In particular, they note the importance of the common law, including property law, to the 
success of laissez-faire policies and citing Roger Cotterrell argue, [L]aw is being extensively 
used to ‘recreate a climate of free enterprise’ and distribution by market forces.405 This more 
nuanced understanding of the changing role of regulation rather than deregulation provides 
important background to understand the evolution of aggregate extraction regulation in Ontario, 
as discussed in Chapter Four. Detailed and specific attention to the particular role of law in 
reconfiguring the state is also consistent with my approach to exposing and critically examining 
the role of private property in land use decision-making in Ontario.  
 
Notably, while environmental governance scholars have observed and debated changes to 
environmental management, decision-making and dispute resolution in a variety of 
jurisdictions since the mid-1980s, there is little agreement about the nature and the depth of 
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such changes.406 Indeed, despite the widespread claims about the shift away from state power 
under neoliberalism, Gunningham argues that the state is not “simply one amongst a number 
of actors” in the context of environmental policy.407 In his view, the success of emerging 
environmental policy initiatives has been reliant on at least three roles for the state in natural 
resources management: “definitional guidance” wherein the state “describes and defines” the 
governance arrangement; “participatory incentives” whereby the state provides positive or 
negative incentives for particular actors; and, “enforcement capability” to ensure that 
obligations are fulfilled and evaluate success.408 He argues that the concept of “regulatory 
capitalism” better reflects contemporary environmental governance 409  by reflecting how 
regulation has in fact increased as markets are enrolled as regulatory mechanisms. 
Simultaneously, non-state actors are increasingly taking on regulatory roles as governance 
networks evolve through “hybridity between the privatization of the public and the 
publicization of the private.”410 This understanding of hybrid regulatory networks is highly 
relevant to increasingly proponent-driven nature of aggregate regulation in Ontario and the role 
of aggregate resource owners and developers and aligned technical experts in shaping land use 
law and policy. 
 
My project examines whether and how the neoliberal governance features identified by 
Cossman and Fudge411 and Peck et al. 412 have emerged in the context of Ontario’s land use 
planning system. Gunningham’s framework provides a useful tool for the delineation of the 
specific mechanisms at work in Ontario’s land use planning system. In particular, he proposes 
a continuum in the role of the state, from law to regulation, to governance.413 In his view, law 
refers to specific state-based statutes while regulation encompasses a broader range of flexible 
instruments that enrol a range of non-state actors while still operating “in the shadow of the 
state.” Governance mechanisms, he argues, do not privilege the state or require formal 
authority, as power and responsibility are diffuse.414 This is an important clarification in the 
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governance debates as the role of law and its relationship to other forms of social and economic 
regulation can be obscured, making it difficult to trace the ways in which specific legal tools 
influence people-place relations. The overview of relevant law and policy in Chapter Four 
provides a detailed description of the range of tools used by various actors in aggregate 
extraction decision-making. In particular, I examine how the role of owner and non-owner 
parties are fundamentally shaped by the way in which state and non-state actors define, control 
and enforce land use law. 
ii. Environmental governance and people-place relations 
Lemos and Agrawal note that the structure of environmental decision-making and power 
relations related to natural resources not only affects the relationships between different levels 
of decision makers and between decision makers and constituents, but also critically shapes 
“the subjective relationships of people with each other and with the environment.”415 They note 
that this aspect of environmental governance has received little attention in the literature.416 
The notable exceptions to this are work on ‘environmentality,’ such as the work of Arun 
Agrawal and that of political scientist Timothy Luke, 417 and, examinations of neoliberal modes 
of environmental governance discussed above.418 As Himley notes, these scholars build on 
insights from political ecology 419  as well as “theoretical tools” from both urban regime 
theory,420 and regulation theory, 421 particularly geographers like Peck and Tickell who have 
drawn attention to the role of actors at the subnational scale.422 
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Geographers Karen Bakker, 423  Noel Castree424  and Becky Mansfield 425  and urban studies 
scholars David Young, Gene Desfor, and Roger Keil 426  point to neoliberalism as a 
transformative force in shaping and reshaping contemporary human relationships with the 
more-than-human world.427 In particular, concerns about privatization, the production and 
protection of private property, and the increasingly pervasive use of markets as mechanisms of 
environmental governance are central concerns in these accounts of environmental 
governance.428  Planning scholar Tore Sager notes the importance of neoliberalism as “an 
essential descriptor of the transformations of regulatory systems and changing urban conditions 
throughout the world.”429 As noted above, this project follows from governance scholars in 
examining the effect of neoliberal forms of regulation on human relationships with the more-
than-human world, particularly drawing on the concerns expressed by environmental 
governance scholars about the role of private property in land use governance. 
 
In large part these scholars have focused on case studies of particular resources or systems of 
environmental management. This detailed empirical work has exposed how the materiality of 
specific places matters to governance as the biophysical properties of land and ecological 
systems “impinge on and shape the organizational and institutional systems through which they 
are governed.”430 For example, Scott Prudham’s work on forests in the Pacific Northwest as 
well as Karen Bakker’s work on water point to nonhuman resistance to specific political-
economic forms of control, such as commodification.431 Mansfield focuses on private property 
environmental governance mechanisms and argues, “Property has become the central mode of 
regulating multiple forms of nature.”432 Mansfield argues that this “re-making of nature-society 
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relations,”433 through multiple forms of privatization produces owners and non-owners through 
a market-based subjectivity and discipline wherein ‘owners’ are constructed as “efficient, 
profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals” without regard to the nature of their relationship with the 
owned-place or thing. 434 My project engages with this work by examining the production of 
owners and non-owners through land use law and the social and material consequences for 
people-place relations in the specific context of aggregate mineral extraction.  
 
Bakker notes how the physicality of the resource being governed strongly influences the 
particular forms of resource governance selected by neoliberal governments.435 For example, 
she argues that private property regimes are more easily established for particular types of 
resources “because of their biophysical characteristics, behaviours, and articulation (co-
constitution) of labour and consumption practices.”436 This work has important implications 
for the examination of people-place relations and how they emerge in the context of land use 
disputes. Indeed in the context of aggregate extraction, Canadian environmental scholars 
Anders Sandberg and Lisa Wallace recently drew attention to the importance of particular 
properties of mineral deposits as a factor in decision-making.437 This research argues that the 
geologically fixed nature of aggregate mineral resources is compounded by the development 
of aggregate resources on privately owned land. As McCarthy argues, this unavoidable 
materiality makes environmental issues a unique realm of regulation. This, Bridge and 
Perreault argue, makes environmental governance a critical area of research for geographers. 
In my view, this is also true of legal scholars. Indeed, as noted above in Section 1, the 
materiality and connectivity of the more-than-human world challenge the anthropocentric 
premises of property law and the desire to see property as imposing a clear and orderly set of 
relations between people and about things. 
 
The complex context of land use disputes problematizes attempts to understand environmental 
governance in relation to a particular ‘resource’ in isolation from the broader ecosystem of 
which it is an integral part. Indeed, the layers of competing claims in land use disputes are 
inextricably linked to the material reality of resources in place and problematize decision-
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making that divides the nonhuman world into distinct and separate pieces. Following from the 
discussion of place above in Section 2, this project recognizes that aggregate resources occur 
in specific places. These places are constituted through complex networks of human uses and 
attachments with soil, wetlands, forest and hydrogeological features, which intersect with the 
relations within the more-than-human world. These messy interconnections pose critical 
challenges to planning and property law and it is vital that legal scholarship grapple with how 
the presence of places as complex interconnected eco-social systems challenges law and legal 
decision-making. My project will specifically develop an understanding of how private 
property relations work through law to bracket the human and more-than-human relationships 
with, and within, the places at stake. 
iii. More-than-human environmental governance 
While environmental geography scholars do provide for nonhuman agency, Braun argues that 
scholarship on neoliberal natures fails to “incorporate the ‘nonhuman…as a constitutive 
element of social and economic life.”438  Bridge and Perreault exemplify this when they suggest 
interpreting environmental governance as “governance through nature” rather than 
“governance of nature”.439  This maintains the anthropocentric conception of socio-natural 
relations and the validity of a hierarchical human-nature divide as a foundation for governance. 
As a result of the failure to go beyond a social constructionist critique of socio-nature relations, 
Bakker argues, these accounts do not fully address the range of “environmental processes and 
socio-natural entities subsumed within processes of neoliberalization.”440 Instead she calls for 
the interrogation of “the status of nonhumans as political subjects,” through the incorporation 
of political ecology, emotional geography, and ecological sciences methodologies and a break 
from the humanist model of political economy in which ‘neoliberal natures’ scholarship has 
been embedded.441 Braun goes further, calling for environmental geographers to combine the 
insights of non-representational theory about human-nonhuman relations and the “radical 
uncertainty of complex systems and the capacity of bodies for affect”442 with the physical 
geographers’ acknowledgement that “a great deal of order nevertheless exists.”443  
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While these critiques are important, particularly with respect to the production of ‘nature,’ land 
and resources through property and land use law, and for the potential for relationships of 
reciprocity with place and non-instrumental relations with the nonhuman environment, they 
also present significant risks. As Lorimer cautions, such “[m]ore than human approaches 
deploy political categories alien to the hard-fought taxonomies of modern legislation and 
representation – including human rights.”444 Arguably, such perspectives are fundamentally 
incompatible with the legal logics of modern property, planning and even environmental law. 
As work by both Valverde and Blomley has demonstrated, activist legal strategies that attempt 
to introduce legal concepts that are fundamentally incompatible with logics and tools of 
planning and land use law risk the possibility of failing to gain entry to the debate.445 This 
project specifically examines the ways in which land use law includes and excludes particular 
claims and knowledges about the more-than-human world. With this understanding, it aims to 
consider how the logics and tools of land use planning might be reoriented towards just and 
reciprocal relations with place. 
 
As outlined above, the critical environmental governance scholarship provides a number of 
important and useful analytical tools to account for human-more-than-human relations in the 
context of land use planning and property law. However, in my view, the focus on 
neoliberalism and relatively recent developments in legal and policy approaches to socio-nature 
relations is somewhat limiting. As the discussion of property law and theory above in Section 
1 make clear, people-place relations have long been shaped, defined and controlled through the 
ideology of private property and the legal and cultural practices of private property relations. 
Indeed, the commodification of places and their nonhuman inhabitants was central to the 
colonial settlement of Ontario, the dispossession of Indigenous land and the establishment of a 
resource-based capitalist economy. 446  Therefore, while struggles over enclosure, 
commodification and the power to define people-place relations may be a feature of neoliberal 
governance,447 they are not uniquely so. In fact, in the context of aggregate extraction, shifts 
towards centralization of decision-making and the expanded role of corporate actors in defining 
legal and policy strategies pre-dated the rise of neoliberal governments in Canada, Ontario, and 
Toronto. Therefore, this project engages primarily with aspects of this scholarship that draw 
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attention to the more-than-human world, the materiality of the environment in decision-making 
and governance, and the importance of understanding the specific role of state law in the larger 
historical and socio-natural context of liberal property regimes, land use planning and natural 
resource management. 
B. Planning 
Land use planning disputes are classic examples of “wicked problems”.448 Paul Lachapelle 
and Stephen McCool define wicked problems as involving “multiple and competing values 
and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-effect relationships, limited time and resources, 
incomplete information, and structural inequities in access to information and the distribution 
of political power.”449 As planning scholar Barry Cullingworth argues, while land use 
disputes involve detailed scientific information, they cannot be treated as purely scientific or 
technical problems. He argues, “[I]nevitably the outcome is based upon a mixture of 
scientific, social, economic and political issues as perceived by the multiplicity of 
organizations and individuals involved in the planning process.”450 Planning, Murdoch 
argues, “has considerable difficulty in ‘representing’ the complex and heterogeneous spaces 
in which it is inevitably immersed.”451 As a result, he argues, planning produces inclusions 
and exclusions, notably the exclusion of non-ownership relations with land and the 
nonhuman environment.452 This project examines this process of inclusion and exclusion in 
the specific context of aggregate siting disputes. 
 
What is missing from such accounts of the complexity of land use disputes is attention to the 
particular role of law as part of land use planning processes through which such wicked 
problems are defined and inclusions and exclusions are negotiated and enforced. My research 
explores how land use law works in the face of these wicked problems. In particular, I 
consider how law accounts for and responds to the complexity of human relationships with 
place and the materiality of the nonhuman world that are uniquely exposed in disputes about 
land use. This section briefly situates this exploration of Ontario’s land use planning law in 
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the historical context of planning in Canada. It will then examine theoretical approaches to 
land use planning law and specifically consider research on participation in planning. 
i. Planning History and Theory 
Canadian planning evolved from both the British town-planning garden city and the 
American city efficient planning ideologies.453 The dual influences on planning in Canada 
were summarized by Gerald Hodge: “The broad social view of responsibility for community 
health and housing is derived from the British; the functional view of arranging streets, 
utilities and the use of zoning is distinctively American.”454 However, planning scholars J.B. 
Cullingworth and Stephen V. Ward argue that it is a mistake to see Canadian planning as 
simply a variant of either British or American planning.455 In the context of my research, this 
caution informs my reading of both American and British planning scholarship and reinforces 
the importance of locating my research in the specificity of Southwestern Ontario, as well as 
recognizing Indigenous land law and environmental governance jurisdiction. Attending to the 
influence of both traditions on Ontario’s land use law, this project understands planning as 
having a unique trajectory and development in Canada, influenced by local legal and political 
cultures, but also by distinctive institutional structures and responses to economic and social 
events.456 As Canadian planning scholar Zack Taylor points out, the British North American 
colony that would later become Ontario adopted a rules-based system for municipal 
government early on in the history of planning with the Upper Canada Municipal 
Corporations Act: “[T]he Baldwin Act was the first legislation in the English-speaking world 
to consolidate enabling provisions for all forms of general-purpose municipal governments, 
both urban and rural.”457 In this sense, Ontario’s approach to planning law has long been 
distinctive despite the range of international influences that have shaped particular elements 
and approaches therein. 
 
                                                         
453 Stephen V Ward, “The International Diffusion of Planning: A Review and a Canadian Case Study” (1999) 
4:1 Int Plan Stud 53 at 60. 
454 Gerald Hodge, Planning Canadian Communities. An Introduction to the Principles, Practice, and Participants 
(Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1991); Thomas I. Gunton,“The Evolution of Urban and Regional Planning in 
Canada: 1900-1960,” Ph. D. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1981) [unpublished]. 
455 Cullingworth, supra note 450 at 468; Ward, supra note 453 at 58. 
456 Zack Taylor, “If Different, then Why?: Explaining the Divergent Political Development of Canadian and 
American Local Governance” (2014) 49 Int J Can Stud 53 at 57. 
457 Ibid at 58. 
 
 85 
Professional planning in Canada was historically linked to the role of technical and scientific 
experts in planning processes.458 As Sager argues, this idea of planning as based on 
“professionally good solutions” rather than politics or the market is common to a range of 
planning traditions.459 Thomas Adams, a key influence on Canadian planning who was 
recruited from England to head up the Commission of Conservation in 1914, advocated for a 
scientific approach to planning and emphasized objectivity and efficiency:460 “Adams’ focus 
on numbers, standards, and statistics clearly promulgated the value that planning could bring 
to society.”461  In Canada, the separation of planning and political decision-making is linked 
to the establishment of specialist appointed bodies to oversee municipal affairs, such as the 
Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, which later became Ontario’s primary adjudicative 
planning body, the Ontario Municipal Board.462 Political scientist John Chipman traces the 
historical establishment of the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board in 1906 and its 
transition to the Ontario Municipal Board in 1932, to the desire of political officials to 
remove contentious disputes about urban development and complex ‘technical’ matters 
outside of the political realm into the hands of ‘expert’ decision makers.463 Emerging issues 
about the ‘public interest’ in infrastructure development, such as municipal railways and 
energy utilities, were seen as time consuming and complex. Therefore, the Board was created 
to “remove from the shoulders of elected politicians and place on those of a tribunal 
composed of non-elected experts the time consuming responsibility for decision-making.”464  
 
As Peter Moore argues, the quasi-independent nature of these decision-making bodies 
“ensured that the “politics” was kept out of planning.”465 However, despite the historical 
depoliticization of planning as a technical exercise, critics such as Bent Flyvberg have argued 
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that it is a thoroughly political exercise that is “always set within relations of power.”466  In 
Ontario, early planning was not without politics, but rather a closed and elite system of 
governance. As Moore notes, removing planning from the formal political sphere resulted in 
a planning system strongly influenced by the interests of the provincial business elite.467 
Indeed Taylor has speculated that the “narrow electoral franchise” linking participation to 
property ownership at the municipal level is one of the key institutional influences on the 
nature of municipal governance and local politics in Canada.468 Chipman notes that the 
Ontario Municipal Board’s early oversight power for municipal bylaws was explicitly linked 
to property ownership.469 While this language restricting participation in planning decisions 
has been removed from provincial law, his study found that the Board’s approach to land use 
disputes perpetuates this link between private property rights and planning.470 In examining 
the public interest in contemporary planning law in Ontario, Marcia Valiante concludes that 
while the protection of private property rights may not be expressly embedded in 
contemporary legislation, it endures as “part of the culture of planning law.”471  
 
Scholars have paid particular attention to the history of zoning in Canadian planning law. 
Zoning, Moore argues in his study of its historic development in Toronto, was a tool that fit 
squarely within the “scientific management” approach to city planning that was emerging by 
the 1920s.472 Legal scholar Eran Kaplinsky argues that while planning systems in North 
America were purportedly intended to shift land use control away from private law notions of 
nuisance and restrictive covenants, the imposition of regulatory control over private land 
through zoning laws was politically palatable because of its appeal to private property owners 
and developers.473 The “practice of zoning,” Kaplinsky argues, has been shaped by a social, 
political and economic context, resulting in a focus on “the protection of private property 
values.”474 Indeed Cullingworth notes that policymakers explicitly linked zoning to the 
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protection of property in early attempts to bring it into law in Ontario.475 Tracing the early 
history of zoning, Walter Van Nus argues that early on Canadian planners “exchanged the 
goal of an optimally efficient urban organism for that of an optimally profitable one for the 
property industry.”476 With respect to the Ontario Municipal Board, Chipman’s study 
concluded that the Board has adopted a private law nuisance framework to deal with land use 
disputes and notes the problematic blurring of the public interest with the private interests of 
local neighbours.477 
 
Blomley notes that we should be cautious about characterizing the adoption of zoning as 
purely in the service of private interests in light of the continuing influence of utilitarian 
conceptions of land use employed by early planners.478 Appeals to economic arguments may 
have been politically expedient for planners, but they were not necessarily the underlying 
motivation.479 The relationship between private property and planning is more nuanced, 
Blomley argues, and we need to understand the specific ways in which it works through land 
use law to organize space. Blomley traces the historical development of debates about the 
role of Canadian planning and draws attention to the utilitarian emphasis on improvement of 
land and avoidance of waste by influential thinkers, such as Adams. Because of the emphasis 
on achieving a specific vision of the common good through efficient development of land and 
resources for human benefit, Blomley argues, these early planners understood private 
ownership as a potential source of waste that needed to be controlled and directed towards 
proper and productive purposes – namely the development of property for economic 
productivity.480 In Blomley’s view, this utilitarian logic continues to shape contemporary land 
use planning in consequential ways.481 This research adopts a nuanced approach to 
understanding the role of private property in planning law and explores the particular 
consequences of the enduring anthropocentric, development-focused orientation for the 
places involved in aggregate mineral extraction.  
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Marcia Valiante and Anneke Smit note that early zoning decisions in Ontario accepted the 
impact on property rights as legitimate in pursuing public benefits. However, they note a 
simultaneous effort by courts and tribunals “to ensure that private rights were not lost to 
arbitrary municipal decisions.482 This balancing exercise remains central to planning 
decisions in Ontario. Yet, as Valiante points out, not only are there always “multiple public 
interests at play,” land use conflicts expose tensions between different private interests.483 
This research provides further insight into this relationship by focusing on the more-than-
ownership interests asserted in aggregate siting disputes. These interests, I argue, are not 
easily characterized as purely private or public in nature. Rather, they at times combine 
interests in privately owned land neighbouring the proposed site with concerns about 
environmental, landscape, social and cultural impacts on a particular place. As this research 
demonstrates, claims by parties with private interests as neighbours may also be excluded 
where they do not fit into the frame of proper land use considerations. In my view, 
Chipman’s finding that direct adverse impacts on neighbouring private property owners 
tended to outweigh less tangible claims to collective benefits484 points not only to the 
importance of characterizing who is making the claim, but also to the need to trace how 
different stories about what is at stake and what is to be gained in a particular dispute 
succeed. Indeed, while we should remain cautious about the parochial and exclusionary 
politics invoked to maintain conceptions of character or amenity in planning, this research 
demonstrates that the role of interests in neighbouring land has a more complex relationship 
with private property development than the research might suggest, particularly with respect 
to industrial and extractive development and corporate proponents.  
 
While the historical relationship between planning and the protection of private property pre-
dates neoliberalism and recent changes to land use planning and environmental governance in 
Ontario, commentators on regional and infrastructure planning in Ontario argue that 
neoliberalism is an important contextual concept for understanding contemporary planning in 
Ontario.485 Indeed Sager argues that the “shift from bureaucratic regulation to public 
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entrepreneurialism” in urban planning policy and politics has profoundly impacted planning 
in a number of countries.486 He specifically notes that contemporary investment in large-scale 
infrastructure is shaped by the competition for global investment capital between urban 
regions and serves as a “crucial precondition” for neoliberal policies. This pro-growth agenda 
builds on the utilitarian roots of planning in Ontario and directly shapes the demand for 
aggregate minerals as “physical products of urban entrepreneurship” with spatial and material 
effects in both urban and rural places.487 At the same time, it is important to understand how 
neoliberal governance strategies have also maintained and re-enforced the bureaucratic model 
of technical expertise and “decide-announce-defend model of planning” that emerged in the 
first half of the twentieth century.488 This link between past and recent strategies and politics 
of urban development and rural planning is an important part of understanding the legal 
boundaries of people-place relations in Ontario and the ways in which non-ownership 
relations challenge assumptions in the provincial planning framework. Therefore, while 
neoliberalism is not responsible for planning’s private property and technical orientation, this 
research demonstrates that it has facilitated a reinscription and purification of the private 
property ideology and scientific managerial approaches in Ontario’s land use law. 
ii. Planning Law 
Understanding planning in this historical context as political and entangled in power 
relations, my project takes up Blomley’s call to explore the relationship between private 
property and planning. Planning, he argues, ‘often appears to distance itself from questions 
regarding property. Its declared focus is the spatial organization of something called “land 
use.”489 Building on Valverde’s unpacking of ‘land use’, Blomley argues, “[L]and use … 
does not quite sever planning from its relation to property, but rather hooks the two together 
in quite a particular and particularly consequential manner.”490 Private property, he notes, is 
enrolled by land use planning “in order to achieve desired ends.”491 This nuanced attention to 
the relationship between private property and planning is critical to my project, which 
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specifically considers the role that law plays in upholding particular private property relations 
and facilitating specific uses of land. Canadian socio-legal scholar Mariana Valverde points 
to law “as a mode or a conduit for governance.”492  She argues that in the context of urban 
governance, law may be only one aspect of the everyday at the local level, but nonetheless 
“law does matter.” 493  
 
Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex web of legislation and policy that is 
described in detail in Chapter Four and critically examined throughout this project. In the 
context of aggregate extraction, the key legal tools include municipal power over zoning and 
official plans and centralized provincial planning policy through the Planning Act494, the 
Provincial Policy Statement495 and the Aggregate Resources Act496 and associated Ministry of 
Natural Resources guidelines.497  There is an impressive body of scholarship examining 
Anglo-American and Canadian planning generally.498 However, with some notable 
exceptions discussed in this section, there is a surprising lack of critical scholarship focused 
on Canadian planning law.499 In her book Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an 
Age of Diversity, Valverde points out, “the main scholarly literatures on the urban either 
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ignore law’s power or show it only as an exceptional force or a set of antiquated rules.”500 
Where critical scholarship has directly considered Canadian planning law, the focus has often 
been explicitly on the ‘urban’ and city planning to the exclusion of rural or peri-urban regions 
and their connections to urban regions.501 More particularly, again with a few exceptions 
including contributions to the 2015 edited collection Public Interest, Private Property, 
Canadian legal scholarship has rarely examined the relationship between private property and 
planning law.502 In their introduction to the collection, Editors Marcia Valiante and Anneke 
Smit call for “a more active debate in Canada on the appropriate parameters of the public 
planning power and role, the acceptable limitations on the enjoyment of private property 
rights, and the influence of both on the shape of urban Canada.”503 Similarly, the Ontario 
Municipal Board has also received surprisingly little attention from legal scholars,504 though 
it has been the subject of more attention from other disciplines.505 This lack of attention is 
surprising both because it is the oldest existing specialist planning tribunal in the world, as 
well as the oldest quasi-judicial body in the province with broad and powerful jurisdiction to 
deal with issues and disputes under over 100 statutes.506 However, it is consistent with an 
internationally recognized gap in legal and planning scholarship with respect to planning 
appeal tribunals.507 In light of these gaps, my project makes an original contribution to both 
legal and planning scholarship by providing a detailed and critical examination of Ontario’s 
planning framework and the role of the Ontario Municipal Board in the context of aggregate 
extraction. Further, because aggregate extraction is both an urban and rural planning issue, it 
necessitates exploration of how the law operates along the spectrum of urban, suburban and 
rural places and their people-place relations. 
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Planning conflicts engage specific legal and regulatory frameworks and a detailed 
examination of how these “mechanisms” actually operate is an important, but often 
neglected, part of understanding land use disputes. Whether the goal is theoretical or political, 
Valverde notes the importance of understanding the distinctive “logics that are not unique but 
nevertheless characteristic of local governance.”508 Valverde’s work is explicitly focused on 
the urban; however, her “law in action” approach509 to making the everyday operation of 
local regulatory and legal tools visible can be adapted to the geographic and jurisdictional 
contexts of this project. Valverde builds a detailed place-based “legal inventory of laws” as 
the starting point of her inquiry.510 In Chapter Four, I adapt this inventory approach to the 
rural land use context in Ontario aiming to provide an overview of the “basic legal 
architecture” and spaces of aggregate resource management. Understanding the specific 
networks of legal tools involved is equally critical to the organization of everyday life outside 
of the ‘urban.’ Indeed, the complexity of planning law is arguably part of what makes land 
use disputes wicked problems wherever they take place.  
 
Valverde points to the unique ways in which planning law works through categories of ‘use’: 
“Governing people, things and spaces through ‘use’ is a different kind of governmental 
operation than the much better known operation of governing through legal categories of 
personhood and group identity.”511 In her view, “use” operates as a distinct legal technology 
in the context of municipal and planning law.512 Instead of acting on persons, or even directly 
on property, she argues, land use law acts on specific uses, which obscures law’s work of 
ordering people and things.513 For Valverde, this has particular legal and political significance 
because she concludes that use logics are “incommensurable” with the logic of rights, and 
therefore, the currency of rights-based claims fails to ”translate” into legal success at the local 
level.514 This poses important challenges to activist strategies attempting to find adjudicative 
solutions to the failure of decision-making processes to account for person-place relations. 
While I argue that such logics extend to various scales of planning governance, not just the 
local, her focus on the ‘how’ of planning governance is highly relevant to understanding the 
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success of aggregate development proponents in Ontario. Complimenting Blomley’s 
performativity approach and his use of ‘bracketing’, Valverde’s attention to particular legal 
mechanisms and relationships informs my detailed consideration of how concepts like 
ownership and rurality work through law to shape aggregate siting decisions. Further, as 
Blomley notes, “[P]lanning, and its instruments, such as zoning, do not have an essential 
politics, and can be deployed for multiple ends.”515 Therefore, understanding how such 
instruments are successfully used towards particular ends can inform activist strategies for 
environmentally just planning and land use decisions, and potentially even transformative 
legal change. 
 
Valverde has more recently built on this work by attending to the relationship between spatial 
and temporal dimensions of law.516 In this more recent work she draws attention to the 
depoliticizing effect of jurisdiction, noting, “[I]n general, for law to work smoothly, disputes 
about the substance and the qualitative features of governance have to be turned into 
seemingly mundane and technical questions about who has control over a particular 
spacetime (an inheritance, a quantity of lumber, a murder)”.517 As will be examined in 
Chapter Four, the shift of regulatory power from local to provincial authorities was a direct 
result of the historically contentious nature of aggregate siting in Ontario. As Valverde notes, 
this shift not only changes the actors, but also what can be claimed, debated, and decided: 
“[T]he consumers of legal decisions are kept from asking: how should problem X or Y be 
governed in the first place.”518 As I argue in Chapter Five, the powerful role of centralized 
provincial planning policy in aggregate disputes limits the influence of public planning 
instruments at the local level.  
 
Valiante attempts to unpack conceptions of the “public interest” and “the common good” that 
have historically justified the limitations on private ownership imposed through land use law 
in Ontario.519 As discussed in Chapter Four, the public interest is not defined in Ontario 
planning law. Rather, a very broadly defined ‘provincial interest’ guides decision-making and 
informs the case-by-case “balancing of competing interests” by local authorities and the 
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Ontario Municipal Board.520 Thus, while she characterizes provincial planning policy as 
“highly prescriptive”, the concept of ‘public interest’ “at the heart of this direction” remains 
highly contested.521 Yet, Valiante argues, as a result of the closed-nature of the approach to 
policy making in Ontario’s planning framework and the reliance on site-specific amendments 
to plans at the municipal level, “participants at every level are restricted to raising concerns 
about a specific proposal and have no forum in which to debate the logic of the prevailing 
approach to growth and development and the underlying assumptions about the benefits that 
are supposed to flow inevitably.” 522 The result, she concludes, is that “[T]he assumptions and 
beliefs that underlie current planning discourse are thus sheltered from public debate.”523 
While Valiante calls for more and better opportunities for participation as a result of this 
closure, which will be discussed in subsection iii, it also suggests the need to unpack key 
legal tools and concepts involved in bracketing conflicts and decisions about land use issues. 
Of particular relevance to this project are the relationships between private property 
ownership and development siting, the development-focused orientation of provincial 
planning, and the tension between expertise, knowledge and experience.  
 
The vast majority of aggregate development occurs on private land. As Blomley notes, rather 
than neutralizing it, the fact that provincial planning law brackets “[i]ssues of property 
acquisition and distribution” implicates planning in reproducing existing forms of exclusion 
and hierarchies of interest, and perhaps even in producing new ones.524 Indeed, it is argued 
here that the relationship of private owners to the land where an aggregate mine is proposed 
imports specific forms of spatial, temporal, and interpretive privilege. Therefore, while it is 
important to understand how land use governance operates through uses rather than persons 
as Valverde suggests,525 and, while “land use planning does not question who owns, or 
how”,526 this research demonstrates that ownership and owners matter in aggregate extraction 
disputes. What Blomley and Valvarde’s work provide is a nuanced approach to 
understanding how and to what ends. In the case of aggregate extraction in Ontario, land use 
planning law builds on the foundational privileges that flow through ownership and is used 
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use to construct extraction as a proper use of land. This “particular arrangement of 
property”527 profoundly shapes people-place relations in the province.  
iii. Participation 
One of the critical aspects of planning law and policy for understanding land use disputes is 
the structure of participation at all decision-making stages, and the legal rights of appeal and 
standing in subsequent adjudicative processes. The importance of decision-making structures 
and structural opportunities for contestation is emphasized by the environmental governance 
literature, such as works by Bakker,528 McCarthy,529 and Perreault.530 These scholars consider 
the role of social movements in disputing, shaping and reinforcing governance structures 
alongside the specific ways in which injustice and inequality are codified by neoliberal 
control of natural resources and environmental decision-making.531 In the UK context, Eloise 
Scotford and Rachael Walsh have argued that land use regimes have redefined property 
relations away from commodification through private property rights and towards a 
democratized form of environmental decision-making.532 However, in the context of 
Ontario’s land use law, Valiante concludes that while there are “multiple public interests at 
play … procedural opportunities to participate do not fully account for all the multiple 
interests, and that private economic and property interests heavily influence the outcomes of 
development decisions nominally made in the public interest.”533 While early twentieth 
century Canadian planning “assumed” the public interest based on the collection of 
‘objective’ data collection and the influence of elites,534 planners and planning scholars now 
recognize the plurality of public interests engaged by land use planning.535 As a result, 
Valiante argues, focus has shifted from defining the public interest to the procedural aspects 
of planning decisions.536 My research seeks to look beyond aspirational statutory goals with 
respect to environmental outcomes or public participation to examine how Ontario’s land use 
planning regime both creates and constrains space for contestation about the use of private 
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land. Therefore, while planning processes do provide for participation in ways that other 
traditional legal forums do not, I seek to understand the specific ways in which law brackets 
both the process and the substance of land use disputes. Valiante and Smit note, “the balance 
between public and private interests in Canadian planning law must be understood as 
evolving and continually in need of negotiation.”537 In this sense, it is critical to understand 
who and what is being included in the negotiations and who and what are being excluded, 
both in order to understand the consequences, and to find strategic openings to intervene and 
transform people-place relations. In this way, the detailed research undertaken in this project 
can point to strategic opportunities to rethink and reassert non-ownership relations.  
Additionally, it proposes ways to avoid the pitfalls of legal translation between 
“incommensurable logics” that Valverde and Blomley discuss.   
 
Murdoch argues that planning should not be understood as a “normative ideal,” but rather as 
“immanently enmeshed” in socio-political context.538 As discussed above, despite the 
ongoing depoliticization of land use planning, the rationality of technical expertise is 
mobilized to justify and enforce prior political decisions about spatial order.539 This is 
particularly important when dealing with environmental issues and people-place relations 
because, as as legal geographers Carolyn Harrison and Tracey Bedford argue on the basis of 
several studies in the United Kingdom, “a planning system underpinned by an ideology of 
private property rights and a free market forecloses alternative ways of valuing the natural 
world.”540 In the United States, Lachapelle and McCool argue that the “technocentric 
utilitarianism” in planning and natural resource governance has led to the “mechanization” of 
natural resource decision-making, in which public input is often seen as “little more than 
another source of data.”541 This technological “way of seeing,” Murdoch argues, results in the 
selective inclusion of actors in planning processes.542 Further, as Harrison and Bedford argue, 
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reliance on technical experts and the resulting instrumental rationality can result in 
“institutional closure” to the range of value orientations engaged by environmental 
decisions.543 In particular, Nash et al. note affective dimensions of place-based relations can 
be excluded by the technical orientation of planning decision-making.544 This project 
demonstrates that these concerns extend to the Canadian context, in which a range of more-
than-owner claims are excluded or fail to be considered, not only as a result of the barriers to 
participation, but because of the closure of planning decision makers to non-instrumental, 
affective, and relational claims about place.  
 
Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of 
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Young and 
Keil’s study of regional water planning points to the discourse of “scarcity” that operates to 
drive regional development in Southwestern Ontario by casting the vulnerability of the 
region’s ecological systems as an investment opportunity through the politics and practice of 
planning.545 Groves et al. similarly argue that ‘risk thinking’ “shapes the distribution of 
power” in the context of energy infrastructure planning in the United Kingdom. 546 In 
particular, they point to the growing role of quasi-state and non-state actors as “centres of 
calculation” controlling the production, organization and distribution of information about 
risks related to resource demand and supply.547 In their study of oil and gas-producing 
provinces in Canada, Carter et al. identified that not only were there barriers to participation, 
access to basic information about extractive impacts was difficult to obtain.548 While Carter et 
al. examined decisions falling under the federal environment assessment regime, the 
processes share key characteristics with aggregate framework examined in this project, 
including proponent control over timing and knowledge production, as well as a trend 
towards exemptions for a wide range of activities and an increasing role for private actors 
within environmental governance.549 They also note that limitations on participation were 
combined with deliberate weakening of regulatory capacity and scientific knowledge, 
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increasing reliance on non-state actors for aspects of environmental governance.550 Policy 
makers, Carter et al. found, routinely defended oil and gas development with economic 
justifications about the need for revenue.551 The resulting “narratives of necessity” 552 place 
conceptual limits on the terms of debate about specific land use decisions with important 
implications for attempts to assert non-ownership relations with place.  
 
My research builds on insights from planning and urban studies scholars by examining the 
context of aggregate extraction as a site where “assumptions and storylines”553 interact with 
land use law to frame environmental governance and people-place relations in Ontario. 
Aggregate sites are places with complex material and eco-social relations, but for the 
purposes of land use law, they are divided into different kinds of space for particular human 
uses: agricultural fields, ‘natural’ sites such as forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as 
trails, and subsurface resources such as mineral deposits and groundwater sources. People-
place relations are defined and constrained through these categories and associated legal 
logics of ‘use’ and ‘need’, as well as through broader discursive frames about development 
and human-environment relations. In Ontario, these underlying discourses fundamentally 
shape individual planning decisions, and therefore, as discussed in Chapter Four, the closed-
nature of provincial policy making means “many of the most basic assumptions and policy 
directions of planning the province are off the table” even during formal consultation 
processes about guiding instruments in the planning framework.554 In the case of aggregate 
mineral planning, this is compounded by the involvement of technical experts who are 
simultaneously engaged to prepare reports that will inform government policy and are 
retained by aggregate developers for siting applications.555 
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British geographers Richard Cowell and Susan Owens link the integration of environmental 
concerns into the land use decision-making framework to the successful use of participatory 
opportunities by environmental interests and concerned communities.556 In particular, they 
point to the locally based resistance to aggregate extraction in rural England as having 
successfully “reframed” both the problems and the solutions related to extraction.557 
According to Cowell and Owens, this “subversive” use of the planning system has been 
related to particular “opportunity structures” 558 and “theatrical opportunities”559 within the 
public-inquiry based system. As they argue,  
…the importance of planning lies not simply in its instrumental capacity to deliver 
environmental sustainability, but in its relative openness to influence by environmental 
interests and concerned communities, which enable connections to be drawn between 
projects, plans and wider policies.560 
Groves et al. build on Cowell and Owen’s work to argue that in addition to having 
instrumental utility in terms of enhancing the evidence base for decision-making, 
participatory process may also facilitate “public reflection on substantive issues” and 
furthering social justice by providing recognition of inequity and historical injustice.561 In 
particular, they argue, planning forums can provide critical opportunities to examine and 
rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy as well as consider larger questions 
about social, economic and ecological relations: “If a piece of infrastructure is a kind of 
solution to a problem, participatory governance may, by including more perspectives, enable 
the problem itself to be examined, along with the ways in which it has been framed as a 
problem.” 562 In this sense, planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking 
about people-place relations despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or mundane issues 
of infrastructure siting or zoning and despite presumptions about ‘need’ and ‘demand.’ As 
Gibson notes in the Canadian context, “[P]ublic participants have historically been the actors 
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most motivated and often most effective in ensuring careful critical review of project 
proposals and associated environmental assessment work.”563 
While planning disputes, particularly disputes about the siting of infrastructure such as 
quarries, are often characterized as conflicts between localized ‘not-in-my-backyard’ politics 
and broader public interest, this project adopts the perspective that land use disputes are much 
more complex and often raise significant substantive issues that are otherwise left out of 
public planning processes. In this sense, my research demonstrates that not only does more-
than-owner participation serve to legitimize the outcome of planning decisions,564 it has the 
potential to improve substantive outcomes by ensuring that critical issues are raised and 
evidence considered. Critics such as Kaplinsky have raised valid concerns about the specific 
forms of objection used by private land owners in disputes over new land uses, particularly 
the cloaking of concerns in the language of “traffic,” “parking,” “environmental,” or other 
concerns about supposed tangible impact.”565 Indeed, Valverde also points to the “hijacking” 
of participatory processes by homeowners, particularly in the context of affordable housing 
development.566 However, as Groves et al. argue, “siting conflicts over such infrastructure 
often act as condensation points for wider concerns, which can ‘cross scale’ from the interests 
of a specific community to connect with national and international issues.”567 Indeed the Stop 
the Mega Quarry campaign discussed in Chapter One began as a localized conflict in the 
small rural township of Melancthon, Ontario, yet it has evolved into an ambitious and 
ongoing “Food and Water First” campaign about environmental and food policy at multiple 
scales. In my view, it is possible to acknowledge the unequal distribution of power and access 
to participation in planning without reducing the issues raised in such disputes as NIMBYism 
‘cloaked’ in environmental or other impact concerns. The more interesting questions are 
whether and how legal and policy frameworks may constrain the types of claims made by 
parties such that broader questions about social priorities, people-place relations and 
alternative conceptions of the public interest are narrowed to fit within the particular logics 
familiar to land use planning decision makers. Following from Michael Woods et al., I seek 
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to engage with the “complex relations of attachment, belonging, exclusion and otherness that 
permeate such conflicts.”568  
 
The failure to meaningfully involve communities in planning policy development prior to the 
approval process for site-specific proposals and the framing of participation as ‘objection’ 
may not only constrain who participates, but also how they articulate and assert claims.569 In 
the context of natural resources planning, Lachapelle and McCool emphasize the importance 
of opportunities to redefine problems and solutions in natural resource planning. They point 
to the concept of ‘ownership’ in participation as one way to account for a range of forms of 
knowledge about a particular place or environment and to facilitate the redistribution of 
power in relation to decisions about that place.570 This relational conception of ownership in 
participation is characterized by “responsibility, obligation, and caring imbued by citizens 
and agencies for both the problem and the process of public resource planning and 
management.”571 Lachapelle and McCool argue that transformative potential in natural 
resource planning depends on both the willingness of decision makers to share responsibility 
and deal with issues of structural inequality, as well as their capacity as decision makers to 
develop relationships of trust and cooperation with the public.572 Critically, the authors 
referred to in this subsection point to specific conditions under which participation in 
planning processes provide the kind of opportunities outlined above. These include the 
following: early participation prior to decisions being or the terms of debate being defined; a 
rethinking of the role of experts in planning; access to information; meaningful opportunities 
to impact and influence the outcome; accounting for a diversity of values and perspectives; 
acknowledging the multi-scalar effects of planning decisions; transparency about the process; 
and, provision on clear and principled reasons for every decision.573 While Cowell and 
Owens emphasize that good planning decisions are not correlated to a particular scale of 
decision-making, the “upscaling” of planning in the UK from local to regional levels 
eliminated “a key deliberative forum.”574 They argue that in England the local level forum 
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served as “a space in which the links between grounded experiences of development become 
linked to policy learning and change.”575 This resonates with Valiante’s concerns about the 
closure of provincial planning policy processes in Ontario.576 Echoing Fudge and Cossman, 
Groves et al. describe how neoliberal decentralization through privatization and the resulting 
recentralization of decision-making power577 has resulted in “systemic difficulties” for the 
participation of the “wider publics” in planning decisions.578 This project examines how one 
particular land use has been ‘scaled-up’ and despite the role of municipal governance in land 
use planning in Ontario, it is hierarchically privileged by this closed policy-led provincial 
planning framework. However, I note that scaling-up planning decisions should not be 
understood as inherently negative, just as local control does not necessarily further social or 
environmental justice. As Valverde has demonstrated, ‘local’ control over certain types of 
planning decisions tends to privilege particular notions of morality and social hierarchy, in 
particular with respect to the siting of shelter housing and other attempts to shift away from 
the dominance of the single-family home in residential areas.579  
As Sager notes, the push for “flexible planning” and for faster planning processes is linked to 
neoliberal governance and the emphasis on entrepreneurialism in planning policy.580 What 
Owens refers to as the “planning cascade”581 limits participation to objection to specific 
development proposals and issues of siting in the context of predetermined ‘need’ and 
predefined policy problems. In this way, land use conflicts appear to be the types of localized 
NIMBY conflicts in which vested interests clash with the public interest and the need for, or 
possibility of, “substantive reflection on strategic problems” is rejected or ignored.582 
According to scholars in both the United Kingdom583 and Canada,584 it is precisely these 
political opportunities for deliberation on substantive issues that have been the target of 
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government reforms aimed at ‘modernising’ or ‘streamlining’ planning processes. 
Constructed as being “obstructive,” these “subversive functions of planning” are replaced 
with a “technical-rational” model of land use decision-making that reinforces the scientific 
managerial vision of planning.585 Despite the relative historical effectiveness of groups in 
shifting planning discourse towards environmental sustainability, these types of deliberative 
opportunities are depicted as inappropriate “blockages” and environmentalists are depicted as 
anti-growth, anti-progress and even more recently in Canada, dangerous.586  
Changes to Canada’s federal environmental assessment in 2012 not only directly limited 
participation, but more importantly by dramatically reducing the number of projects that 
would be assessed and narrowing the scope of assessment, the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act of 2012 “eliminates many opportunities for public participation and limit[s] 
the potential range of public contributions, probably excluding the most significant public 
concerns.”587 The changes responded to “unprecedented attempts at public objections to oil 
and gas industry expansion.”588 They leave key responsibilities to provincial frameworks, 
which in the case of Ontario has also been compromised, according to Gibson.589 The 
subsequent federal Liberal government has undertaken a review of the Act and environmental 
assessment processes, which was still underway at the time of writing.590 In the context of oil 
and gas extraction Carter et al. found “ongoing and increased impediments to public 
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involvement.”591 Cowell and Owens also point to the ability of policymakers, and developers, 
to constrain debate and participation through adopting and defining concepts such as 
‘sustainable development’ in ways that may "discipline" alternative conceptions.592 
Examining a federal oil and gas review in Canada, Anna Zalik argues, “[I]t offers a venue 
through which competing responses to ecological/economic crises are offered by capital and 
its opponents; but it also encloses the affective and most unruly elements of such struggles – 
within formal procedures shaped by the interests of extractive capital/state alliances.”593 My 
project will specifically examine how Ontario’s land use planning framework constrains 
opportunities for debate and limits creative articulations of people-place relations. 
iv. Planning, place, and the ‘more-than-human’ world 
One of the more challenging elements of focusing my project on people-place relations rather 
than on more general aspects of environmental concerns and participation in land use 
disputes is the difficulty of the ‘more-than-human’.594 The emphasis on improvement and use 
noted by Blomley continues to influence contemporary planning. My detailed examination of 
aggregate extraction law and policy demonstrates that the anthropocentric conception of 
‘conservation’ as protecting resources for human use promoted by early planners continues to 
fundamentally inform contemporary planning in Ontario. As Adams wrote of land use in 
early twentieth century Ontario: “To conserve land resources means to prevent deterioration 
of the productive uses of the land that has already been equipped and improved, and 
simultaneously to develop more intensive use of such land, as well as to open up and improve 
new lands.”595 Zalik points to the use of ‘resource sterilization’ by both proponents and the 
state in the context of oil and gas development in Alberta to describe both environmental 
protection measures and use-based claims by First Nations that were argued should prevent 
mining. As discussed in Chapter Four, Ontario’s guiding planning policy provides for 
absolute protection of aggregate mineral resources and operations from development and 
activities that “hinder expansion or continued use” or would be “incompatible” for public 
health, safety or environmental impact related reasons.596 In the 2010 State of the Aggregate 
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Resource Report prepared for government, overlapping “planning, environmental and 
agricultural” uses and interests were characterized as “constraints” on resource development, 
indicating the pro-development orientation of the analysis.597 As Harrison and Bedford note, 
existing legal frameworks perpetuate an understanding of nature as separate from society and 
fail to account for relations of connectivity and dependence between humans and 
nonhumans.598 They call for new planning structures and practices that can account for a 
diversity of perspectives and values, as well as opening space for ecological systems to join 
the debate on their own terms.599 As noted above, recognition and respect for Indigenous 
legal orders and jurisdiction over land use decision-making is a particularly promising way to 
facilitate such a shift in Canada. For example in Anishinabek law, rocks have legal 
personality and interests that must be considered in decision-making: “it would be 
inappropriate to use rocks without their acquiescence and participation because such inaction 
could oppress their liberty in some circumstances.”600 In Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 
John Borrows describes a legal process in his home community, Neyashiingmiing, to decide 
whether an alvar area of the Niagara Escarpment could be used as a new pow-wow site. 
Based on “community deliberation, naturalistic observation drawn from scientists and Elders 
and sacred teachings” the decision-making process provided for the appropriate “respect and 
reverence” towards the alvar and resulted in a decision not to relocate the pow-wow site to 
that location.601 As discussed below, Indigenous contributions are leading calls for a 
broadened conception of environmental justice in Canada.602 In New Zealand, some Treaty of 
Waitangi settlements have resulted in sophisticated and creative engagements with Māori law 
to redress historical breaches and grievances. These include the Whanganui River, which is 
now a legal person with trustees from the Whanganui iwi and the Crown jointly-appointed to 
act in its interest;603 and, Te Urewera, a site of violent suppression of anti-colonial resistance 
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and a former national park, which is now vested in its own legal identity, owning itself in 
perpetuity, and governed by the laws of the Tūhoe people through the Te Urewera Board.604 
Political ecology and place-based perspectives also hold promise for moving this project 
forward. Building on the critical geography and political ecology perspectives outlined 
above, Murdoch challenges the humanist and anthropocentric foundations of planning by 
calling for the ‘ecologizing’ of planning.605 He argues that the unequal distribution of power 
in the inherently political processes of planning has meant that earlier efforts to incorporate 
environmental and sustainability concerns failed to fundamentally shift the instrumental 
understanding of human-nature relations as powerful interests were able to define notions of 
capacity and sustainability in their interests.606  Following from Latour, Murdoch challenges 
scholars of planning theory and practice to “rethink the distinctions between the physical, the 
social, the political and the environmental.”607 The resulting uncertainty and complexity is 
profoundly challenging to basic precepts of planning and property law. In particular, his call 
to enlarge planning procedures to ‘give voice’ to nonhumans such that all those affected by 
planning’s operation can take part in decision-making requires a rethinking of both planning 
theory and practice.608 While my project does not take this up directly, by focusing on the 
role of human-nonhuman relations as they emerge in the context of land use disputes, my 
project will push thinking about planning law and techniques for the inclusion of human-
more-than-human relations forward. This project draws particular attention to the 
environmentally-focused narratives of more-than-owner parties in aggregate disputes to 
understand whether and how articulations of relationships with the more-than-human world 
may serve as a foundation for a environmentally just politics of rural place. As outlined in the 
following subsection, this project also supports the call for a shift in environmental justice 
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approaches that foregrounds the leadership of Indigenous voices and integrates ecological 
integrity with environmental justice to account for the more-than-human world.609 
C. Environmental Justice 
Environmental justice is both a theoretical approach in academia and a framing tool used by 
activists and policy makers.610 While the literature on environmental justice is broad, this 
project engages with environmental justice scholarship in two key ways: i) to support calls 
for a shift away from anthropocentric understandings of justice towards more relational 
approaches that extend to the more-than-human world; and ii) to understand how rurality can 
be understood as a dimension of environmental justice. In doing so, this project primarily 
engages with Canadian environmental justice scholars in order to situate the case of 
aggregate resource extraction within the specific context of patterns of environmental 
inequity in the Canadian state and the particular historical and ongoing processes of 
colonialism and resource extractivism contributing to such patterns. By focusing on Canadian 
scholarship, I seek to engage with other Canadian research about the distribution of 
environmental harms and impacts, entitlement to environmental benefits, as well as access to 
and participation in environmental decision-making. While environmental justice approaches 
and practices emerged in the context of the United States to contend with the uneven 
distribution of environmental harms, particularly the impact of industrial development on 
African-American communities and the grassroots responses,611 Canadian scholarship is 
adapting the framework to a range of contexts.612 As Agyeman et al. point out, environmental 
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justice movements have been active in Canada “for centuries (if not millennia), just as there 
have been struggles over the ownership of land and resources throughout Canadian history – 
and before the boats came.”613 In particular, Indigenous struggles to protect territory and 
ways of life have long been fighting environmental injustice in many forms.614  
 
I follow from Agyman et al. in rejecting the need to provide a fixed definition of 
environmental justice. Rather than seeking to find “the definitive statement on the 
relationships between land, resources, nature, history, power relations, society, peoples, 
inequity, and all out (human and other-than-human) relations”,615 they seek to be part of a 
larger conversation. This project also aims to contribute to such conversations about how the 
relations we produce, uphold, and sustain as part of broader social, ecological and physical 
networks can be more equitable. For the purposes of this project, I broadly understand 
environmental justice as having both procedural and substantive dimensions which can and 
do overlap, as well as being concerned with the distribution of both environmental benefits 
and harms.616 In addition, more recent work by “Critical Environmental Justice” scholars 
such as David N. Pellow, examines the ways in which “multiple social categories of 
difference are entangled in the production of environmental justice, from race, gender, 
sexuality, ability, and class to species, which would attend to the ways in which both the 
human and more-than-human world are impacted by and respond to environmental 
justice.”617 Scholarship in Canada has also pointed to the need to expand not only 
definitionally, but also to broaden the voices and worldviews, as well as methodologies 
within environmental justice theory and practice.618 Of particular relevance to this project is 
the need to shift away from an anthropocentric orientation of environmental justice.619 
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i. Extending Environmental Justice: The More-Than-Human-World 
As McGregor points out, environmental justice scholarship has been focused on people, 
which she argues “assumes a certain ideology about “environment” – with a focus on how 
certain groups of people (especially those bearing labels such as “minority,” “poor,” 
disadvantaged,” or “Native”) are impacted by environmental destruction, as if the 
environment were somehow separate from us.”620 Indeed, environmental justice is now often 
linked with human rights frameworks.621 However, McGregor explains how this is a limited 
conception of environmental justice from an Anishnaabe perspective, which sees 
environmental justice more broadly: “It is about justice for all beings of Creation, not only 
because threats to their existence threaten ours but because from an Aboriginal perspective 
justice among beings of Creation is life-affirming … While people certainly have a 
responsibility for justice, so do other beings”.622 As Neimanis et al. argue, the human-centred 
conception of environmental justice obscures a key link to the relationship between 
ecological integrity and the survival and well-being of all forms of life.623 Therefore, they 
argue, environmental justice scholarship should work to integrate conceptions of ecological 
integrity and social and ecological justice.624 Further, McGregor notes that an Anishnaabe 
perspective requires environmental justice to recognize the relationships and corresponding 
responsibilities of all beings in ensuring “the processes of Creation will continue.”625  The 
eco-relational approach developed in this project supports this work to foreground people-
place relations and interdependence in land use decision-making, as well as recognizing the 
jurisdiction of Indigenous legal orders that continue to do this work in particular places. In 
doing so, this project aims to avoid the binaries of anthropocentric versus ecocentric 
approaches to environmental governance. 
 
Haluza-Delay et al. articulate a goal for an action-oriented scholarly agenda in Canada: “That 
we may live well together in this land.”626 They propose several dimensions to this: the moral 
question of “both how to ‘live’ and how to do it ‘well’”; the implicit shift from the individual 
to “togetherness”; and, the place-based nature of this togetherness to include social and 
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physical dimensions.627 While they specifically engage with Canadian studies and 
environmental studies in advocating for “place pluralism,” in my view, their goal is equally 
relevant to legal scholars seeking to address injustices and work towards environmental 
justice and decolonization. Further, and of particular relevance to this project, they 
specifically align this goal with relational and embodied conceptions of place.628 Indeed, they 
propose a “place pluralism” that accounts for the “variability of place, and the sutures and 
fractures in what seems to have material objectivity”, while also making “explicit the 
participation of more ecological actors.”629 Building on Gruenewald’s twin bases of 
“reinhabitation” and “decolonization” for a pluralistic approach to place,630 Haluza-Delay et 
al. extend conceptions of recognition in environmental justice towards an “ecological politics 
of recognition”631 – one that recognizes “ecological others, of contrasting cultural practices of 
the land, of our own domination or suppression, and of the past.”632 Indeed they argue that a 
conception of “just sustainability” rooted in place pluralism is one of the key Canadian 
contributions to broader conversations about environmental justice, which they note, “comes 
about primarily with Indigenous peoples as partners in knowledge formation.”633 Just 
sustainability requires the duality of reinhabiting place through the development of ways of 
living informed by the particularity of place and the unsettling and uncomfortable work of 
decolonization.634 Haluza-Delay et al. provide a useful framework for understanding when 
and how place-based claims and place-protection are complicit in reinforcing ongoing 
colonization, particularly colonial land use patterns linked to exclusion and the distribution of 
environmental harms.635 In particular, this project examines the role that law plays in 
obscuring the plurality of place and excluding embodied and relational understandings of 
place from decision-making processes. Following from Graham’s work, this project argues 
that this is one way in which law can limit the potential of land use politics to realize 
transformative environmental relations.636  
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ii. Rurality and Environmental Justice 
This project also considers whether and how rurality emerges as a dimension of 
environmental justice. In particular, it examines how the legal construction of the “rural” 
contributes to environmental injustice and facilitates extractive development. As Pellow 
notes, “the integrity and future of rural spaces has never been at great risk” from 
environmental harms associated with resource extraction and development.637 Nonetheless, 
the specific role of rurality in vulnerability to the distribution of environmental harms and 
access to environmental benefits has been underexplored. As Pellow notes, while many sites 
of environmental justice activism and scholarship may have been rural in nature, including in 
many rural and remote Indigenous territories and communities in Canada, rurality is “simply 
not at the heart of this literature.”638 
 
Building on critical planning scholarship discussed above in Section 2, my research rejects 
simplistic accounts of rural land use politics as NIMBYism.639 In Ontario, engagement in 
planning decision-making about peri-urban and rural areas by farmers, ex-urbanites, and 
vacation-homeowners have been characterized as largely self-interested.640 Such claims are 
often largely understood as linked to amenity values or property values and as “rooted in the 
traditional producers’ discourse of individualism and property rights.”641  As Jennifer Foster’s 
important research on environmental planning in the Niagara Escarpment and Oak Ridges 
Moraine in Ontario demonstrates, dominant narratives about environmental preservation and 
planning have been implicated in “social exclusion and xenophobia”.642 Further, as Foster 
argues, they can and do reinforce colonial land use narratives and constructions of place and 
landscape that erase and exclude Indigenous histories and contemporary jurisdiction and 
ways of life.643 These are critical dangers of parochial politics of place and the 
depoliticization of the planning process through land use law that do emerge as part of rural 
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land use politics in Ontario. In the Canadian context, this research argues, rural land use 
politics must engage with the uncomfortable and difficult work of grappling with settler-
colonialism in order to contribute to environmental justice.  
 
At the same time, this project demonstrates that rural people-place relations are complex, and 
sometimes, contradictory. As researchers we cannot presume claims in rural land use politics 
are one-dimensional. Following from environmental scholars such as Sandberg et al. and 
Gilbert et al. who explore the complexity of place-politics in Ontario,644 my project explores 
this complexity in order to find strategic opportunities to engage in difficult conversations 
about living together and with the land. Nuanced and critical examination of expressions of 
ecological relations, respect for Indigenous histories and legal orders, and assertions of 
reciprocity with the more-than-human world in the politics of rural places is a crucial part of 
building environmental justice movements across the rural-urban interface.645 In this way, as 
Alexa Scully argues in discussing reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples in Canada, places 
and the embodied and experiential relations of which they are constituted can serve as “the 
literal common ground”646 for realizing progressive planning and environmental justice. 
Further, in Pellow’s view, work on the intersection of rurality and environmental justice is a 
key site to explore questions about human-more-than-human relations: “[H]ow can we work 
together with nonhuman natures as our allies and partners to promote and secure 
environmental justice and sustainability for all?”647 
 
Emerging scholarship that examines environmental justice claims in rural contexts can 
provoke and push scholarship and practice beyond the “mold” of “grassroots, ‘bottom-up’ 
community reactions by people of colour in low-income neighbourhoods,”648 as the 
examination of wind-resistance in Ontario by Dayna N. Scott and Adrian Smith 
demonstrates. They ask, “How should we react to movements of white, middle class property 
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owners articulating claims that resonate with the values and aims that have motivated the 
environmental justice movement?”649 While not all rural land use movements share these 
characteristics, indeed rurality can be associated with poverty and economic marginalization 
as well as resource dependence, those engaged in the land use politics examined here were 
predominately white and property owners. As Scott and Smith argue, this necessarily points 
to an important “enduring privilege” that may powerfully inform their capacity to demand 
political responses to their resistance and shape their access to decision makers and 
processes.650 At the same time, as Pellow argues, explorations of rurality and environmental 
justice provide an important caution for scholars and activists to guard against assumptions 
that “inclusion might enable justice”, which he defines as one of the “greatest shortcomings” 
in environmental justice movements and scholarship.”651 He notes that this emphasis on 
procedural inclusion limits the potential to shift away from state-centric frameworks, and 
therefore, the transformative potential of environmental justice work.652 Indeed, as this 
project demonstrates, it also limits our ability to expose how law works to shape people-place 
relations towards particular property relations and forms of land use through the selective 
inclusion and exclusion of ‘what is at stake’ in a particular dispute. In this sense, the relative 
privilege and institutional access of those resisting particular forms of land use and 
development does not necessarily translate into transformative claims about place-based 
relations being heard or acknowledged in decision-making processes. Following from 
Graham and Nedelsky, this research takes an eco-relational approach to examining land use 
disputes in places legally defined as rural in order to understand claims to environmental 
justice as more than claims to procedural inclusion. Rather, it interrogates the ways in which 
the place-based claims expose concerns about the loss or transformation of place and 
severing of relations with the more-than-human world. In doing so, it cautiously and critically 
looks for strategic openings to work towards a just and inclusive politics of ‘living well 
together’ in rural places. 
 
This chapter has introduced the theoretical strands I have woven together to develop the 
place-based methodology discussed in the following chapter, and to generate my eco-
relational approach to land use law, discussed in Chapters Five through Nine, from the 
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documentary and interview data collected in this project. The following chapters apply the 
ideas and concepts outlined above to examine the structure of legal relations in Ontario’s 
aggregate mineral planning framework and to uncover the broad more-than-owner relations 
engaged by these disputes.
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the methodology applied in this project, including the process of 
constructing the research questions and research plan, and the approach to data analysis. I 
begin by introducing qualitative approaches and the rationale for adopting them. The second 
section examines place-based research methods and their application to this study. The third 
section describes the documentary review, the participants, the research settings and the 
interview process. The approach to data analysis is established in the fourth section. The final 
section then examines the validity and generalizability of the research and sets out the 
limitations. 
 
For this project I developed a qualitative data-based methodology for documentary analysis 
which includes the design, conduct, and analysis of unstructured interviews with participants 
in aggregate extraction conflicts. My methodological approach was informed by my desire to 
privilege the experiences and perspectives of the participants while also uncovering the range 
of socio-material people-place relations engaged by these disputes. In this way, I was able to 
develop my original eco-relational framework to foreground the people-place relations 
engaged in aggregate extraction conflicts and identify the values at stake while also ensuring 
these are set in the context of broader institutional relations. 
 
1. Qualitative Research 
The qualitative data-based method adopted in this project is informed by the theoretical 
framework set out in Chapter Two and place-based approaches to research about 
environmental issues. Qualitative methodologies begin from an understanding of the social 
world, including law and regulatory practices, as primarily socially constructed. In doing so, 
qualitative approaches explicitly acknowledge the need to situate research within the social 
world.1 Like other land use conflicts, aggregate extraction disputes are about specific places 
and environments rather than abstract notions of ‘the environment’. Therefore, detailed 
examination of the wider context in which these conflicts arise, and conflicting claims are 
articulated, is essential to understanding the disputes examined here. 
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Qualitative research is characterized by reflexivity, detailed contextual analysis and 
acknowledgement of the negotiated multiplicity of social life.2  To illustrate this, Clifford 
Geertz’s notion of “thick description” points to the need for rich contextual description of the 
actions and practices of people with an interest in the problem being examined in order to 
identify connections and patterns.3 Forestry scholars Mae Davenport and Dorothy Anderson 
argue that research about people-place relations in natural resource scholarship can “extend 
our understanding of the human-environment relationship beyond the tangible and 
instrumental to include the symbolic and emotional.”4 In particular, they advocate for 
qualitative research methodologies in this area of research: “By examining people’s 
connections to places as expressed through their own words, these studies capture the 
subjective, lived experiences people have with nature.”5   Davenport and Anderson point to 
the strength of interpretive research in which theory is generated from the data to provide 
much needed guidance for decision makers and regulatory agencies in the complex context of 
natural resource and land use conflicts.6 This kind of inductive approach, Lisa Webley notes, 
“seeks to derive themes or patterns from the data collected as the research progresses.”7  This 
project adopts an original place-based qualitative methodology for legal research that seeks to 
uncover and foreground articulations of relations with place.   This methodology is used in 
order to theorize the work done through law to shape people-place relations, and explore how 
these relations in turn shape law. In the context of environmental decision-making, Neil 
Adger et al., note that “thick” analysis also requires interdisciplinary research across the 
social sciences and beyond.8 This project extends beyond legal scholarship to engage with 
geography, political science, history, and sociology scholarship and incorporates Elizabeth 
Fisher et al.’s call for environmental law scholars to develop “interactional expertise” to 
ensure “legal scholarship is based on a sound understanding of environmental problems.”9 
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8 W Neil Adger et al, “Governance for Sustainability: Towards a ‘Thick’ Analysis of Environmental 
Decisionmaking” (2003) 35 Environment and Planning A 6 1095 at 1096. 
9 E Fisher et al, “Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship” (2009) 
21 J Environ Law 2 213. 
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A. Place-Based Qualitative Research: The Researcher as a Participant in Place 
Place-based research, Antony S. Cheng et al. argue, has the potential to enhance dialogue and 
deliberation by foregrounding the “rich, layered place meanings that are expressed and 
valued by people” in natural resource decision-making. For them, one of the central goals of 
taking a place-based approach is “to foster more equitable, democratic participation in natural 
resource politics by including a broader range of voices and values centering around places 
rather than policy positions.”10 Place-based research, they argue, is qualitative research that 
seeks to “uncover place-based connections.”11 In this study, place is used to express an 
explicit acknowledgement of the relationality of the human and ecological communities.  
Ecologists and other scholars interested in areas of natural resource management are using 
place-based approaches to explore people-place relations in the context of environmental 
decision-making.12 However, with the exception of some legal historians, this place-based 
approach to scholarship has rarely been taken up in legal scholarship. As Fisher et al. 
observe, non-legal scholarship about environmental law often demonstrates “very little 
appreciation of the complexity of legal institutions, ideas and processes involved.”13 In 
actively adopting a place-based approach by “designing and facilitating processes where a 
rich diversity of place meanings can be expressed, negotiated, and transformed”,14 I draw 
place-based approaches into legal scholarship. At the same time, I extend the place-based 
perspective by taking the complexity of legal practices and processes seriously and focus on 
how legal tools and practices are used to include, exclude, and transform people-place 
relations.  
This research goes beyond uncovering and understanding place connections to examining the 
co-constitutive role of legal concepts, tools, and practices in place-making and the production 
                                                         
10 Antony S Cheng, Linda E Kruger & Steven E Daniels, “‘Place’ as an Integrating Concept in Natural Resource 
Politics: Propositions for a Social Science Research Agenda” (2003) 16:2 Society & Natural Resources 87 at 89. 
11 Ibid at 100. 
12 Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 682; Richard C Stedman, “Is It Really Just a Social Construction?: The 
Contribution of the Physical Environment to Sense of Place” (2003) 16 Society & Natural Resources 8 671; 
Davenport & Anderson, supra note 4; Herbert W Schroeder, “Ecology of the heart: Understanding how people 
experience natural environments” (1996) 13 Natural resource management: The human dimension 27; Herbert 
W Schroeder, “Voices From Michigan’s Black River: Obtaining Information On ‘Special Places’ For Natural 
Resource Planning” (St. Paul, Minn.: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, North Central Forest 
Experiment Station, 1996), online: <http://www.cabdirect.org/abstracts/19980611838.html>. 
13 Fisher et al, supra note 9 at 234. 
14 Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 10 at 101. 
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of people-place relations. In doing so, I take up Deborah Martin et al.’s call for more research 
examining the disconnect between people’s place claims and law and the actors and networks 
in land use conflicts.15 Attention to place-based connections, not only more accurately 
exposes what is at stake in a particular conflict about land use, it also provides a basis for the 
relational reorientation of land use law away from instrumental anthropocentrism by creating 
space for a much wider range of relations with place and the values that these relationships 
uphold. Attention to the range and complexity of place claims in land use disputes reveals 
connections and commonalties between divergent and overlapping people-place relations and 
can complicate stereotypes and simplistic characterizations of land use politics.16 As Cheng et 
al. argue, “place-based research should [also] seek to question the status quo and to give real 
meaning and substance to public involvement in natural resource politics.”17 Daniel Williams 
and Michael Patterson further acknowledge that understanding people-place relations is 
critical to natural resource management as it “embeds resource attributes into the system of 
which they are a part”.18 In this way place-based research can expose how decision-making 
shapes relations beyond the human world. In doing so, the approach adopted here creates 
space for a broader conversation about the role of land use law and whether relevant legal 
frameworks have the capacity to account for values and relationships articulated by the 
participants.19  
In taking up a place-based approach I also note Richard Stedman’s caution about its neglect 
of the role of the physical dimensions of the environment in constructing these meanings in 
relationship with people.20 Davenport and Anderson also push researchers to develop a 
“holistic and integrated understanding” of the place meanings and the specific physical 
setting to which they relate.21 Therefore, beyond adopting qualitative interpretivist 
approaches, I follow Cheng et al. in acknowledging the need for researchers to experience the 
places they research. As described in the Introduction, my own familiarity with some of the 
                                                         
15 Deborah Martin, Alexander Scherr & Christopher City, “Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the 
Production of Space” (2010) 34 Prog Hum Geogr 2 175 at 35. 
16 Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 682 at 99; Andrea M Brandenburg & Matthew S Carroll, “Your place 
or mine?: The effect of place creation on environmental values and landscape meanings” (1995) 8 Society & 
Natural Resources 5 381 at 391. 
17 Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 10 at 101. 
18 Daniel R Williams & Michael E Patterson, “Environmental meaning and ecosystem management: 
Perspectives from environmental psychology and human geography” (1996) 9 Society & Natural Resources 5 
507 at 508. 
19 Martin, Scherr & City, supra note 15. 
20 Stedman, supra note 12 at 671. 
21 Davenport & Anderson, supra note 4 at 630. 
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places and conflicts involved was a motivation for undertaking this research. While as Cheng 
et al. note, “[T]here is no objective middle ground” in the context of natural resource 
conflicts, it is important to recognize that this familiarity and connection positions me as a 
kind of interested party rather than an objective and neutral observer. The advantages and 
limitations of this positionality will be discussed in more detail in the next section; however, 
from a place-based perspective it has particular advantages. While I did not have in-depth 
experiences of all the places involved in this study, I did have the advantage of intimate 
knowledge of the geography, as well as general familiarity with the social dynamics of 
several places involved. This not only provided a basis on which to build the place-based 
approach adopted here, it contributed to a sense of trust with participants in both the initial 
stages of recruitment and during the interviews. Put simply, people understood that I saw and 
cared about the places involved in the disputes and this helped them feel comfortable sharing 
their narratives and experiences with me.  
In addition to my personal understanding and experience of the places involved, participants 
provided invaluable experiences of place through site visits where possible, and through 
photos, maps, and narratives about the places involved. Attention to the visual texts provided 
by participants as well as those included in application materials also provides insight into the 
ways that these “stand in for the actual site” in planning processes, particularly for decision 
makers and other legal actors.22 Environmental history scholarship about Ontario, such as 
David Wood’s exploration of settlement in Ontario, Claire Elizabeth Campbell’s study of the 
Georgian Bay region, Neil Forkey’s study of the Trent Valley, Kelly and Larson’s forest 
history of the Niagara Escarpment and Nick Eyles work on the geological history of the 
province also augmented my understanding of the places and people-place relations of 
Ontario.23  
                                                         
22 Susan Turner, “Rendering the Site Developable: Texts And Local Government Decision Making In Land Use 
Planning”, Marie L Campbell & Ann Manicom, eds. Knowledge, Experience, and Ruling Relations (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) 234 at 235. 
23 David Wood, Making Ontario (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 2000); Claire Elizabeth Campbell, 
Shaped by the West Wind: Nature And History in Georgian Bay (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); Neil Stevens 
Forkey, Shaping the Upper Canadian frontier: environment, society, and culture in the Trent Valley (University 
of Calgary Press, 2003); Peter E Kelly & Douglas W Larson, The last stand: a journey through the ancient cliff-
face forest of the Niagara Escarpment (Toronto: Dundurn, 2007); Nick Eyles, Ontario rocks: three billion years 
of environmental change (Markham: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Ltd, 2002). 
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2. Data Collection 
William Gibson and Andrew Brown point to three ways of thinking about methods in 
qualitative data collection: “observing people; asking people questions; and reading.”24 The 
approach I developed largely involves reading and talking to people through documentary 
analysis and unstructured key informant interviews. The use of multiple methods provides for 
an exploration of the problem being examined from different perspectives than would be 
available simply through documentary or interview research alone. 
A. Reading: Documentary Analysis 
The reading, or documentary analysis, in this research includes the literature review of 
relevant secondary material, critical examination of the legal framework for licensing 
extraction, review of aggregate extraction licensing applications and appeals between 2001 
and 2014 in Ontario, as well as reviewing the written and oral submissions made before a 
legislative review committee tasked with a review of the Aggregate Resources Act.25  
 
I begin by developing a map of key issues and actors based on my informal understanding of 
the relationships in selected aggregate conflicts, identifying important entities, structures, 
viewpoints, processes and the issues, both recognized and emergent or potential. The core of 
this mapping exercise includes the development of an “inventory of laws”26 relevant to 
aggregate conflicts, which is adapted from Marianna Valverde and included in Chapter Six. 
This mapping process is also informed by Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis which begins 
with the question ‘how does law structure relations?’ In developing my eco-relational 
framework I extend that inquiry to explicitly include the structuring of relations with the 
more-than-human world. This inventory is used to provide a detailed examination of the 
everyday operation of land use decisions and to make visible the active role of law in land 
use planning. The ‘legal system’ is often treated as background by actors in planning disputes 
and is not the object of scrutiny itself. Incremental changes to legislation or policy may be 
contemplated, but more fundamental shifts in how the law shapes human relationships with 
land and the environment are viewed as impossible or impractical, or simply not imagined at 
                                                         
24 Gibson & Brown, supra note 1, at 54. 
25In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on 
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1st session, 40th Parliament, 
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best 
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection, 
including conservation and recycling. 
26 Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity (University of 
Chicago Press, 2012) at 24. 
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all. Making law’s work visible exposes the foundational discourses and worldviews 
informing legal and cultural notions of ‘use’, ‘value’, ‘ownership’, ‘environment’ and even 
the concept of property in land, at the heart of land use law and policy. In doing so, 
meaningful critique and creative engagement with the legal system is made possible. The 
‘map’ provided by this initial analysis informs both the selection of documentary materials 
for content analysis and interview sampling by exposing key moments in the legal process in 
land use decision-making requiring further examination and scrutiny.  This includes the pre-
application land acquisition, research and preparation, the application and public consultation 
stage, and finally the hearing where applicable. 
 
The next step is an initial review of the Provincial Environmental Registry, a public online 
database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993, SO 199s, c 28), where 
Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly 
posted. This identified 242 decisions on large-scale industrial aggregate mines, including 
approvals, withdrawals, and denials between 2001 and 2014. A database of the decisions 
identifies the dates of proposal and decision, location, depth of extraction, volume of 
extraction, objections filed, key issues identified, and, the decision maker for each. This 
provides the basis for the basic quantitative analysis provided in Chapter Seven and for the 
selection of cases for further analysis. This process informed the development and refinement 
of the research question by providing a detailed picture of the outcomes and actors in 
aggregate extraction conflicts. 
 
The next stage is the selection of cases for more detailed analysis through a review of key 
documents, including decisions of the provincial land use tribunal, the Ontario Municipal 
Board, and any publically available submission documents from the proponent and other 
parties. In particular, the review revealed the level and nature of participation by members of 
the public and regulatory and planning bodies. Cases with high levels of more-than-owner 
participation were identified and from these I selected proposals or appeals resulting in, or 
likely to result in, a hearing before the Board, or high levels of public and media attention. 
The cases included applications that were approved, denied, and withdrawn, as well as some 
additional cases including both large-scale extensions that were not included in the Provincial 
reporting regime. Other cases included were identified by a review of media coverage, the 
legislative review submissions, and through interview participants. These cases are the basis 
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for the case law analysis in Chapters Five and Eight and inform the participant selection and 
interview process described below. 
B. Talking to People: Interviews 
i. Participants 
Based on the documentary analysis, 19 semi-structured in-person key informant interviews 
were conducted with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes as either more-
than-owner parties or professionals, such as lawyers, planners or scientific technical 
consultants in multiple locations throughout Ontario. All the disputes were in places deemed 
‘rural’ by local or regional plans with the exception of one case study in Northern Ontario. 
The goal of participant selection was not to be representative of the broader provincial 
population. Rather, I sought to identify key informants that would “purposefully inform” my 
understanding by providing in-depth knowledge about what is at stake in disputes about 
aggregate extraction and experiential perspectives on the associated decision-making 
processes.27 By selecting informants from a range of geographic locations who were engaged 
with distinct conflicts and organizations, I sought to include a range of perspectives and 
experiences.28 
 
Participants are primarily activists in local or regionally-based organizations formed to 
respond to a specific application or pre-existing organizations who chose to become involved 
with a particular quarry application based on a particular set of environmental or social 
concerns. These participants included (1) farmers, (2) residents of communities close to 
proposed mine sites, (3) non-resident home owners in communities close to proposed mine 
sites, and (4) members of locally-based environmental and conservation groups. I chose 
participants based on their involvement in one of the cases identified through documentary 
analysis or through other participants. Initially I knew the participants personally but I then 
identified further participants through the documentary data and by “snowball sampling” by 
asking those participants to refer me to others. In particular, I selected participants who had 
been involved in cases that were active since 2012 or who were involved in ongoing work 
related to aggregate extraction so that their experiences would be relatively recent and easier 
to recall. In one case the conflict was dated earlier, however, it was geographically and 
legally unique and therefore justified inclusion. Participants in this case remained 
                                                         
27 John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2006) at 127. 
28 Ibid at 129. 
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knowledgeable and engaged despite the passage of time and had retained many of the 
documents relevant to the case.  
 
The participants are, or were, all in leadership roles for the groups they were involved with 
and listed as organizers or spokespersons on websites, formal submissions, or other legal 
documents. In addition to the more-than-owner participants, two lawyers, one scientific 
consultant, one policy analyst, one professional naturalist, and two planners were also 
interviewed. The lawyers had both worked on aggregate siting cases, one for an 
environmental organization supporting one of the more-than-owner parties, and the other for 
First Nations facing aggregate extraction proposals. The consultant had worked for multiple 
more-than-owner parties as a technical expert and witness. The policy analyst was at an 
independent legislative body. The naturalist worked for a conservation organization that 
worked with both aggregate developers and more-than-owner parties. One planner was an 
independent expert who had worked for more-than-owner parties, the other was a planner for 
a provincial planning agency. All the participants were white but for one expert participant. 
15 participants were men and 10 were women. Participants were recruited following the 
receipt of ethics approval from York University’s Human Participants Review Sub-
Committee in the Office on Research Ethics.29 Initial contact with participants was by email 
with an informed consent letter attached for their review. The letter detailed the project, the 
interview process and the issues to be discussed, as well as the use of the data in the research. 
The letter was again reviewed at the outset of the in-person interviews.  
 
Interviews took place in both one-on-one and small group settings. The group interviews 
were undertaken at the suggestion of the participants. Where possible, interviews with more-
than-owner parties took place in the area that was the subject of the conflict. However, 
locations were selected for the comfort and convenience of the participants and therefore 
some of the interviews took place in the Greater Toronto Area. The professional interviews 
took place in the offices of the participants, with the exception of one lawyer whose interview 
had to be rescheduled and was therefore completed by phone. General interview locations are 
set out in the table below. In some cases subsequent site visits were made by the author in 
order to achieve a place-based understanding of the participants’ perspectives. In two cases, 
participants provided extensive guided tours of the proposed sites following the formal 
                                                         
29 I received ethics approval on February 06, 2013. 
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interview. In two cases I am personally familiar with the area. All participants provided maps 
and often photographs of the site during the interview. Table 1 summarizes the participant 
affiliations and interview locations. 
 
Interview 
Number 
Location Affiliation 
1 Toronto More-than-owner party; Farmer resident 
2 Municipality of Hamilton More-than-owner party; Residents (2) 
3 Renfrew County More-than-owner party; Resident 
4 Toronto Professional Planner 
5 Toronto  Policy Analyst – Independent Legislative Office 
6 Burlington More-than-owner party; Resident 
7 Wellington County  More-than-owner party; Resident 
8 Orillia  Professional Naturalist 
9 Dufferin County More-than-owner party; Farmer residents (2) 
10 Collingwood More-than-owner party; Residents, member of local 
environmental organization (3) 
11 Kingston  More-than-owner party; Former resident, member 
of local environmental organization 
12 Oakville More-than-owner party; Member of local 
environmental organization 
13 Toronto Lawyer for Environmental Organization 
14 Mississauga  Scientific Consultant 
15 Toronto (by phone)  Lawyer for First Nations parties 
16 Wawa Residents (4) 
17 Port Credit More-than-owner party; Resident 
18 Georgetown (Planner) Planner – Government Planning Agency 
19 Toronto More-than-owner party; Non-resident home owner, 
member of local environmental organization 
Table 1: Interviews  
A significant limitation of this research is that it does not include the perspectives and 
experiences of Indigenous communities facing aggregate development proposals in Ontario. 
The project was initially designed to include at least one aggregate development in the 
Niagara Escarpment Development Plan Area or Manitoulin Island, areas in which First 
Nation parties had been actively involved in the aggregate planning process, in order to 
include First Nation perspectives, concerns and experiences. I recognized, and continue to 
recognize, the impact of aggregate development on Indigenous land and relationships with 
place and community as a pressing concern and an important topic for further research. 
Further, while Indigenous organizations and individuals did not actively participate in the 
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disputes I examined,30 I understand settler-colonialism to be foundational to the structure of 
property and planning relations engaged by these conflicts. I also recognize Indigenous legal 
orders and the perspectives of Indigenous people as central to individual land use conflicts, as 
well as the broader inquiry about how we use to law to structure people-place relations in 
Canada. However, as a white, settler, legal academic trained in western knowledge systems, I 
also recognize that this is work that must be done cautiously and with careful negotiation.31 
Upon reflection, and through discussion with both Indigenous and non-Indigenous advisors, I 
came to the conclusion that a separate research framework and a longer timeline are required 
to allow for the “relational work”32 that can inform my understanding of how to do this work 
“in a good way”.33 Therefore while my work to develop these relationships with a specific 
community is ongoing and will inform future work, it is not included in this project. The goal 
of this ongoing work is to develop a distinct research framework that “takes direction” from a 
specific community, “connects” with Indigenous knowledge holders and community 
members, and engages meaningfully with Indigenous legal principles for land use 
governance.34 Therefore, the discussion above in Chapter Two and below in the following 
chapters considers questions and implications related to Indigenous land and legal orders as a 
critical part of a broader discussion about private property, planning, rurality and 
environmental justice in Ontario and Canada. However, Indigenous perspectives are not 
reflected in the empirical data discussed below. 
 
ii. The Interview Process 
The interviews took place over seven months. They lasted approximately one hour, however, 
many participants were eager to share and I accommodated longer interviews where possible. 
The group interviews tended to be between one and two hours due to the multiple 
participants. The interviews were taped with the consent of participants and transcribed 
verbatim. The transcripts and notes were stored electronically on a password-protected 
                                                         
30 This should be qualified by noting Indigenous people did join the broader campaign against the Melancthon 
mega-quarry proposal and developed relationships with the lead organization, the North Dufferin Agricultural 
Task Force, as noted in Chapter 8, participants in this study reflected on these as positive, important and 
ongoing. 
31 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous peoples (New York: Zed books, 
1999) at 180. 
32 Margaret Elizabeth Kovach, Indigenous methodologies: Characteristics, conversations, and contexts 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 172. 
33 Jessica Ball & Pauline Janyst, “Enacting research ethics in partnerships with indigenous communities in 
Canada:‘Do it in a good way’” (2008) 3 Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 2 33 at 48. 
34 Kovach, supra note 32 at 172. 
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computer. Anonymized notes from the transcripts were printed during the writing process and 
shredded prior to being recycled. I also took detailed notes during the interviews and made 
further reflective notes following the interviews to record my thoughts and reactions as the 
interviewer as soon as possible thereafter. These were anonymized and kept in a locked filing 
cabinet. With travel, advance preparation, as well as subsequent site visits and time for 
reflection, the processes generally took between one-half to one-full day. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and based on an interview guide. One interview guide 
was developed for more-than-owner parties and another for professional participants 
(Appendices A and B). The more-than-owner guide was designed to draw out narratives 
around four themes: (1) what was at stake in the conflict; (2) the relationship with the place(s) 
involved; (3) involvement in the decision-making process and relationships with decision 
makers; and (4) engagement with the legal and policy framework. The professional guide was 
designed around three themes: (1) the types of legal/technical issues raised in aggregate 
conflicts; (2) opportunities for and influence of public involvement in the decision-making 
processes; (3) views on the legal and policy framework and priorities for reform. The 
professional guide was slightly modified in each case to account for the specific expertise, 
such as law or planning. The interview guides were informed by the literature review and 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the documentary analysis described above, 
and discussions with my supervisor. In particular, the guide was informed by Nedelsky’s 
relational approach to legal disputes that foregrounds the work that law does to structure 
relations,35 by Joseph Pierce et al’s relational placemaking framework,36 and by the place-
based approach to uncovering people-place relations described above.  
 
The guides were revised following the initial interviews with members of each group to 
reflect this initial interview experience. The guides provided some structure to keep the 
interview on track and maintain a consistent set of themes. However, I took an open-ended 
approach and encouraged participants to talk openly about what they considered to be 
important about their experience. The more-than-owner guide begins with general questions 
that ask the participants to situate themselves in relation to the specific conflict in which they 
                                                         
35 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
36 Joseph Pierce, Deborah G Martin & James T Murphy, “Relational Place-Making: The Networked Politics of 
Place” (2011) 36 Trans Inst Br Geogr 1 54. 
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become involved. The guide then prompts them to share the story of their involvement. I 
approached the interviews as an opportunity for interaction and conversation and to develop 
relationships with the participants. This approach is in keeping with feminist approaches to 
research that seek to work with participants and respect their knowledge and expertise.37 
Further, the open-ended approach is consistent with a place-based approach that seeks to 
understand people’s relationships with place in their own words and based on their own 
experiences.38 In many interviews, participants continued to cover the themes in the guide 
without further prompting and the guide was not necessarily referred to after the initial 
questions. Participants’ were enthusiastic and shared detailed narratives about relationships to 
place, experiences of the planning and legal processes, and described what was at stake for 
them in the conflict. In many cases participants expressed gratitude for the opportunity to 
reflect on their experiences and to tell their story. Some contrasted this with the sense that 
they had not been listened to during the planning process. Participants also raised new issues 
and topics and I often followed up with more questions and engaged with these topics in 
addition to those covered in the interview guide. This is also consistent with an approach that 
values the expertise and experience of research participants. 
 
As described in the introduction and noted above, prior to conducting this study I was 
engaged in one of the cases selected for examination, which was taking place in an area of 
personal significance. My involvement consisted of assisting with the preparation of 
submissions for a local activist group and working closely with their expert consultant. In one 
sense this locates me as a participant researcher or “insider” conducting research on an issue 
in which I have also engaged as an activist.39 Participants often knew this, particularly where 
they knew me already or had been referred to me through another interviewee. I was also 
open about this positionality prior to the start of the formal interview. I briefly explained my 
connection to the Melancthon case and that, while it had been the motivation for me to 
undertake this study, I was no longer actively working on the issue outside of my PhD 
research. However, as a trained-lawyer, a doctoral student and academic researcher, as well 
as an urbanite non-resident in the areas under examination, I was also an outsider. In the 
                                                         
37 Marjorie L DeVault & Glenda Gross, “Feminist Qualitative Interviewing: Experience, Talk, and Knowledge” 
in Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2012) 
206. 
38 Cheng, Kruger & Daniels, supra note 12; Davenport & Anderson, supra note 4. 
39 Sonya Corbin Dwyer & Jennifer L Buckle, “The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in Qualitative 
Research” (2009) 8 International Journal of Qualitative Methods 1 54. 
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context of largely rural communities, and of participants without legal training, often actively 
engaged in current and ongoing conflicts, I was in a very different position than most of the 
interviewees. This dual positionality requires attention to how both of these locations as a 
researcher may influence the research. At the same time, I reject the insider/outsider binary 
and adopt the view of qualitative researchers as necessarily being “with” and “in ‘relation 
to’” the participants in this study: “The intimacy of qualitative research no longer allows us to 
remain true outsiders to the experience under study and, because of our role as researchers, it 
does not qualify us as complete insiders. We now occupy the space between, with the costs 
and benefits this status affords.”40 Indeed, taking a constructivist position, it is clear that there 
is no neutral position as a researcher since there is no “pure form” of knowledge that exists 
outside the circumstances of the interview and the knowledge it produces.41 Rather, it is the 
attention to biases and assumptions and dedication to representing the experiences shared by 
participants that matter in ensuring the quality of one’s research: “the core ingredient is not 
insider or outsider status but an ability to be open, authentic, honest, deeply interested in the 
experience of one's research participants, and committed to accurately and adequately 
representing their experience.”42 
 
In general, knowledge of my involvement with the Melancthon quarry case helped to 
establish “rapport” between myself and the interviewee and helped them to feel 
comfortable.43 In one case a participant involved in active and very adversarial litigation only 
agreed to meet with me on the basis of this connection. As noted above, it also enhanced the 
place–based approach to the research design and analysis. However, it is possible the 
participants who perceived me as an insider made assumptions about my knowledge or 
understanding and may not have fully explained aspects of their experience. In addition, it is 
possible that this also influenced what aspects they emphasized about their experience by 
focusing what they perceived as shared factors versus others that might be divergent. My 
partial insider status also raises concern about the potential influence on my interpretation of 
the data and, therefore required “disciplined bracketing and detailed reflection on the 
                                                         
40 Ibid at 60. 
41 Jaber F Gubrium & James A Holstein, “Narrative Ethnography”, Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, Patricia Leavy, 
eds., Handbook of Emergent Methods (New York: Guildford Press, 2008) at 15. 
42 Dwyer & Buckle, supra note 39 at 59. 
43 Tim Rapley, “Interviews” in Clive Seale et al, eds, Qualitative research practice (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 
2011). 
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subjective nature of the research process, with a close awareness of one’s own personal 
biases and perspectives”.44  
3. Data Analysis 
 
In this project, the collection of data through interviews aims to draw out stories about 
people-place relations that emerge from specific aggregate conflicts.45 I examine individual 
everyday experiences of engagement with the aggregate licensing and planning system in 
order to situate individual narratives “within a complex institutional field”46 that serves to 
coordinate and organize individual involvement in the everyday world to sustain institutional 
processes.47  In this way, I engage with individual narratives and experiences while 
understanding these as an “entry point” into understanding the work that law does to structure 
and mediate people-place relations and to explore the space for a relational reorientation of 
land use planning law and practice.48 
 
Property theorist Carol Rose argues that property law is upheld by stories produced and 
circulated in a particular society.49 Legal geographer Nicholas Blomley has shown how 
particular property relations are materialized in part by narratives and representations about 
landscape.50 Examining how stories are produced and circulated in the social world, and 
exposing the preferred stories of specific environments, holds enormous potential in the study 
of law, and property and planning law in particular. As Susan Turner notes, “citizens learn in 
their experience in ‘the process’ that how they know the world in their everyday relations is 
not how it is put together in the relations of planning.”51 Attention to narratives about 
participation in planning processes can contribute to an understanding of the legal system as 
an actor rather than a passive system or background. Law actively participates in the cultural 
construction of specific places and their relationships with the people who live with them, use 
                                                         
44 Dwyer & Buckle, supra note 39 at 59. 
45 Gubrium & Holstein, supra note 41. 
46 Dorothy E Smith, ed., Institutional Ethnography as Practice (Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2006). 
47 Dorothy E Smith, ed. Institutional ethnography: A sociology for people (Toronto: Rowman Altamira, 2005); 
Dorothy E Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A feminist sociology (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1987). 
48 Kevin Walby, “Institutional ethnography and data analysis: making sense of data dialogues” (2013) 16 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 141 2 at 142. 
49 Rose, supra note 24. 
50 Nicholas Blomley, “Landscapes of property” (1998) L and Soc Rev 567. 
51 Susan Turner, “Rendering the site developable: texts and local government decision making in land use 
planning”, Marie L Campbell & Ann Manicom, eds. Knowledge, Experience, and Ruling Relations (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) 234 at 234. 
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them, or feel connected to them spiritually, historically or emotionally. This project 
specifically considers whether and how the narratives that dominate in legal processes 
transform the land as the outcomes of land use decisions are enacted on real places and the 
people connected with them. In particular, I consider the role narratives of ownership play in 
shaping the landscape to create and uphold private places, as well as they ways in which 
other stories about relations with place are deemed irrelevant, outside the boundaries of the 
land use decision-making process. 
 
 John Creswell explains the data analysis process of qualitative sources as a “spiral”, with the 
researcher engaging “in the process of analytic circles rather than using a fixed linear 
approach.”52 His “data analysis spiral” includes the following steps: (1) organizing the data; 
(2) reading and memoing; (3) describing, classifying and interpreting data into codes and 
themes; (4) interpreting the data; and then (5) presenting the data. In my research, several 
themes emerged from the literature review to guide the documentary review: (1) the 
relationship between private property and land use planning; (2) the role of place in land use 
planning law and land use politics; (3) planning law as environmental governance; and (4) 
environmental justice and land use planning. These themes were revised as I undertook the 
documentary analysis and then again as I designed the interview guide and read and re-read 
the interview transcripts. A revised set of themes informed the development of a coding guide 
for the interview data, which is attached as Appendix C. The guide was then used to code the 
data from the interviews using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software. The coding was an 
iterative process and the themes were subject to ongoing revision, including the identification 
of key sub-themes within the major themes and relationships between the themes. As 
Creswell recommends, I remained open to the emergence of new codes throughout the 
process.53 In the process of interpreting the data, I continually went back to the literature 
review to relate the findings from the data analysis to the secondary literature.54 This process 
resulted in the production of new theoretical insights while simultaneously exposing the gaps 
and tensions that required returning to the literature or returning to the data, or both. 
                                                         
52 Creswell, supra note 27at 182. 
53 Ibid at 185. 
54 Ibid at 187. 
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A. Validity and Generalisability 
Concerns about the validity and generalisability of qualitative research are often raised when 
contrasted with quantitative approaches that have results that can be easily replicated and 
measured for accuracy.55 While qualitative research is distinct from quantitative research and 
the notions of accuracy and reliability cannot necessarily be applied in the same way, it 
remains essential that researchers ensure the quality of data collection and analysis when 
applying qualitative methods.56 Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln propose “trustworthiness” as 
a concept better suited to qualitative approaches that acknowledge social construction and the 
multiplicity of perspectives.57 Gibson and Brown adopt trustworthiness as a useful way to 
address concerns about validity in qualitative research.58 Trustworthiness focuses the 
examination on the context of data collection and data generation methods involved in the 
research process and shifts away from notions of inherent truth in any particular account. 
Max Travers puts it this way: 
One methodological principle employed in ethnomethodological research 
is to focus on concrete examples and to stay close to our practical 
experience of doing everyday things and making sense of everyday 
cultural objects, documented so that no one can object to the findings, 
rather than engaging in loose, wide-ranging and usually value-laden 
commentary about the modern world.59 
 
Marie Campbell and Ann Manicom argue, “While Truth may be an illusion, it is nonetheless 
possible – and urgent – to investigate and describe the relations that put our lives in place.”60 
Here I am concerned with how and why people articulate claims about particular places, 
specifically land that is privately owned by others; and, the capacity of the legal frameworks 
and decision makers involved to hear, acknowledge, and meaningfully account for such 
claims as part of the decision-making process. Therefore, the research objective is not to 
assess or determine the ‘truth’ or ‘validity’ of these articulations, or of the decisions, against 
an external standard. Rather, the goal of the data-based component of this study is to first pay 
close attention to multiple and varied constructions of relationship with place articulated by a 
                                                         
55 Graham R Gibbs, Analysing Qualitative Data (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2008) at 91. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Egon G Guba & Yvonna S Lincoln, “Epistemological and methodological bases of naturalistic inquiry” 
(1982) 30 Educational Communication and Technology 4 233. 
58 Gibson & Brown, supra note 673 at 59. 
59 Max Travers, “New methods, old problems: A sceptical view of innovation in qualitative research” (2009) 9 
Qualitative Research 2 161 at 165. 
60 Marie Campbell & Ann Manicom, Knowledge, Experience, and Ruling: Studies in the Social Organization of 
Knowledge (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) at 5. 
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variety of actors and structured by various legal and policy instruments; and, as a result, to 
provide a detailed account of how these are both included and excluded in the decision-
making processes about the use of privately-owned land, as well as to examine the 
consequences for the people-place relations at stake. The research findings also inform my 
conclusions and proposals for both further research and law reform. In particular, the data 
provides crucial insights into the potential to restructure land use and natural resource law to 
uphold a much wider range of people-place relations and the need to reorient legal 
constructions of property away from ownership and towards reciprocal relations with place. 
 
Graham Gibbs summarizes several techniques developed to address concerns about validity 
in qualitative research and several are adopted here. Triangulation refers to the need to get 
different views on a subject to reveal possible mistakes or limitations, and to expose 
inconsistencies and new dimensions of social reality.61 Here, research participants have been 
drawn from different social and economic groups and geographical locations and have been 
involved in different disputes. Respondent validation refers to the process of checking 
transcription accuracy with the respondents themselves.62 Respondents were advised of this 
process in the letter of request when initial contact was made, which was reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee at York University. The presentation of evidence through 
the inclusion of concise, contextualized quotations grounds the analysis in the data in order to 
ensure accuracy.63  
B. Limitations 
 
As noted above, for ethical and methodological reasons, the empirical component of this 
study does not include First Nations perspectives nor does it examine any Indigenous legal 
orders as sources of law governing aggregate mineral extraction. Given the legal and political 
importance of recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction over land use issues and the practical 
pressing need to address the impact of aggregate mining on Indigenous land, this is a 
significant limitation. My intention to address this through future work designed in order to 
do the required relational work is outlined above. In addition, the participants were almost 
entirely white, had citizenship status, and, most were property owners. As a result, the 
perspectives and experiences of persons from other racial groups are not included here. While 
                                                         
61 Gibbs, supra note 727 at 94. 
62 Ibid at 95. 
63 Ibid at 97. 
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this may accurately represent those engaging in aggregate extraction disputes, it has the 
potential to reinforce dominant constructions of environmentalism and rurality that centre 
white perspectives. This makes the environmental justice lens applied in Chapter Eight 
essential to this study. The limited sample size is also a significant limitation on the 
generalizability of the research and I acknowledge that it therefore does not allow for “the 
estimation of the distribution of the phenomenon in the population as a whole.”64 However, 
this was not the goal of the interviews conducted in this research. Rather, my intention was to 
uncover the wide range of people-place relations engaged by aggregate extraction disputes 
and to develop in-depth understanding how these shape and are shaped by the land use 
planning processes and legal frameworks. Keeping these limitations in mind, the in-depth 
nature of the interviews and enthusiastic participation of the interviewees is a strength of this 
study. The rapport between myself and the interviewees resulted in a high quality of data, 
including meaningful narratives and reflections about what is at stake and how the legal 
process and instruments might better reflect this. Further, the distinct place-based approach to 
the research is an original contribution that has led to unique insights and the development of 
new theoretical concepts.
                                                         
64 Webley, supra note 7 at 943. 
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Chapter Four: Legal and Policy Framework for Aggregate Extraction in Ontario 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the Ministry of Natural Resources, over 90% of aggregate extraction in 
Ontario occurs on private land.1 This makes aggregate mineral resource extraction a 
uniquely fitting case study to understand the relationship between private property and 
planning. This chapter provides a detailed overview of the relevant legal and policy 
framework. In Ontario, the use of private land is regulated by multiple complex and 
overlapping regimes, including both statutory2 and common law3 sources of property law, 
a range of land use planning statutes and policies, environmental regulation, and extra-
legal norms and rules that emerge through networks of economic and civil society 
actors.4  
 
Aggregate mineral mines are primarily regulated through provincial land use planning 
law and policy. However, as noted below, a much broader network of law and policy is 
potentially engaged by particular proposals for mineral extraction. Detailed and specific 
attention to the role that law plays in the land use processes through which “wicked 
problems”, such as aggregate extraction siting, are defined and contested, and inclusions 
and exclusions are negotiated, enforced and disrupted, is essential to resolving the 
research questions at the heart of this project.5 Part I provides a brief historical overview 
                                                         
1 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Aggregate Resources Act 
Review (7 May 2012) [Aggregate Resources Act Review] at G145. 
2 The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, RSO 1990, c C.34; Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1990, c 
T.21. 
3 Mary Jane Mossman & Philip Girard, Property law: Cases and Commentary (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2014). 
4 See for example the Cornerstone Standards Council voluntary aggregate certification process, 
http://www.cornerstonestandards.ca/. 
5 Paul R Lachapelle & Stephen F McCool, “Exploring the Concept of ‘Ownership’ in Natural Resource 
Planning” (2005) 18:3 Society & Natural Resources 279 at 279. Wicked problems are defined as complex 
situations involving “multiple and competing values and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-effect 
relationships, limited time and resources, incomplete information, and structural inequities in access to 
information and the distribution of political power.” 
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of the provincial regulation of aggregate extraction in Ontario. Part II then sets out the 
current regulatory framework at the time of writing, including the primary legislation and 
policy documents and reviews the role of the Ontario Municipal Board.6 Part III provides 
a brief introduction to the aggregate planning reform process started in 2012, as well as 
relevant aspects of the coordinated land use plan review currently underway. 
 
In 2012, Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner noted that aggregate extraction has 
become one of the most contentious land use issues in the Province.7 While aggregate 
mineral resources are widely acknowledged as essential to the built environment and as 
the foundation of necessary infrastructure developments from roads to subways to 
housing and sewer mains, quarries have long been a source of local conflict about land 
use.8 This paradox of a spatially fixed, non-renewable, essential resource and legitimate 
community concerns about direct and cumulative social, health, and environmental 
impacts exemplifies the ‘wicked’ nature of the problems that land use law and policy aim 
to resolve. Multiple and overlapping goals and values in relation to land come into 
conflict. Experts, landowners and more-than-owner parties provide vastly different views 
on the impacts of extraction. Parties and decision makers all work with limited time and 
resources in the context of uncertainty and incomplete information. Perhaps most 
importantly for this project, the legal framework plays a key role in producing structural 
inequities in access to information and power. Since 2005, conflicts over large-scale 
quarry developments in the urban-rural fringe of Southwestern Ontario have resulted in 
                                                         
6 The 2012 legislative review process, the 2013 government response, and the 2017 changes to the Act are 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. While changes to the regulatory framework are noted 
throughout, the research for this dissertation was undertaken while before the 2017 amendments were 
proposed or had come into force. 
7 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Land Use Planning In Ontario: A Primer and Summary of 
Recommendations of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (Toronto: Environmental Commissioner 
of Ontario, 2012); L Anders Sandberg & Lisa Wallace, “Leave the Sand in the Land, Let the Stone Alone: 
Pits, Quarries and Climate Change.” (2013) 12 ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 
1; Sandra Patano & L Anders Sandberg, “Winning back more than words? Power, discourse and quarrying 
on the Niagara Escarpment” (2005) 49 The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien 1 25. 
8 Matt Binnstock & Maureen Carter-Whitney, Aggregate Extraction in Ontario: A strategy for the Future 
(Toronto: Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, 2011) at 1; Glen R Miller et al, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Understanding the foundations of Ontario’s Built Future (Toronto: Canadian 
Urban Institute, 2009); Policy Division, Ministry of Natural Resources, State of the Aggregate Resource in 
Ontario Study: Consolidated Report (Toronto: Queens Printer, 2010). 
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major community mobilizations,9 complex multi-year litigation,10 a foreign investment 
protection claim against the federal and provincial governments,11 a legislative review of 
the governing legislation in 2012,12 and a subsequent reform Bill that received Royal 
Assent in the final stages of this project.13 Participants in quarry disputes have raised 
issues ranging from Indigenous sovereignty,14 to food security, the right to water and 
public health15; and, from regional economic development to international trade.16  
 
As open-pit mines with transformative impacts, quarries have long been a potentially 
controversial use of private land in Ontario and other jurisdictions. However, formal 
oversight of aggregate extraction in Ontario was limited until the 1970s with landowners 
having presumptive power to determine the appropriate use of their land without regard 
to surrounding land uses or the environment.17 As the scale of extraction increased and 
                                                         
9 “Mega quarry defeat is a lesson in activism”, Toronto Star (25 November 2012), online: 
<http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/11/25/mega_quarry_defeat_is_a_lesson_in_activis
m.html>. 
10 Joanna Bull, ““Nelson Aggregate Hearing Explained” (17 November 2010), online: Lake Ontario 
Waterkeeper <http://www.waterkeeper.ca/2010/11/17/nelson-aggregates-hearing-explained/>; Mary Bull, 
“Joint Board Decision re Walker Aggregates Duntroon Quarry Expansion Upheld by Divisional Court”, 
(12 July 2013), online: Wood Bull Blog <http://www.woodbull.ca/resources/wood-bull-
blog/2013/07/12/joint-board-decision-re-walker-aggregates-duntroon-quarry-expansion-upheld-by-
divisional-court>; “Nelson Quarry expansion denied”, InsideHalton.com (11 October 2012), online: 
<https://www.insidehalton.com/community-story/2904589-nelson-quarry-expansion-denied/>; Michael 
Gennings, “NEC asks for review of quarry decision”, Barrie Advance (20 August 2012), online: 
<http://aware-simcoe.ca/2012/08/aggregate-132/>. 
11 Halton Region, “St. Mary’s Cement Group – Update January 2013”, (2013), online: Applications Under 
Current Review; St Marys VCNA, LLC v Government of Canada, 2013 (available on 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/st_marys_vcna.aspx?lang=eng). 
12 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Report on the Review of 
the Aggregate Resources Act (2013).  
13 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, SO 2017 C.6. 
14 Jeremiah Raining Bird, “Ontario’s Review of Quarry Legislation Fails to Address First Nations 
Concerns”, (29 November 2013), online: OKT Law <http://www.oktlaw.com/blog/ontarios-review-of-
quarry-legislation-fails-to-address-first-nations-concerns/>; Aggregate Resources Act Review, supra note 1, 
14 May 2012 (Canadian Environmental Law Association, Joseph Castrilli & Ramani Nadarajah); (16 May 
2012 ) (United Chiefs and Councils of Mnidoo Mnising). 
15 “Food and Water First Pledge”, online: foodandwaterfirst.com <http://foodandwaterfirst.com/pledge/>. 
16 A representative range of objections from non-owner parties are available on the North Dufferin 
Agricultural and Community Task Force (“NDACT”) website: http://ndact.com/index.php/letters-a-
reports/letters-general. 
17 David Estrin & John Swaigen, Environment on trial: a guide to Ontario environmental law and policy 
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1993) at 745. 
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growth of suburban development led to increasing demand, aggregate extraction emerged 
as a site of conflict about land use in the province.18 Since that time, aggregate regulation 
in Ontario has shifted from a primarily municipally controlled land use to a provincially 
led, and an increasingly proponent-driven, activity.19 Like other land use regulation, 
aggregate extraction initially occurred under the Planning Act and the Municipal Act 
which empowered local governments to use zoning by-laws to control where pits and 
quarries could be established and to impose operational requirements through their 
Official Plans.20 As will be described below, while the current regime retains this role for 
municipal governments, decision-making power has been “upscaled” 21 to the provincial 
level, which Valiante notes has a particularly closed policy process. 22 As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the result is an inversion of the planning inquiry – the question of how we 
will proceed with a particular development precedes or subsumes deliberation about 
whether the development should proceed at all.  Further, as planning scholars in the UK 
have noted, this kind of recentralization of decision-making power can have significant 
consequences for participation in planning decisions. 23 
A. From Municipal to Provincial Regulation 
A key shift occurred during the 1970s when, according to Baker et al., aggregate 
developers successfully lobbied the province to centralize control over the process to 
avoid a predicted shortage in resources.24 As will be described below, this narrative of 
scarcity has continued to inform aggregate policy since that time. The Mineral Resources 
                                                         
18 J B Cullingworth, Urban and Regional Planning in Canada (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction 
Publishers, 1987) at 229; Anders Sandberg & Wallace, supra note 7.  
19 Douglas Baker, Christine Slam & Tracy Summerville, “An Evolving Policy Network in Action: The 
Case of Construction Aggregate Policy in Ontario” (2001) 44 Canadian Public Administration 4 463 at 
466. 
20 Ibid at 468. 
21 Richard Cowell & Susan Owens, “Governing space: planning reform and the politics of sustainability” 
(2006) 24 Environment and Planning C 403 at 549. 
22 Marcia Valiante, “In Search of the ‘Public Interest’ in Ontario Planning Decisions” in Marcia Valiante & 
Anneke Smit, eds, Public Interest, Private Property: Law and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2015) at 113. 
23 Christopher Groves, Max Munday & Natalia Yakovleva, “Fighting the Pipe: Neoliberal Governance and 
Barriers to Effective Community Participation in Energy Infrastructure Planning” (2013) 31 Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy 2 340 at 341; Cowell & Owens, supra note 21 at 409. 
24 Baker, Slam & Summerville, supra note 19. 
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Committee, appointed by the Province, was established with members from both the 
provincial government and industry but lacking representation from municipal 
government or the emerging environmental movement.25 While a supplementary report 
attempted to deal with local concerns, this lack of involvement remained a concern and 
was later deemed a “significant and major omission.”26 The resulting Pits and Quarries 
Control Act 1971 established a provincial licensing system, primarily controlled by the 
Ministry of Natural Resources. The regime applied to a limited area of “major aggregate 
production areas” in Southern Ontario, Sudbury and Sault Ste. Marie. This limited 
geographic application has persisted until very recently.27 Arguably, the early “pro-
industry stance” has also persisted despite decades of opposition from local governments, 
communities and the environmental movement.28 
 
According to Cullingworth, the limitations of the 1971 Act quickly became clear and 
little progress was made with respect to rehabilitation of pit and quarry sites. In 1976, the 
government formed the Mineral Aggregate Working Party with members from 
government, industry, municipal government and the public.29 They conducted a one-
year study that rejected the regime’s prioritization of “maximum utilization of available 
resources” and emphasized the need to prioritize the interests and concerns of local 
communities in order to make extraction feasible.30 In fact, they recommended a shared 
control system between the province and municipalities. The study also concluded the 
government faced a lack of credibility due to a lack of enforcement and the weakness of 
the Act as well as limited results of rehabilitation requirements.31  
 
                                                         
25 Cullingworth, supra note 18 at 230. 
26 S. Yundt, “Legislation and Policy Mineral Aggregate Resource Management in Ontario, Canada” (1979) 
1 Minerals and the Environment 3 101 at 103. 
27 SO 1971, c 96. 
28 Cullingworth, supra note 18 at 231. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid; Ontario Mineral Aggregate Working Party, A Policy for Mineral Aggregate Resource Management 
in Ontario: Report of the Ontario Mineral Aggregate Working Party to Leo Bernier, Minister of Natural 
Resources (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1977). 
31 Mineral Aggregate Working Party, supra note 30 at 3. 
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Notwithstanding the recommendations, the Ministry subsequently adopted the “Mineral 
Aggregate Resource Planning Policy” which received cabinet approval in 1982 and was 
incorporated into Section 3 of the Planning Act in 1986 as the “Mineral Aggregate 
Resources Policy Statement.”32 As a case study on environmental assessment and 
aggregate extraction in Ontario notes, of the 64 recommendations of the Working Party 
the Policy Statement incorporated just 12.33 It was in this policy statement that aggregate 
resources were first declared a ‘matter of provincial interest’ and municipalities were 
formally required to preserve as much of the existing aggregate resources as “realistically 
possible.” In this way the planning framework was structured to “enrol” private land in 
the preservation of aggregate minerals and their production as a resource for a specific 
version of the public interest, one emphasizing growth and economically productive uses 
of land.34 The Policy Statement included a statement that other land uses may in “specific 
instances” take precedence over aggregate extraction. In other words, the norm would be 
that aggregate extraction would take precedence over other land uses. As will be outlined 
in section 3 below, this prioritization of aggregate resource protection has been 
maintained in current planning law and policy in Ontario, particularly the Provincial 
Policy Statement.35  
 
The current Aggregate Resources Act came into force in 1990, thus replacing the Pits and 
Quarries Act 1971.36 In the interim some land use protection had been imposed, “at least 
symbolically,” under the landmark land use plan, Niagara Escarpment Development Plan 
Act.37 As Baker et al. note, the aggregate industry lobbied against the passage of the 
                                                         
32 Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing & Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, Mineral 
Aggregate Resource Planning Policy: A Provincial Policy on Planning for Mineral Aggregate Resources 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1982). 
33 Douglas Baker & Darryl Shoemaker, Environmental Assessment and Aggregate Extraction in Southern 
Ontario: The Puslinch Case, The Environmental Assessment and Planning in Ontario Project 3 (Waterloo, 
ON: Department of Environment and Resource Studies, University of Waterloo, 1995) at 6. 
34 Nicholas Blomley, “Land use, planning, and the ‘difficult character of property’” (2016) Planning 
Theory & Practice 1 at 3; Wayne J Caldwell, Rediscovering Thomas Adams: Rural planning and 
development in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 336. 
35 Binnstock & Carter-Whitney, supra note 8. 
36 R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “Act”]. 
37 R.S.O. 1990, c.N.2 [the Niagara Escarpment Act]; Cullingworth, supra note 18 at 230. 
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current Act, and against the Niagara Escarpment planning protections. Bill 170, The 
Aggregate Resources Act was introduced by a Conservative provincial government and 
received first and second readings in 1979 but was later withdrawn.38 While it did 
respond to some of the concerns raised by the Working Party and brought in a more 
detailed set of requirements for site planning and rehabilitation of quarries and pits, 
debates in the legislature revealed serious and ongoing concerns. At second reading Jim 
Foulds, a New Democratic Party Member of the Provincial Parliament noted his party’s 
“serious reservations,” calling the environmental provisions “woefully inadequate,” the 
appeal mechanism “lopsided” in favour of aggregate developers, and noting the lack of 
protection for municipalities. 39He concluded, “[T]he minister's authority to override the 
municipality zoning bylaws is enormous.”40  Several members expressed concerns about 
the centralization of discretionary power in the Minister of Natural Resources and the 
lack of local control. Liberal Party member Robert Nixon pointed to the potentially 
conflicting roles the minister was assigned, being responsible for both development and 
protection of the resource at the same time as controlling the impacts of the industry:  
He is seen not to be a controller of the aggregate industry but really the 
developer himself. It is his responsibility to search out the resources and 
see that the amounts are properly sealed so they are made available to 
industry in a fair and equitable way. It almost seems that the Minister of 
Natural Resources and his advisers become really the operators of the 
overall provincial industry. Of course at the same time they have the 
responsibility to control it.41 
Mel Swart, another New Democratic member also pointed to the “weak, bare bones” 
nature of the bill and criticized the government for placing the substantive policy in a 
discretionary policy document approved by Cabinet with no debate in the legislature and 
no input from municipalities.42 He pointed to a letter sent from the Ministry to the 
Ontario Municipal Board during a hearing on the Durham Official Plan containing an 
early iteration of the Policy Statement entitled the “Mineral Aggregate Policy for Official 
                                                         
38 Bill 170, Aggregate Resources Act, 3rd Sess, 31st Parl, Ontario, 1979. 
39 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 31st Parl, 3rd Sess, (18 December 
1979) at 5:45. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid at 3:45. 
42 Ibid at 4:30. 
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Plans”: “I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that is the policy of this province, not what's in this 
bill… I say it's deliberate that they don't set out the principles in this bill, because they 
want to retain unto themselves the principles and the policy. 43 These concerns about the 
reliance on ministerial discretion and a closed-policy process to guide aggregate 
extraction decisions foreshadow Valiante’s findings about the closed nature of Ontario’s 
planning policy process that contains debate within site specific processes and leaves “the 
logic of the prevailing approach to growth and development” and “underlying 
assumptions about the benefits” unquestioned.44 The development-focused legal and 
policy orientation and enrolment of private land in the provincial interest through 
planning predates the current neoliberal approach to environmental governance in 
Ontario. As described below, the emergence of neoliberal environmental governance in 
the late 1980s both upheld and reinforced the role of land owners as planning decision 
makers and the managerial emphasis on technical and scientific expertise in aggregate 
planning.  
 
The present Act was not introduced until 1988 and was proclaimed in 1990.45 During this 
period the extraction rate in the province rose from 131 million tonnes to 197 million 
tonnes, resulting in “heightened awareness of the overall costs of the industry and 
weaknesses in the policy framework.” 46 A Liberal Party government in 1988 
reintroduced Bill 170. On second reading Ruth Grier, a former New Democratic 
Environment Minister, noted that while it may be an improvement on the former regime, 
the new Act remained unsatisfactory: “We would all like to see the environment 
protected and the aggregates industry controlled. Obviously the crux of it is, is the 
weapon that is being used adequate to do the job? I regret that it is not.” Pointing to the 
inadequate protection of the environment she stated, “Aggregates extraction is not 
sustainable. It is a non-renewable resource. Surely, in developing legislation to deal with 
                                                         
43 Ibid at 4:15. 
44 Valiante, supra note 22 at 124–125. 
45 Baker, Slam & Summerville, supra note 19 at 471. 
46 Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, Aggregate Resources Program: Statistical Update Aggregate 
Resources Section (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1990). 
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aggregates, if one believes in sustainable development, that legislation ought to put the 
environment not just first, but before everything.”47  
 
With Bill 52, the Aggregate and Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996, 
the Conservative government of Mike Harris amended the Act in 1997.48 The 
amendments aimed to increase industry accountability through the introduction of 
requirements for public notice and circulation of applications and mandatory public 
consultation. However, a central objective of the Bill was also to reduce the 
government’s role in the regulation of aggregate licensing and operations by shifting 
towards a self-monitoring system and the creation of an industry-led Aggregate 
Resources Trust that would be responsible for the rehabilitation of abandoned pits and 
quarries, research activity and fee collection as well as distribution.49 During legislative 
debate upon second reading, Liberal opposition member Jim Bradley succinctly 
characterized the effect of the bill: “In this case, we have the industry being put in charge 
of itself.”50 At third reading Bradley also noted the privileged position of the aggregate 
industry in the legislative development process: “They consulted the industries first, got 
their input, drew up their proposals and then consulted somebody else after, which is not 
the proper way to go.”51  The New Democratic critic for natural resources and former 
Minister of Northern Development and Mines Shelley Martel noted that even other 
sectors involved in the government’s own aggregates working group had not been 
involved: “Municipalities had no input, environmental groups had no input, consultants 
who work with operators around these issues had no input. The only group that the 
minister consulted with were the aggregate producers.”52  As described below, this 
                                                         
47 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 35th Leg, 1st Sess, (27 February 
1989), at 1610 (Ruth Grier). 
48 1st Sess, 36th Leg, Ontario, 1996 (assented to December 19, 1996). 
49 Bill 52, ss. 4, 12, 36. 
50 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 36 Parl, Sess 1, (19 June 1996), at 
16:40. 
51 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 36th Leg, 1st Sess, (19 December 
1996), at 1610 (Jim Bradley). 
52 Ibid at 15:50. 
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industry-led policymaking and proponent-driven approach has persisted, and arguably 
increased, to today.  
 
As with Bill 170, the proposed Act was enabling legislation that left much of the 
substance to regulation or policy. This lack of substance was criticized by opposition 
members who noted that they would not get the chance to debate and influence the 
regulations which had yet to be developed and would not come before the Legislature.53 
Further, even in this context of deregulation, Bradley and other members raised concerns 
about the ability of the Ministry to enforce the amended Act. Liberal member Michael 
Brown stated, “[E]ven if we get a set of regulations that look reasonable to us, protect the 
environment, are workable by the industry, we have no assurance whatever that this 
ministry has any chance of actually administering this piece of legislation.”54 Both 
Bradley and Brown linked their concerns with the Conservative government’s move to 
deregulate environmental and natural resource sectors and recent budgetary and staffing 
reductions at the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of the Environment and 
Energy. Bradley lamented job losses for staff “who used to undertake supervisory 
activities, inspection activities and monitoring activities” at the Ministries. He went on, 
“[I] think this Bill really is necessitated by the fact that the government is annihilating 
those ministries by removing so many of the staff and taking away so many of the 
resources.”55 Martel pointed out that 20% of the public service job reductions across 
government were slated to be from the Ministry of Natural Resources.56 She linked her 
concerns about the Bill with a fundamental shift in the role of government with respect to 
natural resource and the environment:  
I think what the government forgets at the end of the day -- and this is a 
most important point -- is that the resources in the province, be they timber 
or wildlife or fish or parks or aggregates, don't just belong to this 
government. They don't just belong to the Minister of Natural Resources. 
They are not his to give away. The crown acts as the steward and provides 
                                                         
53 Ibid at 15:10, 15:50. 
54 Hansard (19 June 1996), supra note 50 at 16:40. 
55 Ibid at 17:00. 
56 Hansard, (19 December 1996), supra note 51 at 1540. 
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the standards and provides the compliance and monitors that compliance 
and provides fines as necessary to ensure that the resources which belong 
to all the people are used in an environmentally sound way to benefit the 
greatest number of people in the province.57 
The current regime, as amended by Bill 42, not only maintains limitations on 
public involvement beyond site-specific objections, it is part of a deliberate and 
sustained effort across Canada to weaken regulatory capacity, reduce scientific 
knowledge within the state, and increase the role of non-state actors in 
knowledge production, risk assessment and compliance.58 As the discussion 
below and the chapters that follow demonstrate, many of these concerns are 
echoed by the experiences of the participants in this project. Whether these will 
be resolved by the proposed amendments remains to be seen as the process is 
ongoing. The Act continues to be enabling legislation with much of the 
substance left to policy and regulation, little of which has been developed or 
made available. Historically, planning and aggregate policy and regulations have 
not been developed in a transparent or participatory manner. As will be 
discussed in Part II and Chapter Nine, in my view, none of the changes represent 
a significant shift in aggregate planning policy and nothing in the reforms 
provides the basis for the transformative change that would be required to realize 
an eco-relational approach to aggregate mineral planning in the province.  
B. Research and Commentary 
The Ministry of Natural Resources has commissioned two studies on provincial 
aggregate resources, one in 1992 and the 2010 State of the Aggregate Resource in 
Ontario Study [SAROS]. The 2010 consolidated SAROS report summarized the findings 
of six individual reports authored by expert consultants:59 Aggregate Consumption and 
                                                         
57 Hansard, (19 June 1996), supra note 50 at 17:30. 
58 Angela V Carter, Gail S Fraser & Anna Zalik, “Environmental Policy Convergence in Canada’s Fossil 
Fuel Provinces? Regulatory Streamlining, Impediments, and Drift” (2017) 43 Canadian Public Policy 1 61 
at 70. 
59 Ministry of Natural Resources, supra note 8. 
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Demand;60 Future Aggregate Availability and Alternatives Analysis;61 The Value of 
Aggregates;62 Reuse and Recycling;63 Aggregate Reserves in Existing Operations;64 and, 
Rehabilitation.65  
 
Following the release of the SAROS report, the provincial Aggregate Resource Advisory 
Committee, which includes stakeholder representatives from industry, environmental 
interests and municipal governments, released a set of consensus recommendations and 
priorities to the Minister.66 There was no public consultation about the review in advance 
or subsequently despite the contentious history of aggregate resource development. The 
SAROS recommendations included the need for a provincial “Strategic Aggregate 
Roadmap” based on a lifecycle management approach and an emphasis on improved 
rehabilitation as well as the protection of aggregate resources and simplification of the 
approval process. It is critical to assess the recommendations as partial and limited, as 
they report only those issues about which there was consensus. Environmental 
considerations are absent from the report as no consensus recommendations were reached 
regarding the environmental impact of aggregate extraction. While a review of SAROS 
technical data is beyond the scope of this project (and my expertise), it is critical to 
acknowledge that a range of stakeholders agreed about the importance of knowledge 
production and data collection, and that the SAROS process and report have been 
criticized as “aggregate-centric” and as emphasizing the benefits of extraction for the 
                                                         
60 Altus Group Economic Consulting, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: Paper 1-
Aggregate Consumption and Demand (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
61 MHBC Planning, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: Paper2-Future Availability & 
Alternatives (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
62 AECOM, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: Paper3-Value of Aggregates (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
63 LVM Jegel, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: Paper 4-Reuse & Recycling (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
64 Golder Associates, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: Paper 5-Aggregate Reserves 
(Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
65 Skelton Brumwell & Associates Inc. and Savanta Inc., State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study: 
Paper 6-Rehabilitation (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2010). 
66 Aggregate Resource Advisory Committee, Aggregate Resource Advisory Committee Consensus 
Recommendations to the Minister of Natural Resources (Ministry of Natural Resources, 2010), online: 
<http://files.ontario.ca/environment-and-energy/aggregates/aggregate-resource-in-ontario-
study/stdprod_067787.pdf> 
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economy while minimizing social and environmental impacts and the potential to reduce 
demand.67 
 
There have been other reports evaluating the aggregate industry in Ontario, such as the 
Canadian Urban Institute’s Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Understanding the 
Foundations of Ontario’s Built Future, prepared for Dufferin Aggregates prior to the 
SAROS report in anticipation of an application for a quarry licence.68 The Report is 
presented as an “independent assessment by a neutral party” but acknowledges its 
reliance on a combination of publicly available data and industry provided data. In 2005, 
the Pembina Institute released a study on Ontario’s aggregate policy.69 The authors 
concluded that the provincial approach did not manage the resource sustainability and did 
not promote the appropriate balance between aggregate extraction and other land uses.70 
They called for a comprehensive provincial strategy to manage aggregate resources and 
reduce demand.71 The Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy evaluated 
the SAROS report in their 2001 report Aggregate Extraction in Ontario: A Strategy for 
the Future, which attempts to inform the development of a provincial aggregates strategy 
based on stakeholder interviews, publicly available data, Environmental Commissioner 
reports and policies and practices from other jurisdictions.72 Aggregate mineral extraction 
has also been the subject of commentary in a number of the Environmental 
Commissioner’s Annual Reports and Comments since 2000 and a key issue addressed in 
the 2012 report Land Use Planning in Ontario: Primer and Summary of 
Recommendations of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario.73 The Commissioner 
                                                         
67 See for example the comments made on behalf of Gravel Watch Ontario: Mark L Dorfman, A Review of 
“The State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study” and the “Aggregate Resource Advisory 
Committee” Consensus Recommendations (Toronto, Gravel Watch Ontario, 2011). 
68 Miller et al, supra note 8; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, “ECOIssues: Aggregate Resources 
Act”, (7 May 2012), online: Ecoissues.ca 
<http://www.ecoissues.ca/index.php/Category:Aggregate_Resources_Act>. 
69 Mark Winfield & Amy Taylor. Rebalancing the Load: The Need for an Aggregate Conservation Strategy 
for Ontario (Toronto: Pembina Institute, 2005). 
70 Ibid at 3. 
71 Ibid at 3–4. 
72 Binnstock & Carter-Whitney, supra note 8. 
73 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 7. 
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has pointed to a range of issues, including, the limited capacity of the Ministry to manage 
the aggregate licensing program and enforce compliance, the siting of operations near 
sensitive land uses and natural areas, problems with industry compliance and 
rehabilitation, and the lack of a long-term and comprehensive approach to aggregate 
planning.74    
4. Part II: The Aggregate Mineral Extraction Legislative and Policy Framework 
 
With this historical context in mind, this section provides an overview of current legal 
and policy framework. As mentioned above, the vast majority of aggregate extraction 
occurs on private land in Ontario.75 This makes private ownership a key category in the 
legal governance of aggregate minerals and a starting point for an inquiry into aggregate 
mineral extraction. Under the Canadian constitutional division of powers, planning and 
natural resource governance on private and public lands fall within provincial jurisdiction 
over municipal institutions and property and civil rights and the management of public 
lands.76 Across Canada private land ownership varies in terms of the separation of surface 
and sub-surface rights. In Ontario, as in other provinces and territories, private land may 
have separate or unified surface and sub-surface rights depending on the terms of the 
grant.77 While gold and silver had been reserved to the Crown in English domestic and 
colonial territories since the Case of Mines in 1567,78 the common law rule that all other 
minerals are part of the land itself was reflected in early fee simple land grants in Ontario, 
which included both surface rights and sub-surface rights to non-precious minerals. The 
                                                         
74 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 68. 
75 Aggregate Resources Act Review, supra note 1 at G145. 
76 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, ss 92 (5), (13), 92A. Section 92(5) confers the 
power to manage and sell public lands and timber and wood thereon to the provinces. Section 92(13) 
confers the power to legislate in relation to property and civil rights. Section 92A, the natural resources 
amendment explicitly confers the exclusive power to make laws in relation to non-renewable resource 
exploration, development, conservation and management. 
77 The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, supra note 2, defines “mining rights” as the conveyance or 
reservation of “the ores, mines and minerals on or under the land, together with such right of access for the 
purpose of winning the ores, mines and minerals as is incidental to a grant of ores, mines and minerals”, s 
16. It defines “surface rights” as the conveyance or reservation of “the land therein described with the 
exception of the ores, mines and minerals on or under the land and such right of access for the purpose of 
winning the ores, mines and minerals as is incidental to a grant of ores, mines and minerals”, s 17. 
78 1 Plowd. 310. 
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1869 General Mining Act79 voided the Crown reservation of precious metals and unified 
surface and subsurface ownership. The 1913 Public Lands Act80 revoked past mineral 
reservations and future reservations had to be expressly set out in the letters patent.81 The 
current Public Lands Act carried these provisions forward such that the Crown has no 
interest in mineral rights for lands originally granted before 1913 despite reservations.82 
Notable exceptions include Crown land sold for Agricultural purposes as of April 1st, 
1957, and sales or dispositions for summer resort locations, both of which include 
reservations of all mines and minerals to the Crown.83 Recent statutory reforms to 
provincial mining law have further unified land rights, 84 particularly in Southern Ontario 
where the majority of aggregate extraction takes place. 85 
 
While statutory and common law property regimes are central to the legal construction 
and protection of land ownership, planning law is the primary tool employed to manage 
the intersection between private land use and development and the “multiple public 
interests at play” in the province.86 Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex 
web of legislation and policy. In Ontario, the province provides broad guidance and 
maintains considerable power to constrain local government action through both the 
Planning Act and the Provincial Policy Statement, a policy document that “sets the policy 
foundation for regulating the development and use of land.”87 The bulk of day-to-day 
                                                         
79 32 Vict, c34, s 4. 
80 SO 1913, c6, ss 41-54. 
81 Barry Barton, Canadian law of mining (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1993) at 68–69. 
82 RSO 1990, c P.43, ss 61(1), (3). 
83 Ibid, s 60, 15(6). 
84 Bill 173, the Mining Amendment Act, 2009, SO 2009, Ch 21, (assented to October 21, 2009). The Bill 
amended the Mining Act, RSO 1990, c M.14 and enacted the Far North Act 2010, SO 2010, c 18.  
85 Bruce Pardy & Annette Stoehr, “The Failed Reform of Ontario’s Mining Laws” (2012) 23 Journal of 
Environmental Law and Practice 1 at 6. 
86 Valiante, supra note 22 at 106. 
87 R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, s.22 [the “Planning Act”]; Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Natural 
Resources Management Division, “Aggregate Resources Provincial Standards” (Toronto: Ministry of 
Natural Resources, 1997) (the “Standards”]; Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 
Provincial Policy Statement (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2005) [the “2005 Policy Statement” referred to as 
PPS in the footnotes]. At the time of writing all decisions have been made under the 2005 Policy Statement; 
however, in April 2014 the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, 
which took effect on April 30, 2014, Provincial Policy Statement (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2014), [the 
“2014 Policy Statement”] 
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planning powers and responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities.88 However, 
formal public participation requirements for local planning and development decisions, 
such as the development, revision or amendment of a municipality’s Official Plan, are 
statutory and set out in the Planning Act. These include the provision of information and 
material, public open houses where the public can review this material and ask questions, 
public meetings, and, rights to make oral or written submissions.89 Similar provisions for 
by-laws are also set out in the Planning Act.90  
 
The review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario Municipal 
Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, ostensibly dividing “land use” from 
“environmental” decisions despite the environmentally-focused nature of many 
objections to planning decisions.91 Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies 
have recently been formally linked as part of the Environment and Land Tribunals cluster 
but it is not yet clear what, if any, substantive outcomes the restructuring has brought 
about.92 For certain appeals, particularly where hearings may be required from both 
tribunals, a joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act.93 However, one 
of the unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the 
Ontario Municipal Board, which serves as the primary appeal body for planning and 
development decisions, including those with clear environmental implications such as 
amendments to Official Plans affecting public space, protected green space and 
agricultural lands and the often-contentious applications for aggregate development 
                                                         
88 Hoi Kong, “Something to Talk About: Regulation and Justification in Canadian Municipal Law” (2010) 
48 Osgoode Hall LJ 499; Stanley M Makuch, Neil Craik & B Leisk Signe, Canadian Municipal and 
Planning Law (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004). 
89 Planning Act, supra note 87, ss 17, 22 and 26.2. 
90 Ibid, s 34. 
91 L Anders Sandberg, Gerda R Wekerle & Liette Gilbert, The Oak Ridges Moraine Battles: Development, 
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considered here.94 The Board has jurisdiction to deal with issues and disputes under more 
than 100 statutes, including the Aggregate Resources Act.95 The role of the Board and its 
powers are discussed in more detail below in this Chapter. 
 
In the context of aggregate extraction, the key legal frameworks municipal powers and 
centralized provincial planning policy under the Planning Act, the Provincial Policy 
Statement, provincial planning regimes, particularly the Niagara Escarpment 
Development Plan Act and the Aggregate Resources Act as well as the associated 
Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards. The constitutional and/or treaty 
rights of First Nations and Metis communities and the applicable Indigenous legal orders 
are also part of these key legal frameworks. While this chapter is focused on a detailed 
review of these primary legal and policy regimes, quarry disputes can engage a much 
broader range of municipal, provincial, federal and international law. The following 
overview begins by examining the role of the Crown’s Duty to Consult and 
Accommodate Aboriginal rights and title under Section 35 of the Constitution Act. 
 
A. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate – Aboriginal Rights, Title and 
Crown Constitutional Obligations 
 
Indigenous legal orders, Aboriginal rights and title, as well as treaty rights and 
obligations, have largely been neglected in debates about the regulation of private land 
use in Ontario. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that the Crown 
has a constitutional duty to consult and accommodate in respect of Aboriginal rights, 
claims and treaty rights, where “the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the 
                                                         
94 After this research was undertaken, the Ontario Liberal government launched a review of the role of the 
Ontario Municipal Board, including the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction and its operation. After a 
province-wide consultation process, the government introduced a reform Bill in May 2017: Bill 139, 
Building Better Communities and Conserving Watersheds Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Leg, Ontario, 2017 (first 
reading May 30th, 2017). The Act would replace the OMB with a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, establish 
a Local Planning Appeal Support Centre to provide free legal and planning advice, as well as 
representation. These proposals are outside the scope of this project and remain under consideration. 
95 John George Chipman, A Law Unto Itself: How the Ontario Municipal Board Has Developed and 
Applied Land Use Planning Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 12. 
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potential existence of an Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might 
adversely affect it” in accordance with Section 35 of the Constitution Act.96 Following 
from Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the landmark cases in Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia (Minister of Forests), Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage), and Taku River Tlingit First Nations v. British Columbia (Project 
Assessment Director), demonstrate that the scope and content of the duty will vary along 
a spectrum from a minor “duty to discuss” to “deep consultation,” proportionate to a 
preliminary assessment of the claim and the seriousness of the effects.97 Regardless of 
where the circumstances of a particular case may fall on the spectrum, the consultation 
must always be “meaningful,” undertaken in “good faith” and with the “intention of 
substantially addressing the concerns” of the affected community.98  
 
Much of Ontario is covered by historic treaties rather than subject to Aboriginal title 
claims. Therefore, in large parts of the province, the relevant duty to consult analysis is 
likely to be the Supreme Court’s decision in the Mikisew, which dealt with the duty to 
consult in the context of a historic treaty with a “lands taken up” clause. However, it 
should be noted that there are important areas of unceded land subject to current and 
ongoing land claims and claims of rights that survived treaty.99 Indeed, a highly 
                                                         
96 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, at para. 168 [Delgamuukw]; Haida Nation v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] SCR 511 [Haida], at para. 35; Taku River 
Tlingit First Nations v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 
[Taku River]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388, 
2005 SCC 69 (Canlii), 259 DLR (4th) 610, [2006] 1 CNLR 78 [Mikisew]. See also the Supreme Court’s 
first finding of Aboriginal title See also the Supreme Court’s first finding of Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in]. 
97 Haida, supra note 96, at para. 40, citing Delgamuukw, at para. 168. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See for example, the Algonquin land claim covering a territory of 36,000 square kilometres in eastern 
Ontario currently being negotiated: https://www.ontario.ca/aboriginal/algonquin-land-claim. The Saugeen 
Ojibway Nation Territories have also filed claims related to the lake and lakebeds surrounding their Treaty 
and traditional territories: Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation and Saugeen First Nation v The 
Attorney General of Canada and the Queen in right of Ontario, Statement of Claim, Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, Court File No. 03-CV-261134CM1, (January 5,2004). A motion to strike those portions of 
the above pleadings dealing with Aboriginal title to the Great 
Lakes and their connecting waterways was dismissed by Carnwath J. of the Ontario Superior Court: 
Walpole Island First Nation et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 CanLII 7793 (ON SC), [2004] 3 
CNLR 351. 
 (leave to appeal refused (15 September 2004) Matlow J. (Ont Div Ct). 
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controversial historic aggregate licence for lands claimed by the Tyendinaga Mohawks 
under the federal Specific Claims process for unsettled Indigenous land claims was the 
subject of protests, blockades and violent confrontations in 2006-2007 when an assertion 
of Indigenous jurisdiction was rejected by the proponent and government agencies.100  
 
In 2014, the Court reaffirmed Ontario’s obligations to Aboriginal parties to historic 
treaties, including the duty to consult and accommodate, in the Grassy Narrows First 
Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources) case.101 Earlier in the 2006 Mikisew decision, the 
Court emphasized the importance of the duty to both First Nations and non-Aboriginal 
governments: “[T]he principle of consultation in advance of interference with existing 
treaty rights is a matter of broad general importance to the relations between aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal peoples.”102 Justice Binnie articulated the appropriate test as the 
determination of the “degree to which conduct contemplated by the Crown would 
adversely affect those rights so as to trigger the duty to consult,” noting that the trigger is 
a low threshold and the variation would be in the content of the duty.103 He concluded 
that the Crown has a positive duty - “an obligation to inform itself of the impact” on 
treaty rights and must follow up with a meaningful, “good-faith” process that includes the 
possibility of accommodation that “substantially addresses” the impacts.104 In fact, 
Justice Binnie contemplated that finding the process is not compatible with the honour of 
the Crown may result in the setting aside of a government order “whether or not the facts 
of the case would otherwise support a finding of infringement” of the rights.105 In that 
                                                         
J. of the Ontario Divisional Court September 15,2004). 
100 Shiri Pasternak, Sue Collis & Tia Dafnos, “Criminalization at Tyendinaga: Securing Canada’s Colonial 
Property Regime through Specific Land Claims” (2013) 28 Canadian Journal of Law & Society/La Revue 
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101 2014 SCC 48 [Grassy Narrows]. 
102 Mikisew, supra note 96, at 3. 
103 Ibid, at para 34. 
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case, despite finding that the duty was at the lower end of the spectrum, Binnie found that 
it had not been fulfilled and described what ought to have occurred:  
This engagement ought to have included the provision of information about the 
project addressing what the Crown knew to be Mikisew interests and what the 
Crown anticipated might be the potential adverse impact on those interests. The 
Crown was required to solicit and to listen carefully to Mikisew concerns, and to 
attempt to minimize adverse impacts on the Mikisew hunting, fishing and 
trapping rights.106 
Should the impact result in “no meaningful right” in relation to the traditional territory 
of a Treaty First Nation, both Mikisew and Grassy Narrows impose the treaty 
infringement analysis, including the R v Sparrow justification test, recently reaffirmed 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia.107 The Tsilhqot’in case restated the Sparrow 
test for legislative infringement of protected s. 35 rights as follows: 1) the government 
must show that it fulfilled the procedural duty to consult and accommodate; 2) 
demonstrate a “compelling and substantial” objective for the government actions; and, 
3) establish that the government’s actions are consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary 
duty to Aboriginal peoples.108 
 
A full examination of the relationship between land use planning, Indigenous land use 
laws, and the duty to consult and accommodate is a complex subject and beyond the 
scope of this more broadly focused project. It is an area that requires much more detailed 
scholarly examination than can be offered in the introductory section below. However, 
this overview will provide a general summary of the Canadian legal framework that 
should be considered by all parties in dealing with aggregate extraction proposals in 
Ontario. Specific Indigenous legal frameworks will be applicable and should be 
considered by all parties as appropriate in a particular location.  
                                                         
106 Ibid, at para. 64. 
107 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow]. 
108 Supra note 96, at para 77. 
 154 
i. The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Who is Responsible and 
for What? 
One of the complexities in understanding how the duty to consult and accommodate 
operates in the context of land use planning is a lack of clarity about roles of the various 
actors, including the proponents and a range of actors that may be created and 
empowered by the provincial or federal Crown. These bodies play critical and often 
leading roles in land use planning, but are not themselves the Crown. For example, 
regional and municipal governments, as well as agencies and administrative bodies, such 
as the Niagara Escarpment Commission, the Ontario Municipal Board and the 
Environmental Review Tribunal may all play a role in planning decisions.109 In the 
context of land use planning and environmental decision-making, including aggregate 
extraction licensing, these bodies play very significant roles and cannot be ignored as key 
actors in ensuring that legal duties to Indigenous communities are met. In particular, 
municipalities are often uniquely positioned to understand the local context of the 
impacts of extractive development and may be experienced in conducting certain types of 
consultations. 
 
As described below, while the aggregate licensing process is formally regulated by 
provincial law and administered by the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, conflicts 
about aggregate extraction are often rooted in the municipal zoning and official plan 
amendments required prior to provincial approval. Indeed, the exclusion of the majority 
of private land in Northern Ontario from regulation under the Aggregate Resources Act 
licensing process means that municipal Planning Act approvals are the only mechanism 
for review in large parts of the province where First Nations lands and rights may be 
impacted. Further, public consultation has largely been delegated to the proponent under 
the provincial aggregate policies, making the municipality and the proponent the leading 
bodies with respect to public consultation in the aggregate context.  The Ministry, one or 
more municipal and regional governments, and the Ontario Municipal Board often play 
                                                         
109 Nancy Kleer, Lorraine Land & Judith Rae, “Bearing and Sharing the Duty to Consult and Accommodate 
in the Grey Areas in Consultation: Municipalities, Crown Corporations and Agents, Commissions, and the 
Like” (Paper, delivered at the Canadian Institute Conference, 24 February 2011), at 3. Available online at: 
< http://oktlaw.com/drive/uploads/2016/10/njkGreyAreas.pdf> [Kleer et al.] 
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significant roles at various stages of the licensing process. As well, the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Niagara Escarpment Commission 
and the local conservation authorities may play critical roles in a particular case.  
 
It should be noted that there are real concerns about the consequences of any delegation 
of the Crown’s duty to consult that should be considered in the development of the legal 
and regulatory framework governing aggregate extraction and land use planning more 
generally.110 Kaitlin Ritchie argues that the costs may include the following: 1) the loss of 
critical opportunities to advance reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal people 
through nation-to-nation negotiations; 2) the potential that the “scope and range of 
accommodations” that can result from consultations will be limited by the statutory 
powers of non-Crown bodies, such as municipalities and tribunals;111 and, 3) the potential 
to create confusion about who has the duty to consult that may result in a failure to fulfill 
the duty.112 However, as Imai and Stacey recently pointed out, the failure to engage other 
public bodies and private proponents in the fulfillment of the duty may have important 
and negative consequences for the protection of Aboriginal interests and for the goal of 
reconciliation between the Crown and First Nations.113 In the words of the Court of 
Appeal of Yukon, “[T]he Duty to Consult exists to ensure that the Crown does not 
manage its resources in a manner that ignores Aboriginal claims.”114 
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The Court in Haida found that the Crown cannot delegate the legal responsibility for the 
duty to consult and accommodate, a power that flows from the “assumption of 
sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group” and the 
“honour of the Crown.”115 However, the Court specifically allowed for the Crown to 
delegate “procedural aspects” of the consultations, in that case to industry proponents.116 
As Kleer et al. point out, this leaves the complex question of exactly what has been 
delegated to a case-specific analysis. In Rio Tinto Alcan v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 
the Court contemplated delegation to public bodies where their decision-making roles 
may affect Aboriginal rights and interests, in that case administrative tribunals.117 Carrier 
Sekani did provide some guidance about how to undertake this inquiry, including the 
importance of examining the specific duties and powers conferred on the body by the 
legislature, particularly the nature of the delegation expressed or implied in the enabling 
legislation.118 Kleer et al. point to the Court’s division of the duty into two separate roles 
in the context of delegation: a) the “consulting” role whereby a body is delegated the role 
of engaging with an Indigenous community and examining the potential impacts and 
possible accommodations and has the “remedial powers” necessary to effect changes and 
to accommodate in response to the consultation outcomes; and, b) a “reviewing” role 
through which a body is legally empowered to consider whether there is a duty in the 
circumstances and if so, if the duty has been met.119 
 
The law on how this specifically impacts municipalities has been limited and the 
results of judicial consideration have been mixed. In Ontario, the regulatory 
framework has been silent on the duty to consult and accommodate in the land 
use planning context until 2014. The Ontario Planning Act, Provincial Policy 
Statement and Aggregate Resources Act provided very little guidance in the 
context of aggregate extraction. The 2014 revised Provincial Policy Statement 
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included, for the first time, explicit acknowledgement of the “rights and 
interests” of Aboriginal communities and mandatory language requiring the 
Policy Statement “shall be implemented in a manner that is consistent with the 
recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.”120 Given 
the powerful role of the Provincial Policy Statement in decision-making by both 
municipal governments and the Ontario Municipal Board, this serves as the first 
explicit provincial delegation of at least some aspects of the duty to consult and 
accommodate municipalities in Canada.121 A 2009 report provides that the 
position of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing is that “municipalities 
do have a duty to consult in some circumstances” and notes that in practice 
many municipalities are already engaged in consultation with neighbouring First 
Nations and Metis communities.122 However, the extent of the delegation and the 
implications are as of yet unclear. The Aggregate Resources Act has been silent 
on the duty to consult on Aboriginal rights until the 2017 amendments. Section 
3.1 of the amended Act now provides Ministerial oversight to determine 
“whether adequate consultation with Aboriginal communities has been carried 
out”.123 Not only does this leave “adequate consultation” as an undefined and 
discretionary standard, it presupposes the delegation of the duty to the proponent 
in the context of aggregate extraction. Several members raised concerns about 
leaving the duty of consult to be defined at the discretion of the minister. New 
Democratic Member Gilles Bisson criticized the consultation process on the Bill, 
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which amends both the Act and the Mining Act, based on submissions made by 
Six Nations Chief Ava Hill:  
What they were left with was that somebody came and knocked at the door 
of the First Nation and said, “By the way, here’s what we’d like to do,” 
and walked away. The next thing they know, they’ve got the legislation. 
The Chief is pretty clear. She’s saying, “I cannot support this legislation as 
a First Nations leader because it stops well short of what the UN 
declaration calls for.”124 
Bisson attempted to amend this clause at Committee and raised the issue at second 
reading, citing Chief Hill’s concerns about compliance with the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People:  
It leaves us with a conundrum in this Legislature: If we truly do believe—
as we said we did when we brought the First Nations leadership to this 
Legislature to talk about reconciliation and to reaffirm our intent to work 
with First Nations in order to make sure that they are full partners with 
Ontario and that we respect their right when it comes to the issues of the 
duty to consult and the UN declaration. We at that point voted in an 
affirmation of those principles, and we find ourselves with legislation now 
that falls short of it.125 
 
While there is minimal case law in Ontario, the question is unresolved with some 
decisions assuming a municipal responsibility126 and others determining the opposite, 
finding that municipalities are not “the Crown.” Prior to the 2014 revision of the Policy 
Statement, the Ontario Municipal Board in Sifton v Brantford found the municipality in 
that case did not have “a clear duty to consult resulting from the obligations to consult of 
higher levels of government.”127 In 2015, the Board acknowledged the 2014 duty to 
consult provision in an appeal of a rezoning application for a redevelopment project on 
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unceded Algonquin territory on the Ottawa River or Kichi Zibi.128 The Board found that a 
consultation process incorporating “elements and features within the overall development 
that will recognize and celebrate Algonquin history and culture as well as the overall 
significance of the islands to the Algonquin in particular” was “in line with” the 
consultation contemplated by the Policy Statement and the Official Plan.129 Notably the 
Board characterised the City consultation process as “a number of well attended public 
meetings occurring, where public input was sought from both the public at large as well 
as with the Aboriginal community.”130 The proponent rather than the city undertook 
specific consultation with the Algonquins of Ontario.131 Rather than viewing this as a 
failure of the City to fulfill the duty to consult, the Board invoked the private ownership 
of the land to shield the City and the developers from further obligations, noting that the 
proponent had engaged in consultation “notwithstanding” the private nature of the 
development.132 The decision acknowledges the land as unceded Algonquin territory but 
then immediately limits the significance of this finding:  
“[T]here is no land claim agreement in place and the Board notes that the 
negotiations between the Federal Government, Provincial Government and 
the Algonquins are focused on lands that are under federal 
jurisdiction/ownership and do not include lands that are privately held or 
owned at this time. The subject lands have been held in private ownership 
for over 100 years with small areas still owned by PWGSC subject to 
perpetual lease agreements for perpetual use by private interests.133  
The decision was upheld on appeal in 2016.134   
 
Outside of Ontario, further case law has developed. A 2012 decision of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal in Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City)135 accepted 
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the “powerful arguments, both legal and practical” against “automatically” imposing the 
duty on a municipality, resulting in a confusing situation where the duty to consult 
remained, presumably to be fulfilled by the provincial Crown. The project was allowed to 
proceed as only municipal approval was required.136 As Imai and Stacey argue, the Court 
arrived at this result by asking the wrong question – who has the duty to consult rather 
than whether consultation is required before proceeding - resulting in a problematic 
result.137 The Court held that without the express delegation of the duty, municipal 
authorities do not owe a duty to consult, concluding that “local governments lack the 
authority to engage in the nuanced and complex constitutional process involving ‘facts, 
law, policy and compromise.”138 While acknowledging, “that First Nations may 
experience difficulty in seeking appropriate remedies in the courts in cases like this one,” 
the Court concluded that the law from Haida and Carrier Sekani, combined with the 
municipal “lack of practical resources to consult and accommodate” countered the 
arguments for an implied delegation of the duty put forward by the First Nation.139 
 
Imai and Stacey critique the result in Neskonlith on both legal and practical grounds, 
arguing the constitutional nature of rights recognized and protected by Section 35 does 
not allow for a “sphere of activity by non-government actors that is beyond” their reach 
and to the problematic “implementation issues” of the result.140 The importance of the 
Crown-First Nations relationship and the distinct role of other public or private parties 
cannot result in such parties being in a better position than the Crown to pursue activities 
that adversely impact Aboriginal rights and interests.141 They note that Haida must be 
read alongside R v. Sparrow, in which the Supreme Court set out the test for the Crown to 
justify an infringement on s. 35 rights, including the need to demonstrate a proper 
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legislative objective, that the action infringed on the right as little as possible, and 
engaging in consultation and possibly providing compensation.142 They argue that the 
decision could result in increased conflict, directly counter to the goal of reconciliation 
set out in Haida, where a municipality was permitted to proceed with a project prior to 
the completion of the separate consultations with the Crown and regardless of the 
conclusions about adverse impact, alternatives and accommodation. 143 Similarly, Janna 
Promislow argues that the Neskonlith decision may result in less pressure for legislative 
clarity about Indigenous rights in the context of land use planning as it “appears to 
reverse the direction set in Haida Nation…for a broadly distributed dialogue in relation 
to development on lands subject to Aboriginal rights and title claims, leaving it open to 
legislatures to provide further structure for this dialogue.”144 
 
Promislow also notes that the Court of Appeal decision fails to address the finality of 
some municipal decisions, such as the permit at issue in Neskonlith or the rezoning 
application in Jackman, and the possibility to reduce the potential for claims to limit or 
stop impactful development where proof of Aboriginal rights is pending that was opened 
up by Haida.145 Further, and of particular concern with extractive activities in Ontario, 
the decision has problematic implications with respect to the role of private proponents 
and landowners in relation to the Crown-First Nation relationship. The Supreme Court in 
Tsilhqot’in makes clear that while Ontario can exercise its jurisdiction over land and 
natural resources, this Crown power is “burdened by the Crown obligations toward 
aboriginal people,” in including respect for harvesting rights of Treaty First Nations.146 
The duty to consult and accommodate and the requirement to justify treaty infringements 
cannot be fulfilled by a land use planning system that simply delegates decision-making 
powers that trigger the duty to non-Crown bodies.  As Promislaw argues, “courts should 
avoid interpreting statutory mandates as excluding the duty to consult unless legislation 
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makes those exclusions express.”147 Despite the finding in Jackman, nothing in the 2014 
Policy Statement expressly provides for delegation of the duty to private parties. 
 
Litigation surrounding aggregate extraction has rarely dealt with issues related to the duty 
to consult and accommodate. This is likely due, at least in part, to the failure of the 
regulatory framework to recognize the role of First Nations and Metis claims in land use 
planning in the Province and to institute an appropriate process, which has resulted in 
limiting participation by affected First Nations and Metis governments to the general 
‘stakeholder’ processes related. Such general processes are not seen by First Nations 
governments as fulfilling the duty and some communities have asserted the right to be 
consulted independently and directly by the Crown and all decision-making bodies 
involved in the licensing process, a position consistent with Mikisew. 148 In submissions 
to the legislative review Committee, Saugeen Ojibway Nation representative Veronica 
Smith pointed to the “lack of any consultation process on how the establishment of 
quarries and pits is affecting our traditional territory, our constitutional rights, and our 
Treaty 72 and aboriginal title claims.”149 Chief Hill rejected the 2017 amendment 
regarding consultation and instead proposed the following consultation clause:  
3.1 Consultation with First Nations communities shall be governed by the 
principle of free, prior and informed consent in the extraction of aggregate 
resources from any area within Ontario. If it is found that the extraction 
will be from the treaty area of a First Nation, then that First Nation should 
be entitled to a royalty payment based upon the amount of aggregate 
extracted.150 
In addition, communities facing complex and sometimes multiple consultations have 
pointed to the need for financial support for staffing and technical expertise for 
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consultation. Smith noted the “enormous burden on SON, both in terms of staff time, 
political representative time, and consultant and technician time, to ensure that SON’s 
aboriginal and treaty rights are protected.” 151 The human resource and financial 
challenges faced by First Nations in connection with consultation have been recognized 
by the courts in a range of contexts; however, there is, as of yet, no legal duty for the 
Crown to provide or arrange for such assistance. This remains a significant challenge 
facing First Nations involved with quarry licensing processes, which similar to other 
types of mining, involve the review and interpretation of complex technical reports 
including planning, natural heritage, hydrology, geology, hydrogeology, archeology and 
cultural heritage and often air quality, as well as retaining independent expertise to 
provide advice and expert evidence in any legal proceedings.152 It also compounds the 
lack of revenue sharing, as noted by Chief Hill.153 
 
While the concerns expressed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Neskonlith 
shed some doubt on when an implied delegation would be found, an explicit delegation to 
a municipality is a clear possibility following from both Haida and Carrier Sekani and in 
light of the 2014 Policy Statement. Indeed, Imai and Stacey argue, “municipalities should 
be required to work with the provincial Crown.”154 In Ross River Dena, the Court of 
Appeal of Yukon emphasized that the Crown has a proactive responsibility to establish a 
consultation regime for activities that may interfere with Aboriginal rights and title, in 
that case quartz mineral mining.155 The prospective nature of this obligation, described in 
Ross River Dena as requiring accommodation to take place, where required, before 
Aboriginal rights, title and interests are affected, is consistent with the nature and process 
of land use planning. It should, therefore, be possible to design and establish such a 
regime for aggregate licensing (and other land use matters) that compliments, and 
improves upon, the established role for consultation and prospective decision-making at 
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the municipal level. As was emphasized by the decision in Mikisew, a general process of 
public consultation does not satisfy this obligation; it is specific to the obligations to, and 
impact on, Aboriginal Peoples and their rights. A decision by a First Nation not to engage 
in a general public planning process does not relieve the government of its duty to consult 
and engage directly with Aboriginal Peoples.156 Further, the extent of delegation to a 
private actor in the proponent-led system described below is problematic in the context of 
the Crown’s duty, even where some aspects of consultation can be legally delegated. 
At the time of writing, it remains to be seen how Ontario, Indigenous communities, 
municipalities, proponents and the Ontario Municipal Board will interpret the changes to 
the Policy Statement and define “adequate consultation” under the amended Act. For 
example, Grey County planning staff noted, “It is unclear what the Province is expecting 
of municipalities when making decisions that are consistent” with the new Policy 
Statement. Staff advised the County Planning and Community Development Committee 
that they are “interpreting these policies to indicate that municipalities are encouraged to 
consult Aboriginal communities as part of the planning process and ensuring that the 
conservation of cultural heritage and archaeological resources considers the interests of 
Aboriginal communities.”157 Arguably this interpretation minimizes the significance of 
the mandatory language introduced in the 2014 Policy Statement. More likely, the new 
Policy points towards the collaborative approach recommended by Shin and Stacey, 
whereby the Crown retains primary responsibility, ensuring the centralization of expertise 
and resources, but delegates appropriate parts of the consultation and accommodation to 
municipalities, which are likely in better position to assess the effects of a decision in the 
local context.158   
 
Concerns about the capacity of municipalities to properly engage in consultation 
activities, particularly small and rural communities often involved in aggregate 
development and other extractive activities, should not be minimized. However, the 
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primary role of the Crown should include support for both municipal governments and 
First Nations parties to ensure that consultation proceeds consistent with the dual Haida 
goals of “meaningful” consultation and reconciliation. As Justice Binnie concluded in 
Mikisew: “The contemplated process is not simply one of giving the Mikisew an 
opportunity to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do what she intended to do 
all along.” Several Indigenous communities across Ontario have taken steps to assert 
jurisdiction over their territory and the right to Free Prior and Informed Consent under the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through the development 
of consultation protocols based on Indigenous law to applied to all decisions impacting 
their lands and communities.159 Implementing meaningful consultation between 
aggregate decision makers and Indigenous nations would require recognition and 
implementation of such protocols alongside municipal and provincial practices and 
frameworks used to define the content of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate. Indeed, 
decision-making would be enhanced by consultation and partnerships informed by these 
instruments as they clarify the role Indigenous communities want to play in land use 
decisions, the support they require from governments and proponents to make informed 
decisions in accordance with their laws and protocols, and the legal principles that will be 
applied when making decisions about their territory and rights. The aggregate extraction 
decision-making framework should therefore explicitly recognize the UN Declaration as 
well as the role of these Indigenous planning instruments and decision makers. Any 
delegation to municipal and proponent actors should clearly identify the jurisdiction of 
Indigenous decision makers and legal orders and require that aggregate extraction 
decisions are made in accordance with these instruments. 
 
Ontario has a duty to ensure any procedural delegation upholds the Crown’s non-
delegable obligations to Indigenous communities. However, the 2017 incorporation of 
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Aboriginal consultation in the amended Act still falls short of this standard by failing to 
clearly define adequate consultation or acknowledge the Declaration and the right to Free 
Prior and Informed consent, and by upholding the proponent-driven nature of the process. 
The amendments do nothing to ameliorate the burden of responding to and engaging in 
consultation on Indigenous communities, nor do they support municipalities to build 
meaningful relationships with Indigenous partners and to accommodate section 35 rights 
in the planning process. Further, they fail to acknowledge the role of Indigenous law, 
such as the Indigenous consultation protocols noted above, in defining the Duty to 
Consult and Accommodate in Ontario’s land use framework. 
B. The Aggregate Resources Act 
This section provides a detailed overview of the Act as it existed at the time this research 
was undertaken. While amendments following the recent passage of Bill 39 Aggregate 
Resources and Mining Modernization Act160 are discussed within this section, Part III 
provides a more detailed overview. Notably, the amended Act remains enabling 
legislation and many of the changes proposed during the consultation process discussed 
in Part III require the development of future regulations and are therefore not discussed 
here. Aggregate resources, defined by the Act as, “gravel, sand, clay, earth, shale, stone, 
limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, granite, rock or other prescribed material”,161 
are regulated separately from other minerals under the Aggregate Resources Act [the 
“Act”]. The Act sets out 4 purposes:  
(a) to provide for the management of the aggregate resources of Ontario; 
(b) to control and regulate aggregate operations on Crown and private lands; 
(c) to require the rehabilitation of land from which aggregate has been 
excavated; and 
(d) to minimize adverse impact on the environment in respect of aggregate 
operations.162 
 
“Management” is defined as the “identification, orderly development and protection of 
the aggregate resources of Ontario,” clearly establishing the development-focus of the 
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Act.163 This emphasis on development is consistent with the historical emphasis in 
provincial planning on utilitarian conceptions of improvement and development that 
center around human benefits and economic productivity.164 
 
The Act provides for several categories of aggregate, which are referred to as “pits” or 
“quarries”.165 Depending on the amount, depth and nature of the material to be extracted, 
a pit or a quarry on private land will require either a “Class A” or “Class B” licence under 
S.7(2) of the Aggregate Resources Act. A “pit” refers to the extraction of unconsolidated 
bedrock – stone, sand or gravel.166 A “quarry” involves the extraction of consolidated 
bedrock, for example, shale, limestone or dolostone.167 Extraction on private land can 
also be allowed through a Wayside Permit only for use by a public authority for 
temporary road construction or maintenance.168 Extraction on Crown lands or lands under 
water requires an Aggregate Permit.169 For the purposes of this study, I am focused on 
aggregate licences as outlined above as these have been the focus of recent and ongoing 
conflicts in Ontario. As outlined in Table 2 below, licence applications are further 
classified into eight categories depending on whether extraction below the water table is 
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proposed. The 2017 amendments introduced exceptions to the requirements for licences 
and permits for persons meeting “qualifications that may be prescribed” to “operate a pit 
or quarry” under certain terms or conditions.170 The Bill provided no justification for this 
exemption and provides no detail on the qualifications or terms and conditions. The Act 
also provides for the minister to waive fees associated with licences and permits.171 
  
Class ‘A’:  
Removal of over 20,000 tonnes/annually 
Class ‘B’: 
Removal of 20,000 tonnes or less annually 
Category 1: Pit Below the Water Table Category 5: Pit Below the Water Table 
Category 2: Quarry Below the Water Table Category 6: Quarry Below the Water Table 
Category 3: Pit Above the Water Table Category 7: Pit Above the Water Table 
Category 4: Quarry Above the Water Table Category 8: Quarry Above the Water Table 
 
Table 2: Classifications  
This project primarily considers large scale, below the water table aggregate quarries, 
requiring a Class ‘A’ Quarry Below Water licence.172 However, some Class ‘B’ cases are 
considered in both the case law analysis and the empirical case studies where they raise 
unique or significant issues. Environmental lawyers David Estrin and John Swaigen have 
questioned the distinction, noting that it is based on the “questionable assumption” that 
the volume of extraction is determinative of the harm that will be caused by a mine.173 As 
noted above, the Act has a limited geographic application that is established by 
regulation, which excludes private land in most of northern Ontario and only Planning 
Act approvals govern the establishment of aggregate extraction operations on private land 
in these areas of the province.174 As discussed in Chapter Eight, the exclusion of the vast 
majority of private land in Northern Ontario from the Act reflects a perception of 
emptiness that fails to reflect the complexity of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people-place relations in the north and presumes that there is nothing and no one to be 
harmed by industrial extraction.175 Further, it reinforces the legal construction of the 
                                                         
170 Ibid, ss 7(1.1), 34 (1.1). 
171 Ibid, ss 14(5), 21(2), 39(31). 
172 Ibid, at s.7(2)(a). 
173 Estrin & Swaigen, supra note 17. 
174 O. Reg. 244/97, s 6. 
175 Lisa Pruitt, “The Rural Lawscape: Space Tames Law Tames Space”, Irus Braverman et al. eds., The 
Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) at 197. 
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north as the appropriate place for resource development that has been recently reinscribed 
through the Far North Act’s privileging of extractive rights.176  
i. Administration of the Act 
Under the current process the primary responsibility for an aggregate licensing 
application lies with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (the “ministry”) and 
a landowner who must make an application directly thereto. Local municipalities, 
Conservation Authorities and Regional or County authorities have notice rights under the 
Provincial Standards.177 As well, the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Energy 
and local offices of the Ministry of Natural Resources must be notified. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs must be notified if prime agricultural land is not 
being restored to the same average soil quality and the Niagara Escarpment Commission 
must be notified if the area is within their jurisdiction.178 As discussed in detail below, 
associated Official Plan and zoning amendment applications are primarily the 
responsibility of the local municipal authorities; however, the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Natural Resources have some statutory notice 
and review requirements.  
 
While the Act contemplates statutory guidance for application requirements, guidance is 
contained in two Ministry policy documents, the Aggregate Resources Provincial 
Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal Procedures Manual.179 
Application and operation in accordance with the Standards is required by regulation, 
arguably strengthening their enforceability, but the 700-plus-page Manual is not similarly 
                                                         
176 Holly L Gardner et al, “The Far North Act (2010) Consultative Process: A New Beginning or the 
Reinforcement of an Unacceptable Relationship in Northern Ontario, Canada?” (2012) 3 The International 
Indigenous Policy Journal 2 7; Christopher J A Wilkinson & Tyler Schulz, “Planning the Far North in 
Ontario, Canada: An Examination of the ‘Far North Act, 2010’” (2012) 32 Natural Areas Journal 3 310. 
177 Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, “Provincial Standards of Ontario – Category 2 – Class A Quarry 
Below Water” (1997), online: 
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/en/Business/Aggregates/Publication/STEL02_173877.html, at 10-11, s. 4.1.3. 
178 Ibid. 
179 The Standards supra note 87; Ministry of Natural Resources, Land and Water Branch, Aggregate and 
Petroleum Resources Section, “Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal Procedures Manual” (1996), [the 
“Manual”]. 
http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/en/Business/Aggregates/2ColumnSubPage/266561.html#2_0_Licences.  
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incorporated into the regulations.180 Together these documents specify the technical 
information and reports required during the application process, including expert 
hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s) and cultural heritage report(s), 
which must be prepared by a “qualified” professional as defined in the Act.181 Notably, 
the detailed Manual was not initially available to the public except by individual request, 
which was the subject of specific criticism by the Environmental Commissioner in his 
2006/2007 Annual Report to the Legislature.182 Table 3 outlines the mandatory, 
conditional, and routinely prepared documents associated with a Class “A” Below the 
Water Table quarry, based on both the Standards and the Manual. The Standards require 
the Ministry to provide a determination that an application is complete before the process 
proceeds. The Act also provides for additional information to be required by the 
Minister.183 The amended Act provides for a new “custom plan” category for which the 
Minister can approve custom consultation and notification procedures and requirements 
for surveys or studies for a particular application.184 As discussed in Part III, a number of 
commentators raise concerns about this highly discretionary power, as well as the lack of 
detail about regulatory content in general. A more widely supported amendment provides 
for future regulations enabling the Ministry to have “technical or specialized studies or 
reports” included in an application undergo external peer review.185 However, no such 
regulation is yet proposed. Similarly, a widely supported proposal to have enhanced 
information requirements, including Agricultural Impact Assessments for development 
on prime agricultural land and plain language summaries for all application documents, 
have been left to future regulatory or policy development.186 
                                                         
180 O Reg 244/97 s7. 
181 Ibid, at s.8. Section 8(4) stipulates: “Every site plan accompanying an application for a Class A licence 
must be prepared under the direction of and certified by a professional engineer who is a member of the 
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, a land surveyor who is a member of the Association of 
Ontario Land Surveyors, a landscape architect who is a member of the Ontario Association of Landscape 
Architects, or any other qualified person approved in writing by the Minister.” 
182 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 2007. “MNR’s Aggregate Resources Program Manual.” 
Reconciling Our Priorities, ECO Annual Report, 2006-2007 (Toronto, ON: Environmental Commissioner 
of Ontario) 113-118. See also, “Aggregate Procedures Manual” ECO Notes: 
http://www.ecoissues.ca/index.php/Aggregates_Procedures_Manual. 
183 Supra note 36, s 7(5), 23(5), 36(2). 
184 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160 
185 Ibid, s 45. 
186 Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry Ontario, A Blueprint for Change: A proposal to modernize 
and strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act policy framework (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 2015) at 36. 
 171 
 
Document 
(Required, 
Required in 
Some 
Circumstances, 
Routine) 
Description: Key Content Prepared by 
Site Plan Primarily a descriptive document, 
including drawings: 
• Existing site features and 
surrounding area 
• Operations: including shape, 
heights, area of excavation, 
water diversions, buildings, 
set-backs/berms, hours, 
equipment, monitoring 
• Rehabilitation: progressive 
and final, including 
vegetation, groundwater 
elevation, water drainage, 
buildings 
• Cross-sections of existing 
conditions, rehabilitation, 
final groundwater table, 
typical berm, slope gradients 
A qualified professional: 
ARA, s. 8(1), (4). The Site 
Plan may be prepared by a 
certified professional 
engineer, land surveyor, 
landscape architect or “any 
other qualified person 
approved, in writing, by the 
Minister.” The policy and 
procedure for approval to 
prepare a site plan is 
contained in the Manual, s. 
2.00.01. 
 
Summary 
Statement 
• Any planning and land use 
considerations (planning 
report); 
• Agricultural classification 
per Canada Land Inventory 
for current land and post-
rehabilitation; 
• Quality and quantity of 
aggregate on the site; 
• Main haulage routes, 
proposed truck traffic and 
necessary entrance permits 
(traffic study);  
• Municipal traffic 
agreements/approvals; 
• Progressive and final 
rehabilitation 
Majority can be prepared by 
the Applicant. Groundwater 
portion must be prepared 
by a Professional 
Geoscientist or a 
Professional Engineer. 
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o Details of 
agricultural 
rehabilitation 
o Description of “fill” 
• Required water approvals 
(PTTW or COA) 
• Suggested by manual: 
information on both surface 
and groundwater 
Hydrogeologic 
Report 
a. Level 1: preliminary 
evaluation to determine final 
extraction depth relative to 
established groundwater 
table(s), and potential for 
adverse effects to ground 
and surface water; 
b. Level 2: impact assessment 
required where Level 1 
Report identifies potential 
adverse effect to determine 
significance of effect(s) and 
feasibility of mitigation 
Professional Geoscientist or 
Engineer 
Natural 
Environment 
Report 
a. Level 1: determines whether 
any of following exist on 
and within 120 metres of 
site: significant wetland, 
habitat of endangered or 
threatened species, 
woodlands, valley lands, 
wildlife habitat, areas of 
natural and scientific 
interest; or, fish habitat. 
b. Level 2: If any features 
identified in Level 1 report, 
provides impact assessment 
for negative impacts on 
natural features or 
ecological functions and 
proposed preventative, 
mitigative or remedial 
measures. 
(Terms in bold are defined in the 
Policy Statement) 
Person with appropriate 
training and/or experience 
in identification of fish 
habitat and significant 
natural heritage features. 
 
With reference to the 
Natural Heritage Reference 
Manual for off-site features. 
Cultural 
Heritage 
a. Stage 1: any known 
significant archaeological 
Stage 1: person with 
appropriate training and/or 
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Resource 
Report 
Purpose: “to 
ensure that 
archaeological 
resources are 
identified, 
assessed for 
their 
significance, 
and 
protected…” 
 
resources on subject 
property and potential for 
site to have heritage 
resources; 
b. Stage 2: If known resources 
or medium to high potential, 
survey and any 
recommended mitigation 
c. Stage 3: where 
recommended by stage 2, 
detailed site investigation  
d. Stage 4: outlines any 
recommended mitigation 
through excavation, 
documentation, avoidance 
e. Assessment of impacts to 
built and cultural heritage 
landscapes may be required 
separate and independently 
carried out 
licence – may consist of 
sign-off letter from Ministry 
of Culture, Heritage & 
Libraries Branch 
Stages 2-4: licensed 
Archaeologist 
 
 
 
 
Qualified Heritage 
Consultant 
Noise 
Assessment 
Report 
Required if extraction/processing 
within 500 metres of sensitive 
receptor to determine whether 
provincial guidelines can be 
satisfied 
 
Blast Design 
Report 
Required if limits of extraction 
within 500 metres of sensitive 
receptor to demonstrate provincial 
guidelines can be satisfied 
 
Adaptive 
Management 
Plan 
Not required by the Standards or the 
Manual; however, increasingly 
standard and accepted by the Board. 
May be the subject of a stand-alone 
report or incorporated into larger 
discussion of rehabilitation etc. 
 
Table 3: Required Documents 
Until the 2017 amendments, an approved site plan was required for any aggregate licence 
and the proponent had to operate in accordance with that plan.187 The Act now provides 
for regulatory exemptions from site plan requirements but provides no further guidance 
on the circumstances in which such an exemption would be appropriate. The site plan is 
                                                         
187 Ibid, s 8, 15. Under the amended Act the site plan is required under s 8.  
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the primary mechanism for the regulation of any particular operation by the Ministry, 
therefore an exemption provides for substantially less oversight and monitoring. The 
Minister can attach conditions to the licence and add or vary conditions at any time. 188 
The amended Act will also empower the Minister to require amendments to the site plan 
or submission of a new site plan at any time.189 The amended Act also provides for the 
Minister to require licensees to submit operational information and to conduct 
inventories, studies, surveys or tests, though the licensee can request reconsideration.190 
In the case of a failure to comply with a direction to conduct the requested inventory or 
study, the Minister will be able to have it conducted at the costs of the licensee.191 
 
The Act provides for enforcement powers to ensure compliance. For example, under 
Section 63, which provides for compliance orders, including the power to “order that the 
operation of the pit or quarry cease and that the site be rehabilitated to a safe condition in 
accordance with the order.”192 Section 48 provides for rehabilitation orders, including 
imposing time requirements, where it is found that the operator is “not performing or did 
not perform adequate progressive rehabilitation or final rehabilitation on the site in 
accordance with subsection.” The amended Act will also require rehabilitation reports; 
however the substance and timing of such reports is subject to future regulations.193 The 
Act also requires the Minister’s acceptance of licence surrender upon satisfaction of the 
rehabilitation requirements under the Act, the licence and the site plan.194 A licence can 
also be suspended pending fulfillment of specific requirements under Section 22, or 
revoked for contravention of the Act.195 Revocation orders are appealable to the Ontario 
                                                         
188 Ibid, s 13 (1). 
189 Ibid, s 13(1), as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160 s 
13(1). 
190 Ibid, s 62.3, 62.4. as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160 s 
45. 
191 Ibid, s 62.4. as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160 s 45 
(7)-(8). 
192 Ibid, s 63. The amended Act changes the wording to substitute “the land on which the pit or quarry was 
operated” for “the site”. 
193 Ibid, s 48 (1.1), as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160, s 
39. 
194 Ibid, s 19. 
195 Ibid, s 20. 
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Municipal Board and the licensee is entitled to a hearing within 30 days if notice is 
served.196 Fines can be imposed for failure to comply with Section 63 compliance 
orders.197 The amended Act will provides no minimum fine, but will raise the maximum 
to $1,000,000 with an additional $100,000 per day for the continuation of an offence.198 
Notably the amended Act will also specify that the provision of false or misleading 
information in any report or in information required is an offence.199  
 
The substantive impact of these enforcement powers depends on the identification of 
compliance issues and the capacity to meaningfully enforce them. Until 1997, inspectors 
were required to conduct annual inspections. As noted above, the Act has moved to a 
system of self-monitoring and reporting with the Ministry serving only an auditing 
function. While this project did not include investigation of enforcement decisions, 
longstanding concerns about enforcement have been noted by legislators,200 
researchers,201 the Environmental Commissioner,202 the Board,203 and by participants in 
this project. Estrin and Swaigen noted in 1993, “[B]etween 1973 and 1989, the Ministry 
initiated 154 prosecutions and obtained 81 convictions. The total fines levied amounted 
to about $72,000.” Comparing this to the enforcement record of the Minister of 
Environment and Energy, they point out that the Ministry of Natural Resources had 
therefore undertaken “fewer prosecutions over a 17-year period than the Ministry of 
                                                         
196 Ibid, s 20 (4). 
197 Ibid, s 57, 58. 
198 Ibid, s 58 (1). as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160, s  
42. 
199 Ibid, s 57 (5), as amended by Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 160, s 
41(2). 
200 See discussion accompanying footnotes 44 to 53 above. 
201 Estrin & Swaigen, supra note 17 at 760. 
202 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Doing Less with Less: A special report to the Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario (Toronto: Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2007); Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, Choosing Our Legacy: Annual Report 2003-2004 (Toronto: Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2007); Ministry of Natural Resources, Environmental Bill of Rights File No. 
R2003008 - Review of the Aggregate Resources Act With Respect to Rehabilitation From Which Aggregate 
Has Been Excavated. (Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, 2006). 
203 James Dick Construction Ltd. v Caledon (Town), (2010) 66 OMBR 263 [Rockfort]. See also the 
dissenting opinion in Re Walker Aggregates Inc. supra note 93, but see the majority at p 86. 
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Environment and Energy undertakes in a single year.” They also note that as of 1993 the 
Ministry had not revoked any aggregate licences.  
 
Prompted by the Environmental Commissioner, the Ministry reviewed the self-reporting 
compliance system in 2002.204 The Commissioner reported the Ministry’s findings that 
the quality of the self-compliance reports were “lacking,” both with deficient information 
and sometimes incomplete or inaccurate reporting.205 The review had also revealed that 
while staff were not always able to meet the 20% field audit target, the visits were 
“frequently identifying additional violations” not reported by the proponent.206 In 2004 
the Commissioner reported the Ministry’s update on compliance had found that the field-
audit targets were actually declining.207 The Commissioner’s annual report did note some 
administrative changes had been implemented to improve compliance, including 
invoking the suspension and revocation powers for failure to submit compliance 
reports.208 However, it concluded, “[T]he Ministry’s continuing inability to fulfill this 
obligation is perpetuating conflicts at existing operations, and is also undermining the 
public’s confidence in the regulatory system…”209 In 2003, an Application for Review 
under s 61 of the Environmental Bill of Rights by Gravel Watch, an NGO dedicated to 
aggregate mineral issues, prompted another review of the aggregates program, 
particularly regarding the rehabilitation requirements.210 The Environmental Bill of 
Rights provides for discretion for the Minister to turn down applications for review and 
the Ministry turned down two other Section 61 applications for review of the aggregate 
minerals regime in 2005.211 The Environmental Commissioner reported on the findings of 
the resulting 2006 report and notes that it confirmed long term issues of inadequate 
                                                         
204 The Ministry review is not a public document. However, the findings were reported by the 
Environmental Commissioner in the 2001-2002 Annual Report, Developing Sustainability: Annual Report 
2001-2002 (Toronto: Office of the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2002). 
205 Ibid at 143. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 204 at 63. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid at 64. 
210 Ministry of Natural Resources, supra note 205. 
211 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2005/06 Annual Report - Neglecting our Obligations 
(Toronto: Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2006) at 43. 
 
 177 
staffing, budget and expertise.212 In particular, Ministry findings confirmed a more than 
50% reduction of inspectors, with some responsible for as many as 600 operations, who 
were therefore unable to meet Ministry targets for audits of self-compliance.213 A sample 
compliance survey found that 100 of 121 sites had compliance issues.214 Further, they 
noted that they were unable to adequately evaluate rehabilitation of aggregate sites.215 In 
addition to issues with implementation, the Commissioner’s report notes internal 
concerns about lacking technical expertise, including the loss of “much of its hydro-
geological [sic] knowledge and this in turn makes it difficult to assess potential impacts 
extraction operations could have on water resources.”216 The Commissioner’s report does 
note some improvements underway, including new power for inspectors and plans to hire 
new inspectors and concludes, “much more will be needed to rebuild the Ministry’s 
capacity in this area and to restore public confidence.” There is little evidence to 
demonstrate that this has occurred. One policy analyst reported that while attempts were 
made to follow up on compliance and enforcement issues, “…eventually they just said 
we are not checking anymore because the numbers are not so flattering.”217 
 
The capacity issues and lack of enforcement is of particular concern where applications 
propose complex and evolving “adaptive management plans” to address uncertainties and 
leave significant decisions about how impacts will be monitored and managed to future 
arrangements between the proponent and the Ministry. Under cross-examination, a 
Ministry Aggregate Technical Specialist who gave evidence in the Rockfort quarry case 
discussed in Chapter Five, stated that her District met the Ministry’s 20% “field-checking 
target” and that she “tries to visit most active aggregate sites once per year”.218 In the 
context of significant potential effects and a complex and ongoing management plan that 
left much to be decided and monitored by the Ministry after approval, the Board 
                                                         
212 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 205 at 47. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid at 48. 
215 Ibid at 47. 
216 Ibid at 48. 
217 Interview, May 9, 2014. 
218 Rockfort, supra note 203 at 270. 
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concluded it would “not approve an aggregate proposal which leaves an issue like the 
protection of the natural environment to be dealt with by a third party with demonstrably 
inadequate resources, like MNR.”219 One planner I spoke with noted the lack of public 
trust in the Ministry’s enforcement role: “There is a sense in the public mind that nobody 
is minding the store.”220 The result in her view is an enforcement process driven by 
individual complaints: “A retired engineer who lives near the quarry goes out with his 
binoculars and looks from the Bruce Trail and says ‘ah ha, what is that being dumped 
there on the site?’”221 Not only does this raise environmental justice issues about which 
individuals and communities will have the resources and institutional access to raise 
concerns that will lead to enforcement, even where concerns are successfully raised it is 
difficult to overcome complex causality and evidentiary issues. As one more-than-owner 
participant noted, “The onus is on us to prove that it was them and it is impossible. They 
will say it was a natural disaster that caused it even after a huge blast that caused our 
water not to come clean. It will always come down to you can’t prove it definitively.”222 
 
The Act creates a proponent-driven, self-monitoring system that exemplifies the 
neoliberal reconfiguration of the state towards market-based governance mechanisms and 
privatised modes of regulation aimed at minimizing bureaucracy.223 As Gunningham 
argues, this does not necessarily reflect a reduced role for the state, but rather a 
“hybridity” of governance networks where non-state actors are enrolled in governance 
networks and power and responsibility are diffuse.224 Here the Act retains the role of the 
state in guiding and coordinating aggregate mineral development while non-state actors 
are enrolled to operate “in the shadow of the state.”225 The Provincial Standards and 
Manual demonstrate how this shift in the balance between public and private power 
                                                         
219 Ibid. at 271. 
220 Interview, September 3, 2014. 
221 Interview, September 3, 2014. 
222 Interview, February 19, 2014. 
223 Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore & Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents” (2010) 41 Antipode 
1 94 at 104. 
224 N Gunningham, “Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures” (2009) 21 
Journal of Environmental Law 2 179 at 209. 
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operates in practice through the Applicant’s control of the knowledge base upon which 
the technical, legal and factual decisions are made.226 The application is based on the 
proponent’s site selection, which is usually linked to ownership of the land in question, 
reinforcing the power of private owners to determine land use regardless of the impacts.  
The production of the owner as “efficient, profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals” is central 
to the enrollment of private property mechanisms in the “re-making of nature-society 
relations”. 227 As discussed above, this has a long history in Ontario’s mining law and 
policy and planning frameworks.228 However, in the context of aggregate mineral 
extraction, neoliberal modes of environmental governance have reinscribed and purified 
the ownership model of property and linked it with scientific and managerial approaches 
to land use conflicts. 
 
As discussed below in Chapters Five through Eight, the licensing process is informed and 
driven by the information and expertise provided by the proponent, with the express 
purpose of having the application approved. While the role of technical and scientific 
expertise in Canadian planning was historically linked to the desire to separate planning 
and politics,229 planning scholars have long pointed to the political nature of planning.230  
In Ontario, Moore notes that removing planning from formal politics historically served 
the interests of the business elite.231 Any litigation following from an application relies on 
the knowledge base provided by the proponent, subject to any independent technical or 
legal expertise and documentation that may be provided by Indigenous governments, 
                                                         
226 Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 4. 
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municipal actors or planning authorities, and third party groups or individuals, likely at 
their own expense. In the context of aggregate extraction applications, independent expert 
evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both logistically and financially 
onerous, particularly for Indigenous and small local governments and community groups, 
particularly given that they may or may not be accepted by the Board at a hearing and 
that access to the proponent’s land may not be granted for direct investigation and data 
review.232 Chapters Five, Six and Seven further demonstrate that other sources of 
knowledge, including participants’ experiential knowledge, are often deemed irrelevant 
or critiqued by proponents and decision makers as lacking objectivity or relevant 
expertise. In this way, the aggregate licensing process actively shapes and reshapes the 
people-place relations engaged by a particular proposal. 233 The crisis in enforcement 
capacity that followed from the 1997 amendments exemplifies the neoliberal technique of 
restraining “state-based regulatory power” through the “extension of corporate private 
property rights”.234 The complaints-driven enforcement process facilitates a shift from 
“collective, public responsibility” for safeguarding the ecosystems and communities 
impacted by aggregate extraction to “private individual responsibility” to enforce the 
industry-driven compliance regime.235 In these ways, private property is “enrolled”236 by 
land use planning in specific ways through the Act and associated policy and regulation 
to achieve the desired end of the development and protection of aggregate mineral 
resources. 
C. The Provincial Policy Statement  
 
As the guiding document for planning in the province of Ontario, the Provincial Policy 
Statement requires specific and detailed attention in understanding the legal framework 
for aggregate mineral extraction. The Policy Statement is a detailed and prescriptive 
                                                         
232 See for example the Board’s comments in Re Town of Richmond Hill, PL990303, r’vd by Ontario 
(Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing) v Ontario (Municipal Board) 2001, 41 OMBR 257, 20 MPLR 
(3d) 93.  
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document setting out the provincial vision for “improved land use planning and 
management, which contributes to a more effective and efficient land use planning 
system.”237 The preamble states, “The Provincial Policy Statement provides for 
appropriate development while protecting resources of provincial interest, public health 
and safety, and the quality of the natural and built environment.”238 While the Policy is 
reviewed every five years, it cannot be challenged in a planning or aggregate licensing 
process. Therefore, the assumptions and underlying values remain unchallenged once a 
Policy is put in place.239 The Policy is approved by Cabinet and despite significant public 
consultation, the policy making process is neither deliberative nor participatory.240 
Aggregate resource policies are set out in s 2.5 a dedicated subsection of the Policy 
Statement’s section on the “Wise Use and Management of Resources”. 
 
This section provides a detailed introduction to three key aspects of the policy direction 
provided to the Ministry, municipalities and to the Board in decision-making: 1) The 
presumptive needs analysis; 2) the close to market requirement; 3) the public interest and 
social and environmental impacts. These three areas demonstrate the specific ways in 
which “[a]ggregate resources are given a privileged position” in provincial planning 
policy and practice.241 
 
i. Presumptive Need and Demand Analysis 
Following the report of the Commission on Planning Development Reform in the 1990s, 
provincial planning policy evolved into the Provincial Policy Statement. Since the first 
version was approved, the Policy Statement has consistently prioritized aggregate 
                                                         
237 Policy Statement 2014, supra note 87, Part 1. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Valiante, supra note 22 at 113. 
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resource “protection” and development.242 This prioritization has been maintained 
through to the recently revised 2014 policy. However, until 2005 it maintained that 
“mineral resource needs” should be considered, providing a policy basis for supply and 
demand analysis as central to aggregate licensing decisions: “As much of the mineral 
aggregate resources as is realistically possible will be made available to supply mineral 
resource needs, as close to markets as possible.”243 Opposing parties and governments 
used this version of the policy to argue that the material to be extracted was not currently 
required and therefore the site should not be approved.244 In 2005, the Provincial Policy 
Statement was revised to explicitly eliminate consideration of need in Policy 2.5.2.1:  
As much of the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible shall 
be made available as close to markets as possible. 
Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type 
of supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the 
availability, designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate 
resources locally or elsewhere. 
In this way the need for the resource must be presumed in the analysis of any decision 
maker regardless of the context of supply or demand, locally or provincially. This 
presumptive need analysis remains controversial and stakeholders have argued that 
supply/demand analysis should be reintroduced in aggregate licensing decisions during 
the most recent five-year-review of the Provincial Policy Statement.245 This was also 
raised by a number of deputants at the all-party review of the Act before the Standing 
Committee on General Government described below and by commentators during the 
Policy Statement review,246 and the consultation on the 2017 amendments.247 While the 
Board has concluded that a needs analysis is not required, it has nonetheless also been a 
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live issue in several cases.248 As noted by the Board, “[a]ggregate extraction is the only 
use in the wide ranging Policy Statement where need is not required.”249 A lawyer who 
participated in this study noted, “[t]he underlying rationale for giving aggregates this very 
special status within the Provincial Policy Statement has never really been fully explained 
or rationalized from the perspective of government.”250  
 
The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term 
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known 
deposits, and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude 
or hinder” extraction.251 In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a 
licence “ceases to exist,”252 resulting in a licensing regime with no possibility of 
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the 
changes to surrounding land and land uses. Thus, consistent with the utilitarian 
development focus of planning in Ontario, the resource is severed from its material 
relations to be ‘conserved’ only for specific forms of human use.253 Other forms of 
relation, and even uses that fall outside of the dominant conception of productivity, are 
seen as “constraints”254 or as “resource sterilization”.255  
 
Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of 
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano 
and Sandberg specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the 
aggregate industry to appeal to decision makers, including provincial and local 
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governments and adjudicators.256 In the context of energy infrastructure planning in the 
United Kingdom, Groves et al. similarly argue that discourses of risk “shape the 
distribution of power.”257 In particular, they point to the growing role of quasi-state and 
non-state actors as “centres of calculation” controlling the production, organization and 
distribution of information about risks related to resource demand and supply.258 The 
resulting “narratives of necessity” place conceptual limits on the terms of debate about 
specific land use decisions with important implications for attempts to assert relations 
with place. 259 Therefore, while the SAROS report commissioned by the province 
confirmed long-term needs identified by the aggregate industry, in weighing the impact 
of these findings on planning policy it is important to critically consider the role of 
industry in shaping these conclusions. As noted above, the report has been criticized for 
both substantive and procedural shortcomings and an overall “industry-centered” 
approach. In particular, it has been noted that the planning consultants hired to conduct 
the study for the province are closely linked to the aggregate industry.260 Indeed, a 
majority of those involved were simultaneously retained as experts for the controversial 
Melancthon Mega Quarry proposal submitted for provincial review in 2011. In addition, 
the CIELAP report noted the MNR had themselves identified significant gaps in the 
information provided by the SAROS papers, most notably about recycling and 
rehabilitation.261 
ii. Close to Market Requirement 
The Policy Statement also requires that “as much of the mineral aggregate resources as is 
realistically possible shall be made available as close to markets as possible.”262 The 
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majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area and the surrounding 
Greater Golden Horseshoe region. This implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource 
protection and development on a specific geographic area within the province, within and 
adjacent to these areas, which is also highly valued for agricultural land, recreational use 
and ecological significance. While some concentration of extraction is inevitable with a 
fixed resource like aggregate, the clustering of this type of transformative land use makes 
a cumulative impact assessment relevant, particularly where exacerbated by policy 
requirements.263 A recent Ontario Bar Association presentation by a leading proponent 
council summarized the justification for this policy as follows:  
Transporting aggregates longer distances increases the cost to the user and 
the cost of the final products that use aggregate as inputs, such as public 
infrastructure projects and housing. Therefore, there is a public interest in 
ensuring that aggregate resources are extracted as close to market as 
possible in order to support the Provincial economy.264 
The aggregate industry has also emphasized the environmental benefits of this 
requirement in reducing production-related emissions and contribution to climate 
change.265 
 
Neither the process under the Act, the Policy Statement, nor the municipal amendment 
processes, require a cumulative impacts analysis.266 Arguably, the Ministry Statement of 
Environmental Values, which is discussed below, should require at least consideration of 
cumulative impacts; however, as noted above, the Ministry does not undertake a distinct 
consideration process and the Environmental Commissioner has expressed concern about 
the lack of cumulative impact analysis in aggregate applications.267 The 2014 Policy 
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Statement does allow for (but not require) cumulative impact considerations with respect 
to impacts on water quality and quantity through the requirement for planning authorities 
to use the watershed scale.268 Cumulative impacts are of particular importance for 
communities in areas that fall outside of special planning regimes, which are facing 
increasing pressure for aggregate development as proponents view the regulatory 
requirements of more protected areas as prohibitive, for example, the Carden Plain area 
and parts of Dufferin, Grey and Bruce Counties adjacent to, but excluded from the 
NEPA, and First Nations territories in Southern Ontario and Manitoulin Island. One 
lawyer described the effect as “offloading to adjacent municipalities” through the 
protection of the areas that achieve special designations.269 
 
The close to market requirement is subject to the “realistically possible” limitation and 
the Ministry has taken the position that this should be assessed on a case-by-case basis 
and include examination of other Policy Statement policies and “other considerations.”270 
There has been limited analysis of the section by the Board; however, one case did point 
to social and environmental impacts as part of the “realistically possible test,” finding that 
the proposal was, “not realistic given that the possible environmental impacts have not 
been minimized.”271 Bull and Estrela point out that this is consistent with the purposes of 
the Act to minimize adverse impacts. However, they also note that the close to market 
analysis also suggests that some impacts are acceptable.272 Therefore, the analysis has 
been focused on which impacts and at what threshold in pursuit of the purported 
economic benefits of close to market extraction.273 One planner commented, “To the 
aggregate industry that means all else aside, everything else is diminished this is number 
one. We are going no, the [Policy Statement] says quite clearly you balance all of the 
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policies equally… We argue about that at every single hearing and we are so tired of 
it.”274 
iii. Environmental Impacts 
Natural and cultural heritage, as well as water, agriculture and mineral aggregate 
resources are discussed in Section 2 of the Policy Statement, “Wise Use and Management 
of Resources.” The “balancing” of social and environmental impacts of extraction must 
be considered in light of the Policy Statement’s protective stance for mineral aggregate 
resources and operations from “incompatible” development.275 Section 2.5.2.5 requires 
municipalities to protect known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits, strictly 
limiting development that would “preclude or hinder” access and extraction. Mineral 
aggregate operations must be protected from incompatible development, even where they 
“cease to exist.”276 
 
As the CIELAP report notes, there has never been an attempt to comprehensively study 
the environmental impacts of aggregate extraction in Ontario.277 At first glance, social 
and cultural features are given a high level of protection by the Policy Statement, as they 
“shall be conserved.”278 However, a close examination reveals that protection of natural 
and social-cultural features is largely limited to features formally deemed “significant” by 
provincial policy and is subject to important exemptions.279 While the Policy Statement 
provides for absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies and existing operations, 
social and environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than avoided.280 This 
despite s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected for the long 
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term,” s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve or restore the 
quality and quantity of water,” and s.2.6.1, which states that significant built heritage 
resources and significant cultural heritage landscapes shall be conserved. The 2014 
Policy Statement now draws attention to and explicitly distinguishes between “positive 
directives” such as shall and “limitations or prohibitions” such as shall not which do not 
allow for discretion and “enabling or supportive language” such as should, promote, 
encourage which, they state, allows for “some discretion,” making the close-examination 
of such language essential to decision-making at the application and adjudicative stages.  
 
The 2005 Policy Statement imposed a prohibition on development and site alteration in 
significant habitat of endangered species and threatened species, defined as habitat 
approved by the Ministry of Natural Resources as “necessary for the maintenance, 
survival, and/or recovery of naturally occurring or reintroduced populations of 
endangered species or threatened species.”281 The new 2014 Policy Statement eliminated 
the prohibition, now allowing for development and site alteration in accordance with 
provincial and federal law.282 Lands adjacent to endangered species or threatened species 
habitat are now also exempted from the “no negative impacts” test for development and 
site alteration.283 This is consistent with, and facilitates, the 2013 amendments to the 
Ontario Endangered Species Act noted above, which specifically exempt pits and quarries 
from the requirements to obtain a permit for activities that would otherwise be prohibited, 
including damaging or destroying species habitat, instead requiring only mitigation 
measures and registration of activities with the Ministry without independent monitoring 
requirements and enforcement capacity.284 Exemptions for aggregate extraction, such as 
those newly introduced under the ESA, have been the subject of strong criticism from the 
provincial Environmental Commissioner.285 Further, the requirement to maintain, restore 
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or, where possible, improve “the diversity and connectivity of natural features” and “long 
term ecological function and biodiversity” uses the enabling rather than directive 
language used to protect aggregate deposits and operations.286 Recent Board 
consideration of the Ministry’s Natural Heritage Reference Manual in interpreting the 
Policy Statement introduced the consideration of mitigation measures and rehabilitation 
plans in determining the impact on natural features, including controversial concepts such 
as “replacement and enhancement.”287 The Manual is a Ministry guidance document 
providing “recommended technical criteria” for consistency with the Policy Statement.288 
 
While the precautionary principle is incorporated into the Ministry’s Statement of 
Environmental Values, and arguably therefore a required consideration in the licensing 
process, the adoption of a precautionary approach to aggregate extraction has been 
limited and highly contested by industry.289 Aggregate industry proponents have instead 
focused on the adoption of “adaptive management plans” and this has been endorsed by 
the Board, municipal authorities and the Ministry in particular cases.  In another context, 
the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed the approach as an alternative to the precautionary 
principle: “It counters the potentially paralyzing effects of the precautionary principle on 
otherwise socially and economically useful projects.”290 However, the adaptive 
management approach remains highly controversial; and, as Armitage et al. have noted, 
“[e]xamples of the successful application of adaptive management are few, and it remains 
more of an idealized concept than an empirically tested strategy”. Australian 
commentator Alan Randall has argued, “adaptive management is essentially reactive. It is 
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all about waiting until problems reveal themselves and seeking to resolve them by trial 
and error – basically, standing aside when the lights go out and then feeling our way in 
the dark.”291 In contrast, he describes the precautionary approach as “driven by big risks” 
and the prospective prevention of “plausible but uncertain threats of harm.” Rather than 
weighing outcomes, the precautionary approach looks to the worst-case and if the harm is 
“horrifying, even if unlikely,” prohibition may be the best result.292 Further, there is no 
regulatory or policy requirement for such a plan, nor are there standards. Notably, 
Westgate et al. have cautioned about over-use of the term and noted that few projects 
labelled ‘adaptive management’ are accurately characterized as such.293 Arguably, in the 
context of aggregate extraction, this voluntary and industry-led approach to managing 
ecological impacts compounds the proponent-driven nature of the licensing process. 
While adaptive management plans have been incorporated into site plans and licensing 
conditions and proposed as “an additional layer of oversight,”294 their enforceability has 
been questioned, as has the potentially improper delegation of the Board’s authority to 
the Ministry.295 Indeed, the lack of institutional support for adaptive management has 
been found to be a key constraint on the success of adaptive management arrangements. 
 
Aggregate extraction operations are also exempt from other environmental legislation, 
including any regulations of a local conservation authority under the Conservation 
Authorities Act.296 Such agencies are empowered to regulate development impacts on 
wetlands, shorelines and watercourses.297 Conservation authorities are provided with 
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notice of Planning Act and Aggregate Resources Act applications.298 They may also play 
an advisory role to municipalities on issues related to natural heritage and water. 
 
The 2014 Policy Statement introduced the notion of land use compatibility with respect 
to resource extraction by encouraging the separation of major facilities, which would 
include aggregate operations, and sensitive land uses, which include features of the 
natural or built environment that could be adversely affected by a facility.299 However, 
the wording of the section arguably protects the development of facilities by ensuring 
their “long-term viability” despite adverse impacts and risks to public health and safety 
which should be prevented or “minimized or mitigated. In the case of aggregate 
extraction, this compounds their priority land use status and could serve to limit the 
protection of environmentally and culturally significant features to avoid future land use 
incompatibility in areas identified as having aggregate mineral resources. 
 
The Policy Statement attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between the protection of 
natural features and cultural heritage by classifying aggregate extraction as an “interim” 
activity.300 A lawyer recalled a discussion with a Ministry official who explained the 
interim nature of extraction, “you peel back the cover and you dig out the aggregate and 
then you put it back and it is like doing your bed covers in the morning.”301 The policy 
does require rehabilitation to “accommodate subsequent land use”;302 and the 2014 Policy 
Statement now encourages “comprehensive rehabilitation” in areas with a concentration 
of mineral aggregate operations, defined as “coordinated and complementary, to the 
extent possible, the rehabilitation of other sites in the area.”303 However, the standards for 
rehabilitation are limited to the promotion of “land use compatibility” obscuring the 
specific and unique relationships that adjacent ecological and human communities may 
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have with the land and its current use. The Environmental Commissioner has expressed 
serious concerns about the current number of abandoned aggregate pits and quarries and 
the slow rate of achieving basic levels of rehabilitation.304 Rehabilitation was the subject 
of a successful Environmental Bill of Rights application for review in 2006 that identified 
problems with both monitoring and compliance.305 The Canadian Urban Institute Report 
documented a number of successful cases of rehabilitation.306 However, monitoring, 
enforcement and the pace of rehabilitation remain significant issues. The Canadian 
Environmental Law Association has estimated that at the current rate it would take 
between 234 and 335 years to rehabilitate the 6,900 abandoned pit and quarry sites in 
Ontario.307 
 
Of particular concern to a number of stakeholders involved in recent aggregate disputes, 
despite mandatory protection of “prime agricultural land,” aggregate extraction is 
permitted as an interim use on all classes of farmland, including specialty crop areas.308 
Enhanced requirements for rehabilitation to an “agricultural condition” on prime 
farmland and specialty crop areas explicitly exempt the most potentially harmful class of 
below the water table quarry where the applicant can show that much of the resource is 
below the water table or where extraction is so deep as to render rehabilitation 
“unfeasible.”309 The Policy Statement does require that the applicant also demonstrate 
that alternative locations have been considered and found unsuitable and that agricultural 
rehabilitation is maximized in remaining areas.310 While some commentators have 
characterized these types of alternative considerations as functioning as an early 
screening mechanism,311 it is difficult to see how this occurs in practice given that 
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aggregate producers assemble the parcel through gradual purchases of adjacent land and 
expensive exploration making the relative suitability of the owned parcel largely 
inevitable. The aggregate planning process contrasts with the types of siting decisions 
dealt with under the environmental assessment process, through which public entities’ 
assessment of potential sites prior to selection and the notion of an alternative location, 
is, at least arguably, on the table.312 The consideration and assessment of alternatives has 
not been the subject of detailed examination before the Board.  
 
While the land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and 
potentially as having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities 
for food production, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the Policy 
Statement. Aggregate sites are material places with complex eco-social relations, but for 
the purposes of the licensing decision, they are divided into agricultural fields, ‘natural’ 
heritage features, recreational sites, and subsurface and groundwater resources. The 
policy is currently constructed in such a way that while recognized, other relations to 
place are trumped by the protection of the mineral resource value and economic 
relations.313  These issues will be discussed in the context of specific conflicts and 
decisions below in Chapters Five through Eight. 
D. Municipal Plans and Bylaws 
 
While the decision-making process flows from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts 
include consideration of the local municipality’s Official Plan and zoning by-laws. These 
are the primary tools through which “land use” is governed and organized in Ontario. The 
Official Plan is a comprehensive document reflecting a municipality’s distinct collective 
vision about how to “manage and direct” the effects of physical change on the “social, 
economic, built and natural environment” of a particular area.314 Municipalities also 
regulate land use through zoning bylaws, which implement the Plan and control 
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individual parcels of land with a great deal of specificity, such as controlling building 
height or lot size.315 Planning scholar Eran Kaplinsky points to zoning as one of the most 
important tools in the North American planning tradition.316 Zoning has been defined as 
“simply the restriction of land use; however, it is important to acknowledge its roots in 
the law of nuisance and police power for the protection of property. 317 Other definitions 
emphasize that zoning is aimed at the separation of land uses, “to prevent negative 
external effects associated with the proximity of incompatible activities.”318 Indeed, as 
Valverde argues, “use” is a distinct legal tool because it achieves its work of ordering 
people and things indirectly, by acting on “uses” rather than persons or property directly. 
As with the Act described above, municipal planning tools enroll private property “to 
achieve desired ends.”319 Valverde points to the notion of “incompatibility” as central to 
the logic of zoning and its power as a legal tool.320 The 2014 Policy Statement 
emphasizes this notion of (in)compatibility through a revised standalone section entitled 
“Land Use Compatibility” dealing with the conflict between “major facilities,” including 
resource extraction, and “sensitive land uses,” which include both the ecological and 
social features. While the former subsection 1.7.1e) stated that planning should separate 
such land uses to “prevent” adverse effects, the new section 1.2.6 states that planning 
should “prevent or mitigate” adverse effects and adds consideration for ensuring the 
“long-term viability of major facilities.”321 
 
The Policy Statement recognizes the role of the local official plan as “the most important 
vehicle for implementation” noting that provincial policies “represent minimum 
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standards” that local authorities may go beyond.322 Indeed, the people I spoke with often 
assumed at the outset that the municipality was the primary decision maker about 
aggregate extraction and other land use issues.323 However, as Valiante notes, Ontario’s 
planning framework has become increasingly prescriptive through the specification of 
areas of “provincial interest” and the development of provincial policy, particularly the 
Policy Statement.324 As she notes, the planning statutes, provincial plans, and policies, 
can collectively “be seen as the Ontario government’s view of the collective interests to 
be pursued through the planning system.”325 Technically, in the context of aggregate 
extraction, if the land for which a quarry is proposed is not currently designated as a 
“mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the 
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the 
Planning Act.326 Under the Act no licence can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an 
applicable zoning by-law.327 However, the Policy Statement serves as the guiding 
document for all land use decisions in the province. The Planning Act stipulates that all 
policy and decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the 
Ontario Municipal Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent 
with the Policy Statement.328 The Policy Statement also limits the municipal ability to 
impose higher standards where they would conflict with its policies.329  
 
Official plans are required to identify and protect provincial interests in their land use 
designations and policies, particularly by directing development to “suitable areas.”330 
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This includes the protection of the provincial interest in protection aggregate mineral 
resources. Where an Official Plan affects a matter of provincial interest, the Planning Act 
provides for residual ministerial power to amend the Plan.331 As discussed in Chapter Six, 
despite the Act’s recognition of the role of the Official Plan, the role of the Policy 
Statement inverts the inquiry such that development is presumptively allowed and the 
question of how to manage extraction replaces the question of whether aggregate 
extraction should occur at all. In the context of aggregate minerals, the effect is to limit 
the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and operation, including 
the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into the assessment 
of applications, and to impose protection on features not deemed provincially 
significant.332 Therefore, aggregate disputes often turn on whether the decision of a local 
authority to amend or not to amend the Official Plan conforms to the Policy Statement. It 
is important to note that in areas of the province not regulated by the Aggregate 
Resources Act, municipal Planning Act approvals are the only licensing requirements for 
private land. 
 
Some applications will also involve special provincial planning regimes, such as the 
Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, the Oak Ridges Moraine 
Conservation Act333, the Greenbelt Act,334 or the Growth Plan legislation and policy.335 
This may mean approvals for amendments will require additional planning authority 
approvals, such as the Niagara Escarpment Commission discussed in Chapter Eight, or 
may be subject to additional standards in certain areas. A detailed analysis of each of 
these regimes is outside the scope of this project; however, the following subsection 
summarizes the key elements of the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act 
as the provincial plan most relevant to the conflicts examined in Chapters Five through 
                                                         
331 Planning Act, supra note 87, ss 23 (1), 23 (1.1). 
332 Bull & Estrela, supra note 244 at 28. 
333 2001, SO 2001, c 31. 
334 2005, SO 2005, c 1. 
335 2005, SO 2005, c 13; Ontario, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal. Places to Grow: Growth Plan 
for the Greater Golden Horseshoe (Toronto, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2006): 
https://www.placestogrow.ca/content/ggh/GPGGH_2006_ENG.pdf. 
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Eight, and most considered in the case law examined therein.336 The Niagara Escarpment 
Planning and Development Act represents a key example of legislative action that 
attempts to respond to the construction of specific landscapes as ‘valuable’ and worthy of 
protection while simultaneously promoting economic growth and development. 
Technically provincial development plans take priority over the Policy Statement in the 
event of a conflict.337 However, the finding of a conflict is a matter for the Board to 
determine in the context of a particular case.338 In a 2013 case, the Ontario Divisional 
Court accepted the Board’s parallel analysis approach and application of the “dual 
compliance test,” rejecting the need for the requirements of the Niagara Escarpment Plan 
to be considered separately and prior to the Policy Statement analysis.339 
 
E. Provincial Land Use Plans: The Niagara Escarpment Planning and 
Development Act 
In 1962, blasting from the Dufferin Aggregates Milton Quarry blew a hole in the Niagara 
Escarpment, one of Southern Ontario’s most prominent landscapes. The Escarpment is a 
major limestone outcrop running through a large part of southern Ontario from Niagara 
Falls to the Bruce Peninsula. It is simultaneously a site with unique ecological systems,340 
prime agricultural lands, high scenic and amenity value,341 proximity to urban centres, 
and valuable aggregate mineral deposits, as well as being significant to local Indigenous 
communities as traditional territory and for legal, economic, spiritual and historic 
reasons.342 The transformation of such a prominent landscape was a catalyst for an 
emerging environmental movement in the province and for the social and political 
                                                         
336 For a detailed review of the development and application of the Oak Ridges Moraine regime see: 
Sandberg, Wekerle & Gilbert, supra note 91. 
337 Policy Statement 2014, s 4.12.  
338 See for example the majority finding in Walker, supra note 93. 
339 Ibid, Walker Appeal, supra note 93 at paras 66-67. 
340 Peter E Kelly & Douglas W Larson, The Last Stand: A Journey Through the Ancient Cliff-face Forest of 
the Niagara Escarpment (Toronto: Dundurn, 2007); John L Riley, J V Jalava & Steve Varga, “Ecological 
Survey of the Niagara Escarpment Biosphere Reserve” (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Southcentral Region, 1996). 
341 Kelly & Larson, supra note 343. 
342 John Borrows, “Living between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning and 
Democracy” (1997) 47 U Toronto LJ 417; John Borrows, “Indian agency: forming First Nations law in 
Canada” (2001) 24 PoLAR 9. 
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construction of the Escarpment as a specific and valuable landscape. 343 A 1968 
government-commissioned expert report mapped and documented the entire Niagara 
Escarpment area in response to growing public awareness about the unique features of 
the area and concern about the impact of the aggregate mineral industry.344 In 1990, the 
area was designated as a UNESCO World biosphere reserve.345 
 
The landmark Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act (the “Niagara 
Escarpment Act”) was passed in 1973 with the express purpose of maintaining the 
Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing only for 
“compatible” development.346 The Niagara Escarpment Act was significant both as 
establishing an environmentally-focused land use plan, but also because of the new 
provincial role in planning decisions previously made at the local level, shifting planning 
from a local to a regional scale.347 It created the 17-member Niagara Escarpment 
Commission (the “Commission”), made up of 8 members from escarpment counties and 
regions and 9 members of the public, appointed by Order-in-Council. The Commission is 
responsible for the creation of the land use plan, the Niagara Escarpment Plan, and is 
now responsible for its implementation.348 There are no appointments designated for 
Indigenous governments and representatives. The Commission is an arms-length 
regulatory agency, reporting to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry. The 
Niagara Escarpment Act provides the scope for the policies in the Niagara Escarpment 
Plan (the “Plan”), including but not limited to, management of land and water resources, 
                                                         
343 Graham S Whitelaw et al, “Roles of environmental movement organisations in land-use planning: case 
studies of the Niagara Escarpment and Oak Ridges Moraine, Ontario, Canada” (2008) 51 Journal of 
Environmental Planning and Management 6 801 at 807. 
344 Niagara Escarpment Study Group, Niagara Escarpment Study Conservation and Recreation Report. 
(Treasury Department of Ontario, Queen’s Printer, 1968). 
345 See details online: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-
sciences/biosphere-reserves/europe-north-america/canada/niagara-escarpment/ 
346 Supra, note 37 at s. 2. 
347 Whitelaw et al, supra note 343 at 806. 
348 Supra, note 37 at ss. 5. The 2005 Niagara Escarpment Plan [the “Escarpment Plan”] is available online: 
http://www.escarpment.org/_files/file.php?fileid=fileuRdJDqEnAp&filename=file_NEP_Intro.pdf. An 
amended NEP was released in May 2017, effective as of June 1, 2017. This dissertation considers the 
earlier plan, which was in effect at the time of writing. The revised plan is available here: 
https://escarpment.org/LandPlanning/NEP. 
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location of industry and commerce, identification of major land use areas, provision of 
major parks and open space, control of pollution and the natural environment, and 
ensuring compatibility of private sector development.349 
 
While the process through which the original Plan was developed was neither 
collaborative nor participatory, environmental groups, community organizations and the 
aggregate industry were involved in hearings on the proposed land use plan from 1980 to 
1983. According to Whitelaw et al., critics of the new planning regime, including the 
aggregate industry, private land owners and residential developers, were successful in 
limiting the scope of the plan by over 60% and influencing the planning rules.350 They 
describe the hearing process as “adversarial.”351 The plan is reviewed regularly, and is 
now reviewed at the same time as the other provincial land use plans, as described 
below.352  
 
The Commission’s responsibilities include assessment of applications for amendments to 
the Plan and development permits, including for new aggregate mineral extraction 
operations.353 No other permit or licence, including those under the Aggregate Resources 
Act, can be approved before a development permit is issued.354 The Plan provides for 
seven land use designations: Escarpment Natural, Escarpment Protection, Escarpment 
Rural, Escarpment Recreation, Minor Urban, Urban and Mineral Resource Extraction. 
Each designation is described in detail in the Plan, including the “Objectives,” “Criterion 
for Designation,” and “Permitted Uses” associated with such a designation.355 
Escarpment Natural and Escarpment Protection prohibit mineral resource extraction. An 
amendment to the Plan is required for extraction over 20,000 tonnes on Escarpment Rural 
                                                         
349 Ibid, at s. 9, 
350 Whitelaw et al, supra note 343 at 807. 
351 Ibid at 808. 
352 Niagara Escarpment Act, supra note 37, at s 17. 
353 Ibid, at ss. 6.1, 7, 8, 10, 24. 
354 Ibid, at s 24(3). 
355 Escarpment Plan, supra note 348 at ss 1.3-1.9. Section 1.9 describes the Mineral Resources Extraction 
Area designation. 
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lands, which are described as “essential” and as providing a “buffer to the more 
ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment.”356 Extraction is specifically contemplated 
in such areas, although requiring an amendment to be granted, and these are therefore the 
subjects of applications before the Board.357 
i. Plan Amendments 
Section 8 of the Niagara Escarpment Act sets out seven “objectives” that are “to be 
sought in the consideration of amendments to the Plan”:  
a) to protect unique ecologic and historic areas; 
b) to maintain and enhance the quality and character of natural streams and 
water supplies; 
c) to provide adequate opportunities for outdoor recreation; 
d) to maintain and enhance the open landscape character of the Niagara 
Escarpment in so far as possible, by such means as compatible farming or 
forestry and by preserving the natural scenery; 
e) to ensure that all new development is compatible with the purpose of this 
Act as expressed in section 2; 
f) to provide for adequate public access to the Niagara Escarpment; and 
g) to support municipalities within the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area in 
their exercise of the planning functions conferred upon them by the 
Planning Act. 
Amendments must be consistent with these objectives as well as the purpose of the 
Niagara Escarpment Act, as outlined above, and must be justified by the Applicant.358 
Further, an applicant must demonstrate the purpose and objectives of the Niagara 
Escarpment Act will not be adversely affected.359 Amendments to re-designate 
Escarpment Rural Areas to Mineral Resource Extraction areas require specific 
consideration of the following matters: 
a) Protection of the natural and cultural environment, namely: 
                                                         
356 Ibid at s 1.5. 
357 Ibid, The section sets out five Objectives for such areas:  
1) To maintain scenic values of lands in the vicinity of the Escarpment corridor;  
2) To maintain the open landscape character by encouraging the conservation of the traditional cultural 
landscape and cultural heritage features;  
3) To encourage agriculture and forestry and to provide for compatible rural land uses;  
4) To provide a buffer for more ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment;  
5) To provide for the designation of new Mineral Resource Extraction Areas which can be accommodated 
by an amendment to the Niagara Escarpment Plan. 
358 Ibid, ss 6.1(2.1) and 10(6); Escarpment Plan, supra note 348, s 1.2.1. 
359 Escarpment Plan, supra note 348, s 1.2.1. 
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i. Groundwater and surface water systems on a watershed basis;  
ii. Habitat of endangered (regulated), endangered (not regulated), 
rare, special concern and threatened species;  
iii. Adjacent Escarpment Protection and Escarpment Natural Areas;  
iv. Adjacent Rural Area natural features;  
v. Existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail;  
vi. Provincially significant wetlands;  
vii. Provincially significant ANSIs; and  
viii. Significant cultural heritage features.  
b) Opportunities for achieving the objectives of Section 8 of the Niagara 
Escarpment Planning and Development Act through the final 
rehabilitation of the site;  
c) Maintenance and enhancement of the quality and character of natural 
systems, water supplies, including fish habitat; and 
d) Capability of the land for agricultural uses and its potential for 
rehabilitation for agricultural uses.360  
 
The Niagara Escarpment Act requires the Commission to provide notice and copies of 
proposed Amendments to all NEPA municipalities, and any Commission advisory 
committees, as well as publishing a notice in local newspapers and provide for a 
comment period of a maximum of 60 days, with the possibility for extension when 
deemed necessary by the Commission.361 It allows for, but does not require, the 
Commission to hold public meetings and it is their regular practice to do so.362 The 
Niagara Escarpment Act also provides for the establishment of an “advisory committee” 
                                                         
360 Escarpment Plan, supra note 348, s 1.5. Notably the revised s 1.2.2. amends these criteria as follows: 
a) protection of the Escarpment environment;  
b) opportunities for achieving the objectives of the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act 
through the final rehabilitation of the site; 
c) the protection of prime agricultural areas, the capability of the land for agricultural uses, and its 
potential for rehabilitation for agricultural uses; and  
d) opportunities to include rehabilitated lands in the Niagara Escarpment Parks and Open Space System. 
This amendment is briefly discussed in Part III of this Chapter. 
361 Ibid, ss 10(1), (2). 
362 Ibid, s 10(1.1). Interview, September 3, 2014. 
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to “advise and make recommendations to the Minister, through the Commission, in 
respect of the amendment and implementation” of the Plan.363 
 
If the Commission receives written objections they are required to appoint a hearing 
officer to conduct a hearing within the designated Niagara Escarpment Planning Area 
(the “Area”) “for the purpose of receiving representations respecting the proposed 
amendments by any person desiring to make representations.”364 They may also choose 
to conduct a hearing where no objections are received. The Niagara Escarpment Act 
requires the Applicant to present the proposal and justification at the hearing and to make 
the Application materials available to the public. Subject to the hearing officer’s rules of 
procedure, “any interested person” may question the Applicant and other presenters.365 
Within 60 days of the hearings, the hearing officer is required to provide the Commission 
with a report summarizing the hearing representations and recommending whether the 
proposed amendment should be accepted, rejected or modified with reasons.366 The 
Commission is required to consider both the written comments received and the hearing 
report and make recommendations to the Minister who can refuse or approve the 
amendment and has discretion to make any modifications.367  
 
ii. Development Permits 
Section 22 of the Niagara Escarpment Act provides for the designation of areas within 
the Niagara Escarpment Act Area as “development control areas”. In such areas, 
development must be approved under a development permit or exempted by 
regulation.368 The Area has been designated under Regulation 826. However, lands 
licensed continuously since 1975 under the Pits and Quarries Control Act, 1971 are 
exempted from requirements for a development permit by regulation, which remains 
                                                         
363 Ibid, s 4. (1) and (2). Procedural Guidelines for the Committee on file with the author. 
364 Ibid, s 10(3). 
365 Ibid, s 10(6). 
366 Ibid, s 10 (8). 
367 Ibid, s 10(9), (11). 
368 Ibid.  
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significant since aggregate licences do not expire.369 As well, exploratory excavation and 
testing are exempted, allowing landowners to undertake preliminary studies before 
making any applications.370 
 
The Plan sets out both general and specific Development Criteria that must be considered 
in the permit application process; however, as the Plan notes, not all criteria are 
applicable to all situations.371 The following general criteria under Section 1 are relevant 
to aggregate extraction applications:  
1. Permitted uses may be allowed provided that:  
a. The long term capacity of the site can support the use without a 
substantial negative impact on Escarpment environmental features 
such as contours, water quality, water quantity, natural vegetation, 
soil, wildlife, population, visual attractiveness and cultural heritage 
features. 
b. The cumulative impact of development will not have serious 
detrimental effects on the Escarpment environment (e.g. water 
quality, vegetation, soil, wildlife, and landscape). 
… 
4.  Any development permitted should be designed and located in such a 
manner as to preserve the natural, visual and cultural characteristics of 
the area. 
5.  Where development involves new roads, road improvements or service 
corridors, their designation and alignment should be in harmony with the 
Escarpment landscape. 
8.  Development permitted should be designed and located in such a 
 manner as to provide for or protect access to the Niagara Escarpment 
 including the Bruce Trail Corridor. 
 
Section 2.11 specifically considers mineral resources, with the objective of minimizing 
the impact of new mineral extraction and accessory uses. The Plan requires that 
operations shall not conflict with the following criteria: 
a) The protection of sensitive ecological, geological, historic and archaeological sites 
or areas. 
b) The protection of surface and groundwater resources. 
                                                         
369 O Reg 828/90, s 19. 
370 Ibid, s 5. 
371 This was also emphasized by the majority of the Board in Walker, supra note 93. 
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c) The maintenance of agricultural areas, in accordance with the Agricultural 
Policies of the Provincial Policy Statement (PPS). 
d) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on 
existing agricultural or residential development. 
e) The preservation of the natural and cultural landscapes as much as possible during 
extraction and after rehabilitation. 
f) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on 
parks, open space and the existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail.372 
“Protection” is defined in the Plan as “ensuring that human activities are not allowed to 
occur which will result in the unacceptable degradation of the quality of an 
environment.”373 The application process includes circulation of applications for 
comments to Ministries, municipal governments and Conservation Authorities, all of 
which are considered by a Commission staff planner who writes a report for the 
Commission recommending approval or refusal and may include conditions. The 
proponent, the consulted agencies and surrounding neighbours can appeal a decision to a 
Commission hearing officer within 14 days.374 
The Niagara Escarpment Act requires the government to review the Plan regularly and 
now requires that it be reviewed at the same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the 
Greenbelt Act under s.17 (1). In 2015 the government undertook a coordinated review of 
these and other Provincial Plans, including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan 
and the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan.375 The review and proposed changes at 
the time of writing are discussed in Part III of this chapter.  
                                                         
372 Escarpment Plan, supra note 348. The Section also includes requirements for setbacks from the brow of 
the Escarpment, screening, progressive rehabilitation, the use of off-site material for rehabilitation, 
accessory uses, and restrictions on new adjacent development. The following specific criteria outlined in 
the Plan may also be applicable to an aggregate application: 2.5 New Development Affecting Steep Slopes 
and Ravines; 2.6 New Development Affecting Water Resources; 2.7 New Development Within Wooded 
Areas; 2.8 Wildlife Habitat; 2.9 Forest Management; 2.10 Agriculture; 2.12 Heritage; 2.13 Recreation; 2.14 
Areas of Natural and Scientific Interest (ANSIs); 2.15 Transportation and Utilities; 2.16 The Bruce Trail.  
373 Ibid, Appendix 2, at 127. 
374 The process is outlined on the Commission website: http://www.escarpment.org/applications/index.php. 
The Appeal Form is available here: 
http://www.escarpment.org/_files/file.php?fileid=fileyyylXTxRVl&filename=file_NEC_Appeal_Form.pdf. 
375 More information about the coordinated review can be found on the Ontario Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing website: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page10882.aspx. See, the guiding document for 
public consultation, (Our Region, Our Community, Our Home, 2014). 
 
 205 
Participation: Notice, Consultation, Objections 
As noted in Chapter Two, opportunities for participation and contestation are key 
structural element of environmental governance regimes.376 Legal scholars Eloise 
Scotford and Rachael Walsh argue that land use regimes are redefining property in the 
UK context, shifting from an emphasis on private property rights towards more 
democratic environmental decision-making. British geographers Richard Cowell and 
Susan Owens link the successful use of participatory opportunities by environmental 
interests and concerned communities with the integration of environmental concerns into 
the formal land use decision-making framework.377 They specifically examined resistance 
to aggregate extraction in rural England and argue that it “reframed” both the problems 
and the solutions related to extraction by connecting the site specific struggles with 
broader issues of planning and environmental relations.378 Not only can participation 
enhance the evidence base for decision-making and lead to better decisions and enhance 
access to justice, Groves et al. argue that participatory processes may also provide 
opportunities to examine and rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy.379 
In this sense, planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking about how we 
relate to each other and the environment despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or 
site-specific issues of infrastructure siting or zoning. However, this potential for 
creativity and reflection is largely dependent on the nature of the process – whether the 
broad policy goals are realized through genuinely deliberative processes and genuine 
opportunities to influence outcomes.380 Put another way, whether participation can 
“cross-scales” beyond engagement in site-specific applications to provide for 
                                                         
376 Karen Bakker, “The limits of ‘neoliberal natures’: Debating green neoliberalism” (2010) 34 Progress in 
Human Geography 6 715; James McCarthy, “Privatizing conditions of production: trade agreements as 
neoliberal environmental governance” 35 Geoforum 3 327; Thomas Perreault, “State Restructuring and the 
Scale Politics of Rural Water Governance in Bolivia” (2005) 37 Environment and Planning A 2 263; Eloise 
Scotford & Rachael Walsh, “The Symbiosis of Property and English Environmental Law – Property Rights 
in a Public Law Context” (2013) 76 The Modern Law Review 6 1010; Valiante, supra note 22. 
377 Cowell & Owens, supra note 21 at 406; Susan Owens & Richard Cowell, Land and Limits: Interpreting 
Sustainability in the Planning Process (Routledge, 2002). 
378 Cowell & Owens, supra note 21 at 405–406, 417. 
379 Groves, Munday & Yakovleva, supra note 23 at 342. 
380 Scotford & Walsh, supra note 379. 
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opportunities to contest, debate and shape the underlying values and goals about planning 
and environmental governance.381  
While much of the information about process and participation is in the Standards, prior 
to amendment the Act stated in s 11(3): “Any person may, during the prescribed 
consultation procedures, give the applicant and the Minister written notice stating that the 
person has an objection to the application and specifying the nature of the objection.” The 
amended Act repeals this subsection and moves all details of consultation and 
participation to future regulations.382 The result is that the right to object is no longer 
embedded directly in the statute and is therefore subject to the discretion of Cabinet or 
the Minister. Further, the right to object is subtly narrowed by an amended s 11(5) which 
now instead of providing for “any objections” to be referred to the Board, provides that 
the Minister can refer “any objections arising out of the notification and consultation 
procedures that are prescribed or set out in a custom plan.”383 In addition, as noted above, 
the amended Act includes a discretionary “custom plan” whereby the Minister can 
approve individualized consultation, participation and information requirements for a 
specific application.384 In the context of Ontario’s planning system, scholars have noted 
the influence of private interests in the planning process and the emphasis on economic 
development.385 In the context of aggregate disputes, the participatory potential of the 
planning process is particularly limited by the proponent-driven nature of the process 
both at the application and consultation stages. In fact, despite the protection of aggregate 
resources as a matter of provincial interest, the consultations about aggregate application 
are conducted and controlled by the proponent. The Ministry has no role in addressing 
objections made by citizens or EBR comments and can therefore issue a licence without 
formally addressing concerns expressed in these forums.386 In fact, as will be discussed 
below in Chapters Four and Five, the Ministry tends to play a limited role at both the 
                                                         
381 Groves, Munday & Yakovleva, supra note 23 at 340. 
382 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 13, s 10(1), repealing s 11(3). 
383 Ibid, s 10(1), amending subsection 11(5) of the Act. 
384 Ibid, s 10(1). 
385 Valiante, supra note 22 at 106; Chipman, supra note 95 at 45–49. 
386 A 2014 case indicates that the Minister can make decisions without formal consideration of EBR 
comments, and prior to the deadline for commentary, see Animal Alliance of Canada v Ontario (Minister of 
Natural Resources), 2014 ONSC 2826 [Animal Alliance]. 
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consultation and litigation stages, even where Ministry concerns or objections have arisen 
at some stage in the process without a clear resolution. One planner commented, “MNR 
is a very closed shop. They stick to their obligations under the licensing process and 
although they may have staff involved in the JART [a joint-municipal planning process in 
the Halton Region], they keep their cards very close to their chest and don’t go to 
hearings.”387 The amended Act makes the participation of the Ministry in hearings 
expressly optional.388 
The Standards require the proponent to provide public notice that triggers a 45-day 
“notification” period during which members of the public, local governments, and 
provincial ministries and agencies can file objections to the proposal. Once a proponent 
has filed an application, public notice is also required under the Provincial Standards. A 
copy of the Application must be on file at the local Ministry of Natural Resources 
office.389 Under the Act, Site Plans and Reports submitted for licences become the 
property of the Crown only when a licence is issued.390 The Ministry has interpreted this 
to mean that they cannot “produce” copies for members of the public during the 
application process. The policy manual states that interested parties can view these 
documents at the local MNR office or the local municipality.391 Parties can also request 
information from the proponent; however, the Ontario Environmental Commissioner has 
noted concerns about the effective right of the proponent to withhold information.392 In 
practice many proponents provide online access to information, as do municipalities 
where they are involved in decision-making. However, the process is complex and 
involves a number of different decision makers and actors. As well, the timeline and 
process for objections must be seen in light of the volume and density of information 
                                                         
387 Interview, September 3, 2014. 
388 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 13, 10(3). 
389 Ibid at 10, s. 4.1.2. Notice is required by concurrent publication of a copy of the Form 1 Notice of 
Application for a licence and Form 2 Notice of Information Session in a local newspaper, personal or 
registered mail delivery of copies of both to landowners within 120 metres of boundary, and the posting of 
a sign on the boundary of the site. The on-site sign must advise of the Application, including whether it is 
Class A or B and whether it is above or below the water table, and must specify the size, the name and 
contact information of the Applicant, the date and time of the Information Session. The sign must also 
indicate that a copy of the Application is on file at the local Ministry of Natural Resources office.389 
390 The Act, supra note 36 ss. 8(7), 9(2). 
391 The Manual”, supra note 179 at 3–4. 
392 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, supra note 214 at 81. 
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involved in aggregate applications. The application documents may be hundreds or 
thousands of pages, including highly technical expert reports. Many of the participants in 
this study commented on the “learning curve” involved and the need to find expertise 
within the community to assist with understanding the application and the process. One 
more-than-owner party reflected,  
It was very curious because we just had to go and learn. We knew the 
questions that we wanted to ask, but we had to figure out how to ask them, 
who to ask, who not to ask and how to become part of what to us became 
very quickly a very complicated way to solve local planning issues. 
Most aggregate licence applications are also posted to the provincial Environmental 
Registry, a public online database for environmental decisions, for a minimum of 30 days 
under the Environmental Bill of Rights.393 While the Ministries involved do have some 
discretion regarding what is posted, according to Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner 
almost all new aggregate licences are posted on the Registry. As noted in Part III below, 
the government consultation Blueprint document discussed the possibility for online 
information requirements for applications and the need for plain language summaries for 
all application materials. However, these are not included in the Act and all proposed 
changes to these aspects of the process are subject to future regulations making it 
impossible to say whether and how the reforms would impact the consultation process at 
the time of writing. 
 
The Provincial Standards require the proponent to host one public presentation in the 
local area during the notice period. Neither the technical experts retained by the 
proponent nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist the 
public in interpreting the reports or to ensure compliance. In fact, the Policy Manual 
directs Ministry staff not to attend meetings unless there are “special circumstances.”394 
The Standards suggest a non-exhaustive list of forms such a meeting may take, including 
an information session, an open house or a community meeting. The only requirements 
                                                         
393 1993, SO 199s, c 28. 
394 Manual, supra note 179 at A.R. 2.01.02. 
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set out in the Standards are that the meeting must take place at least 20 days after the 
Notice is published and 10 days before the closing of the notification period.395 It is the 
responsibility of the proponent to notify the Minister when the notification requirements 
have been completed.396 
 
The Provincial Standards specify that objections must be served on the applicant and the 
District Manager of the Ministry of Natural Resources within the 45-day notification 
period.397 This requirement includes objections from any agency. Both the statute and the 
Standards require that the objector specify the nature of the objection. Within two years, 
the proponent must “attempt to resolve” objections and must submit a list of unresolved 
objections and documentation of attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for 
resolutions to the Ministry and to remaining objectors.398 Notably the amendments repeal 
the section in the Act requiring the applicant to work towards resolution and move these 
to regulations.399 A 20-day notice period is then triggered during which remaining 
objectors, including government agencies, must submit further “recommendations” or 
they are deemed to no longer object.400 Proponents are also required to provide the 
Ministry with documentation of landowner, stakeholder and agency circulation.401 
 
Notably, Environmental Registry comments are not considered to be objections under the 
Act and therefore do not afford the participant the same procedural rights outlined above. 
The proponent is also not required to respond, although some may do so in practice. Non-
owner third parties in Ontario cannot appeal land use planning decisions as-of-right. 
While the Environmental Bill of Rights provides for parties with a demonstrable interest 
to seek leave to appeal certain kinds of provincial decisions, the test for leave is 
                                                         
395 Natural Resources Management Division, supra note 285 at 4.2. 
396 Supra, note 36, s. 11(2). 
397 The Standards, supra note 87 at 4.2.2. 
398 Ibid, ss. 4.3.6, 4.3.3.1. 
399 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization Act, supra note 13, s 10(1), repealing s 11(4). 
400 Ibid, s. 4.3.3.3. 
401 Ibid, s12, s. 4.3.3.3. 
 
 210 
“stringent” and the majority of applications have been turned down.402 The most common 
and easiest way to satisfy the standing requirement for leave is to have made a 
submission on the instrument in question; however, it is possible to establish an interest 
without having made a submission, for example through proximity to a proposed 
development.403 Generally, a party seeking leave may be required to justify having not 
submitted at an earlier stage. In practice, the Board hears aggregate disputes as a result of 
a Ministerial referral, an appeal of a municipal decision, or an owner-applicant’s as-of-
right appeal from a Ministerial decision. Non-owner parties who object to proposals 
during the initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to 
hearings ordered under the Act.404 As a result, quarry litigation often formally includes 
non-owner parties and/or participants either as individuals or as groups with similar 
interests in the proceedings. While opportunities to participate are limited by the ability to 
retain legal representation and fund independent technical research, objector participation 
does present a procedural opportunity for non-owners. Unlike property disputes in other 
forums, these land use conflicts are at least theoretically open to claims from third parties 
without ownership interests.  
 
With respect to Official Plan Amendments, the Planning Act requires that the municipal 
council hold at least one public meeting. In advance of the meeting the proposed official 
plan amendment must be available to the public for a minimum of 20 days before the 
meeting. However if they refuse to adopt the amendment, the meeting requirement is 
waived. The Planning Act provides that any person or public body may make written 
                                                         
402 Dawber v Ontario (Director, Ministry of the Environment) (2007), 28 CELR (3d) 281; affd (2008), 36 
CELR (3d) 191 (Ont Div Ct); leave to appeal refused (Ont CA File No M36552, November 26, 2008); 
Richard Lindgren, “Third Party Appeals Under the Environmental Bill of Rights in the Post-Lefarge Era: 
The Public Interest Perspective” (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2009) [Lindgren]. 
403 See for example the Environmental Review Tribunal decision in Dawber, supra note 402, discussed in 
Lindgren, supra note 402. 
404 The Act, supra note 36, ss. 11(5), (6). The Act provides that the Minister may refer the application and 
any objections to the Board for a hearing and that the persons who made the objections are parties. 
However, s.11(5) provides that the Minister can direct the Board to consider only specific issues; and, 
s.11(8) that the Board may refuse to consider objections it considers to not made in good faith, to be 
frivolous or vexatious, or to be made only for the purpose of delay. There is also a rarely invoked third 
party appeal provision in Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights that allows a non-owner party to seek 
leave to appeal, see discussion accompanying notes 402-403. 
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submissions to council during the timeline specified by council.405 It also specifies that 
council must inform the public at the meeting about the power of the Board to dismiss an 
appeal if the appellant has not provided council with oral submissions at a public meeting 
or written submission before an amendment is adopted.406 Similarly, a municipality is 
required to hold at least one public meeting before passing a zoning by-law amendment 
with a minimum of 20 days’ notice to the public and must ensure “sufficient” information 
is provided to the public.407 If changes are made to the proposed amendment the public 
has the right to request another meeting.408  
 
Scholars in Canada409 and the United Kingdom410 have noted the important contributions 
made by more-than-owner or “public” participants in planning processes. In the context 
of aggregate, this contribution was also noted by multiple participants in this research.411 
One more-than-owner party noted it is “citizen’s groups” rather than the Ministries tasked 
with evaluating the applications in the public interest that are stopping applications.412 
Indeed, in several cases examined for this research, serious and complex mitigation 
requirements or site reductions and changes to the application were the result of more-
than-owner party interventions rather than government agencies.413 Another more-than-
owner party noted, “The technical reviews by the Minister were, shall I say, fallible 
because they didn’t seem to give it the kind of scrutiny we have and we are not experts. 
We just kept bumping up on little things that we would go, ‘how did they miss this?’”414 
Yet structural opportunities for participation and deliberation within the planning system 
have been diminished as the target of state reforms aimed at ‘modernizing’ or 
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‘streamlining’ the processes that control land use and development in Ontario. 415 This is 
consistent with trends in other jurisdictions within Canada,416 and internationally, such as 
the United Kingdom417 where neoliberal environmental governance promotes 
“flexibility” and economic competitiveness and shifts towards market mechanisms in the 
planning system.418 As noted in Chapter Two, planning has a long history with efforts to 
replace the ‘politics’ of planning with professional expertise through a “technical-
rational” model of land use decision-making.419 In the context of neoliberal 
environmental governance, deliberative opportunities are deemed “blockages” and more-
than-owner parties engaging in the planning process are depicted as anti-growth, anti-
progress and even dangerous or criminal.420 As discussed in Chapters Six to Eight, this 
research demonstrates that even where parties do continue to engage in the planning 
process, the failure to recognize the full range of people-place relations with private land 
as relevant to land use decisions results in a more subtle form of exclusion. This 
enclosure of “the affective and unruly elements” of planning conflicts upholds the 
privileged position of aggregate proponents and limits the transformative and 
democratizing potential of planning.421 Thus, the data put forward by more-than-owner 
                                                         
415 Roger Keil & Gene Desfor, “Ecological Modernisation in Los Angeles and Toronto” (2003) 8 Local 
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parties serves as a valuable supplement to state oversight while the challenges they pose 
are bracketed to maintain an orderly and efficient process.422 Citing public frustration 
with aggregate approvals and other forms of development, the Environmental 
Commissioner has recently noted the need for meaningful consultation on land use issues: 
First, consultation is not simply telling people what you intend to do and, then, 
listening to their comments. 
… 
To be legitimate, an approval process must be able to reach a decision not 
to proceed. I’m not saying that this should be a common outcome. Quite 
the contrary, one would expect that the vast majority of proposed 
undertakings would be well-designed and well-considered, even before 
they reach the public consultation stage, so as to be likely candidates for 
approval. But, in a valid and meaningful consultation process, we would 
expect that sometimes rational arguments or contrasting societal value 
systems would and should lead to a “No”. Without that possibility, there is 
no value in consultation.423 
 
Other Approvals and Applicable Laws 
 
The provincial Ministry of the Environment is responsible for three forms of approvals 
related to aggregate extraction. The Ministry’s responsibilities are based on both the 
Ontario Water Resources Act424 and the Environmental Protection Act425 in the case of a 
potential contaminant. These approvals are not required before a licence is granted. 
However, it is the Ministry practice not to process the application until other approvals 
have been granted, as they are required before operations can begin at an aggregate 
extraction site. 
Under the Ontario Water Resources Act, the Ministry is responsible for the supervision of 
the province’s ground and surface water supply. Permits to Take Water are required when 
more than 50,000 litres of water per day will be taken. Since water table and groundwater 
                                                         
422 Lachapelle & McCool, supra note 5 at 280. 
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impacts are often a central aspect of public concerns about an application, these 
applications can be quite contentious and attempts have been made to appeal 
approvals.426 Industrial sewage Certificates of Approval are required when sewage is 
discharged into ground or surface water under the Ontario Water Resources Act s. 53. In 
the context of aggregate extraction, dewatering systems and wash plants require this form 
of approval. The permitting system controls water takings for the purpose of avoiding 
adverse impacts on other water users or the environment. The Board has, at least once, 
required a permit and certificate as a condition for the issuance of the licence for 
aggregate extraction.427 However, this is not standard practice. 
 
Permits have historically been required in connection with endangered and threatened 
species and species habitat under the Endangered Species Act.428 In 2013 however, 
amendments to that Act introduced a “rules-in-regulation” or “permit-by-rule” system for 
a range of industrial development activities, including pits and quarries.429 The new 
system means proponents are simply required to follow the rules as set out in the 
regulations and no longer require a permit. In effect, as the Environmental Commissioner 
concluded, the Ministry no longer has the power to stop activities based on their impact 
on endangered species in the province:  
That is where the regulatory changes of 2013 have their most profound 
consequences: they do not allow MNR to say “no.” Every place, no matter 
how unique or ecologically important, will be open to activities with the 
potential to adversely affect species at risk; no place is untouchable or 
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special. And that does not appear to be consistent with the purposes of the 
Act or the general standards of modern natural resource management.430 
The regulations also provide species-specific exemptions for projects that meet certain 
conditions, including species such as bobolinks 431and butternut trees,432 which have been 
at issue in aggregate extraction proposals. Further, instead of requirements for “overall 
benefits” to the affected species that commonly applied to permits, many activities will 
only be subject to requirements to “minimize adverse effects.”433 There are however 
seven species excluded from exemptions for aggregate operations.434 Notably these 
amendments were part of an effort to “streamline” the approvals process and reduce the 
cost of maintaining the permit system. Of particular interest in the context of reforms to 
the Aggregate Resources Act and the use of discretionary regulatory powers, the 
government tabled the Endangered Species Act changes as part of an omnibus budget bill 
in 2012.435 These were withdrawn in response to widespread criticism but then later 
implemented by regulation, without public consultation or legislative debate. 
 
Aggregate extraction is also excluded from the list of “drinking water threats” under the 
Clean Water Act.436 Aggregate licences and permits are now prescribed instruments 
under the Clean Water Act, which means that they can be used to implement the 
protection and management of water sources.437 The Clean Water Act sets out “source 
protection areas”438 within the province and establishes “source protection 
committees”439 for each. The committees must develop “source protection plans” with 
policies to prevent significant drinking water threats.440 Sections 39 and 43 of the Clean 
Water Act now respectively require new and existing instruments to “conform” to 
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significant threat policies and designated Great Lakes policies in source protection plans. 
However only new instruments are required to “have regard” to other source protection 
plan policies.441 Therefore while aggregate operations are not prescribed threats, aspects 
of their operation, such as handling and storage of fuel are, and must therefore be 
managed in accordance with the source water protection plan. Proposed amendments to 
the Act provide the authority to require changes to existing instruments and conditions 
for new approvals.442 Municipal Planning Act decisions must also “conform” to 
significant threat policies and designated Great Lakes policies in source protection plans 
and “have regard” to other source protection plan policies.443 
 
While the provincial Environmental Assessment Act does not apply to aggregate 
applications, more-than-owner parties and environmental organizations have raised 
concerns about this in the context of large-scale applications, including the Superior 
Aggregates proposal in Mitchipicoten Bay on the coast of Lake Superior,444 and the 
Melancthon mega quarry.445 In the case of the Melancthon quarry, opponents 
successfully lobbied the province to order an environmental assessment due to the 
unprecedented scale of the proposed development, which would have been one of the 
largest in Canada and in North America.446 The proposal was subsequently withdrawn 
and the EA was never conducted so it is not clear how this would have operated in 
relation to the process under the Act.  
 
Federal Jurisdiction can be engaged by aggregate applications, particularly under the 
Fisheries Act447 and protection of waterways. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
recent changes to those regimes have limited their application.448 Similarly, the 
                                                         
441 Ibid, at s. 39. 
442 Bill 39, supra note  13, ss 13(1), 13(3), 23, 25, 31, 37(1). 
443 Ibid, s. 39(1). 
444 Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Municipality of Wawa, supra note 413. 
445 See the application on the EBR Registry, Number 011-2864. 
446 O Reg 444/11. 
447 RSC, 1895, c F-14. 
448 Gibson, supra note 412. 
 
 217 
application of the federal environmental assessment regime has been narrowed to make it 
unlikely to be applied in a provincial aggregate siting situation.449  
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement may be implicated depending on whether the 
proponent could qualify as a “foreign investor,” in particular the proponent may invoke 
the investor protection mechanism if the application is turned down.450 A recent NAFTA 
case was launched by a foreign-owned proponent in conjunction with a civil suit against 
the provincial government following the provincial use of the rarely invoked Ministerial 
Zoning Power and was only withdrawn after a $15-million settlement was made by the 
province.451 Despite widespread recognition that the NAFTA suit was an inappropriate 
mechanism to challenge the government’s decision, the eventual settlement may have a 
chilling effect on future decision makers.452 While outside the scope of this project, a 
2007 decision of a federal-provincial environmental assessment Joint Review Panel to 
reject a proposed quarry in Nova Scotia was successfully challenged under NAFTA.453 
The proponent, Bilcon, is seeking $100,000,000 in compensatory damages. Notably, 
there was a strong dissent from one member of the NAFTA panel who warned the 
decision could result in a “chill on the operation of environmental review panels”.454 The 
member went on to disagree with the majority’s finding that the Joint-Review Panel was 
wrong to emphasize the effect of the project on the human environment and to take 
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“account of the community’s own expression of its interests and values”.455 He 
concluded, 
This result may be disturbing to many. In this day and age, the idea of an 
environmental review panel putting more weight on the human environment 
and on community values than on scientific and technical feasibility, and 
concluding that these community values were not outweighed by what the 
panel regarded as modest economic benefits over 50 years, does not appear 
at all unusual. Neither such a result nor the process by which it was reached 
in this case could ever be said to “offend judicial propriety”. Once again, a 
chill will be imposed on environmental review panels which will be 
concerned not to give too much weight to socio-economic considerations or 
other considerations of the human environment in case the result is a claim 
for damages under NAFTA Chapter 11. In this respect, the decision of the 
majority will be seen as a remarkable step backwards in environmental 
protection.456  
Canada filed a notice of application for judicial review in Federal Court in June 2015, 
arguing that the NAFTA tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and the dispute should have 
been taken to a Canadian court.457 While the proponent attempted to stay the proceedings 
pending the NAFTA Tribunal’s decision on damages, the Federal Court denied the 
motion and will allow the Canadian government’s application to proceed.458 Bilcon is 
appealing the decision. The majority’s finding that “community core values” fell outside 
the proper scope of the environmental assessment inquiry and preference for technical 
and biophysical evidence exemplifies the closure of a decision-making process to the 
range of people-place relations engaged by planning decisions. As noted by the 
dissenting member, the decision has the potential to reinforce and deepen closure in 
planning systems and reinforces the emphasis on expertise and technocratic approaches 
to environmental governance. While scientific and technical evidence are key parts of 
land use decisions, they are an inherently “complex mix of the scientific, social, 
economic, political” and material and decision makers must grapple with all these 
dimensions in order to find sustainable solutions.459 
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Hearings and Decisions: Aggregate Resources Act and Official Plan and By-Law 
Amendments 
A. The Ministry of Natural Resources 
Under the Aggregate Resources Act process, the Ministry will make a recommendation to 
the Minister within 30 days of the proponent submitting all required documentation about 
resolved and remaining objections at the end of the two-year period.460 The Minister has 
three statutory options: 1) refer the application and any objections to the Ontario 
Municipal Board for a hearing, or in the case of a site within the Niagara Escarpment 
Plan Area, a joint-board of the Ontario Municipal Board and the Environmental Review 
Tribunal under the Consolidated Hearings Act;461 2) issue the licence; 3) refuse to issue 
the licence.462 Section 12(1) of the Act sets out the matters that the Minister must 
consider in making the decision: 
(a) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on the environment; 
(b) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on nearby communities; 
(c) any comments provided by a municipality in which the site is located; 
(d) the suitability of the progressive rehabilitation and final rehabilitation plans for 
the site; 
(e) any possible effects on ground and surface water resources; 
(f) any possible effects of the operation of the pit or quarry on agricultural resources; 
(g) any planning and land use considerations; 
(h) the main haulage routes and proposed truck traffic to and from the site; 
(i) the quality and quantity of the aggregate on the site; 
(j) the applicant’s history of compliance with this Act and the regulations, if a licence 
or permit has previously been issued to the applicant under this Act or a predecessor 
of this Act; and 
(k) such other matters as are considered appropriate.463 
The amended s 12 (e) includes effects on drinking water sources as a consideration. 
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Section 7 of the Environmental Bill of Rights requires the Ministry to have a 
Statement of Environmental Values. Section 11 requires that the Minister “take every 
reasonable step to ensure that the ministry statement of environmental values is 
considered whenever decisions that might significantly affect the environment are made 
in the Ministry.” 464 The Statement lists the following principles:  
• A sound understanding of natural and ecological systems and how our actions 
affect them is key to achieving sustainability  
• As our understanding of the way the natural world works and how our actions 
affect it is often incomplete, MNR staff should exercise caution and special 
concern for natural values in the face of such uncertainty.  
• The finite capacity of our natural systems should be recognized in planning and 
allocation decisions.  
• Natural resources should be properly valued to provide a fair return to Ontarians 
and to reflect their ecological, social and economic contributions.  
• Participation in resource management by all those who share an interest is a 
necessary ingredient, particularly in support of communities who must balance 
economic diversity with other needs.  Those affected by proposed changes must 
have access to information and opportunities to provide input to decisions that 
affect their lives.  
• Applied research and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge and 
innovative technologies must be fostered to support the sustainable development 
of natural resources.  
• An ecosystem approach to managing our natural resources enables a holistic 
perspective of social, economic and ecological aspects and provides the context 
for integrated resource management.  
• The planning for and management of natural resources should strive for 
continuous improvement and effectiveness through adaptive management of 
natural resources.  
• In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection must be an 
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation.  
• From both a sound business and environmental perspective, it is less costly and 
more effective to anticipate and prevent negative environmental impacts before 
undertaking new activities than it is to correct environmental problems after the 
fact.  
• Rehabilitating degraded environments is an important aspect of resource 
stewardship.  
                                                         
464 Supra, note. 
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However, the Ministry has historically interpreted the Statement as relevant only to 
decisions related to the development of “Acts, regulations, and policies” and not to 
instruments, such as Aggregate Resources Act applications. The Environmental 
Commissioner has repeatedly pointed out that the Environmental Bill of Rights does not 
exempt instruments and that the Ministry should be considering the Statement in 
determining the outcome of aggregate applications. Indeed, this was confirmed by the 
Ontario Divisional Court in Lafarge Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Environmental Review 
Tribunal): “There is no exclusion for Directors when they are making a decision whether 
or not to implement a proposal for a Class I or a Class II instrument.”465 The Ministry of 
Natural Resources has taken the position that the Statement is an embedded part of the 
existing aggregate licensing process. Upon review, the Commissioner “found no 
reference to how specific SEV principles (e.g., cumulative effects, the ecosystem 
approach, the precautionary approach) had been considered.”466 The 2011/2012 Annual 
Report to the Legislature rejected this approach:  
To adequately demonstrate that SEV consideration has occurred, SEV 
consideration documentation requires an explicit explanation of which 
specific SEV principles were considered, and why and how they were 
considered, applied and/or dismissed during the decision-making 
process.467 
In the 2014 Animal Alliance decision, the Divisional Court accepted the Ministry of 
Natural Resources’ process for consideration of the Statement as fulfilling the section 11 
requirements, known as the “SEV consideration statement,” a form of checklist with 
placeholder notations, such as, “a total of XXXX comments were provided” and “I have 
taken into consideration the aforementioned in my decision to approve [proposal title].” 
The Court also held that there was no concern with the Ministry’s completion of the 
Statement consideration in advance of the closing of the 30 day Environmental Registry 
public comment period, concluding that these processes mandated by the Environmental 
Bill of Rights are “separate” and it was not necessary to demonstrate that all comments 
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were reviewed.468 Further, the Court pointed out that failure to comply with Part II, 
including section 11, “does not affect the validity of any policy, Act, regulation or 
instrument, except as provided in section 118.”469 Section 118 limits applications for 
judicial review to the grounds that the Minister “failed in a fundamental way to comply 
with the requirements of Part II respecting a proposal for an instrument.” However, 
according to the Environmental Commissioner’s investigation, even this minimal 
formalistic process is not part of the aggregate licensing review process at the Ministry.470 
In light of this, the impact of the Statement on aggregate licensing is arguably quite 
limited. 
 
If the Minister refuses the licence, notice must be served on the application with 
reasons.471 No reasons are required for approval. The applicant is entitled to a hearing by 
the Board if notice is served.472 Therefore the application may end up before the Board by 
referral or by appeal of a refusal. The proponent is automatically entitled to a hearing in 
the case of a refusal. Notably, unlike in referral hearings, objectors are not included as 
mandatory parties to a refusal hearing; only the Minister and the applicant are required, 
although the Minister has discretion to include other parties.473 In practice, most 
controversial applications will end up being referred to the Board.  
B. Planning Act Approvals 
Under the Act no licence can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an applicable zoning 
by-law.474 Therefore, the Act requires the proponent to apply to local authorities for 
appropriate amendments to the Official Plan or By-Laws under the Planning Act before a 
licence can be issued. After the consultation process described above takes place, the 
Municipality must make a decision on the application. 
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As set out in the Planning Act, all policy and decisions of municipal governments 
must be consistent with the Policy Statement.475 Therefore, as Valiante notes, the areas of 
provincial interest and the Policy Statement are “potentially ambiguous and arguably 
contradictory”, leaving “room for interpretation by local councils and the OMB” about 
how to achieve the right balance between conflicting priorities.476 The long-standing 
provincial interest in aggregate resources and their privileged position in the Policy 
Statement mean local decision makers are in fact highly constrained in the context of 
these applications. Further, despite the relative openness of municipal planning processes 
and the wide ability to make submissions, scholars have noted the potential for such 
processes to be dominated by well-resourced business or other private interests such as 
property-owners associations and the systemic lack of access for marginalized parties, 
such as tenants, low-income, and racialized or Indigenous persons or communities.477 
Therefore, it is unclear whether and how Councils will consider and be informed by 
views that challenge dominant people-place and socio-economic relations.   
If the amendment is refused or if the municipality fails to adopt the amendment 
within 180 days for Official Plans, and 120 days for zoning by-law amendments, the 
proponent can appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board for a hearing.478 Notably while a 
decision to deny an application requires reasons, none are required where an application 
is approved.479 In practice, most controversial planning amendments, including those in 
relation to aggregate extraction applications, will be subject to an appeal to the Board.480 
However, the rarely invoked Minister’s Zoning Order power has also been applied in a 
recent quarry dispute.481 
                                                         
475 Planning Act, supra, note 87, s. 3. But, notably, s 66(1) of the Act limits municipal powers to regulate 
aggregate extraction: This Act, the regulations and the provisions of licences and site plans apply despite 
any municipal by-law, official plan or development agreement and, to the extent that a municipal by-law, 
official plan or development agreement deals with the same subject-matter as this Act, the regulations or 
the provisions of a licence or site plan, the by-law, official plan or development agreement is inoperative 
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C. The Ontario Municipal Board 
The role of the Ontario Municipal Board is a key element in the regulation of aggregate 
extraction as the Minister routinely refers applications to the Board where members of 
the public and/or ministries, planning authorities and local governments file objections. It 
is a uniquely powerful institution, as recently noted by the Ontario Bar Association: 
“There is no tribunal in Ontario that has a similarly broad jurisdiction and responsibility 
as the OMB and there is no comparable tribunal or agency in any other province.”482 An 
understanding of the Board’s powers and procedures is therefore essential to the context 
of aggregate extraction decisions. 
 
A 2009 study on the relationship between the City of Toronto and the Board argued that 
the Board shifts responsibility for political planning decisions, particularly contentious 
development decisions, away from elected officials.483 The study measured the relative 
success of private developers before the Board when compared to both the City and to 
community groups. Notably, it found not only that developers were significantly more 
successful before the Board, winning 64% of the time when directly opposing developers, 
but also demonstrated that the City fared significantly worse when aligned with a 
community group participating in the hearing.484 As will be discussed below in Chapter 
Seven, aggregate extraction licence applications are overwhelmingly approved at the 
Board, despite a few notable exceptions in recent years.485 Even in the Niagara 
Escarpment Plan Area, created in part in response to concerns about the impact of pits 
and quarries, the first application was not rejected until 2012 in the Re Nelson Aggregates 
Co. decision.486 Indeed, in Re Walker Aggregates Co., another 2012 case within the 
NEPDA, the majority of the panel approved a large quarry adjacent to an existing one, 
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despite a strong dissent from the third panel member.487 The Divisional Court denied the 
Niagara Escarpment Commission’s application for leave to appeal in Walker.488  
Where hearings related to the Official Plan and/or municipal by-law amendments are also 
required under the Planning Act, the proceedings will likely be consolidated.489 In most 
aggregate conflicts both municipal and licensing issues are considered during a hearing. 
Therefore, the municipal decision-making process is relevant to the Board’s decision. 
Since 1997 the Planning Act has stated that the Board “shall have regard to” decisions by 
municipal council or approval authorities made under the Act and related to the same 
matter, including the information and material considered by council.490 This has been 
interpreted by the Board as a lower standard of deference than the “shall be consistent 
with” requirement applied to the Provincial Policy Statement, requiring the Board to 
“consider them carefully in relation to the circumstances at hand, their objectives and the 
statements as a whole, and what they seek to protect.”491 The Board has rejected the 
interpretation that this section binds the Board, citing the need to maintain its 
“independent decision making authority.”492 
 
The Board controls its own process as per s 91 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act493 and 
s 25.1 of the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act494 and has set out rules related to 
standing and the hearing process, including the form of documents and exhibits, filing 
and notice requirements, adjournment powers, mediation and the conduct of the 
proceedings in the Ontario Municipal Board Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Rules 
specify further discretion over their own procedure. For example, Rule 3 states that the 
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Rules “shall be liberally interpreted to secure the just, most expeditions and cost-effective 
determination” and Rule 4 considers matters that are not dealt with in the Rules.  
The Board may at any time in a proceeding make orders with respect to the 
procedure and practices that apply in the proceeding. If these Rules do not 
provide for a matter of procedure, the Board may do whatever is necessary and 
permitted by law to enable it to adjudicate effectively and completely on any 
matter before it. 495 
Rule 5 guards against overly technical procedural objections, allowing for 
“substantial compliance with the Rules” and Rule 6 provides the Board with powers 
of exemption: 
“The Board may grant all necessary exceptions from these Rules or from a 
procedural order, or grant other relief as it considers appropriate, to ensure 
that the real questions in issue are determined in a just, most expeditious and 
cost-effective manner.”    
The combined effect is to provide the Board with considerable discretion to 
seemingly contravene specific rules while adhering to the broader scheme. 
 
The Board retains screening power to dismiss a proceeding prior to the hearing on 
jurisdictional grounds and, in a range of municipal matters including official plan 
and zoning amendments. This includes where the Board finds no “apparent land 
use planning ground,” the failure to make prior submissions on the matter, or that 
the appeal was not made in “good faith, is frivolous or vexatious, or is made only 
for the purpose of delay.”496 Therefore, as Valiante notes, “many issues, concerns, 
and values that might have been considered by council must be either abandoned 
or reformulated in a way that will qualify” on these grounds.497 
i. Standing and Participation at the Hearing 
Party standing, and full participation, before the Board is determined by the 
Planning Act, or the development permit regime applicable to a specific dispute, such as 
                                                         
495 Ontario Municipal Board Act, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 889: Ontario Municipal Board Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, r 4 [“OMB Rules”]. 
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the Aggregate Resources Act, and in many cases, linked to participation during the 
prescribed consultation period. Parties who object to an aggregate application during the 
initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to hearings on 
applications referred under the Act,498 though notably not an appeal of a ministerial 
refusal of an application.499 The Act specifies that the Minister, the applicant and the 
objectors are parties to the hearing,500 though the amendments make it optional for the 
Minister to join.501 As noted above, since 2007 the right to appeal a municipal decision 
on an official plan amendment or a zoning by-law is restricted to persons who made oral 
or written submissions to council during the decision-making process.502 Such persons 
can also be added by the Board as Parties to an appeal of a zoning by-law amendment but 
do not have a right of appeal for a zoning amendment.503 The Board retains some 
discretion to add persons who fail to meet the Planning Act submission requirements if 
there are “reasonable grounds” to do so,504 or “other such persons” under the Act.505  
Recent decisions indicate the Board has taken a strict approach to the submission 
requirements, including that oral submissions must be made at the statutory meeting not 
in another forum, and written submissions must describe the objection.506 
 
Under the Board rules, Parties are defined as full participants in the proceedings, with the 
full range of rights, including: 
a) Serving and filing motions; 
b) Receiving copies of all documents exchanged or filed; 
                                                         
498 The Act, supra note 36, ss. 11(5), (6). The Act provides that the Minister may refer the application and 
any objections to the Board for a hearing and that the persons who made the objections are parties. 
However, s.11(5) provides that the Minister can direct the Board to consider only specific issues; and, 
s.11(8) that the Board may refuse to consider objections it considers to not made in good faith, to be 
frivolous or vexatious, or to be made only for the purpose of delay. 
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c) Making opening and closing submissions; 
d) Presenting and cross-examining witnesses; 
e) Claiming or being subject to costs; 
f) Requesting a review of the Board decision.507 
Parties are entitled to make a motion for discovery where another party has refused to 
provide information.508 However, opportunities to participate are effectively limited by 
the ability to retain legal representation and fund independent technical expertise, as well 
as the onerous length and complexity of the hearings. Board rules also provide for 
discretionary “participant” status and many individuals and groups opt for this more 
limited role because of financial constraints or because the Board can grant “participant” 
status without an individual or group having made prior submissions under the Planning 
Act procedure.509 Board practice is to grant such standing in most cases. 510 Participant 
status affords only the ability make a statement, rather than full participation. One more-
than-owner party described the experience of being a participant: “We felt very token 
there. If you didn’t have a lawyer and you weren’t an “expert”, you didn’t feel like they 
were listening to you.”511 In particular, participants are not entitled to call or cross-
examine witnesses. Whether as parties or participants, individuals and groups involved in 
Board hearings face considerable conceptual and practical obstacles to meaningful 
participation, from the accepted language and narrative of planning considerations 
outlined in the Policy Statement and the relevant local development regime to the 
political and financial burden of retaining expertise and representation. 
 
The Board also has a large role in pre-hearing mediation and case management. Board 
Associate-Chair S. Wilson Lee described the pre-hearing as follows:  
[A] tool to map out, delineate the morphology of the issues. It is a forum to 
cull issues, to bring about a more rational organization of how hearings are 
to be segmented. Finally, it is the venue where the Board Member can probe 
and create a climate whether an alternative adjudicative mechanism can be 
                                                         
507 OMB Rules, supra note 495 r 32. 
508 Ibid, r 33. 
509 Ibid, r 2, 32. 
510 Bruce Wayne Krushelnicki, A Practical Guide to the Ontario Municipal Board (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 
2007); Moore, supra note 486. 
511 Interview, September 9, 2014. 
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deployed. For more complex cases, Members will work with the parties to 
design facilitation of expert witnesses; and, finally, work schedules for the 
hearings. 
ii. Witnesses – Experts and Non-Experts 
Witnesses, particularly expert witnesses on planning and technical or scientific matters, 
play an essential role in many land use hearings,512 including aggregate extraction 
conflicts in which highly technical information is central to decision-making. As one 
lawyer told me, “Even with free legal counsel, you can’t do these cases without experts. 
It is never a legal issue. It is always the experts that are more important than lawyers in 
that setting.”513 An expert working for more-than-owner parties noted while lawyers and 
planners “deal with the process”, without technical experts “the guns aren’t loaded” and 
parties are unlikely to succeed.514 The Board Rules were amended in 2013 to include an 
amended Rule 21 requiring experts appearing on behalf of Parties to a hearing expected 
to be 10 days or more, or where requested by a Party, to sign the “Acknowledgment of 
Expert’s Duty” form stating the following or provide the same information in the body of 
their report: 
I acknowledge that it is my duty to provide evidence in relation to this 
proceeding as follows: 
a) to provide evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan; 
b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within 
my area of expertise; and 
c) to provide such additional assistance as the Board may reasonably require 
to determine a matter in issue. 
 
Clause 4 also requires the expert to acknowledge this duty “prevails over any obligation” 
to the party they are engaged by or on behalf of. Rule 21 requires that the form, along 
with documentation of the expert’s qualifications, details of the issues he or she will 
address, the opinions, reasons and conclusions of the expert, and a list of reports or 
documents he or she will refer to, be served on other Parties and filed with the municipal 
clerk 30 days in advance of the hearing. The Rule 21.01 now also sets out the “Duty of 
the Expert Witness” in the same terms as above and including that these duties prevail. 
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These changes brought the Board’s procedure for expert evidence in line with general 
civil practice under rule 4.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which was introduced to 
respond to concerns about “opinions for sale” and expert reports and evidence being 
shaped by clients rather than the expert opinions of the professionals.515 The changes, 
recommended by Justice Osborne in the Report for the Civil Justice Reform Project, 
clarified that the duty of the expert is to assist the court, first and foremost. Notably, the 
Report acknowledges a lack of enforceability may limit the impact of the rule, but 
concludes the change “cannot hurt the process and will hopefully limit the extent of 
expert bias.”516   
 
The role of experts and expertise is a particularly contentious issue before the Board 517  
and the role of experts as “advocates” or “lobbyists” remains a concern for parties and for 
the planning profession.518 Both more-than-owner and professional participants in this 
study noted problems with retaining expert witnesses because of the costs, but also 
because many experienced professionals were “conflicted out because they have all acted 
for the proponent at one time or another” and “few experts want to work for NGOs.”519 
Several participants noted that they had “scoped down” or scaled back the issues they 
would challenge at the Board because of the cost of hiring multiple experts rather than 
based on the merit of the arguments.520 The Board has the discretion to determine the 
weight that both expert and non-expert evidence will be given on any particular matter. 
Even where more-than-owner parties were able to retain witnesses, lawyer and expert 
participants in this study reported that the Board routinely gave more weight to proponent 
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witnesses. One expert noted, “They do whatever they can to discredit you…there is 
always this stigma if you work for rate payers. You see it in Board decisions. It will say 
‘we preferred the applicant’s witnesses’”.521 Another more-than-owner group advised that 
their ecology witness on an endangered plant species was found not to be an “expert,” as 
he did not have academic credentials despite years of working in the field.522 As a witness 
who regularly works for government and more-than-owner parties told me, because he 
grew up in areas near to some of the sites in the applications he appears on, he has been 
challenged as lacking objectivity rather than recognized as having relevant local 
expertise: “Everything is legal. It is process. Everything is strangers from away. They 
didn’t have any idea about the local agriculture.”523 
 
Other witnesses also play a role in proceedings, including formal Participants and may be 
required under Rule 21.02 to provide a witness or participant statement, including, 
background, experience and interest in the matter, as well as details of the issues to be 
addressed, evidence to be presented, and any reports to be relied on. More-than-owner 
participants in this study shared experiences of engaging in the hearing process. One 
participant shared his sense that the affective dimensions were deemed irrelevant: “You 
take it on because you are human, yet you know full well that taking this emotional 
impact to the Board has really no factual bearing. [The] Board couldn’t care less if you 
cry.”524 Another reflected on the process, “It doesn’t listen to the heart. It listens to 
legislation. I would think that rather than looking just at process, they should be looking 
at the heart of the matter, the emotions…they shouldn’t be just restricting it to legal 
issues and lawyers’ arguments.”525 Thus more-than-owner parties are required to spend 
valuable resources on technical evidence, which is used by decision-makers to 
supplement the inadequate proponent data and the lack of state-funded assessment, and in 
doing so reinforce the exclusion of other issues, experience, knowledge, and values 
relevant to the people-place relations at stake. 
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iii. Decisions: Powers of the Board 
The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and of fact in 
matters before it.526 However, under the Aggregate Resources Act, the Minister can 
specify the issues that the Board can determine.527 The Board can also refuse to consider 
certain objections and continue with a hearing on the basis of remaining objections under 
both the Act and its own Rules. As an administrative tribunal the Board does not follow 
the stare decisis principle and members may consider, but are not bound by, prior 
decisions of the Board.528 
 
Section 12(1) of the Act sets out the matters that the Board, like the Minister, must 
consider: 
(a) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on the environment; 
(b) the effect of the operation of the pit or quarry on nearby communities; 
(c) any comments provided by a municipality in which the site is located; 
(d) the suitability of the progressive rehabilitation and final rehabilitation plans for 
the site; 
(e) any possible effects on ground and surface water resources; 
(f) any possible effects of the operation of the pit or quarry on agricultural resources; 
(g) any planning and land use considerations; 
(h) the main haulage routes and proposed truck traffic to and from the site; 
(i) the quality and quantity of the aggregate on the site; 
(j) the applicant’s history of compliance with this Act and the regulations, if a licence 
or permit has previously been issued to the applicant under this Act or a predecessor 
of this Act; and 
(k) such other matters as are considered appropriate.529 
In 2011, the Board in Jennison Construction, concluded that where a proponent has 
satisfied the Policy Statement and municipal land use tests, the tests in section 12 would 
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also be satisfied.530 In that case the Board has also determined that the “minimize adverse 
interests” test set out in the Purpose of the Act must be addressed but concluded that it is 
less onerous than the “no negative impacts test” set out in the Policy Statement.531 
However, it should be noted that section 12 of the Act applies more widely to the 
“environment” rather than the specific natural heritage features considered under the 
Policy Statement, which are discussed in more detail below.  
 
If the Board directs the Minister to issue a licence, then they can specify conditions. The 
Minister is not bound by the Board conditions if she finds they are not consistent with the 
Act.532 The Provincial Standards impose a series of “Prescribed Conditions” for each 
category of licence, including dust mitigation, blasting standards and hours, maintenance 
of monitoring records, requirement to obtain any required Certificate of Approval and/or 
Permit to Take Water.533 The standards also impose a set of “Operational Conditions,” 
governing basic aspects of extraction, fencing, transport, berms and some aspects of 
rehabilitation.534  
 
Decisions by the Board are subject to an internal appeal under section 43 of the Ontario 
Municipal Board Act, which allows the Board to “rehear, review, rescind, change, alter or 
vary” it. Decisions are otherwise final; however, an application for leave to appeal on a 
question of law can be made to the Divisional Court under section 96(1).535 The province 
does retain one unique and powerful tool to intervene on planning matters, such as 
appeals of official plans and amendments, through the ‘declaration of provincial interest 
power’ by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, which renders the Board 
decision subject to confirmation, variation or rescindment by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council (in practice Cabinet).536 This tool is rarely used. 
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Part III: A Regulatory Regime in Flux – 2017 Amendments to the Act and the 
Niagara Escarpment Plan 
A. Aggregate Resources Act Reform  
In 2011, during a provincial election campaign in which the proposed Melancthon Mega 
Quarry north of Toronto became a surprise campaign issue, the incumbent Liberals 
promised a legislative review of the Act.537 In May 2012, they initiated an all-party 
review of the Aggregate Resources Act at the Standing Committee on General 
Government. The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and 
rehabilitation, best practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, 
aggregate resource development and protection, including conservation and recycling.538 
It did not include provincial planning policy or any other municipal or provincial 
planning legislation, including consideration of the guiding Provincial Policy Statement 
or the role of the Ontario Municipal Board in aggregate resources matters.  
 
On Friday May 4, 2012, the government announced that the review would begin the 
following Monday May 7, 2012, with hearings before the Committee on May 7, 9, 12 and 
14 for 2 to 3 hours each day.539 The Ontario Environmental Commissioner and several 
industry representatives were scheduled to depute during the first week. Similar to the 
Bill 52 process described above, no community groups, agricultural groups or 
environmental organizations were notified or scheduled to depute. The public, including 
such organizations, were invited to provide written comments or submit a request to 
depute during the remaining two days. After public outcry about the limited notice, the 
location of the hearings in Toronto and not in host-communities, and very limited spaces 
for deputation, the Committee held five additional public hearings in Toronto, 
                                                         
537 Brad Pritchard, ““Liberals promise to review aggregate rules”, Simcoe.com (20 September 2011) online: 
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Orangeville, Kitchener, Kanata and Sudbury.540 The Committee heard 86 deputations 
from industry, municipal representatives, the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 
community groups, environmental organizations, professional organizations and 
individuals.541 Further comments could be submitted in writing. In addition, the 
Committee spent portions of four days visiting 12 operating, rehabilitated, proposed, or 
abandoned pits and quarries across Ontario. These visits were facilitated by, and 
accompanied by representatives from the Ontario Stone, Sand & Gravel Association, as 
well as individual aggregate companies and staff. 542 Members of the public or 
community were not invited to participate in site visits. While the Report notes a visit to 
the proposed site of the Melancthon Mega Quarry, local residents have noted that the 
members simply drove by a portion of the site, having declined an invitation to visit the 
adjacent farmland from local community members.543 
 
When the Standing Committee on General Government released its report, the 
recommendations focused on nine areas: improving public information; licensing and 
fees; review of licences; the use of recycled materials; municipal responsibilities; 
agricultural land; water resources; rehabilitation; and alternative modes of transport.544 
Given its narrow mandate, it is not surprising that the recommendations deal exclusively 
with the managerial elements of the regulatory regime under the Act. With respect to the 
licensing process, a central issue for many submitters, the Committee emphasized the 
need for simplification and standardization, and the adoption of efficiency measures, such 
as digital data collection for inspections.545 The Committee also focused on the use of 
recycled aggregates and the need to standardize and possibly increase fees.546 The Report 
did recommend more scrutiny for significant site plan amendments and an increase in the 
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public notification period, as well as identifying the need for stronger requirements for 
rehabilitation on agricultural land and the assessment of cumulative impacts on water 
resources.547 However, the report failed to address any of the deeper policy questions 
about the privileged status of aggregate extraction over other land uses, the limitations on 
the planning role of municipal governments, and the lack of acknowledgement of the 
rights of Indigenous communities. Indeed, the two recommendations related to municipal 
governments emphasize their circumscribed role, requiring them to “apply sound 
planning principles” to the separating land uses and minimizing “disruption and tension 
with current or future non-aggregate land uses.” Additionally, they recommended 
Municipalities work with relevant ministries in the exercise of their responsibilities to 
protect aggregate resources, accommodate extraction, and develop “suitable relationships 
with neighbouring land uses.”548 
 
In February 2014 the government released its “Comprehensive Government Response to 
Standing Committee on General Government’s Report on the Review of the Aggregate 
Resources Act” responding to the Report.549 In some respects the government response 
went further than the Committee. They explicitly mentioned the need to meet 
constitutional and other obligations to Aboriginal peoples, including the distinctive nature 
of the Duty to Consult and accommodate.550 They also noted that it might be necessary 
go beyond the recommendations made by the Committee with respect to site plan 
amendments and agricultural land.551 They promised consultations with stakeholders and 
Aboriginal communities on several issues: changes and enhancement to information and 
studies required in the application process; changes to notification and consultation 
requirements; agricultural impacts; and the site plan amendment process. However, they 
also reinforced the limited role for municipal planning, only offering enhanced geological 
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information to allow municipalities to implement the Policy Statement – in other words, 
preserving and protecting aggregate minerals and extraction sites.552  
 
A series of sessions were held with key stakeholders, agencies, and First Nation and 
Métis communities and a consultation paper was developed to seek feedback on proposed 
changes. The “Blueprint for Change: A Proposal to modernize and strengthen the 
Aggregate Resources Act policy framework” document was posted to the Environmental 
Registry on October 21, 2015 with 55 days for public comment.553 The Ministry received 
451 comments.554 The Blueprint was cautiously well received.555 As noted in the EBR 
summary, comments strongly support changes to the regime but specific proposals 
received mixed reaction. Notably the EBR summary notes that a large number of 
submissions called for more transformative change to Ontario’s planning law and policy 
than the Blueprint offered with respect to the protection of water and agricultural lands. 
Further, several comments emphasized the rights of Indigenous communities as well as 
the Duty to Consult. Many supportive commentators did note omissions or concerns 
including the failure to require an analysis of need.556 Following the Blueprint 
consultation, some further targeted consultation took place. Bill 39, An Act to Amend the 
Aggregate Resources Act and the Mining Act, was introduced in October 2016 and 
received Royal Assent in May 2017 at the very late stages of this project. Table 4 at the 
end of this chapter summarizes the changes proposed in the Blueprint. The bolded text 
indicates where a proposal has been incorporated directly in the amendments to the Act, 
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555 Ontario Federation of Agriculture, Re: EBR Registry Number 012-5444 A Proposal to modernize and 
strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act policy Framework (Ontario: Ontario Federation of Agriculture, 
2015); Corporation of the Town of Milton, Aggregate Resources Act Review (Milton, ON: Corporation of 
the Town of Milton, 2015); Development Approval and Planning Policy Department, Town of Caledon 
Comments on the Province of Ontario Paper: A Blueprint for Change - A Proposal to modernize and 
strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act policy Framework (Caledon, ON: Town of Caledon, 2015); 
Ontario Professional Planners Institute, Re: A Blueprint for Change: A Proposal to modernize and 
strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act Policy Framework: EBR Registry Number 012-5444 (Toronto: 
Professional Planners Institute, 2015). 
556 Canadian Environmental Law Association, Re: A Blueprint for Change: A Proposal to modernize and 
strengthen the Aggregate Resources Act policy Framework: EBR Registry Number 012-5444 (Toronto: 
Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2015); Corporation of the Town of Milton, supra note 558. 
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including the section number in the Bill. Several of the changes have been noted above in 
this chapter’s discussion of the legal and policy framework. 
 
Most of the Blueprint proposals were not directly incorporated into the amended Act. 
Like its predecessors, the amended Act is enabling legislation and much of the detailed 
content is left to future regulations or to the discretion of the Minister. The current 
Minister, Kathryn McGarry, noted this in her introduction of the Bill for second reading: 
“Should this bill pass, we will continue to move forward with our phased approach, with 
changes to regulations and provincial standards, including changes to fees to come soon 
after passage.”557 She noted that the government will provide for further consultation in 
the development of further regulations. However, with the exception of regulations 
related to fees, there is neither a timeline nor any specific proposal for this process at this 
time.  
 
As a result, few of the more substantive proposals have been realized at the time of 
writing. Indeed, some of these could lead to a range of outcomes depending on what is 
actually proposed, which could then exacerbate the challenges faced by more-than-owner 
parties and municipalities under the current framework. For example, as one submission 
noted, while recycling of aggregate materials is important, the increased emphasis on 
recycling at aggregate extraction sites could increase the pressure on rural areas to 
accommodate impactful industrial activities largely related to urban growth and 
development. In my view, the changes will do little to ensure the complex socio-
materiality of the places at stake is foregrounded in future aggregate resource decisions. 
The Act continues to be a proponent-driven regime and nothing in the Blueprint suggests 
Ontario will move towards a broader publically driven strategic planning process for 
aggregate minerals under future regulatory changes. Nor does it suggest any meaningful 
increase in the capacity of the Ministry to deal with compliance issues and increase 
enforcement activities. 
                                                         
557 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 41st Parl, 1st Sess, (27 October 
2016) at 16:40. 
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Several members at Committee and stakeholders have expressed concern about the lack 
of detail in the Bill and submissions from several parties suggested that it should not go 
forward until the proposed regulations are prepared and available for public review.558 
New Democratic Member Michael Mantha noted at third reading: “Again, the 
government is asking this Legislature to trust. This enabling legislation is vague and 
leaves almost all of the crucial details to regulations.”559 Progressive Conservative 
member Todd Smith observed, “In the 37 pages of legislation that deal with aggregate 
resources, there were 59 references to regulation in the bill as it was before us at second 
reading.”560  New Democratic member Jennifer French had specific concerns about the 
substantive content that was left to Cabinet at second reading, none of which have been 
resolved to date:  
There are no interpretive guidelines or tools for approval authorities to 
help them balance the need for aggregate operations with other public 
interests. There is still no clear obligation to screen out pit or quarry 
applications that conflict with the government’s own protections for 
natural heritage or source water, as the Environmental Commissioner 
recommended a decade ago. If the government is sincere about 
modernizing the ARA to provide better environmental safeguards, then it 
should demonstrate this in the legislation.561 
 
While the Blueprint and Bill 39 were not the subject of this dissertation, this brief review 
informs the recommendations and conclusions found in Chapter 9. It is not intended to be 
comprehensive. Indeed, as the Act continues to be enabling legislation and much of the 
substantive content is either contained in the Provincial Policy Statement, or is to be 
included in future regulations or internal Ministry policy, it is premature to offer a 
comprehensive analysis. Many of the government’s own proposals fall outside of the 
                                                         
558 Halton Area Planning Partnership, Bill 39 - An Act to amend the Aggregate Resources Act and the 
Mining Act Joint Submission, PD-053-16 (Halton Region, ON: Halton Area Planning Partnership, 2016); 
Corporation of the Town of Milton, Planning Report - Aggregate Resources Act Review, PD-053-16 
(Milton, ON: Corporation of the Town of Milton, 2016). 
559 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 41st Leg, 2nd Sess, (11 April 2017) 
at 1650 (Michael Mantha). 
560 Ibid, at 1700 (Todd Smith). 
561 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 41st Leg, 2nd Sess, (15 November 
2016) at 0940 (Jennifer French) 
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amendments, making it difficult to assess whether these proposals will be incorporated 
and what impact they might have. As well, changes to the Policy Statement were outside 
of the review and the amendment process, leaving the fundamental assumptions about 
land use, development, and the privileged position of aggregate extraction unchanged, 
and even reinforced. Amendments to the Niagara Escarpment Plan described below also 
fail to challenge the hierarchical ordering of interests and actors in the context of 
aggregate mineral development.   
B. The 2015 Co-ordinated Provincial Plan Review: Changes to the Niagara 
Escarpment Plan 
 
As noted above, The NEPDA requires the government to review the Plan regularly and 
now requires that it be reviewed at the same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the 
Greenbelt Act under s.17 (1). A coordinated review of these and other Provincial Plans, 
including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and the Greater Golden Horseshoe 
Growth Plan began in 2015.562 The coordinated review began in 2015 with an appointed 
advisory panel who developed a set of recommendations.563 The Panel members included 
former Toronto Mayor David Crombie, a municipal planner, a geologist and former 
Ministry of Natural Resources employee, and representatives from the Ontario Federation 
of Agriculture, the development industry, and the viticulture industry. The review 
included public and stakeholder consultation and the Commission and other arms-length 
agencies participated in this process. Initial public consultation took place through online 
submissions and a series of public meetings in March, April and May 2015. The 
government developed draft plans and released these for a period of public comment until 
October 2016.564 More than 1,000 comments were received on the draft plans. Final 
revised plans were expected in early 2017, but had only just been released as this project 
was completed.565 A detailed analysis is therefore beyond the scope of this project.  
                                                         
562 More information about the coordinated review and the new plans can be found on the Ontario Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing website: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page10882.aspx. See, the guiding 
document for public consultation, (Our Region, Our Community, Our Home, 2014). 
563 Co-ordinated Land Use Planning Review Advisory Panel, Planning for Health, Prosperity and Growth 
in the Greater Golden Horseshoe: 2015 – 2041 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 2015). 
564 The four amended Plans can be viewed online: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page10882.aspx. 
565 The final revised Plan was released in May 2017 and takes effect as of June 1, 2017. 
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Proposals and revisions directly related to aggregate minerals are briefly reviewed below 
but were not the subject of this research. The Minister of Natural Resources makes any 
final decisions about changes to the NEP pursuant to the review, as per section 17 (3).  
 
As part of the review, the Commission provides the Ministry with recommendations 
related to the NEP. The Commission prepared for the 2015 statutory review of the NEP 
and the Provincial Plans with a series of Staff Reports and conversations about key issues 
at the Commission. In September 2014, the Commission considered a staff report on 
whether, 30 years later, Commission aggregate mineral policies had realized the goals 
and intentions of the NEPDA, or whether changes were required to achieve protection of 
the Escarpment.566 Many of the groups who participated in the research for this 
dissertation made submissions to the Commission on the aggregate policies, calling for 
an end to, or moratorium on, aggregate extraction in the NEPA. Despite the modest 
recommendation by planning staff to “review and improve existing policies and 
development criteria,” in September 2014 the Commission voted 7 to 5 to end aggregate 
extraction in the NEPA. Commissioners characterized the staff recommended options as 
“business as usual” and concluded, “[I]t is time to get back to first principles. There has 
been a long period of accommodating aggregate extraction. It is time to transition and 
phase this use out of the NEP.”567 In November 2014 staff presented a follow up memo 
detailing how these changes would work in practice.568  
 
The Commission made a submission to the Advisory panel in May 2015 and made final 
submissions in December 2016. Their 2015 submissions included the recommendation 
                                                         
566 Niagara Escarpment Commission, Topic 6: Aggregate Resources Policies, Niagara Escarpment Plan 
Review 2015 Discussion Paper (Georgetown, ON: Niagara Escarpment Commission, 2014). 
567 Personal correspondence, October 7, 2014. Commission discussion papers and Minutes of Commission 
policy meeting are available online: 
http://www.escarpment.org/planreview/NECDiscussionPapers/index.php. See the September 17 minutes 
for the decision referenced here. 
568 Niagara Escarpment Commission, Topic 6: Aggregate Resources Policies - Addendum 1, Niagara 
Escarpment Plan Review 2015 Discussion Paper (Georgetown, ON: Niagara Escarpment Commission, 
2015). 
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that no new mineral aggregate operations would be permitted in the NEP area.569 The 
revised Plan did not adopt this position and maintains that new Mineral Resource 
Extraction Areas producing more than 20,000 tonnes can be considered through a plan 
change.570 No plan change is required for extraction under 20,000 tonnes.571 It also 
expressly incorporates the lack of a needs analysis as set out in the Provincial Policy 
Statement directly into the Plan.572 The Commission has historically opposed this 
clause,573 and has relied on a 2001 protocol with the Ministry acknowledging the 
Commission’s authority to consider need. While applicants were not required to submit 
evidence on need under the protocol, MNR would provide expert advice. For a number of 
years the protocol informally remained in place and need has been considered in 
applications within the NEP.574 In 2010, the protocol was updated to reflect the 2005 
Policy Statement, which as described above, expressly excludes needs analysis. 
Nonetheless, the Commission has continued to draw attention to the relevance of need in 
considering the justification for a particular development since the renegotiation of the 
protocol.575  
 
Section 1.2.2 of the new Plan revised the requirements for amendments for Mineral 
Resource Extraction Areas. It expressly excludes “demonstration of need” for the 
resource, making the Plan consistent with the Policy Statement. It also revises the criteria 
to be considered as follows:   
a) protection of the Escarpment environment; 
b) opportunities for achieving the objectives of the Niagara 
Escarpment Planning and Development Act through the final 
                                                         
569 Niagara Escarpment Commission, Coordinated Land Use Planning Review: Recommendations to the 
Minster of Natural Resources and Forestry on Policy Revisions to the Niagara Escarpment Plan, Niagara 
Escarpment Commission Staff Report (Georgetown, ON: Niagara Escarpment Commission, 2015) at 
Appendix C, 62-69. 
570 NEP 2017, supra note 348, s 1.2.2. 
571 Ibid at 1.5.3. 
572 Ibid at 1.1.2(2). 
573 Niagara Escarpment Commission, The Niagara Escarpment Commission’s Recommendations on Part 
2.5 Mineral Aggregates Planning Reform Provincial Policy Statement Draft Policies (Toronto: Queen’s 
Printer, 2003). 
574 Niagara Escarpment Commission, Initial Staff Report - Proposed Niagara Escarpment Plan Amendment 
PG 159/05 (Harold Sutherland Construction Ltd) (Georgetown, ON: Niagara Escarpment Commission, 
2010) at 10–11. 
575 Niagara Escarpment Commission, Re: Five Year Review of the Provincial Policy Statement (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer, 2010) at 6. 
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rehabilitation of the site; 
c) the protection of prime agricultural areas, the capability of 
the land for agricultural uses, and its potential for rehabilitation 
for agricultural uses; and 
d) opportunities to include rehabilitated lands in the Niagara 
Escarpment Parks and Open Space System. 
Notably, the new criteria substitutes the very broadly defined term Escarpment 
environment for the much more specifically defined former “natural and cultural 
environment” outlined above, which included endangered (both regulated and non-
regulated), rare, special concern and threatened species habitat. Escarpment environment 
is defined in the new Plan as “the physical and natural heritage features, cultural heritage 
resources, and scenic resources associated with the Escarpment landscape.”576 It remains 
to be seen how this will be interpreted by the Commission and the Board and whether it 
includes the same considerations included in the form criteria. The new criteria does add 
express consideration of prime agricultural lands; however, it removes the “maintenance 
and enhancement” standard for the “quality and character of natural systems, water 
supplies, including fish habitat” from the amendment considerations.577 While the revised 
general development criteria does include protection and, “where possible”, enhancement 
for “key natural heritage features and functions” and “scenic resources and open 
landscape character,” these are considered at the development permit stage rather than 
the primary inquiry into whether the plan should be amended.578 Further, the revised 
Plan’s development criteria provides an express exception for mineral aggregate 
extraction within the habitat of endangered and threatened species in accordance with the 
exceptions under the Endangered Species Act described above.579 Many of the “key 
natural heritage features” are narrowly defined as those already designated as 
“significant”.580 The Commission’s final recommendations opposed the exception for 
mineral aggregate extraction and state that this policy is “inconsistent with the NEP 
objectives for protection of key natural heritage features” and “would be considered a 
lowering of the standard for protection of habitat of species at risk”.581  In my view, 
                                                         
576 2017 NEP, supra note 348, Appendix 2. 
577 Ibid, s 1.2.2. 
578 Ibid, s 2.7. 
579 Ibid, 2.7.8. 
580 Ibid, s 2.7.1. 
581 Niagara Escarpment Commission, supra note 572 at 70–71. 
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despite the position taken by the Commission in the lead up to the review, the revised 
2017 Plan has weakened both the amendment criteria and the development criteria with 
respect to aggregate mineral development in the Niagara Escarpment Plan Area. 
 
C. Ontario’s Aggregate Reform: Opportunity Lost 
In my view, the recent review and amendment process is a lost opportunity to bring about 
transformative change in the provincial land use law framework. Instead, the 
amendments reinforce the closure of the planning system to public debate and 
contestation by exacerbating the highly discretionary nature of aggregate mineral 
regulation and the determinative agency of the aggregate industry. They fail to respond to 
the long-standing crisis in enforcement capacity and the lack of consultation and 
accommodation for Indigenous rights. Perhaps most importantly, they leave the 
hierarchical ordering of land uses in the Policy Statement unchallenged. The changes 
uphold and reinforce the primacy of private ownership in a proponent driven framework 
and a model of planning foregrounding a development-oriented and narrow view of 
people-place relations. Therefore, despite six years of efforts on the part of legislators and 
interested parties throughout the province, little has changed for Ontario’s quarry stories. 
Individual site-specific land use planning conflicts will continue to provide the limited 
but strategic openings for the assertion and articulation of alternative people-place 
relations in Ontario’s land use law; however, the planning system remains closed to the 
values such as ecological integrity and just sustainability and to relations of the places at 
stake. Aggregate proposals will continue to be amongst the most contentious land use 
disputes in the province and more-than-owner parties will face the same barriers not only 
to participation, but also to the inclusion and meaningful consideration of their 
articulations about the people-place relations at stake.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the legal and policy framework through 
which aggregate extraction is governed in Ontario. In particular, it considered the 
structure of relations established and upheld by the Act and the Policy Statement, 
examined the role of decision makers, owners and more-than-owner parties in the formal 
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processes engaged by aggregate extraction decisions, and introduced recent and ongoing 
amendments to the relevant statutes and instruments. The following chapters build on the 
detailed understanding of the legal and policy framework developed here to undertake an 
eco-relational assessment of Ontario’s quarry conflicts and the people-place relations at 
stake. 
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Proposed Changes for New 
Applications 
Proposed Changes for 
Existing and Future Sites 
Proposed Changes to Fees 
and Royalties 
Other Proposed Changes 
Enhanced requirements for 
impact studies for natural 
environment, water, cultural 
heritage, noise traffic and dust 
Power to require studies, 
information (ss 45, 62.3, 
62.4), and updated site plans 
(ss 13(1), 25, 31) 
Alignment of fees between 
crown and private land 
(Proposed changes to 
Regulation 244/97) 
New powers in relation to 
Aggregate Resources Trust (s 
6(1)) 
Requirement for agricultural 
impact studies on prime 
agricultural lands or lands 
within prime agricultural areas 
Ability to establish 
conditions related to source 
water protection plans (s 
13(1), 13(3), 23, 25, 31, 37(1)) 
Disbursement of fees outside 
of municipalities 
All specific requirements for 
applications, amendments, 
and reporting to regulations 
and standards (ss 7, 13(1), 
16(1), 21(2), 30, s 49(3),  
Enhanced summary statement 
requirements for all 
applications 
Standardizing tonnage to 
include recycled aggregate 
from site (s 53) 
Index fees and royalties to the 
Consumer Price Index 
Consolidate definitions of 
rock (s 49(1) 
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Requirement to establish a 
maximum disturbed area in 
site plan, to be incorporated as 
condition 
Reporting requirements for 
site rehabilitation (s 39, 
49(11)) and removal of 
recycles/blended materials 
Royalty applied to aggregate 
sites subject to mining leases 
(s 38) 
Powers to establish programs 
to certify and train aggregate 
operations 
Plain language summaries for 
proposals and technical studies 
Requirement for record-
keeping on importation of fill 
for rehabilitation and 
clarification of record-keeping 
during operations 
Establish fees in regulation 
(ss  7, 26, 49(6)) 
Elimination of hearings for 
revocation for non-payment of 
royalty for permits 
Online information 
requirements for applications 1 
million tonnes + 
Streamline self-compliance 
reports from annual to bi- or 
tri-annual depending on Class 
of licence/permit 
Power to waive fees on 
private land (s 7(4.1), 14) 
Minister may rather than 
must be a party at the Board 
(s 10(3)) 
List of notified agencies to 
include Ministry of 
Transportation, Conservation 
Authorities, and source water 
protection authorities 
Establishing list of significant 
amendments requiring 
circulation with exceptions 
available 
Regulatory power to address 
unanticipated needs in 
relation to fees (s 49) 
Contact information for 
participants are public 
record (ss 10(2), 20(3), 29) 
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Ministerial discretion to waive 
publicity requirements for 
remote or isolated areas or if 
not feasible, or where 
substitute plan approved 
Criteria for determination of 
notification requirements for 
amendment proposals 
 Removal of sections 
requiring licensee to serve 
copies of approvals and site 
plans to municipalities (ss 12, 
24) 
Requirement for “adequate” 
consultation with Aboriginal 
communities (s 2) 
Self-filing of amended site 
plans for minor changes that 
would be in effect once filed 
(s13(1), 25, 31) 
  
Digital submissions Remove minimum fine to 
allow for the use to tickets 
under the Provincial Offences 
Act (s 42) 
  
Requests for existing site to 
extract below the water table to 
require a new application 
Increase maximum fines to 
1,000,000 plus an additional 
$100,000/day for 
continuation of offence (s 42) 
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New applications for small, 
temporary extraction on 
farms, extraction of pre-
existing stockpiles of Crown-
owned aggregate (s 7(1), 
28(1), 28(2), 28(3), 41(1), 
49(2), 49(10)) 
Clarify that it is an offence to 
provide false information 
related to any reporting 
requirement (s 41(1)) 
  
Ability to waive application 
requirements (ss 8, 9, 10, 11) 
No-consent transfer power 
for sites using Crown-owned 
aggregate (s 34, 35) 
  
Ability to refuse applications 
on Crown land 
Liability protection for 
ministry employees (s 4) 
  
Enabling power to provide 
for peer review requirements 
for technical studies (s 45) 
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New definition of “established 
sites” to allow for 
grandfathering in newly 
designated areas 
   
Permit by rule for low-risk 
activities with rules and 
maximums for extraction on 
private land for personal use 
   
Conditions and time limits for 
primary purpose exemption 
orders 
   
Table 4: 2017 Amendments to the Aggregate Resources Act  
 
  251 
Chapter Five – Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, Environmental Rights 
and Land Use Planning1 
 
1. Introduction 
Conflicts about how land can and should be used engage a complex web of relationships. 
These include relationships between people, but also relationships between people and 
places. Both these types of relationship are structured by formal law and by cultural 
constructions of property, rights, and the non-human environment.  In particular, the theory 
and practice of “land use law”2 is informed by specific and “locatable” legal and cultural 
narratives about what property is, and what it does.3 Anglo-American property law and the 
land use planning regimes established in Canada attempt to contain people-place 
relationships within the framework of private property ownership. While this ownership 
model of property is often taken for granted in decision-making processes, struggles for 
environmental rights in land use conflicts require us to “remember property”4 and to critically 
examine the ways in which it shapes our relationships with the non-human environment.  
 
According to American property theorist Carol Rose, private property regimes “hold together 
only on the basis of common beliefs and understandings.”5 These narratives frame the way 
human relationships to the non-human environment are regulated through formal land use 
planning processes. In the case of Ontario, the ownership model is the dominant narrative in 
cultural and legal discourse: property is about the exclusive relationship of an individual 
owner with a particular ‘thing’ and the resulting control over access to, and use of, that thing 
- in this case, land.   However, the diversity of interests and claims engaged by contemporary 
land use conflicts demonstrates that these conceptual and narrative frameworks do not 
                                                         
1 Originally published as Van Wagner, E. (2013). Putting Property in its Place: Relational Theory, 
Environmental Rights and Land Use Planning. Revue général de droit 43, 271. Portions of this Chapter are the 
same or similar to portions of Chapters 1, 2 and 4. These portions are italicized to alert the reader what is 
repeated and allow them to skip these portions as desired. Citation style has been maintained as in the 
publication. 
2 I adopt the term ‘land use law’ to describe an intersection of regulatory regimes governing how land can be 
owned, developed, used and protected in Ontario, including, land use planning law, environmental law, water 
law, mining law, energy law and the common law of property. 
3 Libby Porter, Unlearning the Colonial Cultures of Planning, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company: 
2010) at 44. 
4 Nicholas Blomley, “Remember Property” (2005) 29 Progress in Human Geography 125 [Blomley, 
“Remember Property]. 
5 Carol M Rose, “Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership, ” 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 1994) at 5 
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account for the range of human relationships with the non-human environment. Nor do they 
adequately provide space for the articulation and assertion of the full range of interests in 
how land can and should be used. In particular, such frameworks fail to adequately account 
for the non-ownership interests in land privately owned by others. These interests and the 
creative ways they are reshaping land use law are the focus of this paper.  
 
Part II of the paper provides a brief background on the ownership model of property and 
property rights as it has developed in Anglo-American property law. Building on the work of 
Australian property law scholar Nicole Graham, this section explores how contemporary 
property law fails to account for people-place relationships. 6 Part III explores how a 
relational approach to property law and rights discourse has the potential to open space for a 
conceptual shift in human relationships with the non-human environment. The promise of 
relational analysis to more accurately identify “what is really at stake”7 in land use conflicts 
is explored by bringing together Graham’s property critique and Jennifer Nedelsky’s 
relational analysis.  In Part IV, I consider these relational perspectives in the context of recent 
aggregate extraction conflicts in Ontario, which have emerged as some of the most 
contentious environmental disputes in the province. 8  Three recent decisions are considered 
to demonstrate how quarry disputes can serve as strategic opportunities for the assertion of 
person-place relationships and non-ownership interests in land. Part V offers concluding 
thoughts and considers some implications for further research into the role of non-ownership 
claims in land use planning disputes and property law. 
 
2. Constructing Property: Owners and Non-Owners, Places and Things  
A specific vision of what property is, and what it does, underpins the basic legal frameworks 
governing how land, water and natural resources are used in English Canada. This vision 
exists in the theory and practice of land use law and it fundamentally shapes the 
jurisprudence interpreting and applying those frameworks.9 A multitude of valuable and 
                                                         
6 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law. (New York, Routledge: 2011) [Graham, Lawscape].  
7 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) [Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”]. 
8“Land Use Planning in Ontario: Recommendations of the Environmental Commissioner 2001-2011” (2011): 
http://www.eco.on.ca/blog/2011/01/25/land-use-planning-in-ontario-ten-years-of-eco-recommendations/ 
[Environmental Commissioner]. “Aggregate” is defined in s.1 of the ARA as “gravel, sand, clay, earth, shale, 
stone, limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, granite and rock, or other prescribed material”. 
9 Blomley, “Remember Property”, supra note 4 at 126; Nicole Graham, “Owning the Earth” in Exploring Wild 
Law, Peter Burdon, Ed. Wakefield: Kent Town, South Australia, 259-269 at 261 [Graham, Owning]. 
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diverse critiques of the historical development and contemporary application of property in 
legal theory and practice exist within legal scholarship and other disciplines.10 It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to review them here. Rather, I am specifically concerned with how the 
ownership model of property shapes contemporary people-place relationships and the way we 
make decisions about the land and environment.  
 
Property as the foundation of contemporary land use law is constructed as a way of 
organizing abstract rights of ownership, control and alienation of things as between people: 
“[T]he dominant view of property, in both legal and cultural discourses, is one of abstract 
entitlements as between persons which are alienable from, rather than proper to, a person.”11 
Following from John Locke’s property theory as it developed in England, and in Canada 
under British colonial expansion, formal title to land is given supremacy over other types of 
claims and relationships. Historically, enclosure processes facilitated the privatization of 
commonly owned resources in England as they were transformed into individually owned 
parcels of land. Indigenous legal scholar John Borrows explains how, in Canada, colonial law 
“imposed a conceptual grid over both space and time which divides, parcels, registers, and 
bounds peoples and places.”12 Complex Indigenous systems of government and law 
regulating person-person and people-place relationships were ignored and purposefully 
undermined as settlers undertook the work of ordering and managing space.13 
 
Central to the ownership model of property, and its role in colonial expansion, is the 
presumption of a dichotomy between nature and culture, whereby people (the owners) are 
detached from places (the owned).14 Property, under this model, is a person-person and not a 
people-place relationship. Commodification through transformation and cultivation of non-
human nature is not only inevitable, but also, necessary for the common good. 15 The right to 
                                                         
10 See Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, History, Theories. (London, Routledge: 2007) for an excellent 
overview [Davies]. See also, C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1962); Allan Pottage, “Instituting Property”, (1998) 18 OJLS; Kevin 
Gray, “Property in thin air” (1991) 50 CLJ; Nicholas Blomley, David Delany and Richard Ford. The Legal 
Geographies Reader: law, power, space. (San Francisco, Wiley-Blackwell: 2001); Hilarly Lim and Anne 
Bottomley, eds. Feminist Perspectives on Land Law. (New York, Routledge: 2007) 
11 Graham, Lawscape, supra, note 6 at 27. 
12 John Borrows, “Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental Planning and Democracy” 
(1997) 47 UTLJ 417 at 427. 
13 Ibid, at 445; Porter, supra note 3 at 151. 
14 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 2. 
15 Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership. (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press: 1994) at 5 [Rose]; Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 24. 
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use land is so integral to this model of property that it is protected even when a particular use 
may harm the land in ways that fundamentally transform or destroy it.16 As Graham argues, 
“[m]odern legal discourse does not countenance the possibility of reciprocity between people 
and place, much less obligation or responsibility of people to place.”17 Further, as a person-
person relation, property rights construct persons as either owners or non-owners, serving as 
boundaries that not only result in systemic inequality, but, require it.18 Property rights are 
defined by acts of transformation, cultivation and development of non-human nature for use 
and profit, and include both the power to exclude and control in relation to other persons and 
the freedom to alienate or dispose of one’s property as one chooses.19  
 
Graham emphasizes the ‘dephysicalisation’ of property as a key development in modern 
western property law. It is through this “contemporary legal expression of the nature/culture 
paradigm” that property is defined as a person-person relationship, and place is rendered 
meaningless in contemporary legal disputes.20 Dephysicalized property protects value rather 
than things.21 The value of land becomes abstracted from its physicality, which is subsumed 
in the value created through its use and the corresponding ability to exclude all others from 
that use. As American scholar Kenneth Vandevelde notes, the Hohfeldian concept of 
dephysicalized property, “banished the need for things from property”.22   
 
Graham traces dephysicalisation in property law to Locke’s “uncanny rationalisation of the 
physical severance of people and place.” Linking this separation of people and place with the 
imposition of colonial legal order, Graham argues that laws derived from this model make 
certain kinds of land use possible.23 Places are transformed into commodities, valued only for 
their use for production and profit. Land is no longer understood as part of a particular place 
with spatial or temporal limits.24 However, she argues, people-place relationships are 
                                                         
16 Graham, Owning, supra note 9 at 266; Kate Galloway, “Landowners’ vs. Miners’ Property Interests: The 
unsustainability of property as dominion” (2012) 37 Alt L J 77 at 80 [Galloway]. 
17 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 169. 
18 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note at 7 95. 
19 Rose, supra note 15 at 20, 28; Graham, Owning, supra note 9 at 261. 
20 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 160. 
21 Kenneth J. Vandevelde “The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property” 29 Buff. L. Rev. (1980) at 259-60 [Vandevelde], discussing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
“Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913); Hohfeld, 
“Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning” 26 Yale L.J. 710 (917). 
22 Vandevelde, at 360. 
23 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 At 160. 
24 Ibid, 5, 7. 
 
  255 
nonetheless material: “The trouble with defining property as ‘dephysicalised’ is that it is not 
– property relations, by which I mean the relationships between people and place, are 
material relations – something the law finds deeply problematic.”25 The result, Graham 
argues, is a “maladapted” and dysfunctional system of land use law.26 While legal theory and 
practice maintain the irrelevance of the physical, property rights operate to protect these 
forms of use regardless of spatial or temporal location with “material consequences” for local 
ecosystems and peoples: 
Because the places are not seen in their ecological context, but as a source of 
commercial profit, the paradigm of modern law does not merely prescribe a 
dephysicalised property relation in an abstract sense. The paradigm of modern 
law prescribes its materialization through land use practices that have no 
necessary response to or correlation with their local ecological contexts. 
Dephysicalised property is, therefore, not only abstract, it is real.27 
 
Indeed, the property narrative guiding colonial settlement in Ontario “profoundly and 
purposefully changed” the natural environment, according to historian David Wood. He 
argues that the transformation of the natural world and “the drive for progress, in itself 
became an ideology – indeed, the prevailing, almost universal land ethic of the province.”28 
 
This dominant property narrative shapes whether and how interests in land and the non-
human environment can be articulated and asserted in legal forums. It shapes the legal and 
cultural recognition and treatment of such claims in decision-making processes related to land 
use and environmental planning.29 The legal discourse of property in which Canadian 
planning law is embedded has traditionally been “closed” to place-based analysis. Claims 
asserting people-place relationships in land use decision-making forums have been 
understood as disruptive and subversive.30 However, the limitations of the dominant 
framework are increasingly exposed in land use conflicts, as non-owner parties assert 
interests in private land and articulate rights that exceed the boundaries of the ownership 
model. 
                                                         
25 Ibid, at 7. 
26 Ibid, at 206. 
27 Ibid, at 183-4. 
28 J. David Wood, “Making Ontario: Agricultural Colonization and Landscape Recreation Before the Railway” 
(Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queens University Press: 2005). 
29 Graham, Owning, supra note 9 at 261. 
30 Graham, supra note 6 at 20; John Borrows, “With or Without You: First Nations Law (In Canada)” (1996) 41 
McGill L.J. 629; G. Wa and D. Uukw, The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en 
Hereditary Chiefs in the Supreme British Columbia 1987-1990. (Gabriolla, BC, Reflections: 1996). 
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3. Property and Place: Relational Approaches 
The strangeness and crises of people-place relations prescribed by modern 
property law are increasingly evident from disputes over property rights where 
what has been lost has not been the right, but the place.31 
 
 
Feminist legal theorist Margaret Davies recently noted an emerging scholarly interest in 
alternative articulations of property – “what might be optimistically called the beginnings of a 
paradigm shift in the meanings and extent of property and its ties to individualism and 
liberalism.”32 She points to feminist critiques of liberal individualism and property rights that 
have called for a more relational approach – consideration of the context and relationships 
within which property is situated.33 Citing “stewardship” as an emergent concept, Davies 
notes a shift from property law as the realm of fixed, exclusive individual rights, to more 
discretionary rights, which she describes as “more fragile, contextual, and limited use.”34 She 
argues that the strengthening of environmental and planning law, including the incorporation 
of stewardship concepts in jurisdictions like Australia, is evidence of law’s opening to these 
alternative visions of property.35 
 
Canadian feminist legal theorist Jennifer Nedelsky has long advocated a rethinking of rights, 
and of property rights in particular, from a relational perspective.36 In focusing on 
relationships, she is referring not only to personal relationships, but also to the “structural and 
institutional relationships” structured by law and rights. This structuring is the work that law 
and rights actually do, she argues, and therefore, it should be exposed and placed at the center 
of our analysis.37 Like Graham’s places, relationships are central to our material existence, 
yet are obscured by the legal discourse of the autonomous and bounded individual. “A 
                                                         
31 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 185-6. 
32 Margaret Davies, “Persons, Property, Community”, 2012 2 feminists@law at 13, 
http://journals.kent.ac.uk/index.php/feministsatlaw/issue/current [Davis, “Persons, Property, Community”]. 
33 Ibid, at 14. 
34 Ibid, 15-16. 
35 Ibid, at 16, citing the Australian Product Stewardship Act 2011; The Product Stewardship (Oil) Act 2000; the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, s 3A; and the Environmental Stewardship 
Program (http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/stewardship/index.html). 
36 Nedelsky, “Law’s Relations”, supra note 7; “Law, boundaries, and the bounded self” 1990 30 Representations 
162. 
37 “Law’s Relations”, supra note 7 at 65. 
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relational analysis,” Nedelsky argues, “provides a better framework for identifying what is 
really at stake in difficult cases and for making judgments about the competing 
interpretations of rights involved.”38 Further, in Nedeskly’s opinion, a relational reorientation 
of rights as more than individual entitlements provides a “welcoming framework” for 
concepts that blur the distinction between the individual and the collective.39 
 
While Nedelsky expressly maintains the dephysicalized construction of property as primarily 
about relationships between people, she points to the need for further development of her 
relational analysis to encompass the relationships between humans and non-humans.40  Her 
critique of the property-inspired language of boundaries embedded in contemporary notions 
of ‘rights’ points to the need to rethink what property is: “We need to take our traditional 
concepts like property, and ask what patterns of relationship among people and the material 
world we want, what patterns seem true to both integrity and integration.”41 Nedelsky’s 
reconceptualization of autonomy - from requiring independence from the collective to being 
enabled by constructive relationships - opens up conceptual space for place as more than 
commodity.42 Graham’s concept of the reciprocal people-place relationship in property 
relations is a starting point for the future project of using the relational approach to articulate 
the responsibility of humans to the non-human world.43  
 
Graham also aims to (re)centre the notion of relationship - in her case, the people-place 
relationship that property law has erased and excluded. In doing so, Graham rejects the 
dualism of either anthropocentric or ecocentric analyses of environmental crises:  
The concepts of network and interconnection open a space for the notion of 
inalienable relationships between people and place. The idea that relationships are 
interdependent and multilinear works against the idea that relationships are 
oppositional within the dichotomous nature/culture paradigm of anthropocentrism.44 
 
In fact, she notes, the etymological origins of the word “property” invokes a “mutually 
formative” relationship between property and identity.45 In the original sense, property was 
                                                         
38 Ibid, at 4. 
39 Ibid, at 373. 
40 Ibid, at 196. 
41 Ibid, 117. 
42 Ibid, at 152. 
43 Ibid, at 199. 
44 Graham, Lawscape, supra note 6 at 18. 
45 Ibid, at 26. 
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all about the interconnections between people and things, with land in particular being central 
to the formation of identity for individuals and communities.46 Graham and others have noted 
echoes of this in the way that lay persons and communities assert interests based on 
generational or other forms of connection with a particular place.47  
 
Both Nedelsky and Graham seek to “open space” to reorient legal discourse towards already 
existing relationships and the work they do. Both point to the failure of property law to 
recognize relationships fundamental to the material conditions of life as the source of 
dysfunction in the law, resulting in its failure to adequately respond to ongoing and emergent 
social and environmental crises and conflicts. And, while both engage at length with the 
theoretical aspects of this potential reorientation, they are also deeply concerned with the 
practical outcomes of this present dysfunction. In particular, abstract rights limit the ability of 
interested parties to meaningful express their claims and connect their experience to the 
formal decision-making process. As Graham observes in the context of land use conflicts, 
“courts swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into disputes over 
abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss associated with 
transformation of the non-human environment become “dissident voices.”48 
 
Nedelsky proposes a four-step approach to resolving a particular dispute.49 Her approach is 
based on her distinction between values and rights. Values, she argues, are the big abstract 
articulations of what a society sees as essential to humanity. Rights are specific “institutional 
and rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing such values.”50 Rights, in 
Nedelsky’s model, are not rigid and universal or timeless, they are contextual, negotiated and 
evolve around the kinds of relationships we need to pursue our values. Presented with a 
specific dispute, the inquiry begins by examining how the legal structuring of the relevant 
relations is related to the conflict. Having identified the underlying context, the question 
becomes, “What values are at stake?” Once the values are articulated, the inquiry shifts to the 
kinds of relationships that would foster those values. Finally, with these relationships in 
                                                         
46 Ibid; David Seipp, “The Concept of property in the early common law” 1994 12 Law and History Review, 29 
at 49. 
47 Ibid at 27; Davies, supra note 10 at 27; David Lametti, “The concept of property: relations through objects of 
social wealth” 2003 325 UTLR 325 at 354. 
48 Graham, supra note 7, at 163. 
49 “Law’s Relations”, supra note 7 at 236. 
50 Ibid, at 241. 
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mind, the question becomes how would different types of rights structure relations differently 
in the relevant context?51 
 
Creating space for articulations and assertions of the people-place relationship in Ontario’s 
land use law framework requires the kind of creative reorientation suggested by Graham and 
Nedelsky. Contemporary land use and property law are fundamentally structured to maintain 
and enforce the ownership property narrative and abstract property rights. However, 
Canadian law does provide some examples of strategic challenges to this vision of property 
relations. Constitutional rights and title claims by First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples, as 
well as the (re)assertion of Indigenous law in many parts of Canada, fundamentally challenge 
colonial legal frameworks governing land use and people-place relations.52 Feminist family 
property litigation has also successfully challenged law’s construction of ownership and 
property relationships.53 While these are the result of legal strategies as part of broader 
political projects that found strategic ways to push legal boundaries, and should be 
understood as partial and vulnerable in the context of ongoing colonization, racism and 
gender inequality, they demonstrate that dissident voices can use legal processes to advocate 
for alternative visions of property. As I will outline below, recent land use conflicts about 
aggregate extraction in Ontario demonstrate potential strategic cracks in the land use planning 
framework. Rethinking rights through the assertion of place and the expression of our relation 
with places, has the potential to help us find and use them to reorient property and rights 
towards environmental justice.  
 
4. In Context: Aggregate Extraction, Place and Property54 
Except at the front where the Great Lake pounds and the beach stones form ever-
changing terraces – solid waves of their own in response – Loughbreeze Beach 
Farm spreads in ruin around Esther. The parts of it that are not being claimed by 
that which is unclaimable are being excavated by industry: the growing quarry, 
the impossible earth-wound made by the cement company. Meadows she played 
in as a child, woodlots, cornfields, and pastures have disappeared into this gaping 
                                                         
51 Ibid, at 236. 
52 See for example, John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010); G. Wa and D. Uukw, supra note 12. 
53 See for example, Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980; Mary Jane Mossman, “Running to Stand Still: The 
Paradox of Family Law Reform”, 1994 5 Dalhousie L.J. 6; Heather Conway and Philip Girard, “’No Place Like 
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30 Queen’s L.J. 715. 
54 This repeats portions of the material that appears also in Chapter Four, pages 138-139. 
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absence. Past midnight, when the lake is calm, Esther has for the last ten years, 
been able to hear huge machines grinding closer and closer to the finish of her 
world.55 
 
Ontario’s Environmental Commissioner recently noted that aggregate extraction, more often 
referred to as quarrying, has become one of the most contentious land use issues in the 
Province.56 Since 2005, conflicts over large-scale quarry developments in the urban-rural 
fringe of Southwestern Ontario have resulted in major community mobilizations,57 complex 
multi-year litigation,58 a foreign investment protection claim against the federal and 
provincial governments,59 and an election promise of legislative review.60 Non-owner parties 
to quarry disputes have raised issues ranging from Indigenous sovereignty to food security 
and public health; and, from regional economic development and water rights to 
international trade.61 The range and diversity of claims raised by these parties through 
formal objections processes, political campaigns, the media and litigation, make it clear that 
current legal and policy frameworks are unable to account for the complexity of property 
relations engaged by these land use conflicts. 
 
Ontario’s quarry conflicts offer an opportunity to examine the complexity of contemporary 
property relations as non-owner actors - First Nations, local ratepayer and community groups, 
farmers, environmentalists, and municipal governments - attempt to assert a variety of claims 
to privately-owned property. These claims do engage the person-person relationships 
between owners and non-owners at the center of traditional property law.62 However, this 
                                                         
55 Jane Urquhart, Away (Toronto, McLelland & Stewart: 1993) at 9. 
56 Supra, note 8. 
57 “Mega quarry defeat is a lesson in activism”, Toronto Star, Sunday November 25, 2012, 
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58 For example, see “Nelson Aggregate Hearing Explained”, Lake Ontario Waterkeeper, November 17, 2010: 
http://www.waterkeeper.ca/2010/11/17/nelson-aggregates-hearing-explained/. 
59 “St. Mary’s Cement Group – Update January 2013”, Halton Region,  
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60 Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1st session, 40th Parliament, March 22, 2012. 
61 A representative range of objections from non-owner parties are available on the North Dufferin Agricultural 
and Community Task Force (“NDACT”) website: http://ndact.com/index.php/letters-a-reports/letters-general. 
62 While these complex networks of relationships related to land use are beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
notable that quarry disputes such as the recent Melancthon mega quarry dispute, have emerged as a site of 
potential coalition building for broader environmental justice goals, bringing together First Nations, farmers, 
environmentalists, and local community groups, see for example, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/coalition-of-farmers-and-urban-foodies-halts-ontario-mega-
quarry/article5546334/. At the same time, it is important to note that these disputes raise important equity 
questions as the gentrification of the rural-urban fringe in Southwestern Ontario changes the socio-economic 
make up of rural areas, and therefore, the kinds of interests raised in land use conflicts. 
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paper is concerned with these conflicts because they also engage the much less visible, and 
much less examined, people-place relationship between non-owners and the land itself.  
 
Because quarry disputes in Ontario are regulated through land use planning law, they serve as 
a possible strategic entry point from which to shift the legal discourse about our relationships 
to land and the environment. As administrative processes, land use decisions present unique 
opportunities for non-owner persons and groups to assert claims within a legal process. 
Otherwise legally obscured people-place relationships can emerge as troublesome and 
subversive actors in these conflicts. As well, despite the abstract model of property rights 
informing the land use planning system, the physical reality of the land in question is 
uniquely exposed in land use planning disputes, as principles of property law and 
environmental law are simultaneously invoked. In this context, quarry conflicts offer a 
strategic opportunity to reinsert the people-place relationship into both legal theory and 
practice.  
 
A. Legislation and Policy – The Aggregate Licensing Process63 
A detailed overview of the complex regulatory regime applicable to aggregate extraction in 
Ontario is beyond the scope of this paper. A brief overview is provided below, with particular 
attention to the way the applicable law and policy constructs the boundaries of the legal 
process and the relevance of the places in question. Aggregate licensing applications also 
incorporate aspects of other regimes, in many cases the environmental regulation of water 
and air, but potentially also regulatory regimes at different scales of governance, such as the 
constitutional and treaty rights of Indigenous peoples, as well as Indigenous legal orders, 
and increasingly, investor protection mechanisms in international trade agreements such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement.64 
 
The Aggregate Resources Act65 provides for several categories of aggregate mine.66 This 
paper, like the majority of high profile aggregate conflicts, is concerned with large scale, 
below the water table aggregate quarries, requiring a Class “A” Quarry Below Water 
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license under the Act.67 For this type of licence, a landowner must make an application to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources (the “Ministry”).  A site plan and technical reports prepared 
by a “qualified” professional must be included in the application.68 While the Act 
contemplates statutory guidance for application requirements, no such regulations have been 
enacted. Guidance is contained only in two Ministry policy documents, the Aggregate 
Resources Provincial Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal 
Procedures Manual.69 Together these documents specify the technical information and 
reports required, including expert hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s) 
and cultural heritage report(s). Based on this information and the objections received from 
members of the public and other government agencies through the processes outlined below, 
the Minister of Natural resources can issue the licence, refuse to issue the licence, or refer 
the matter to the Ontario Municipal Board (the “Board”) for a hearing.70 
 
While these policy requirements flow from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts are 
focused on the local municipality’s Official Plan. If the land is not currently designated as a 
“mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the 
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the 
Planning Act.71 Under the Act no license can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an 
applicable zoning by-law.72 Therefore, most aggregate disputes turn on whether the decision 
of a local authority to amend, or not to amend, the Official Plan conforms to the Provincial 
Policy Statement (the “Policy Statement”).73 Under the Planning Act, the Policy Statement 
                                                         
67 Ibid, at s.7(2)(a). 
68 Ibid, at s.8. Section 8(4) stipulates: “Every site plan accompanying an application for a Class A licence must 
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serves as the guiding document for all land use decisions in the province. It stipulates that all 
policy and decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the Ontario 
Municipal Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent with the Policy 
Statement.74   
 
Since the first version was approved in the 1990s, the Policy Statement has consistently 
prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and development. Prior to the first PPS, 
aggregate resources were declared a “matter of provincial interest” in 1986, effectively 
requiring municipalities to prioritize the protection of aggregate resources above other land 
uses.75 This prioritization has been maintained through to the present. In 2005, the Policy 
Statementwas revised to eliminate any consideration of provincial mineral resource needs in 
licensing decisions. The current version states, 
  
Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type of 
supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability, 
designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or 
elsewhere.76 
 
The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term 
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits, 
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude or hinder” 
extraction.77 In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a license “ceases 
to exist”,78 resulting in the strange phenomenon of a licensing regime with no possibility of 
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the 
changes to surrounding land and land uses. 
 
The Policy Statement also implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource protection and 
development on a specific geographic area within the province by requiring that “as much of 
the mineral aggregate resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as close 
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to markets as possible.”79 The majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area 
and the surrounding Greater Golden Horseshoe region. 
 
While the Policy Statement provides for absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies 
and existing operations, social and environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than 
avoided.80 This despite s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected 
for the long term”, and s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve 
or restore the quality and quantity of water.” The Policy Statement sets up a clear conflict 
between these requirements and its prioritization of mineral aggregate extraction. At first 
glance social and cultural features are given greater protection as they “shall be 
conserved.”81 However, a close examination of the Policy Statement reveals that protection 
of natural and social-cultural features is largely limited to features formally deemed 
“significant” by provincial policy.82  
 
The Policy Statement attempts to resolve this apparent conflict by classifying aggregate 
extraction as an “interim” activity.83 “Rehabilitation” to “accommodate subsequent land 
use” is explicitly required.84 However, the lack of any standards for rehabilitation beyond the 
promotion of “land use compatibility” demonstrates the failure to understand the site of 
extraction as a place with value beyond commodification or acknowledge its relationships to 
the adjacent environment and communities. Land identified as containing valuable aggregate 
deposits is treated, in Heidegger’s words, as “one vast gasoline station for human 
exploitation.”85 Beyond the absurdity of a potentially infinite licence for an “interim” 
activity, and concerns about the nature and quality of rehabilitation, the Environmental 
Commissioner has expressed serious concerns about the current number of abandoned 
aggregate pits and quarries and the slow rate of achieving basic levels of rehabilitation.86  At 
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the current rate, the Canadian Environmental Law Association recently estimated it would 
take between 234 and 335 years to rehabilitate the 6,900 abandoned pit and quarry sites in 
Ontario.87 
 
The disconnect between the purported protection of natural, social and cultural features and 
the prioritization of aggregate extraction in the Policy Statement is most evident in relation to 
the treatment of agricultural lands.88 Despite mandatory protection of “prime agricultural 
land,” aggregate extraction is permitted as an interim use on farmland. Requirements for 
rehabilitation to “substantially the same areas and same average soil quality” explicitly 
exempt the most potentially harmful class of below the water table quarry. The exemption 
applies where the applicant can show that much of the resource is below the water table or 
where extraction is so deep as to render rehabilitation “unfeasible”. The current Policy 
Statement requires that the applicant also demonstrate that alternative locations have been 
considered and that agricultural rehabilitation is maximized in remaining areas.89 While the 
land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and potentially as 
having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities for food 
production, its value as a commodity is ultimately what matters. The Policy Statement is 
constructed in such a way that other claims are trumped by the protection of the resource 
value.   
 
B. Legislation and Policy – Notice and Participation90 
While there are no statutory public consultation standards in the Act, Ministry policy 
requires the proponent to provide public notice. This triggers a 45-day “notification” period 
during which members of the public, local governments, and provincial ministries and 
agencies can file objections to the proposal.91 Within two years, the proponent must “attempt 
to resolve” objections and must submit a list of unresolved objections and documentation of 
attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for resolutions to the Ministry and to 
                                                         
87 Joseph Castrilli and Ramani Nadarajah, “Submissions to the Standing Committee on General Government on 
the Aggregate Resources Act”, May 14, 2012: http://s.cela.ca/files/839Aggregates.pdf. 
88 Ibid, s. 2.3.1. 
89 Ibid, s. 2.5.4. 
90 This section provides a summary of the material presented in Chapter Four, pages 190-207. 
91 MNR, Standards, supra note 69, ss. 4.1.1., 4.2. 
 
  266 
remaining objectors.92 A 20-day notice period is then triggered during which remaining 
objectors, including government agencies, must submit further “recommendations” or they 
are deemed to no longer object.93 
 
Non-owner third parties in Ontario cannot appeal land use planning decisions as-of-right. 
While the provincial Environmental Bill of Rights provides for parties with a demonstrable 
interest to seek leave to appeal certain kinds of decisions,94 the test for leave is “stringent” 
and the majority of applications have been turned down.95 In practice, the Board hears 
aggregate disputes as a result of a Ministerial referral, or an owner-applicant’s as-of-right 
appeal from a Ministerial decision. Non-owner parties who object to proposals during the 
initial 45-day notice process do have a presumptive right to be parties to hearings ordered 
under the Act.96 As a result, quarry litigation often formally includes non-owner parties 
either as individuals or as groups with similar interests in the proceedings. While 
opportunities to participate are limited by the ability to retain legal representation and fund 
independent technical research, objector participation does present a procedural opportunity 
for non-owners. Unlike property disputes in other forums, these land use conflicts are at least 
theoretically open to claims from third parties without ownership interests.   
 
In addition to public notice, the proponent is required to host one public presentation in the 
local area during the notice period. Neither the technical experts retained by the proponent 
nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist the public in 
interpreting the reports. Most aggregate licence applications are also posted to the 
provincial Environmental Registry, a public online database for environmental decisions, for 
a minimum of 30 days under the Environmental Bill of Rights. However, these comments are 
not considered to be objections under the Act and therefore do not afford the objector the 
same procedural rights outlined above. The proponent is also not required to respond.  
                                                         
92 Ibid, ss. 4.3.6, 4.3.3.1. 
93 Ibid, supra note 69, s. 4.3.3.3. 
94 S.O. 1993, c. 28. 
95 Richard Lindgren, “Third Party Appeals Under the Environmental Bill of Rights in the Post-Lefarge Era: The 
Public Interest Perspective” (Toronto: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2009). 
96 ARA, supra note 65, ss. 11(5), (6). The Act provides that the Minister may refer the application and any 
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provides that the Minister can direct the Board to consider only specific issues; and, s.11(8) that the Board may 
refuse to consider objections it considers to not made in good faith, to be frivolous or vexatious, or to be made 
only for the purpose of delay. There is also a rarely invoked third party appeal provision in Ontario’s 
Environmental Bill of Rights that allows a non-owner party to seek leave to appeal. 
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C. Quarry Places: Current and Recent Cases 
While the legal and policy framework outlined above demonstrates how the ownership model 
of property fundamentally shapes Ontario’s land use regime, recent quarry decisions 
demonstrate that land use conflicts provide a strategic opportunity to reorient law towards 
people-place relationships and relational analysis. In particular, several themes emerge from 
three recent and highly contested quarry cases: James Dick Construction Ltd. v. Caledon 
(Town),97 Nelson Aggregate Co., Re98 and Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re).99 The first part of 
the analysis is organized around four themes identified in the decisions: 1) onus; 2) 
precaution, 3) reinserting need, and, 4) place and ecological context.100 The decisions are then 
considered through Nedelsky’s four-step relational approach. While none of the parties 
advanced a relational analysis, nor did the Board in any of these cases adopt one, the reasons 
in these decisions demonstrate openness to the centrality of relationships and the significance 
of place in decisions about land use. Applying Nedelsky’s approach to these decisions 
demonstrates how a relational perspective could help to clarify what is stake and identify a 
path to resolution in future land use disputes. 
 
i. Onus 
The issue of onus is significant in land use decisions because in many ways, the hearing process 
operates on the terms of the applicant landowner. The licensing process is set in motion by the 
owner’s proposal to use private land for extractive purposes. As a result of the applicant-driven 
nature of the process, the vast majority of the evidence that comes before the Board is prepared 
and presented by experts employed by the applicant for the purpose of having the licence 
approved.  
 
                                                         
97 (2010) 66 O.M.B.R. 263 [Rockfort]. 
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In practice, objectors are often burdened with proving that extraction will cause negative 
impacts, and expert evidence to demonstrate this is expensive and logistically difficult to obtain. 
The majority decision in Walker is an excellent example:  
There is no compelling evidence before the Joint Board that the proposed 
application would offend the first Purpose of the NEP, as in this area the Niagara 
Escarpment and lands in its vicinity will be maintained as a substantially natural 
environment and there will be no break in the continuous natural environment 
resulting from this application. This is clearly shown on Exhibits 314 and 315.  
Nor is there any compelling evidence that a quarry use cannot be compatible with 
the natural environment.101 
 
In weighing the evidence before the Board, the majority largely accepts the evidence put 
forward by applicant. A close reading of their decision reveals an implicit link between the 
owner-applicant’s economically-oriented relationship to the land and the majority’s 
preference for their evidence. At the outset, the majority characterizes evidence about the 
benefits of the proposed quarry as definitive: “it is clear that the proposed quarry is a highly 
significant project for the local community which will create jobs and contribute millions of 
dollars to the local economy.”102 In contrast, the majority appears to treat the non-owner 
objections as suspect, requiring them to provide “compelling evidence” to overcome the 
presumption that the applicant has the right to determine what is best for their property. They 
characterize the issues raised by non-owners as “legitimate concerns,” subtly contrasting their 
indeterminate nature to the definite economic benefits established by the applicant.103 
 
As noted by the dissenting member, the majority overwhelmingly “prefers” the evidence and 
the witnesses put forward by the applicant, or concludes that the opposing parties “have not 
put forward any compelling evidence.”104 He notes that the majority does not provide reasons 
or make findings of credibility to explain these preferences or conclusions.105  The majority 
explicitly acknowledges being “significantly influenced” by the applicant’s status as the 
owner-operator of an existing quarry on adjacent lands. On this basis they describe aggregate 
                                                         
101 Walker, supra note 99 at 1, emphasis added.  
102 Ibid, at 1. 
103 Ibid, at 2. 
104 Ibid, at 182. The majority uses the language “no compelling evidence” with regard to the opposing parties 
argument thirteen times in their decision at pages 18, 31, 35, 46, 54, 55, 61, 62, 78, 79, 81, 83 and 90. They 
explicitly state that they “prefer” the evidence of applicant eight times at pages 25, 50, 53, 55, 68, 81, 96 and 
161. 
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extraction as a “long-established land use” and note the “positive history” and “lack of 
negative impact” of the applicant’s existing quarry.106  
 
The majority notes that they considered the applicant’s “many years of data.”107 However, 
they fail to acknowledge the argument put forward by one of the non-owner parties that the 
existing quarry is a poor case study as it was established in 1964, long before the existing 
approvals process and regulatory monitoring regimes were established.108 As there is no pre-
extraction baseline for the existing quarry lands, any conclusions about its impact are of 
limited use at best, and potentially misleading at worst. In contrast, the dissenting member 
notes that monitoring data has only been collected from 1996 on the existing quarry lands and 
concludes that it is of limited use without baseline data about the hydrological or natural 
systems prior to extraction.109  
 
In contrast, the dissenting member in Walker emphasizes the onus on the proponent, finding 
that the majority in had in fact reversed it.110 He goes on to note that under the majority’s test 
few proposals could fail.111 The dissenting member also took care to note that amendments 
and development permits “are not granted as of right”.112 While aggregate development may 
be a contemplated use within the applicable land use framework, in that case the Niagara 
Escarpment Planning and Development Act, it is “only such development…as is compatible 
with that natural environment”.113 While the majority concluded that their role was to 
“determine the appropriate balance” between the environmental, social and economic 
benefits,114 the dissenting member explicitly rejected this “rebalancing” approach.115 He 
found that the Niagara Escarpment Plan was an “environmentally focused plan” and other 
contemplated activities, regardless of their purported social and economic benefits, are 
secondary, and in the case of aggregate mining, restricted.116 
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In Rockfort, the Board found that the Policy Statement clearly placed the onus on the 
proponent, and not on the objectors, despite the lack of a statutory burden in the ARA:  
The Board finds that this means that a proponent of development has the onus 
of demonstrating no negative impact.  Objectors to a development need not 
demonstrate that there will be negative impact.117  
 
While technically this burden under the Policy Statement applies to the Board’s 
determination regarding the Planning Act approvals, the Board found this to be highly 
relevant to the ultimate ARA determination.118 Further, while the Board in Rockfort noted that 
the Policy Statement “acknowledges the importance” of aggregate extraction, it found that 
mineral aggregate policies do not take priority over any other policy.119  
 
In Rockfort and the Walker dissent, the presumption of the hierarchy of ownership is limited 
by the requirement that owners acknowledge other ecological and people-place relationships 
with land. While the ARA framework and the process are structured around the ownership 
relationship of the applicant to the land, these decision makers emphasize the onus on the 
proponent to draw attention to a broader range of relations involved in land use and its 
consequences. In doing so they expose opportunities for the structural relations imposed by 
law to be reoriented. 
 
ii. Precaution 
In his review of judicial treatment of the precautionary principle, Chris Tollefson points to 
the approach adopted in recent Australian decisions that put it to work where it can “add 
analytic value.”120 In Telstra Corporation Ltd. v. Hornsby Shire Council,121 the Land and 
Environment Court of New South Wales found that the principle can be applied where two 
conditions can be established; (1) a threat of serious irreversible environmental damage, and 
(2) scientific uncertainty as to the environmental damage.122 While the Rockfort and Nelson 
decisions do not explicitly reference the precautionary principle, their analysis appears to put 
                                                         
117 Rockfort, supra note 97 at 271. 
118 Ibid, at 271. 
119 Ibid at 276. 
120 Chris Tollefson. “A Precautionary Tale: Trials and Tribulations of the Precautionary Principle”, 2012, 
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variations of the principle to work in circumstances fitting the Telstra conditions. Moreover, 
the dissenting member in Walker expressly adopts the precautionary principle. 
 
In Rockfort, the Board based the analysis of potential negative impacts on an unmitigated or 
inadequately mitigated quarry, effectively a worst-case scenario approach, despite the 
detailed and expert-prepared mitigation plan put forward by the applicant:  
The Board finds that an unmitigated or an inadequately mitigated quarry could 
have a disastrous effect on the natural features and functions on the lands 
surrounding the subject property.  Therefore a high degree of certainty, which 
would be attendant upon demonstration by JDCL, is required before the Board 
approves the applications.  Such demonstration has not taken place.123 
 
They did not accept the applicant’s argument that the analysis should proceed on the basis of 
the impact of the mitigation plan working as proposed. Therefore, even while accepting the 
conclusions of the applicant’s experts as “supportable,” the Board found that the applicable 
Policy Statement and the Official Plan tests required more: “…demonstration of no 
unacceptable impact on the natural environment is the test established by the Policy 
Statement and OP, and that test goes beyond supportable conclusions.”124 The Board 
explicitly rejected the Proponent’s argument that they could meet the standard because the 
mitigation plan demonstrated a “strongly diminished risk of undesirable outcomes”.125  This 
analysis is consistent with a precautionary approach, which Alan Randall describes as “driven 
by big risks” and the prospective prevention of “plausible but uncertain threats of harm.”126 
Rather than weighing outcomes, the precautionary approach looks to the worst-case and if the 
harm is “horrifying, even if unlikely,” prohibition may be the best result.127 
 
In Walker, the dissenting member cautioned, “[e]ven if a proposed development may be 
technically feasible, that does not mean it should proceed.”128 He noted that the applicable 
Plan’s language, requiring that the amendment would ensure only compatible development, 
sets a very high standard: “In other words, ‘possibly’, or ‘likely’, is not good enough.”129  He 
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adopts the precautionary principle as a minimum standard and finds the applicable regulatory 
regime, the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, sets an even higher 
standard of ensuring only compatible development.130    
 
In Nelson, the Board’s rejection of the application was largely based on concerns about the 
impact on one endangered species, the Jefferson Salamander. The Board took note of the 
“knowledge gaps” about the species and its habitat, including the effectiveness of mitigation 
efforts to address threats.131 Concluding that there is “still a great deal unknown,” the Board 
found that “particular care must be taken when assessing impacts” on the species and its 
habitat.132 The standard applicable in that case was to establish with “a substantial degree of 
certainty that implementation of the proposed development will ensure that the Jefferson 
Salamander and its habitat will be protected.”133 
 
In all three cases, the decision makers are indicating a shift from an adaptive management 
approach, as proposed by the applicant and accepted by the Ministry, to a precautionary 
approach. As Randall argues, “adaptive management is essentially reactive. It is all about 
waiting until problems reveal themselves and seeking to resolve them by trial and error – 
basically, standing aside when the lights go out and then feeling our way in the dark.”134 
Applicant proposals to mitigate rather than prevent potentially catastrophic harm to land and 
non-human species exemplify they type of maladapted land use practices and material 
consequences that Graham’s argument result from law’s dephysicalized model of property.135   
 
iii. Reinserting Need 
Despite the explicit rejection of need-based analysis in the PPS, the Board in Rockfort found 
the issue of need to be relevant and explicitly re-inserted it into the analysis:  
The language of the policy documents speaking to making as much of the 
mineral aggregate as realistically possible, to the market as possible, implies a 
Provincial, Regional and Town recognition of the need for the resource.  
However that does not make the issue of need irrelevant to these proceedings.  
James Parkin, qualified by the Board to provide expert land use planning 
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evidence on behalf of JDCL opined that need is a relevant planning 
consideration, as it goes to balance.  The Board finds that this is the case.  It 
cannot engage properly in the mandated balancing exercise without 
understanding whether there is a need for the aggregate resource.  If there were 
no demonstrable need for the resource in this Province the Board would be 
unlikely to countenance the changes and impact that a stone quarry would have 
on the Town and the Region.136 
 
In that case, the applicant had adduced evidence to establish the need and the objectors did 
not dispute it. Therefore, the Board accepted that need was established. However, the 
decision clearly indicates a willingness to consider such evidence should it be put forward.  
 
The Walker dissent goes further to conclude that justification of the amendment required 
consideration of need and alternate sites in the context of that case.137 As in Rockfort, it was 
the proponent in Walker who adduced evidence regarding need, which the dissenting member 
interpreted as a waiver of the Policy Statement “need shield” and therefore accepted the 
objectors’ evidence regarding need and alternate sites.138   
 
iv. Place and Ecological Context 
While all three decisions are largely expressed in terms of the technical evidence presented 
by the parties, in some of the Board’s conclusions other voices are heard. In Rockfort and 
Walker, the physical reality of the land in question emerges as a significant factor in the 
decision, as do the material relationships asserted by objectors, both ecological and cultural. 
 
The dissent in Walker expressly acknowledges the profound difference between land uses 
that have the potential to be sustainable, such as farming or forestry, and the “radical and 
complete” transformation of aggregate extraction: “In my view, a quarry operation is not in 
the same category of features as farming and forestry.  While they are all “human-made”, the 
latter are sustainable uses of the land.  A quarry is not sustainable - it removes land and 
changes the landscape forever.”139 This recognition of the threat of the loss of place not only 
acknowledges the physicality of the land, it recognizes the human relationships with that 
specific place as relevant to the decision. In Graham’s terms, the legal decision is “grounded” 
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in the material reality of the land.140 Citing Nelson, the dissent rejects the proposal to 
“protect” significant natural features, including endangered species, by fragmenting the 
landscape and leaving isolated islands of habitat in the midst of a large-scale aggregate 
mining operation.  The member goes on to reject the majority’s conclusion that rehabilitation 
to a large human-made lake, fragmenting the existing natural features, would “maintain the 
natural environment” based on the site-specific natural and cultural features of the landscape:  
 
The footprint of the proposed quarry and the unnatural end-lake at the site will 
drastically, and permanently, alter this unique ecologic area.  It will result in the 
destruction of most of the significant woodland that is its core.  This will 
diminish the remaining natural features, functions, and systems in the area, 
including linkages, and surface and groundwater flow and recharge, and leave 
isolated and oddly shaped landforms of uncertain long-term ecological value.141 
 
The dissenting member further rejected a series of findings by the majority that would allow 
destruction of significant natural features, concluding that it is impossible to maintain and 
enhance the natural environment by removing features and functions.142 He rejected what he 
called the “more elsewhere” approach, finding that a significant woodland on the site cannot 
be destroyed because it is part of a larger woodland beyond the site.143 He also roundly 
rejected the proponent’s “Net Gain” proposal whereby woodland and wildlife habitat 
permanently destroyed by the quarry would be replaced by “recreating them” in another 
location:  
If a feature is removed, or otherwise destroyed, in one area, and a similar feature 
created in another location within the NEP Area, then an existing feature will be 
destroyed within the NEP Area in the new location as well.  The end result is that 
there will be two areas where features have been destroyed.144  
 
Finally, the member explicitly rejects the characterization of the quarry as an “interim use” of 
the subject land, finding that the total time period of activity until complete rehabilitation was 
between 58 and 80 years.145  
 
This analysis applies knowledge about the particular ecological and social systems of the 
place in question to conclude that there are material physical limits to how the land should be 
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used. The member concludes that these limits should be determinative of the appropriate use 
for that place and explicitly distinguishes between forms of use that harm and destroy the 
land and those that have the potential to be sustainable. In doing so, the member shifts away 
from a fixed concept of ownership towards a contextualized understanding of property rights.  
 
In Rockfort, the Board rejected the proponent’s arguments about the inevitability or 
progressive nature of “change” and situates the subject lands as a place with a particular 
environmental and social context with relationships to the land and people around it:  
The Policy Statement directs conservation of significant cultural heritage 
landscapes. The subject property is part of such a landscape and the eradication 
of the agricultural context does not constitute conservation; it constitutes 
destruction. Such destruction is an unacceptable impact.146  
 
The Board’s conclusions point to the relationship between the land as a specific ‘natural’ 
place and the human community connected to it:  
In addition, the fundamental change to the character of the area attendant upon 
the proposed quarry would not be acceptable.  The loss of views of rural lands, 
the loss of a cultural heritage landscape and cultural heritage resources and the 
conversion of a rural area into an urban area centred on a heavy industrial 
operation cannot be permitted in the interest of the production of more aggregate 
for infrastructure development.  It is time for alternatives to aggregate for 
infrastructure construction to be found.  Too much of what is essential to the 
character of this Province would be lost if aggregate extraction were to be 
permitted on lands like the subject property.  Lands situated in a significant 
cultural landscape, surrounded by significant natural heritage features and 
functions, are not lands on which extraction should be permitted in the absence 
of demonstration of no negative impacts.147 
 
 
All the parties agreed that there were “no significant natural heritage features” on the 
property to be excavated or subject to activities associated with excavation. Nonetheless, the 
Board found that the impact on groundwater systems and therefore on the surrounding area 
dependent on the groundwater features would be negative.148 In Rockfort the Board is shifting 
away from a presumptive use model to contingent ownership rights limited by the character 
and integrity of a place. Based on an acknowledgment of the land as situated within social 
and natural systems, the features and functions that make up a particular place are valued 
above the abstracted resource.   
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D. Applying a Relational Approach 
The themes emerging from these cases reveal a potential shift in the responsiveness of land 
use decision makers to assertions of non-ownership interests in private land. These cracks in 
the property narrative at the foundation of land use law should be exploited both theoretically 
and in practice. Creative thinking about relationships and rights has the potential to reorient 
debates about land use and the structure of environmental decision-making. Nedelsky’s four-
step relational approach offers one way to begin this work. A full relational analysis of the 
cases discussed above would require further research into the complex relations and the 
diverse perspectives of the many parties involved in each case. What follows is a brief 
theoretical application of the four-step approach to Ontario’s quarry conflicts based on the 
information available in the quarry decisions and the themes discussed above. 
 
i. How Does Law Structure the Relevant Relations? 
The first step of Nedelsky’s approach is to consider the way that law structures the relevant 
relations. At the outset of the ARA process, the owner as applicant is the primary actor and 
their ownership of the land as private property is the core relation. While the establishment of 
a regulatory regime like the ARA does provide for public interest limitations on the ownership 
relationship, the relations it establishes are centered on the presumptive ability of an owner to 
use the land as a “source of commercial profit.”149 The exclusive legal relationship to the land 
and the resulting right to use it, even in ways that will fundamentally transform or destroy it, 
fundamentally shapes the relationship of the owner to all other parties, human and non-
human.  
 
Non-owner parties are recognized within the legal framework of the ARA and the PPS. 
However, the ARA positions non-owners as third-party objectors to a quarry decision with 
limited standing and contingent relations. Third party relations are with the decision maker 
and the decision-making process - they are set apart from the primary ownership relationship. 
They are neither rights to the land nor a formal acknowledgement of a relationship with the 
land owned by the applicant.150 
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ii. What Values are at Stake? 
A number of values may be at stake for the parties involved in quarry conflicts and each of 
these could take various forms for each party. For the applicant, one of these values might be 
expressed as the freedom to use property for private benefit and profit. For a non-owner 
party, one value might be expressed as the need to understand and respect the capacities and 
limits of land and ecological systems.  
 
The process outlined in the Act shapes the space for these conflicting values to be heard and 
accounted for by the decision makers in each case. In the cases discussed above, the 
precautionary principle provided non-owners with an analytical tool to encourage the 
decision makers to consider specific and place-based knowledge about the land and 
environment in question. In this way, the reality of “physical limits to the status quo” became 
a legitimate factor for consideration.151 Further, the precautionary principle opened up space 
for the decision makers to prefer a prospective approach to managing risk, based on 
knowledge of the relevant ecological systems, including the temporal and spatial connectivity 
of particular places.152 The insertion of a needs-based analysis also provided an opportunity 
for the decision makers to raise questions about whether a specific place can, or should, be 
used in the manner and for the purpose proposed. Continued assertion of the need analysis in 
quarry cases could be used to raise critical questions about commodification of land and the 
interests served by a particular proposal: Is this specific aggregate needed? By whom? Where 
is it needed? For what purpose is it needed?  
 
iii. What Relationships Might Foster These Values 
Nedelsky’s framework now turns our attention to the types of relationships that might foster 
the values at stake. For the owner-applicant, the status quo ARA framework recognizes 
ownership as the primary relationship in the approvals process. While the regulatory 
approvals process ostensibly limits ownership rights, its applicant-driven nature privileges the 
ownership relationship vis-à-vis non-owner parties. The applicant is free to propose a 
fundamentally transformative use by virtue of owning the land, a relationship that is 
                                                         
151 Graham, owning, supra note 9 at 266. 
152 Ibid. 
  278 
understood to include both the freedom to commodify the owned land and to exclude non-
owner parties from using it. The discussion of onus above demonstrates how the applicant-
driven process results in the owner’s information setting the terms of the debate. It becomes 
the knowledge base for the decision-making process and all other actors articulate their 
objections based on the information contained in the application as prepared by and for the 
owner.  
 
The cases reveal that the precautionary principle assists in conceptualizing relationships that 
foster respect for the capacities and limits of land and ecological systems. Reorienting 
people-place relations away from ownership as exclusion and commodification, and towards 
responsibility, requires an acknowledgement of the human dependence on, and role in, 
ecological systems.153 As Graham argues, it is not a matter of replacing anthropocentric 
relations with ecocentric relations that maintain the nature/culture dualism at the heart of 
modern property law.154 Taking a precautionary, “slow-down and learn”155 approach to land 
use decisions provides the necessary opportunity to understand complex ecological systems, 
consider cumulative effects, and build responsibility for consequences into property relations. 
Such an approach would necessarily include a contextualized needs-based analysis that 
would consider the human need for extracted aggregate alongside other social and ecological 
needs in the context of specific person-place relations. For example, a decision maker might 
consider whether the aggregate to be extracted is part of a natural system that fulfills social 
and ecological needs for the surrounding species and human communities. In this way, the 
resource is understood to have functions and relationships as it exists in an ecological system 
and not only as an abstract extracted commodity. Similarly, owners and non-owners are 
understood as part of an interconnected ecological system that constitutes a specific place. An 
owner’s relationships of dependence and responsibility to other people, other species, and the 
land itself are acknowledged and made visible through a shift away from fixed exclusive 
rights to the more limited and contextual forms of property relations noted by Davies.156 
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These types of relationships with land might be described as ‘stewardship’157 or 
‘custodianship.’158 As Graham argues, they should be characterized by reciprocity with the 
land and acknowledgment of interdependence and responsibility.159 In Ontario, as in many 
other places, examples can be found in the systems of law or jurisprudence of Indigenous 
peoples, such as the Anishinabek form of ownership described by Borrows in which “land is 
provisionally held for (con)temporary sustenance and for those unborn.”160 As Graham notes, 
the point of looking to Indigenous legal practices and property relations is not to “essentialise 
and racialise law but to identify and respect the intellectual integrity and practical success of 
laws that have been and remain locally viable and authoritative.”161 The key is that the land is 
brought back in to property relations and the material consequences of destructive and 
harmful uses are exposed and considered in the decision-making process.  
 
In the cases discussed above, the conflict is not about the use versus non-use of the land. Nor 
is it about changing ownership from private to public. Rather, quarry disputes are often about 
conflicting forms of land use, such as extraction versus agriculture. The cases discussed 
above demonstrate that use-based relationships articulated by non-owners can be understood 
as potentially compatible or sustainable in a specific place, and therefore, preferable to the 
transformative extraction proposed by the owner.162 At the same time, the cases reveal 
openness to the less instrumental relationships articulated by non-owners, such as the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of a landscape or the character of place for both 
human and non-human needs. The point is not to erase human activity from the landscape, 
but to expose our connections to land and consider the material consequences of a range of 
human activities, including but not limited to those proposed by the owner.  
 
iv. What Kinds of Rights Can Foster These Relationships? 
Nedelsky’s final step brings us to the practical question of the rights that can foster these 
relationships. In her words, what are the “institutional and rhetorical means of expressing, 
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contesting and implementing such values?”163 As this analysis has considered the role of non-
owners in quarry conflicts, one possibility would be to consider new or improved rights for 
third parties in the current decision-making process. Examples of such rights are discussed 
elsewhere, such as proposals for a “right to a healthy environment.”164 Proposals for rights or 
standing for the land or non-human species have also been proposed and might be 
appropriately considered.165 However, by clarifying what is at stake, a relational analysis of 
Ontario’s quarry disputes points to third possible approach – redefining what ownership and 
its associated rights mean in land and property law.  
 
Starting with a redefined ownership relationship has the potential to reorient the land use 
planning process away from a contest of rights and interests. If ownership were understood as 
affording limited and contextual rights of private use and benefit but to exclude rights to 
fundamentally transform ecological systems and/or cause substantial harm or destruction of 
the land, decisions about such uses would need to be made very differently.166 There may still 
be resources that we decide we need to use despite the potential to destroy or transform 
places. However, such decisions would no longer be driven by an owner’s private decision to 
profit from doing so. The material consequences could be exposed and examined through 
independently obtained knowledge about the social and ecological systems of the specific 
place. Reorienting land use law away from the ownership model of property could make 
proposals for new forms of environmental rights for a range of parties, including non-human 
species, less difficult to conceptualize and implement in practice. Rather than adding more 
rights to the already complex existing conflict of claims and interests, these types of novel 
rights would have the space to reshape law’s relations. 
 
What would this look like in practice? In the context of Ontario’s quarry disputes this might 
mean replacing the current licensing process with a publically-driven aggregate development 
strategy informed by independent and specific place-based knowledge about the land and 
social and ecological systems that aggregate minerals are a part of. In the short term, changes 
could build on the opportunities revealed in the cases discussed above. For example, a 
                                                         
163 Nedelsky, supra note 7 at 241. 
164 David Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment: Revitalizing Canada’s Constitution (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2012). 
165 For example see, Peter Burdon, Ed., Exploring Wild Law: the philosophy of earth jurisprudence, (Kent 
Town, South Australia: Wakefield, 2011). 
166 Galloway, supra note 16 at 80. 
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statutory onus on the proponent to demonstrate that no negative impact will result from the 
proposed quarry could be added to the Act. Requirements for both a needs-based analysis and 
a precautionary approach could be included in the Act and the Policy Statement. Support for 
non-owner parties to bring forward a range of concerns at all stages of the decision-making 
process, including expensive expert scientific and technical evidence, could also significantly 
improve the quality of the knowledge base for decision makers. But the focus of creative 
legal interventions and law reform efforts should be clear – to transform the way law 
structures our people-place relations from ownership to responsibility. 
5. Conclusions 
 
Examining land use law through a relational analysis opens up space for the creative 
articulation and assertion of people-place relations in land use decision-making. As 
Nedelsky’s work makes clear, law structures the relationships in quarry disputes – both those 
between people and those between people and places. And as Graham argues, land use law 
structures property relationships to obscure both the physical nature of property and the 
relationships between people and places. In Ontario, the law and policy of land use 
transforms places identified as sources of aggregate minerals into commodities – all other 
natural, social and cultural features of the land are superseded by the use-value of the 
aggregate. Claims based on non-ownership relations with other aspects of the land are 
transformed into Graham’s dissident voices.  The resulting legal “maladaption” has material 
consequences as land use practices that disregard the ecological capacities and limits of 
particular places continue to be not only permitted, but deemed appropriate and desirable.167 
Land use conflicts like Ontario’s quarry disputes arise as a result of law’s failure to account 
for relationships with places outside of the ownership model, based on connections with the 
social, cultural and ecological features of a specific place. 
 
Future research is necessary to identify the range of values at stake in these disputes, as 
diverse parties will experience and articulate the central concerns differently, perhaps 
emphasizing ecological sustainability, environmental health, food security, or Indigenous 
rights.  Similarly, future research is needed to explore the diversity of relationships these 
parties envision to protect these values – perhaps stewardship, custodianship, perhaps local 
self-government or Indigenous sovereignty. The recent quarry cases outlined above reveal a 
                                                         
167 Graham, supra note 6 at 175, 206. 
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strategic opening for people-place relationships to be asserted by the non-owner parties with 
an interest in how privately-owned land can and should be used. By articulating 
connectedness with, and responsibility to, specific places in these forums, we can do at least 
some of the work to move land use law beyond a model of property as a contest of abstract 
rights to exclude and control.  Creative re-thinking of what ownership means, what property 
is, and the potential for reciprocal relationships between people and places, will be required if 
we are to create rights that realize and institutionalize these relationships and protect these 
values. Perhaps we can start, as Graham suggests, by looking outside of ourselves and take 
direction from the very places at the heart of these debates:  
If we want to know how to reshape our property law, we have to look no further 
than the landscape because it is the landscape that reveals our place in the world 
and the opportunities and limits of our connection with it.168 
 
 
                                                         
168 Ibid, at 206. 
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Chapter Six – The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate 
extraction disputes1 
Introduction 
 
Disagreements about property – what, where, and whose it is - take place in a range of 
forums and can take many different forms. Such contestation often engages with formal law 
at various stages. Therefore, while formal law may only be one aspect of contested property 
claims, ‘law does matter’ to property relations and to the ways in which they can be contested 
and transformed  (Valverde, 2012, p. 6). This chapter examines the land use planning dispute 
as one particular space in which disagreements about property occur. While land use has 
been, and continues to be, treated as a presumptively neutral technical concept (Blomley, 
2016), this chapter critically examines the role of legal ownership in land use law. It explores 
the ways in which law ‘brackets’ human relationships with land to produce and (re)enforce 
particular forms of land use (Blomley, 2014) by examining the specific work that legal 
concepts of ownership are used to perform in disputes about how private land can be used (C. 
A. Arnold, 2002; Blomley, 2016; Porter, 2012; Smit & Valiante, 2015; Valverde, 2012). The 
discussion below, like O’Donnell’s work in this volume, explores the way that ownership is 
used to shape the relationship between private property and planning in order to expose 
opportunities for the creative rethinking of property relations. This chapter contributes to a 
small body of scholarship exploring this relationship in the Canadian context (Blomley, 2016; 
Smit & Valiante, 2015) through an examination of disputes about aggregate mineral mining 
in the province of Ontario. 
 
Land use disputes about particular places and developments are often embedded in broader 
tensions about how private land can and should be used, and in whose interest such decisions 
are made. Inherently involving a negotiation about the power of the state to place restrictions 
on private property rights in order to benefit particular conceptions of the ‘public interest’ 
                                                         
1 Forthcoming as, Estair Van Wagner, “The Work of Ownership: Shaping contestation in Ontario’s aggregate 
extraction disputes” Mikkel Thorup, Maja Hojer Bruun, Bjarke Skærlund Risager & Patrick Cockburn eds. 
Contested Property Claims: What disagreement tells us about ownership (London: Routledge, forthcoming). 
Portions of this Chapter are the same or similar to portions of Chapters 2 and 4. These portions are italicized to 
alert the reader what is repeated and allow them to skip these portions as desired, a note at the start of the section 
points the reader to the relevant portions of earlier chapters. Citation style has been maintained as in the 
publication, as has grammatical. 
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(Smit & Valiante, 2015, p. 7), land use conflicts uniquely expose the relationship between 
private property and planning. Groves et al. argue that planning forums can provide critical 
opportunities to examine and rethink assumptions built into planning law and policy and to 
consider larger questions about social, economic and ecological relations: ‘If a piece of 
infrastructure is a kind of solution to a problem, participatory governance may, by including 
more perspectives, enable the problem itself to be examined, along with the ways in which it 
has been framed as a problem.’ (Groves, Munday, & Yakovleva, 2013, p. 342) In this sense, 
planning disputes can be opportunities for creative rethinking about how we relate to each 
other and our environment despite being grounded in seemingly narrow or site-specific issues 
of infrastructure siting or zoning. Yet, a resource-oriented and instrumental planning 
perspective can obscure non-instrumental relations with land while foregrounding 
instrumental relationships to land (Henwood & Pidgeon, 2001; Nash, Lewis, & Griffin, 
2010). The ideological flexibility of planning makes it essential to identify how specific 
concepts and tools shape the boundaries of conversations we have in land use processes, and 
therefore, the outcomes.  
 
British geographers Richard Cowell and Susan Owens point to the locally based resistance to 
aggregate extraction in rural England as having successfully ‘reframed’ both the problems 
and the solutions related to extraction.(Cowell & Owens, 2006, pp. 405–406). As they argue,  
 
…the importance of planning lies not simply in its instrumental capacity to deliver 
environmental sustainability, but in its relative openness to influence by 
environmental interests and concerned communities, which enable connections to be 
drawn between projects, plans and wider policies. (Cowell & Owens, 2006, p. 417) 
 
They point to a key link between the successful use of participatory opportunities by 
environmental interests and concerned communities and the integration of environmental 
concerns into the formal land use decision-making framework (Cowell & Owens, 2006, p. 
406; Owens & Cowell, 2002). This potential for creativity and reflection is largely dependent 
on the process – whether the broad policy goals are realized through genuinely deliberative 
processes and genuine opportunities to influence outcomes (Scotford & Walsh, 2013). One of 
the central functions of law in land use disputes is to structure the relations between the 
parties at all stages of the process. Law orders and manages relations between the parties and 
the decision makers, but also, the less visible relations between all of these actors and the 
land itself (Blomley, 2014; Nedelsky, 2012; Van Wagner, 2013, 2016a). As noted by both 
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O’Donnell and Pasternak in this volume, the interests and agency of more-than-human actors 
are obscured by colonial property relations in settler states; however, this structure of legal 
relations attempts to shape the extent to which, and the ways in which, all actors, human and 
more-than-human, engage with the particular decision-making processes. In doing this work, 
law is used to bound and define the nature of the contestation in procedural and substantive 
terms. In one sense this is a necessary exercise in organizing and scoping a particular dispute 
in order to find realistic and timely ways to resolve it. Nonetheless, the specific ways in 
which law is used to achieve this work have consequences that extend beyond the outcome of 
a particular dispute as ‘a set of relations specified as legally consequential are bracketed and 
detached from entanglements (ethical, practical, ecological, ontological) that are now placed 
outside the frame’ (Blomley, 2014, p. 136). As noted by American environmental law scholar 
Joseph Sax, layering-on increasingly complex environmental regulatory regimes has done 
little to limit environmental degradation without attention to structural elements of the legal 
system that create rewards and incentives for particular forms of land use and ecological 
transformation (Sax, 2008, pp. 9–10). 
 
While the success of bracketing may be limited and partial, Blomley notes that the work of 
producing and upholding brackets is nonetheless deeply political: ‘When and how they are 
constructed and who gets to bracket are deeply consequential questions. For not everyone has 
the opportunity or the power to successfully frame law in ways that stick.’ It is, therefore, 
important to understand precisely how this work is done through law and to trace its 
successes and failures (Blomley, 2014, p. 139). As Valverde’s provocative work on 
spatiotemporalities in law suggests, we must do so in terms of the interrelations between 
space and time at work in particular contexts. She notes, ‘…for law to work smoothly, 
disputes about the substance and qualitative features of governance have to be turned into 
seemingly mundane and technical questions about who has control over a particular 
spacetime’ (Valverde, 2015, p. 84). Both directly and indirectly, Valverde argues, the ‘how of 
governance’ is sidestepped by transforming political questions into purportedly technical 
questions about legal jurisdiction and ‘consumers of legal decisions are kept from asking: 
how should problem X or Y be governed in the first place’ (Valverde, 2015, p. 86). 
Ownership, it is argued here, is one key category through which land use law is used to 
manage both the ordering of actors and events and to control the flows of knowledge and 
information that are included or excluded in the process. As such, ownership works through 
land use law in two key ways: It asserts the chronological power to control the sequencing of 
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events; and, it simultaneously upholds the substantive power to manage and control the 
messy complexity of relations engaged by decisions about how land can, and should, be used.  
 
The disputes about aggregate mineral mining examined below provide one example of how 
private ownership plays a critical role in bracketing the relationships between landowners, 
other parties, and the land itself through land use law. These conflicts demonstrate that 
despite explicit environmentally-focused policy goals and opportunities for participation in 
planning law and policy, the enduring legal conception of property ownership as a 
‘thingless,’ abstract bundle of rights brackets the procedural and substantive nature of land 
use decision-making in significant ways. The ‘dephysicalized’ formal legal concept of 
property deems human relationships with places legally irrelevant and therefore serves to 
assert limits on development or use while other forms of relations with place are often not 
cognizable (Graham, 2010; Hohfeld, 1913; Vandevelde, 1980). Dominant property relations 
successfully foreground the role of land as commodity – an object that can, and indeed 
should, be alienated and used for production and profit without regard to the specificity of 
location and relational spatial or temporal effects (C. A. Arnold, 2013; Freyfogle, 2011; Sax, 
2008). Other messy affective, social, and ecological relations with particular places are 
severed for the purposes of legal decision-making, even where they have been invited (or 
perhaps tolerated) at consultative stages in the planning process or are acknowledged features 
of the natural systems at stake. As Blomley explains, this bracketing performs an ‘attempt to 
stabilize and fix a boundary within which interactions take place more or less independently 
of their surrounding context’ (Blomley, 2014, p. 135).  
 
The centrality of the owner in aggregate extraction decisions is obscured by formal state 
control of the licensing process and structural opportunities for participation. However, the 
role of ownership in determining the sequence of events in the decision-making process 
results not only in the power to determine when a decision-making process is initiated, it 
situates the private owner at the peak of a hierarchy of land use planning actors. As such, the 
owner is imbued with substantial power to shape spatial and temporal dimensions of how 
land use governance is enacted and who can meaningfully participate and influence the 
outcome. In Valverde’s terms, ownership answers preliminary questions about the who of 
governance over the timespace of the application and the site; and, in doing so, ‘implicitly 
determines how’ land use disputes should be governed (Valverde, 2015, p. 84, 86). This ‘re-
making of nature-society relations’ through private property environmental governance 
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mechanisms produces owners as ‘efficient, profit-seeking, ‘rational’ individuals’ without 
regard to the nature of their relationship with the particular place at stake (Mansfield, 2007, p. 
393) and without acknowledgment of the wider affective and more-than-human relations 
engaged (Murdoch, 2005; Whatmore, 2002, 2006). 
  
As the discussion below will demonstrate, these conflicts demonstrate that legal ownership 
remains a powerful determinant of when and how land is used. Ontario’s public land use 
planning framework formally upholds the public power to restrict private property rights 
(Smit & Valiante, 2015), yet private ownership remains a key category in shaping particular 
relationships to land as legally significant while others are deemed extra-legal or irrelevant.  
At the same time, these legal spaces of contestation about land use can provide important 
insights about challenging the boundaries set by dominant property relations. According to 
property theorist Carol Rose, moments of cultural and political recognition of alternative 
property relations have the potential to change our definition of property and property 
practices (Rose, 1998, p. 141). O’Donnell argues in this volume that land use contestation 
about the impacts of climate change can expose openings for alternative approaches to 
property relations. The Algonquin tenure system described by Pasternak, also in this volume, 
demonstrates how one place-based Indigenous legal order asserts enduring jurisdiction over 
land use governance through relations of responsibility and care. As I have argued elsewhere, 
rural land use movements can play a role in redefining people-place relations if they resist a 
parochial politics of place and take on the difficult and unsettling work of meaningful 
engagement with Indigenous legal orders (Bartel & Graham, 2016; Van Wagner, 2016b, p. 
323). The disputes about aggregate mineral mining examined below reveal strategic 
opportunities to rethink property through land use planning law and to transform the ways in 
which law shapes, and is shaped by, people-place relations. In particular, this chapter argues 
that decentering ownership in land use disputes has the potential to transform power 
imbalances upheld by the hierarchical ordering of authority and the chronological ordering of 
key steps in planning processes.  
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Aggregate Extraction: The construction of a unique land use2 
 
Aggregate mineral resources – sand, gravel, rock, and stone - are widely acknowledged to be 
essential to the built environment as the foundation of infrastructure developments from roads 
to subways to housing and sewer mains. They are valuable natural resources with the 
potential to produce economic value when extracted and transformed into marketable 
commodities through industrial mining and production. At the same time, aggregate minerals 
are functioning and integrated parts of the physical environment in which they are embedded, 
with material, ecological and social relations (Eyles & Eyles, 2002). These landscapes are 
often layered with other, potentially conflicting interests, such as agricultural production, 
housing development, recreational use, Indigenous land rights and jurisdiction, and 
ecological and amenity values (Van Wagner, 2013, 2016a). 
 
While quarrying for aggregate minerals has long been practiced by many societies and in 
diverse locations, contemporary aggregate mines are large, industrial, open pit mines. As 
such, they have significant, transformative, and enduring impacts on the land and the human 
and more than human communities in which they are located (Sandberg & Wallace, 2013; 
Sandberg, Wekerle, & Gilbert, 2013; Van Wagner, 2016a, 2016b). It is therefore not 
surprising that, quarries have also long been a source of legal and political conflict about 
appropriate land use in the province (Binnstock & Carter-Whitney, 2011, p. 1; Miller et al., 
2009; Policy Division, Ministry of Natural Resources, 2010). Indeed, since 2005 aggregate 
extraction has become one of the most contentious land use issues in the province (Sandberg 
& Wallace, 2013; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2012; Patano & Sandberg, 
2005). Disputes, including those examined for this research, often arise from disagreement 
about the nature and extent of these impacts on the local environment, human health, and 
social factors, such as traffic, noise, and employment. Aggregate extraction disputes 
therefore provide an important example of the material consequences of framing land use 
decisions through dominant property relations and instrumental relationships to land. In 
particular, aggregate extraction in Ontario primarily occurs on privately owned land. 
Therefore, the disputes that arise provide a unique case through which to explore how 
private ownership operates through law to shape procedural and substantive elements of 
disagreements about land use.  
                                                         
2 This section provides a summary of the material in Chapter Four, pages 132-142. Repeated content is 
italicized. 
  289 
 
Land use is regulated by multiple complex and overlapping legal regimes in Ontario, 
including a range of land use planning statutes and policies, environmental regulation, as 
well as both the statutory registration framework and common law of property. While the 
development and oversight of aggregate mines have some similarities with other extractive 
activities and certain types of infrastructure, the majority of aggregate extraction is regulated 
through a distinctive interaction between the provincial planning policy, municipal plans and 
bylaws, and the Aggregate Resources Act (1990) [the ‘Act’], a standalone statutory 
framework governing the process for aggregate licence and permit applications.3 In this way, 
aggregate mines are structured as a legally unique land use, with decisions informed by 
general planning policy, but set apart through distinct procedural and substantive 
considerations.  
 
Within a broad and complex network of land use law and policy potentially engaged by 
proposals for aggregate mineral extraction, this chapter is focused on a subset of primary 
legal frameworks that have been the subject of disagreement and contestation through 
ongoing law reform and legislative review processes, the Act and the Provincial Policy 
Statement. 4 Formal oversight of aggregate extraction in Ontario was limited until the 1950s 
when the scale of extraction and growth of suburban development led to increasing conflict 
(Sandberg & Wallace, 2013; Baker, Slam, & Summerville, 2001, p. 468; Cullingworth, 1987, 
p. 229). Since that time, aggregate regulation in Ontario has shifted to a provincially led, and 
increasingly proponent-driven, activity (Baker et al., 2001, p. 466) in which non-state actors 
are enrolled in flexible forms of regulation that neither privilege nor require formal authority 
(Gunningham, 2009, p. 181; Gunningham & Holley, 2010).  This shift is consistent with the 
broader international ‘shift from bureaucratic regulation to public entrepreneurialism’ in 
                                                         
3 While the majority of production is covered by the Act, it should be noted that it has a limited geographic 
application, which excludes private land in most of northern Ontario. In these areas Planning Act approvals 
govern the establishment of aggregate extraction operations on private land in these areas of the province. 
However, portions of the north have been progressively added as disputes arise with respect to specific 
applications, see the Ontario Municipal Board decision on the Superior Aggregates proposal on the shores of 
Lake Superior: Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Municipality of Wawa (2009), PL040025. 
4In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on 
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1st session, 40th Parliament, 
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best 
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection, 
including conservation and recycling. 
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planning regimes, driven and shaped by inter-urban competition for global investment 
capital (Sager, 2011, p. 156).   
 
Conflicts over large-scale quarry developments in the urban-rural fringe of Southwestern 
Ontario have resulted in major community mobilizations,(“Mega quarry defeat is a lesson in 
activism,” 2012) complex multi-year litigation (Bull, 2010), a foreign investment protection 
claim against the federal and provincial governments, (Halton Region, 2013; St. Mary’s 
VCNA, LLC v. Government of Canada, 2013) and a legislative review of the governing 
legislation (Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government & 
Standing Committee on General Government, 2013).5 With a fixed, non-renewable ‘essential’ 
resource situated in areas of overlapping and conflicting relationships with land and the 
potential for direct and cumulative social, health, and environmental impacts of extraction, 
aggregate mining exemplifies the ‘wicked problems’ that land use law and policy aim to 
resolve (Rittel & Webber, 1974). In this context, law works through ownership to simplify 
and sever this complexity and to uphold relations with land that support particular land uses 
and conceptions of economic development.6 
Extracting Private Profit in the Public Interest: The centrality of ownership in the 
aggregate licensing process7 
 
A. The Legal Structure of Aggregate Disputes 
In Canada, planning falls within provincial jurisdiction over municipal institutions and 
property and civil rights (The Constitution Act, 1867). In Ontario, the province provides 
broad guidance and maintains considerable power to constrain local government action 
                                                         
5 At the time of writing a Bill to amend the Aggregate Resources Act had been introduced to the provincial 
legislature as a result of the legislative review process: Bill 39 Aggregate Resources and Mining Modernization 
Act 2017, available online: http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=4213. The Bill 
retains key features of the existing regime discussed in this chapter. 
6 This chapter is based on a larger qualitative research project examining a series of aggregate mineral mining 
disputes in Ontario, Canada between 2001 and 2014. Specific cases for detailed documentary analysis and in-
depth interviews were selected through a review of key documents to identify the level of participation by 
members of the public and governmental and non-governmental organizations in the regulatory process and the 
types of issues and concerns about the impact of extraction raised by such parties. 18 unstructured in-person 
interviews were conducted with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes. Participants were 
largely activists in local or regionally-based organizations formed to respond to a specific application or pre-
existing organizations who chose to become involved with a particular quarry application based on a particular 
set of environmental or social concerns.  
7 This section provides a summary of the material in Chapter Four, pages 150-201 and 219-227. Repeated 
content is italicized. 
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through both the Planning Act (1990) and the Provincial Policy Statement (Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2014), a policy document that ‘sets the policy foundation for 
regulating the development and use of land.’8 The bulk of day-to-day planning powers and 
responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities who regulate land use through zoning in 
Official Plans and by-laws (Kong, 2010; Makuch, Craik, & Leisk Signe, 2004), though 
provincial planning regimes, such as the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development 
Act (1990), retain significant centralized planning powers in particular parts of the province. 
While it is not the focus of this chapter it is important to note that aggregate decisions 
directly engage the constitutional and/or treaty rights of First Nations and Metis communities 
and the applicable Indigenous legal orders in their territories. Indigenous communities in 
Ontario have long been asserting their right to consultation and accommodation and 
demanding more control over aggregate resource decisions (Ritchie, 2013); however, the 
Duty to Consult and accommodate such rights and interests was only formally acknowledged 
in the revised 2014 Policy Statement and is still absent in formal aggregate extraction law 
and policy. 
 
Adjudicative review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario 
Municipal Board (the ‘Board’), which serves as the primary appeal body for planning and 
development decisions, and the Environmental Review Tribunal, ostensibly dividing ‘land 
use’ from ‘environmental’ decisions despite the environmentally-focused nature of many 
objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al., 2013; Van Wagner, 2013). One of the 
unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the Board in 
decisions with clear environmental implications such as amendments to Official Plans 
affecting public space, protected green space, and agricultural lands, as well as the often-
contentious applications for aggregate development considered here. It has jurisdiction to 
deal with issues and disputes under more than 100 statutes, including the Aggregate 
Resources Act.9  
 
                                                         
8 In April 2014 the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took 
effect on April 30, 2014 [the ‘2014  PPS], however, the cases discussed in this chapter were considered under 
the former 2005 Provincial Policy Statement, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx [the ‘2005 PPS’]. The 
key aggregate mineral provisions discussed below remain largely unchanged in the new version.  
9 For certain appeals, including some aggregate disputes where hearings may be required from both tribunals, a 
joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act (1990). See for example, Nelson Aggregate Co., Re, 
2012 CLB 29642, [Nelson], Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012 CLB 16274 [Walker]. 
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As noted above, aggregate decisions engage a dual set of processes; the general land 
use planning process through municipal zoning and land use governance, and, the specific 
licensing process managed by the Ministry of Natural Resources (the ‘Ministry’). The current 
Aggregate Resources Act is an operational statute for the management of aggregate mining 
proposals. It is not a framework for broader planning inquiries that are dealt with under the 
Planning Act process and the resulting Official Plans. Section 2 sets out 4 purposes:  
 
(a) to provide for the management of the aggregate resources of Ontario; 
(b) to control and regulate aggregate operations on Crown and private lands; 
(c) to require the rehabilitation of land from which aggregate has been excavated; and 
(d) to minimize adverse impact on the environment in respect of aggregate operations. 
 
‘Management’ is defined in the Act as the ‘identification, orderly development and protection 
of the aggregate resources of Ontario,’ clearly establishing the development-focus of the Act  
(s 1(1)). No license can be issued if extraction is prohibited by an applicable zoning by-law (s 
12.1.(1); therefore, if the land for which a quarry is proposed is not currently designated as a 
‘mineral aggregate extraction area’ under the applicable municipal Official Plan, the 
proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate amendments under the 
Planning Act (s 22). Some applications will also involve special provincial planning regimes, 
such as the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, or urban growth plans 
(Places to Grow Act, 2005) and associated policy (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 
2006). This may mean additional planning authority approvals or the application of additional 
standards in certain areas. Therefore, the general planning question of whether extraction is 
an appropriate land use in a particular place should be the initial inquiry in siting aggregate 
development in accordance with planning documents of the local authority. However, this 
order of decisions and jurisdiction is restructured by law in two key ways. First, s 66(1) of the 
Act expressly limits municipal powers to regulate aggregate extraction:  
This Act, the regulations and the provisions of licences and site plans apply despite 
any municipal by-law, official plan or development agreement and, to the extent that a 
municipal by-law, official plan or development agreement deals with the same 
subject-matter as this Act, the regulations or the provisions of a license or site plan, 
the by-law, official plan or development agreement is inoperative. 
Second, the Planning Act stipulates that all policy and decisions of municipal governments 
and land use tribunals, shall be consistent with the Policy Statement (s 3). The hierarchical 
structure of interests in land set out in the Policy Statement expressly prioritizes aggregate 
development, restricts the power of local land use decision makers, and shifts the focus to the 
mechanics of operation to be presumptively approved. Indeed, it limits the municipal ability 
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to impose higher standards where they would conflict with any of its policies (s 4.7). Official 
plans are required to identify and protect provincial interests in their land use designations 
and policies, particularly by directing development to ‘suitable areas’ (s 4.7).  
 
The effect is to limit the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and 
operation, including the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into 
the assessment of applications, or to impose protection on features not deemed provincially 
‘significant’ (M. Bull & Estrela, 2012). The jurisdiction of local authorities over extraction is 
rendered hollow by this shift from an inquiry about land use governance throughout the area 
to one about the protection and development of one resource, and the management of one 
site. This inversion of the land use versus operational decisions is compounded by the 
procedural practice of having the planning and licensing inquiries run parallel or even jointly 
once it reaches an appeal or adjudicative stage. While this may have important efficiency and 
clarity implications for all parties in an already complex and time-consuming process, the 
effect of compressing these distinct inquiries is that land use questions often end up 
secondary to the technical and managerial licensing inquiry about a specific site (Re Walker 
Aggregates Inc., 2012). In this way, the messier and more difficult aspects of decisions about 
extractive and transformative land uses are severed and shifted outside of the legal decision-
making space.  
 
Within this spatial and temporal frame created by the intersection of general planning law and 
the aggregate extraction regime, private land ownership plays a particular role in upholding 
the ordering of interests in Ontario’s aggregate mineral law and policy. Legal ownership is 
used to perform two key boundary-setting functions in this process, which have both spatial 
and temporal dimensions. First, the owner becomes the planner by proposing a specific land 
use in a particular location and initiating a decision-making process. This may be 
accompanied by physical changes to the landscape that shape the material conditions of the 
site in advance of a decision or even an application, thus changing the baseline for social, 
physical, and ecological impacts. Second, in a proponent-driven process, ownership includes 
the power to shape the story and establish the factual record on which decisions are made. 
This exclusive spatial access and chronological power has consequences for the procedural 
and substantive outcomes of aggregate applications. Ownership, as a legal category, both 
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shapes the sequencing of events and decisions within the process and centres the landowner 
as the decision maker within a hierarchy of actors and interests. In doing so, it powerfully 
influences the outcomes for a complex network of social, material, and ecological interests 
and actors. 
 
The Owner as Planner: Site selection and the (re)shaping of the landscapes of 
extraction 
Aggregate minerals are fixed resources. As with other minerals, the rock is where it is and 
that is where extraction must take place. As one large aggregate producer, noted in their 
submissions to the 2012 legislative review, ‘[a]ggregate are fixed location non-renewable 
natural resources which can only be mined where Mother Nature deposited them.’ The fixed 
nature of aggregate minerals also means that extraction is concentrated in particular areas, for 
example, the area around Orangeville, north of Toronto has a high concentration of mine 
sites. This raises the potential for effects to be cumulative, both geospatially and temporally, 
rather than simply site and project-specific and for contestation to cross jurisdictional, legal, 
temporal, and ownership boundaries.  
  
But extraction is not only fixed by geological formations. According to the submissions of 
the Ministry of Natural Resources to the Legislative Review, over 90% of aggregate 
production in Ontario is on private land (Aggregate Resources Act Review, 2012, p. G145). 
In Ontario, surface and sub-surface rights may be unified or separated depending on the terms 
of the original grant and whether mineral rights were reserved to the Crown. However, the 
majority of private land includes both mineral and surface rights and recent amendments to 
mining legislation have further unified land rights, particularly in Southern Ontario where the 
majority of aggregate extraction disputes take place (Pardy & Stoehr, 2011, p. 6). Site 
selection is therefore inextricably linked to land ownership as it layers onto the fixed location 
of the resource. The rock is where it is, but it must be extracted where it is owned. In this 
way, land ownership and the rights associated with private ownership are central to the nature 
of the disagreements and contestations that arise in relation to aggregate disputes. Therefore, 
while contestation about the siting of aggregate quarries may have similarities with disputes 
about ‘locally unwanted land uses’ (LULUs) such as landfills or power stations and may 
similarly expose ‘not in my backyard attitudes’ within and between communities, the 
proponent-led process presents a distinctive context in which to explore the relationship 
between private land ownership and public land use planning. 
Site Selection and Private Planning 
An aggregate licence application is based on the proponent’s site selection. While some 
proponents lease private land for aggregate development from other landholders, selection is 
largely grounded on their own ownership of the land in question. In noting the preponderance 
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of private land in aggregate resource development the Ministry of Natural Resources 
representative at the 2012 legislative review hearing observed, ‘[O]wnership of the land is 
very important’ (Aggregate Resources Act Review, 2012). The link between private 
ownership and site selection raises concerns about whose interests are being served in the 
siting of transformative extractive development. 
 
Because of the dual physical fix of an in situ resource extracted from privately-owned land 
aggregate mineral extraction is not dealt with through public planning or environmental 
assessment processes. As noted above, this distinguishes them from applications that go 
through processes such as environmental assessment and ‘willing host’ searches in which a 
number of alternative sites are considered. While these are subject to criticism in their own 
right, they do theoretically involve a broader type of deliberative public planning exercise 
than a process driven by private land ownership.10 In the aggregate context, it is unlikely that 
a proponent would seriously consider alternative sites that they do not own and do not have 
access to for required testing and preparation when putting an expensive and time-consuming 
application together. Without such consideration of alternatives, there is a danger that site 
selection will be linked to an owner’s ability to assemble land and to their economic 
assumptions and interests than to specific knowledge about local social and ecological 
relations of a particular place or to a notion of the ‘public interest’ in extractive land uses. 
  
Some participants in the study expressed concerns about aggregate developers targeting areas 
with small populations and struggling economies with promises of jobs and economic 
development for land acquisition and future development (Participant 1, 2014; Participants 
16-20, 2014). In the case of one large-scale proposal, an internal company communication 
obtained by a group opposing the quarry revealed that the site location had been selected 
because the area has one of the smallest populations in the province and the land had the least 
regulatory governance controlling extraction in North America (Participant 1, 2014). The 
aggregate industry and government decision makers routinely characterize overlapping 
interests in land recognized in law and policy, such as the environmental protections in the 
Niagara Escarpment, as ‘constraints’ on the development of the resource. Extraction is both 
                                                         
10 The provincial and federal environmental assessment regimes applicable in Ontario have both been subject to 
critique, particularly after amendments that narrowed opportunities for public participation (Auditor General, 
2016; Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2008; Lindgren & Dunn, 2010). Notably, the regimes are also 
proponent-driven and therefore share some of the issues outlined below with respect to spatial and temporal 
control. 
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legally and politically constructed as a presumptively appropriate land use, but for the 
intrusion of other values and relations on the land that limit or restrict development.   
 
Other participants noted concerns about the transparency of a process driven by private land 
acquisition. The selection and assembly of land can potentially start years or decades in 
advance of an application. In this sense, the sequence of events is initiated long before the 
formal statutory process begins. One participant described the process: ‘We found out later 
that they had been acquiring lands for 20 years, additional to what they already had. But 
under a numbered company, so it was not apparent that they were buying it. Some people 
sold it under a different understanding’ (Participant 4, 2014). Another described the impact 
on sellers who sold under the pretence that the land would continue to be used for agricultural 
purposes (Participant 1, 2014): …[F]or some of the farmers who sold to see those houses be 
burned and lost was like us going to a year-long funeral… 
 
Another participant recalled that the site owner went back to neighbouring land owners who 
had not sold prior to the Application and said, ‘you can't sell your house now because there is 
going to be a quarry on it, nobody is going to buy it, we will take it off your hands’ 
(Participants 13-14, 2014). This chronological power not only advantages the land owner by 
providing a head start in the process, but also through the potential to affect the property 
relations of neighbouring lands in ways that facilitate particular forms of future land use.  
 
A number of participants reflected on the need for a broader public form of aggregate 
resource planning between local and provincial governments that could separate the private 
ownership of lands from decisions about where extractive land uses are appropriate within 
the province (Participant  15, 2014; Participant 1, 2014; Participants 2,3, 2014; Participant 4, 
2014; Participants 13-14, 2014). Indeed, some groups intentionally shifted from site-specific 
opposition to demanding broader changes in the land use planning process in Ontario, calling 
for a different balance between different values and interests in land to be embedded within 
the legal and policy frameworks. Implicit within these reflections was a desire to engage 
directly with the ‘how’ of land use governance, the messy political elements of planning that 
were excluded as irrelevant in deliberations about specific applications (Valverde, 2015, p. 
86). 
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Making spaces of extraction: The transformation of private land 
In a proponent-driven system, land ownership determines the physical location of the site and 
initiates the process of development. However, it also provides the owner with a more subtle 
chronological privilege: the power to determine the condition of the site at the time of 
application. Anglo-Canadian property conceptualizes ownership as a bundle of rights with 
respect to a particular piece of land or resource (Blomley, 2005; Davies, 2007; Mossman & 
Girard, 2014). This includes extensive rights to alter and transform the physical and material 
environment, and therefore, the material and temporal networks of relation embedded within 
or connected to that particular place – social, political, economic, ecological, geological, 
hydrological and other forms of relation. Thus ownership can be used to bracket what can be 
considered by decision makers by determining what exists at the critical moment in which the 
licensing process applies to the site. Through an owner’s right to transform their land and to 
exclude the relevant features of the site, such as endangered species, forests, or wetlands, 
from consideration they can determine what exists for the purposes of the law. This pre-
application control has important consequences for the ability of parties seeking to assert 
competing values and overlapping interests in the land and for the potential for decision 
makers to assess such claims. Heritage and environmental features that could potentially 
‘constrain’ development can legally be destroyed, removed, minimized, or transformed long 
before an application is made by virtue of the extensive rights to transform private property 
as of right. As a result, relevant features, relations and interests are excluded from 
consideration in any subsequent planning process. In particular, and as noted by Pasternak in 
this volume, more-than-human beings and systems may be most profoundly impacted by 
these purportedly private decisions. Indeed, entire ecosystems and populations may be 
managed out of existence prior to the legal process being triggered. One participant expressed 
concerns about the impact of such transformation on the planning process (Participant 4, 
2014): ‘That is what is happening now with some developments. Yes, some developers buy 
the property, they clear it out, destroys its ecological value and then what is your argument? 
You have a woodland? I don't see a woodland.’ 
 
One dispute over a large-scale quarry began with concerns about violations of the local tree 
cutting by-law. A participant in that process observed that the by-law had been put in place in 
the context of agricultural land use to facilitate farming activities and large-scale woodlot 
removal would never have been contemplated (Participant 1, 2014). They later became 
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concerned that the removal of hectares of trees was motivated by the desire to ‘lessen the 
chances of wild life conduits and other conservation thought to stand in the way of their 
coming application’ (Participant 1, 2014). Another participant involved in the same quarry 
dispute described the subsequent destruction of the homes and farm buildings on the land 
acquired for the proposed quarry site (Participants 13-14, 2014):  
 
There is a big house down the road… It is a huge, big house and they took all the 
windows out of the top part about November, December, let the wind and the snow 
and everything blow through and then they finally took it down. When that house 
went down, people started to believe that something was wrong. 
 
These unanticipated changes impacted not only the physical landscape, but also initiated a 
sequence of events that transformed the social networks within the local community 
(Participant 13-14, 2014):  
 
Nobody really blamed the sale but it left such a hole of connections. It is like [you] 
lay out a thousand piece puzzle and take 30-pieces out. It is not the same. As much as 
your people might suggest that losing a couple hundred or 300 people out of the 
community, people come and go, this wasn't it. This was forced, violent, burned, 
blown up, dug under. Farmsteads that had been cared for 100 years by people 
disappeared from the landscape … dark and not a light of life anywhere at night. It 
left a profound emotional drain on the people.  
  
In another case within the provincially protected Niagara Escarpment Plan Area, participants 
described the owner’s attempt to destroy wetlands after the endangered Jefferson salamander 
was discovered on neighbouring property and the group opposing applied for provincial 
wetland designation over the area (Participant 15, 2014; Participant 4, 2014). The owner in 
that case was ultimately charged at the urging of local residents and opponents of the quarry 
and pled guilty. However, the success of this enforcement was due to the informal research 
and access of a neighbouring land owner to the habitat sites rather than any systemic legal 
safeguard. 
 
Beyond the physical and ecological changes in advance of applications, participants reflected 
on the ways aggregate mining approvals in a particular place can facilitate a long-term and 
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wider transformation of the landscape by fixing industrial extraction as an appropriate land 
use for future applications for expansion or new mines in the local area (Participant 22, 2014; 
Participants 2, 3, 2014; Participant 7, 2014; Participants 16-20, 2014; Participant 21, 2014). 
The Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term 
use, including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits, 
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would ‘preclude or hinder’ 
extraction (ss. 2.5.2.4, 2.5.2.5). In fact, this protection continues even where an operation or a 
license ‘ceases to exist,’ (s. 2.5.2.4) resulting in a licensing regime with no possibility of 
expiration regardless of the length of time an area has remained undeveloped and the changes 
to surrounding land and land uses. 
 
Several participants expressed concerns that once approved, expansion in size or below the 
water table was much easier to attain, or that other proposals would be more likely to be 
approved once the area was seen as an extractive zone by decision makers (Participant  22, 
2014; Participants 2,3, 2014; Participant 7, 2014; Participant 16-20, 2014; Participant 21, 
2014). In the words of one participant: ‘[T]he only way to control it is to stop it’ (Participant 
16-20, 2014). However, as described below, ownership also plays a strong role in shaping the 
process and substance of attempts to control or stop a particular application at both the 
planning and adjudicative stages. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the overwhelming 
majority of applications are approved, either by the Minister or the Board, pointing to a 
structural imbalance in the process (Van Wagner, 2016a, pp. 45–46). 
 
Controlling the facts, controlling the space: Knowledge and power in land use decisions 
 
Citing public frustration with aggregate approvals and other types of land use decisions, the 
Environmental Commissioner has noted the importance of meaningful consultation: 
 
First, consultation is not simply telling people what you intend to do and, then, 
listening to their comments. 
… 
To be legitimate, an approval process must be able to reach a decision not to proceed. 
I’m not saying that this should be a common outcome… But, in a valid and 
meaningful consultation process, we would expect that sometimes rational arguments 
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or contrasting societal value systems would and should lead to a “No”. Without that 
possibility, there is no value in consultation (Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Participants in this study expressed concerns that despite opportunities for public 
participation, the process was structured to presumptively support development. Indeed, 
several noted that land owners proposing aggregate mines assumed that proposals would go 
forward despite the need for consultation and Ministerial or Board approval. One participant 
paraphrased a representative of the company at a community meeting, ‘It doesn’t matter what 
you people do, we are going to go forward with this’ (Participant 16-20, 2014). Another 
described the ‘arrogance’ of the proponent, ‘They had done the political legwork and under 
the Aggregate Resources Act and knew they could muscle this thing through. Couldn't care 
less what the community wanted’ (Participant 1, 2014). A planner from one provincial 
planning agency reflected on the political pressure to move applications forward to approval 
(Planner 2, 2014, p. 2):  
If, say, the municipality or the agencies has made a decision and it is not a favourable 
one, the operator may express its concern to Queen's Park. In response, we have had 
calls from the MPP and the Minister’s office requesting to understand what is going 
on and why it is taking so long to bring the application to a final decision. Then we 
need a briefing note explaining the process, the stakeholders involved, and what are 
the key issues?  
For many participants, this ‘entitlement to approval’ was fuelled by a process driven by the 
proponent, who provides the majority of the information and expertise to decision makers for 
the express purpose of having the application approved.  The Aggregate Resources 
Provincial Standards and the Aggregate Resources Policy and Internal Procedures Manual 
specify the technical information and reports the applicant is required to provide, including 
expert hydrogeologic report(s), natural environment report(s) and cultural heritage report(s), 
which must be prepared by a ‘qualified’ professional as defined in the Act (s 8). Licensing 
and planning approval processes and any subsequent litigation are based on this factual and 
technical record, subject to any independent technical or legal expertise and documentation 
that may be provided by Indigenous governments, municipal actors or planning authorities, 
and other groups or individuals at their own expense. The chronological power of site 
selection and modification, as well as initiation of the process, is thus compounded by the 
power to frame the questions and issues to be considered. By controlling the knowledge base 
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on which the decision will be made, owners powerfully shape the narrative of what is at 
stake.  
 
Independent expert evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both logistically 
and financially onerous for Indigenous and small local governments and community groups, 
particularly given that they may or may not be accepted by the Board at a hearing and that 
access to the proponent’s land may not be granted for direct investigation and data review (Re 
Town of Richmond Hill, PL990303, r’vd by Ontario (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing) v Ontario (Municipal Board) 2001). As one lawyer noted, ‘It is phenomenally 
expensive to really mount a legal challenge to an application for aggregate licence’ (Lawyer, 
2014). Many participants explained that they had scoped down their appeal to one or two 
issues because of the cost or the accessibility of experts (Participant 22, 2014; Participants 8-
12, 2014; Participant 16-20, 2014; Participant 21, 2014). Two experts who have worked with 
parties opposing quarries noted that the Board tends to accept proponent expert opinions and 
shared experiences of being challenged as ‘advocates,’ unable to be objective (Consultant, 
2014; Planner, 2014). Further, proponents are under no obligation to allow other parties and 
their experts onto the site, making review of the data limited and potentially impossible, 
particularly with complex hydrological or ecological data that require in-season and regular 
onsite observation. Even government agencies have limited access to verify data and collect 
independent data to challenge proponent claims. 
 
This evidentiary and narrative power is compounded by what an applicant is not required to 
establish. Until 2005 the Policy Statement maintained that ‘mineral resource needs’ should be 
considered, providing a policy basis for supply and demand analysis as central to aggregate 
licensing decisions (2.2.3.1, 1996). Opposing parties and governments used this version of 
the policy to argue that the material to be extracted was not currently required and therefore 
that sites should not be approved (M. Bull & Estrela, 2012, p. 24). In 2005, the Provincial 
Policy Statement was revised to explicitly eliminate consideration of need in Policy 2.5.2.1:  
Demonstration of need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type of 
supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability, 
designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or 
elsewhere. 
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One environmental lawyer characterized this lack of a needs analysis as the ‘biggest 
stumbling block’ in the aggregate planning decision framework (Lawyer, 2014). This was 
also raised by a number of deputants at the all-party review of the Act before the Standing 
Committee on General Government described below and by commentators during the Policy 
Statement review (“Review of the Aggregate Resources Act,” 2013.).11 While the Board has 
concluded that a needs analysis is not required, it has nonetheless also been a live issue in 
several cases as parties continue to press for the opportunity to contest the underlying 
assumptions in the framework (Jennison Construction Ltd. V Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh 
(Town), 2011; James Dick Construction, 2010; Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012). In 
one case the Board itself noted, ‘[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging 
Policy Statement where need is not required’ (Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County), 
2010, 16)  
 
Planning and urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of 
specific discursive frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano and 
Sandberg specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the aggregate 
industry to appeal to decision makers, including provincial and local governments and 
adjudicators (Patano & Sandberg, 2005; Young & Keil, 2005). Such ‘narratives of necessity’ 
place conceptual limits on the terms of debate about specific land use decisions (Cowell & 
Owens, 2006). Here the presumption of need embedded in the statute fixes the conception of 
the public interest as one of perpetual economic growth and expanding (sub)urbanism 
directly in law, foreclosing debate about the shape of the present and future built environment 
and the urban-rural relationship.  
Defining the Landscape: The role of ownership in land use decision making 
Ontario’s planning law and policy does not expressly protect private property ownership. Nor 
does it expressly situate private owners as planners. Indeed, aggregate decisions engage many 
of the forward-looking, participatory and consultative aspects of the province’s public 
planning regime. Nonetheless, this chapter demonstrates how ownership endures as key legal 
category in land use law. Ownership is used to order actors in a hierarchy of interests in 
which aggregate development is prioritized over other relations with land and simultaneously 
structures the sequence of events to produce specific spatiotemporal relations. The successful 
                                                         
11 111 of 166 comments on the Provincial Policy Statement Review can be accessed on the Environmental 
Registry, Registry Number 011-7070. 
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bracketing work done through ownership is reflected in the overwhelming success of 
aggregate applications in the province (Van Wagner, 2016a). However, the ongoing 
contestation about extraction points to the unsettled nature of the spatiotemporal boundaries 
law attempts to uphold. Understanding the specific work that ownership does through site 
selection, modification, and control of the factual record can serve to reveal strategic 
opportunities for intervention and the transformation of property relations into more just and 
complex people-place relations. 
 
Transforming the aggregate planning process requires the decoupling of site selection from 
private ownership and the implementation of meaningful and inclusive consultation from pre-
application throughout the life of a project. Decentrering ownership, both temporally and 
spatially, could create opportunities for parties to introduce the material and spatial 
particularity of the human and ecological communities at stake and to expose the wider 
substantive and political aspects of the decisions. A better balance of power in the decision-
making process would make visible what is really at stake (Nedelsky, 2012): how we make 
decisions about the extraction of important resources from their material and social context 
while attending to the transformative impacts of doing so for the human and ecological 
communities and networks of social and material relations.  For example, aggregate 
development sites could be determined through a broad, policy-driven public planning 
process rather than purely site-specific private applications. Such a shift raises other 
concerns, particularly about the nature of participation in such a process, the power of private 
interests to determine ‘the public interest’, and the relationships between municipal and 
provincial actors and Indigenous governments; however, these are issues that land use 
governance must urgently and meaningfully address in planning more broadly. Perhaps 
transforming the way we make aggregate extraction decisions could be a starting point for 
this important work, including the recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction (Pasternak, this 
volume).  
 
Would the legal decision-making process be transformed if the technical data was provided 
through an independent third party rather than by the proponent? Public funding for 
independent technical expertise and legal advice required by participating parties would be a 
first step towards a more balanced evidentiary record. However, to be meaningful this must 
include access to privately owned sites and oversight of pre-application site changes and this 
requires a shift from property as the realm of fixed, exclusive individual rights towards what 
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Margaret Davies has described as ‘more fragile, contextual, and limited use (Davies, 2012, 
pp. 15–16).’ Certainly a first step in rebalancing the power between the parties would be to 
re-establish the requirement that the proponent demonstrate need such that the costs and 
benefits of the proposal can be explicitly weighed by decision makers and openly contested 
by participants. Decentering ownership could affect these sequencing and evidentiary 
transformations in aggregate licensing decision and effectively reframe the question from 
how we will manage the extraction of this resource to whether we should be extracting this 
rock here, in this place, and in whose interests.  Such a reorientation of decision-making away 
from ownership as the chronological and spatial starting point for land use decision certainly 
has the potential to change the outcome in individual disputes; but, perhaps more importantly 
it could strategically create space within the process of land use governance for urgently-
needed meaningful dialogue about how we should govern the complexity of our 
environmental relations. 
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Chapter Seven – Law’s Ecological Relations: The Legal Structure of People-Place 
Relations in Ontario’s Aggregate Extraction Conflicts1 
 
Introduction 
What is the role of law in structuring human relationships to the more-than-human world in 
which our lives are embedded? I consider this question by examining Anglo-Canadian land 
use law – which I define broadly to include property, environmental, and planning law – in 
the province of Ontario, Canada. Through land use law we recognize and uphold various 
forms of control over and particular types of use rights to land (Lametti 2003; Mossman & 
Girard 2014; Penner 1997); however, we have a much more difficult time recognizing 
relationships with land and ecological systems themselves, in particular relations of 
responsibility, or even reciprocity, with place (Graham 2010; Mossman & Girard 2014).2 
These conceptual boundaries have important consequences for the people-place relations that 
are acknowledged and upheld by law. 
 
While some argue that land use regimes have fundamentally redefined property relations 
from a commodified conception of private property rights towards democratized 
environmental decision-making (Scotford & Walsh 2013), I will argue that we must critically 
consider the people-place relationships that are structured through the everyday practice of 
law in specific places. I seek to look beyond the broad and aspirational goals of 
“sustainability” and “balance” embedded in legislation and policy documents, to ask whether 
and how planning regimes construct or constrain the space for contestation in order to secure 
recognition for relations between land and the more-than-human world (Harrison & Bedford 
2003:443).  
 
Land use conflicts can provide strategic opportunities for interventions in the way we 
organize our ecological relationships. As outlined below, land use planning law and policy in 
Ontario provide important procedural rights to participation and consultation in decision- 
                                                         
1 Originally published as, Van Wagner, E. Law’s Ecological Relations: The legal structure of people-place 
relations in Ontario’s aggregate extraction conflicts. Projections 12, 35. Portions of this Chapter are the same or 
similar to portions of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. These portions are italicized to alert the reader what is repeated and 
allow them to skip these portions as desired. Citation style has been maintained as in the publication. 
2 I am indebted to the work of Nicole Graham (2010) for this concept of reciprocity with place. For a discussion 
of ownership and responsibility, see the work of Joseph Singer (Singer 2001). 
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making about the uses of privately owned land. While disputes about the siting of 
infrastructure and industrial development, such as the conflicts about aggregate mineral 
mines, or quarries discussed in this article are sometimes characterized as purely about 
localized and narrow ‘not-in-my-backyard’ (“NIMBY”) politics in conflict with the broader 
public interest, land use disputes often raise a complex combination of issues and can become 
forums for attempts to disrupt traditional property relations. As Groves et al. argue, “siting 
conflicts over such infrastructure often act as condensation points for wider concerns, which 
can ‘cross scale’ from the interests of a specific community to connect with national and 
international issues” (Groves et al. 2013:340). Valvarde’s research on the urban planning 
context in the city of Toronto demonstrates how conflicts about a wide range of socio-
political issues are ‘funneled’ into the forums created by planning law’s public and 
consultative structure in Ontario (Valverde 2012:12).  
 
In this context, I argue that critical examination of the day-to-day operation of participatory 
planning rights is required to understand how the values and relationships at stake are 
asserted and defined by parties and decision makers. Do the legal rights to be informed about, 
and to appeal and contest land use decisions offer more than a forum for competing claims of 
property to be efficiently channeled? Do they offer more than a way for opposition to private 
development to be managed in the interests of public interest narrowly defined as economic 
growth? Do they create space for rethinking of property relations? Or do they serve as an 
exclusive channel for privileged groups to perpetuate environmental injustice and spatial 
inequities? 
 
This paper is an initial attempt to take up these questions through a study of a series of 
regional planning conflicts over the siting of aggregate mineral mines in Ontario. Below I set 
out a relational approach to land use conflicts and propose an eco-relational analysis of land 
use planning law. I then consider the current legislative framework for siting aggregate 
mineral extraction in the Province to examine law’s work in structuring people-place 
relations. As part of a larger empirical study, this paper specifically applies the relational 
approach to consider the ways in which Ontario’s planning law and policy organize and 
control the types of claims asserted in relation to land and ecological systems. The complex, 
and sometimes contradictory, values and relationships articulated by a range of parties in 
aggregate conflicts will be examined in greater depth as part of the larger project.  
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Relational Theory and Land Use Disputes: Why a Relational Framework? 
 
What does it mean to be constituted by relationships rather than just living 
among others? (Nedelsky 2012:19) 
 
The relational work that law does in land use planning disputes has specific and material 
consequences for land and human and ‘more-than-human’ communities (Graham 2010). 
Understanding how law structures people-place relations in specific places is essential to our 
capacity to respond to the current ecological crisis. In particular, the legal construction of the 
relationships between landowners, other parties, and the land itself, shapes and constrains 
what is at stake in the land use decision-making process, and consequently impacts the 
ecological and material outcomes. As I have argued elsewhere, a relational legal analysis is 
ideally suited to exposing and examining law’s role in shaping people-place relations (Van 
Wagner 2013).  
 
By offering an ecological adaptation of the relational rights theory of Canadian legal scholar 
Jennifer Nedelsky, my aim is to foreground the specific way in which land use law operates 
to constitute our relationships with the wider ecological communities in which our are lives 
are enmeshed. Nedelsky’s work has influenced a growing body of feminist and critical 
property scholarship whose work reimagines property as responsibility, connection, and 
belonging rather than as exclusion and protection from the collective (Cooper 2007; Keenan 
2010; Nedelsky 1990; Singer 2001;  2009). In Law’s Relations, Nedelsky proposes a 
relational rights framework with both methodological and normative dimensions. It is this 
formulation of her relational analysis that I engage with below. 
 
For Nedelsky, an essential element of understanding the world relationally is seeing the 
interconnection between personal and institutional relationships: “each set of relations is 
nested in the next, and all interact with each other” (Nedelsky 2012:31). From this 
perspective, we can understand people-place relations as nested in broader relationships with 
family and human community, as well as the hydrological, geological, and ecological 
relations of the more-than-human world in a specific place, which are themselves shaped by 
societal structures of property ownership, land use regulation, and informal attitudes to the 
environment. In turn, broader economic forces, as well as global climate trends and 
environmental conditions, natural disasters, and human-induced ecological crises, shape these 
structures. In her view, through exposing the way that law structures key relationships we can 
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better understand what kinds of decisions are being made (Nedelsky 2012:65). Nedelsky 
offers her relational rights approach as both an evaluative and transformative framework 
through which to resolve disputes (Nedelsky 2012:32). Once this underlying context has been 
identified, the inquiry shifts to examine the values at stake, which she describes as the broad 
articulations of what is essential in a particular society. She then asks us to consider the kinds 
of relationships that would foster those values, leading to a consideration of what particular 
forms of ‘rights’ would structure relations differently – rights being the “institutional and 
rhetorical means of expressing contesting, and implementing values” (Nedelsky 2012:236).  
 
Because the abstraction of the dominant ‘bundle of rights’ model of property reduces the rich 
multi-faceted relationship between people and places to the ownership relation (Graham 
2010; Gray & Gray 1998; Penner 1995), it is necessary to first make people-place relations 
visible in the decision-making process before we can evaluate and potentially transform 
them. In particular it is essential to understand whether there are some people-place relations 
that are cognizable and others that remain outside the legally recognized rights and interests 
to land. If so, we must consider how this distinction is made and upheld. 
 
Relational Theory and Planning: Seeing People-Place Relations in Law 
Noting the limits of her own analysis to human relations, Nedelsky invites her readers to 
extend her relational rights framework to ecological relations: 
Once attention is drawn to what kinds of relationships generate a given problem 
and what is shaping those relationships, it will become clear that the human 
institutions and norms I offer as examples above are themselves conditioned by 
the availability of natural resources as well as the way humans have constructed 
control over those resources and the way humans understand their entitlement to 
them (Nedelsky 2012:22).  
 
In my view, land use planning disputes offer a compelling context in which to take up this 
invitation. Indeed, they often serve as one of the few legal forums in which these questions of 
control and entitlement are openly contested and alternative relations with land are, to some 
extent, “performed” (Blomley 2013). 
 
Land use planning disputes are examples of “wicked problems,” (Rittel & Webber 1973) 
involving “multiple and competing values and goals, little scientific agreement on cause-
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effect relationships, limited time and resources, incomplete information, and structural 
inequities in access to information and the distribution of political power” (Lachapelle & 
McCool 2005:279). As such, they are contentious and notoriously difficult to resolve. Land 
use planning, and planning law, are also inherently relational in their concern with how we 
live together (Massey 2005). They are about relationships: relationships between neighbours, 
both near and far; relationships between those who own land and those who do not; 
relationships between those who make decisions about land and those who live with these 
decisions; relationships between humans and the animate and inanimate more-than-human 
agents we share space with; and, relationships between the present generation and past and 
future generations. While Valverde’s detailed study of Toronto’s planning regime points to 
the fundamentally “social” nature of all planning, she points to the integration of the 
governance of human and more-than-human as one of the unique elements of planning in 
need of much more scholarly attention (Valverde 2012:217). Planning processes provide for a 
wide range of parties to participate in legal decision-making processes (Arnold 2002). 
Further, the physical world is uniquely exposed in land use decision-making through photos, 
maps, technical data, but also stories and site visits (Van Wagner 2013).  Land use planning 
is also prospective in nature (Arnold 2002:47; Van Wagner 2013). Unlike environmental and 
property law that intervene in people-place relations to remediate after harm has been done, 
planning law has the potential for proactive restructuring of relations to avoid ecological 
harms. 
 
However, the important relational work that planning law does is under-examined by legal 
scholars and often overlooked by others concerned with environmental disputes.3  Valverde 
notes how the logic of zoning and land use law, focused on ‘uses’ rather than people, 
obscures law’s ordering of people and things (Valverde 2005:40–41).  She has noted the 
incommensurability of the use logic of planning law and constitutional rights-based 
arguments relied on in many high profile land use cases (Valverde 2005, 2012).4 As Nicole 
Graham observes, law “swiftly transform disputes about physical land use practices into 
disputes over abstract property rights.” Parties that speak of property as place and the loss 
                                                         
3 Indeed, Valverde (2012, 7) argues, the day-to-day operation of law has been neglected in scholarship about 
planning and urban studies. Tony Arnold similarly points to a neglect of land use regulation by both scholars 
and activists working on environmental justice issues (Arnold 2002). A 2014 Land Use Prof blog post by 
Canadian law professor Deborah Curran specifically noted the limited scholarly work on Canadian land use law, 
with Valvarde’s work as a notable exception: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/destined-to-
be-classic-land-use-books-from-canada.html. 
4 See for example Batty v. Toronto (City), 2011 ONSC 6862, 108 OR (3d) 571. 
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associated with transformation of the nonhuman environment become “dissident voices” 
(Graham 2010:163). In the context of land use disputes, a resource-oriented and instrumental 
planning perspective can serve to obscure a range of relations that may be put forward by 
intervening parties (Henwood & Pidgeon 2001; Nash et al. 2010). In this context a relational 
analysis aimed at examining “the way law participates in a problem” is particularly relevant 
to understanding the relationship between law and planning (Nedelsky 2012).  
 
My point is that while environmentally-motivated participants in land use disputes may find 
themselves frustrated with the process and the outcomes, land use planning is not inherently 
problematic from an environmental perspective. In fact, as noted above, it has some particular 
strategic potential for the transformation of ecological relations. Through careful and detailed 
attention to the legal structuring of relations through deeply embedded constructions of land 
as property and more-than-human others as objects, proprietary rights of control, exclusion, 
use, and destruction, facilitate power over the more-than-human world rather than 
responsibility to, and even reciprocity with, our ecological communities. As Harrison and 
Bedford argue, “a planning system underpinned by an ideology of private property rights and 
a free market forecloses alternative ways of valuing the natural world” (Boucher & 
Whatmore 1993; Cowell & Murdoch 1999; Foster 2002; Harrison & Bedford 2003:352). 
Therefore, while land use planning can be understood as creating space for alternatives to 
traditional property relations and may facilitate “public reflection on substantive issues” 
(Groves et al. 2013:342), we need to understand whether, and how, such opportunities are 
being realized on the ground in particular places. In my view, the promise of an ecological-
relational analysis is the opportunity to link the broad participatory opportunities of planning 
contexts with the unique visibility and presence of place in land use disputes. In doing so, it 
opens up space for transformative performances of ecological relations and the treatment of 
people-place relationships as socially and legally significant. 
 
From Relational Rights to Eco-Relational Rights: Place in Land Use Law 
In shifting the relational rights analysis towards an ecological-relational framework, 
this paper adopts the language of ‘place’ and ‘people-place relations’ to understand the 
overlapping and nested relationships within the ecology of specific landscapes inhabited by 
communities of human relation alongside complex and layered networks of materials and 
entities. Place is used to express an explicit acknowledgement of the relationality of the 
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human and more-than-human: the negotiated “thrown-togetherness” of relation that make up 
the social and material dimensions of particular places (Massey 2004:140–141). In this way, 
the language of place replaces the division imposed when we talk about ‘resources’ – rocks 
or trees, plants or animals, lakes and rivers removed from their networks of ecological 
interdependence to enable use and profit. At the same time, the affective elements of people-
place relations that are often excluded from technical resource-based planning are also made 
visible in this conception of place (Nash et al. 2010), and acknowledging the political nature 
of claims about, and to, place therefore reveals place-making as a site of power relations 
(Murdoch 2005:23; Pierce et al. 2011). This paper builds on Martin et al.’s conception of 
place as, “a setting for and situated in the operation of social and economic processes,” and 
“place claims” as “attachments to, and identification with, specific places” and their “ideals 
about land use and how spatial processes should unfold” (Martin et al. 2010:732, 182) to 
understand the political nature of particular places.  
 
Martin et al. note how land use disputes expose the “discontinuity between place identity and 
legal regulation of place,” as relevant legal frameworks fail to account for the range of 
concerns and attachments expressed by participants. Pierce et al. (2011:61) argue that the 
concept of relational-place is “particularly relevant to conflicts that centre on change in and 
of places.” Building on Massey’s concept of places as “bundles of space-time trajectories” to 
construct a multi-scalar and relational concept of place, they conclude that “all places are 
relational places” (Pierce et al. 2011:60). Relational places are made up of “raw materials,” 
including, “physical features, individuals, coalitions, corporations and groups, as well as 
myriad parts of the built environment” (Pierce et al. 2011:59). Selection amongst these raw 
materials shapes both “individual human-environment experiences,” the formation of shared 
understandings about places and their meaning in pursuit of collective goals. These “bundles” 
are dynamic, ongoing and change over time, each place-frame being only ever a negotiated 
and strategic “fraction of a place” (Pierce et al. 2011:61). The disconnect between people’s 
place claims and law is “one of the central features of the law-space nexus” (Martin et al. 
2010:182). 
 
This paper contributes to the need for further research exploring the actors and networks that 
mediate spatio-legal production in struggles over land use (Martin et al. 2010) by examining 
law’s role in structuring the people-place relations at the heart of a specific set of conflicts. 
As will be discussed below, the persistent centrality of private property ownership in 
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substantive decisions about how private land can and should be used is concealed by the 
procedural emphasis on participation and consultation in Ontario’s provincial land use 
governance. This privileging of the ownership relationship is further obscured by an 
emphasis on measurable and purportedly rational and objective criteria in the adjudication of 
land use disputes despite the affective and embodied nature of the ecological relationships at 
stake.  
 
By focusing on parties who do not have ownership rights to the land involved, I centre the 
broad ‘more-than-ownership’ interests engaged by such disputes. In doing so, I examine the 
ways in which law creates, responds to, and resolves the discontinuities between place claims 
and legally recognized relations to place. Such parties or participants are most often defined 
as non-owners, third parties, or objectors, defined by their distance and exclusion from the 
primary legal relationship of, and the lack of enforceable interests at the outset of the 
analysis. Here, I reject a negative or residual definition and adopt the language of more-than-
ownership to describe these parties and interests. My intention is to capture both the 
individuals and groups whose direct place-relations will be impacted by land use decisions 
and those who may be more indirectly connected to specific places but have related expertise 
and/or interest in the outcome. While not taken up directly in this paper, my intention is also 
to create space for the more-than-human entities with impacted relationships and interests, 
such as animals, plants, rivers, rocks or forests. These categories are not intended to simplify 
or romanticize local or “community” opposition – which can combine potentially 
exclusionary or parochial site-specific concerns with the assertion or development of more 
transformative socio-ecological relations. In this sense, ‘more’ is used to acknowledge those 
interests that fall outside of property-relations defined by the ownership model and not to 
grant any particular relation greater or privileged status. This shift in language is an initial 
attempt to account for the wide spectrum of contested relations with, and within, places that 
are shaped, obscured, and potentially disciplined by law.  
Methodology5 
This paper is part of a larger research project involving documentary analysis of the law and 
policy governing aggregate siting, which includes applications and appeals between 2001 
and 2014 in Ontario, as well as the written and oral submissions made before a legislative 
                                                         
5 This section summarizes the methodological approach outlined in Chapter Three, at pages 119-128. 
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review committee.6 An initial review of the Provincial Environmental Registry, a public 
online database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993, SO 1993, c 28), where 
all Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly 
posted identified 242 decisions on large-scale industrial aggregate mines, including 
approvals, withdrawals, and denials. A database of the decisions was constructed identifying 
the dates of proposal and decision, location, depth of extraction, volume of extraction, 
objections filed, key issues identified, and, decision makers for each. 
 
I selected cases for more detailed analysis through a review of key documents to identify the 
level and nature of participation by members of the public and regulatory and planning 
bodies. Cases with high levels of more-than-owner participation were identified and from 
these I selected proposals or appeals resulting in, or likely to result in, a hearing before the 
provincial land use tribunal. Selection was informed by the relational-place “methodological 
hooks” proposed by Pierce et al. (2011:61), in particular to “identify and examine the place-
frames central to the conflict” and to “identify those actors and institutions key to place-
framing” (Pierce et al. 2011:61) with a specific focus on more-than-owner parties. The cases 
included applications that were approved, denied, and withdrawn, as well as some additional 
cases including both large-scale extensions not included in the Provincial reporting regime 
and ongoing cases identified by a review of media coverage and through interview 
participants. Unstructured in-person interviews were held with over 25 participants in 
aggregate extraction disputes. Participants were largely activists in locally organized 
interest groups who had asserted, or continue to assert, more-than-ownership interests in 
relation to the land at stake in a particular proposal. In addition, two lawyers, one technical 
consultant, one policy analyst, and two planners were also interviewed. Interviews took place 
in both one-on-one and small group settings. Where possible, interviews took place in the 
area that was the subject of the conflict or I made subsequent site visits. All participants 
provided maps and often photographs of the sites. In two cases, participants took me on a 
tour of the larger area of the proposed development. 
                                                         
6In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on 
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1st session, 40th Parliament, 
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best 
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection, 
including conservation and recycling. 
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Legal and Policy Context: The Law of Aggregate Extraction in Ontario 
 
Like many jurisdictions, Ontario has developed a complex system of land use planning (Blais 
2011; Cullingworth 1987; Kaplinsky 2012; Sandberg et al. 2013), including the overlapping 
network of laws that govern the use of private land (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 
2012). The ‘public interest orientation’ and consultative nature of the provincial planning 
regime suggests the existence of legitimate interests in land beyond private ownership. In 
fact, one of the key promises of planning is to reduce conflict where the ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
interests in the use of private land clash (Blais 2011:52).7 Key aspects of provincial land use 
planning law and policy, such as zoning law, are premised on the acceptance of public 
limitations on the right of an owner to use their property in any way they wish (Kaplinsky 
2012; Valverde 2012:139). Unlike the United States and Australia, Canada does not have 
constitutional protection for property rights and Canadian courts have traditionally taken a 
highly deferential stance on the power of the state to regulate the uses of private property 
(Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 1999; Canadian Pacific Railway 
v Vancouver (City) 2006).  
 
In Ontario and other jurisdictions, participation in planning processes has realized some 
“subversive” potential.8 However, Anglo-Canadian planning remains rooted in the liberal 
individualism of colonial property law and continues to enforce abstract, hierarchical, and 
anthropocentric conceptions of human-environment relations that limit the potential to 
reimagine people-place relations (Borrows 1997; Mossman & Girard 2014; Van Wagner 
2013). In particular, despite the lack of constitutional protection for private property, the 
practice of land use law in Ontario reinforces the role of the owner in determining the use of 
private land.9  The case of aggregate mineral extraction in Ontario provides a useful 
                                                         
7 For an example of efforts to empirically measure the benefits of planning, see Cheshire & Sheppard (2002). As 
Blais (2011) points out in the context of Ontario, we know very little about the actual costs and benefits of 
planning.  
8 A review of wider land use debates is beyond the scope of this paper, but see examples such as strengthened 
environmental protections (Patano & Sandberg 2005; Sandberg et al. 2013; Whitelaw et al. 2008), human rights 
protection in zoning decisions (Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario v. Kitchener (City) (2010), O.M.B.D. Case 
No. PL050611; Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] M.J. No 212 (C.A.)), and has 
resulted in unlikely alliances for social and political change (Cowell & Owens 2006; Sandberg et al. 2013; 
Sandercock & Lyssiotis 2003; Scotford & Walsh 2013) 
9 While there is little scholarly commentary on land use law in Canada, see Curran’s 2014 blog post comparing 
the US and Canada and concluding that protections for property owners are similar in the two countries: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/land-use-in-canada-where-extensive-and-restrictive-land-
use-regulation-is-the-norm-by-deborah-curran.html. For a discussion of the private owner as the “primary land 
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illustration of the private landowner, and particularly, as the “primary land use decision 
maker” in the Canadian context.10 
Situating Aggregate Mineral Extraction in the Provincial Land Use Regime11 
While aggregate mineral extraction developments are open-pit mines, in Ontario they are 
regulated under land use planning law and policy. Unlike other large-scale industrial mining 
developments in the Province, they are also largely located on privately owned land. And, 
unlike other ‘locally unwanted land uses (“LULUs”), the siting of aggregate mineral mines 
is driven by private-owner proponents rather than public siting processes, such as 
environmental assessment. 
 
Planning law in Ontario operates through a complex web of legislation and policy. Figure 1 
illustrates the detailed “inventory of the laws” potentially applicable to any given aggregate 
extraction dispute in the Province.12 Land use planning falls within provincial jurisdiction 
over municipal institutions and property and civil rights.13 In the context of aggregate 
extraction, the legal framework includes, the constitutional and/or treaty rights of First 
Nations and Metis communities and the applicable Indigenous legal orders,14 municipal 
powers and centralized provincial planning policy under the Planning Act, the Provincial 
Policy Statement (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2014), [“PPS”], provincial 
planning regimes, particularly the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, and 
                                                         
use decision maker,” see (Platt 2014). At the time of writing a new volume on Canadian planning law was in 
press, Anneke Smit and Marcia Valiante. Public Interest, Private Property (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2015) 
10 It is important to note that the privileging of ownership rights is not the only explanation for outcomes 
described in the case study below. Land use planning decisions are complex and the siting of extractive activity 
is situated within larger dynamics of extractivism as well as rapid sub/urbanization. While I would argue that 
these are related to the structure of land ownership through private property and an owner-driven planning 
system, they also present distinct issues and considerations that are not taken up here. However, I see examining 
law’s role in privileging a specific form of relationship to land as critical to understanding how law upholds 
particular values about the more-than-human world in order to transform people-place relations in land use law.    
11 This section summarizes the material from Chapter Four, on pages 145-149, 162-192, and 219-227. Repeated 
text is indicated in italics. 
12This visual representation is an adaptation of Valverde’s (2012, p. 21-28) “legal inventory of laws”, which 
aims to provide an overview of the “basic legal architecture” engaged by particular disputes. 
13 Canadian Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3, s 92 (13). 
14 While the application of Indigenous law and the constitutional duty to consult First Nations and Metis 
governments is not discussed in this paper, they are considered in the larger project. Indigenous and Aboriginal 
law present some unique legal challenges to the existing aggregate extraction regime that are worthy of 
extensive and specific consideration beyond the scope of this paper.  
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the ARA and associated Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards.15 While the 
decision- making process flows from the Act, most hearings in quarry conflicts include, and 
many are focused on, consideration of amendments to the local municipality’s Official Plan 
and zoning by-laws required. The Province provides broad guidance and maintains 
considerable power to constrain local government action through both the Planning Act and 
the PPS, which “sets the policy foundation for regulating the development and use of land.”16 
  
                                                         
15 Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 13, s.22; Provincial Policy Statement (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Housing 2014); Ministry of Natural Resources guidelines and standards (Ministry of Natural Resources, Land 
and Water Branch, Aggregate and Petroleum Resources Section 1996; Ministry of Natural Resources, Natural 
Resources Management Division 1997) 
16 The majority of cases discussed here were decided under the 2005 Provincial Policy Statement, Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx [the “2005 PPS”]. In April 2014 the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took effect on April 30, 
2014. Applications filed subsequently will be determined under the 2014 PPS. 
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Figure 1: Inventory of Laws for Aggregate Extraction Siting 
 
MUNICIPAL 
 
Official Plan(s) and Development Plans 
(municipal/regional), Zoning, Bylaws, the 
municipal land survey 
 
 
PROVINCIAL 
 
Aggregate Resources Act , Planning Act, 
Endangered Species Act, Ontario Water 
Resources Act, Environmental Protection 
Act, Environmental Bill of Rights, 
Provincial Policy Statement, provincial 
land use plans, MNR guidelines and 
manual, common law of property 
 
 
 
FEDERAL 
 
Fisheries Act, Endangered Species Act, 
Trade Agreements (NAFTA), 
Environmental Assessment Act, s.35 of 
the Constitution (Aboriginal rights and 
title) and the Duty to Consult, Canada 
Lands Inventory, Canada Soil Survey, the 
Geological Survey of Canada 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
Indigenous legal orders 
Treaties 
International Investor Protection 
Mechanisms and Dispute Resolution in 
NAFTA and other Trade Agreements, 
international human rights and 
environmental obligations 
 
Figure 1: Inventory of Laws for Aggregate Extraction Siting 
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Within this provincially led planning regime, the bulk of day-to-day planning powers and 
responsibilities are devolved to local municipalities. However, formal public participation 
requirements for local planning and development decisions are set out in the Planning Act (s. 
17, 22, 26.2, 34). Review of planning decisions is divided between the Ontario Municipal 
Board (OMB) and the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT), ostensibly dividing “land use” 
from “environmental” decisions, despite the environmentally-focused nature of many 
objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al. 2013; Van Wagner 2013).17 However, one 
of the unique features of Ontario’s planning system remains the powerful role of the OMB, a 
quasi-judicial administrative body, which serves as the primary appeal body for planning 
and development decisions, including ARA licensing and associated planning approvals. 
 
The data collected from the Environmental Registry revealed that applications for large-scale 
industrial aggregate mineral mines under the ARA are overwhelmingly approved, both by the 
Ministry that oversees licensing, and by the quasi-judicial appeal body that contested 
applications are reviewed by in Ontario. Table 5 shows that between 2001 and 2014, 86% of 
large-scale ARA applications listed on the Registry were approved with only 2% having been 
denied. While close to 12% are withdrawn, in at least two cases, the applications were 
resubmitted with modifications. In another case, the application was withdrawn after a 
multimillion dollar settlement with the Province and an unsuccessful claim against the 
Federal government under the investor protection clause of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).18 While another high profile withdrawal by the Highlands Company in 
2011 is widely seen as a victory for the well-organized opposition, which brought together 
farmers, urban food movement activists, second home owners, environmentalists and 
indigenous groups, a revised Ontario geological survey now indicates that the applicant’s 
technical assessment of the quality the rock was incorrect and the value was overestimated.19 
  
                                                         
17 Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies have recently been formally linked as part of the 
Environment and Land Tribunals cluster but it is too early to determine any substantive outcomes of the 
restructuring (Sossin & Baxter 2012). For certain appeals, particularly where hearings may be required from 
both tribunals, a joint-board is formed under the Consolidated Hearings Act (RSO 1990. c C.29), such as the 
high profile Nelson Aggregate Co., Re, (2012 CLB 29642), and, Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re) (2012 CLB 
16274) cases. 
18 St. Mary’s Cement proposed a large quarry below the water table, located near Hamilton, Ontario. It was 
opposed by multiple agencies and local governments and a community group and eventually resulted in a rare 
Ministerial Zoning Order under section 77 of the Planning Act prohibiting aggregate development. Members of 
the community group were interviewed for this project. 
19 Consultant, interview, June 2014. 
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Decisions # % 
Approved 208 86 
Withdrawn 28 12 
Denied 6 2 
Total 242 100 
Table 5: Decisions on Class A Licences 2001-2014 as reported on the provincial 
Environmental Registry  
An overwhelming majority of the applications are approved. In many cases, this is despite 
substantial public participation in planning processes and tribunal hearings and strong 
objections by the community and sometimes planning agencies as well. Community activists 
often provide alternative expert evidence at their own expense, even in areas covered by 
explicitly “environmentally focused” development plans such as the Niagara Escarpment in 
southern Ontario. Table 6 shows the range of public commentary or objection for each 
category of decision, based on the Environmental Registry data. 
 
Decision Range of Numbers of 
Comments Filed 
Approved 0-1108 
Withdrawn 0-1563 
Denied 0-441 
Table 6: Comments and Objections filed by members of the public and/or government 
agencies (local, provincial and federal) 
While the Minister has discretion to grant an aggregate extraction license despite outstanding 
public objections, in practice almost all cases in which the proponent does not “resolve” all 
concerns, the adjudication is referred to the Ontario Municipal Board where the planning 
process is transformed into a quasi-judicial adjudicative process. Table 7 below shows the 
breakdown of decisions referred to the Board by decision makers. Seventeen percent of 
applications are adjudicated, with 83 percent being dealt with directly by the Ministry. 
However, it is important to note that Ministry approval does not necessarily imply that 
objections have been resolved from the perspective of the more-than-owner parties. As 
described below, while the applicant has two years to attempt to resolve concerns, once they 
notify the Ministry, parties have only 20 days in which to affirm their objection, or it is 
deemed withdrawn. Technical expertise, capacity, and financial resources may be as 
important in determining whether a party will maintain an objection as their substantive 
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concerns, particularly in light of the near certainty that the application will be referred to the 
Board. Hearings for contentious applications can be quite lengthy and expensive, particularly 
if an individual or group obtains legal advice. For example, the Duntroon quarry extension 
hearing lasted 169 hearing days.20 One interview participant observed the limitations of 
poorly funded local groups directly, having worked in environmental departments of 
government for many years, noting how success was linked to financial resources rather than 
substantive issues: 
Obviously many of them had very legitimate issues but unfortunately they were … 
driven by bake sale funds, could not afford the scientific studies … that were 
needed, so it became very difficult for them to argue their cases.21 
 
Interview participants almost uniformly viewed success before the Board to be unlikely.  
 
Decision Maker Approvals Denials 
 # % # % 
MNR 178 82 1 < 1 
OMB 28 13 3 1 
Joint Board 2  < 1 2 < 1 
Total 208  96 6 2 
Table 7: Outcomes for approved and denied applications by decision maker for 
decisions on Class A Licence Applications under the Ontario Aggregate Resources Act 
2001-2014 as reported on the provincial Environmental Registry 
The discussion below considers the finding that legal outcomes are skewed towards 
applicants, in this case aggregate extraction companies, from a relational perspective. I first 
examine the types of claims about what was at stake in the disputes and then explore how the 
legal and policy frameworks governing the application process structures the people-place 
relationships involved.  
Structuring Legal Relations  
While aggregate decisions engage a complex network of law and policy, the ARA and its 
regulations and Ministerial policies, the Planning Act and the guiding planning policy, the 
PPS, largely determine the structure of relations. The discussion examines the work that law 
does to structure people-place relations in the context of aggregate extraction. First, more-
than-owner perspectives on the people-place relations at the heart of the disputes studied are 
examined to demonstrate that amidst the messy complexity of the place-claims involved, 
                                                         
20 More-than-owner party, Interview, September 9, 2014.  
21 More-than-owner party, Interview, April 23, 2014). 
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assertions of alternative relationships with the more-than-human world emerge and have the 
potential to disrupt legal property relations. It then details three ways in which the people-
place relations of aggregate extraction are shaped through legal texts and processes to uphold 
the legal property relations of private ownership: (1) the relative positions of the potential 
parties during the application and adjudication stages; (2) the presumptive right to 
development and approval; and, (3) mitigation-based rather than a precautionary approach to 
ecological impact. 
Connection, Responsibility, Dependence: The Messy Story of Places at Stake 
Participants in the study expressed complex and sometimes contradictory relationships with 
the places identified for extraction in the disputes studied for this project. As noted above, the 
interests asserted by these more-than-owner parties are neither uniformly environmentally 
motivated nor are they merely instrumental NIMBYism. They are messy – all at once 
instrumental and affective, conservative and transformative, exclusionary and reciprocal. 
Here I am focused on such openings to consider whether the places at stake in aggregate 
disputes can serve as the “literal common ground” for essential conversations and 
negotiations about how we want to live together as human communities embedded in the 
social and ecological complexity of particular material places (Haluza-Delay et al. 2013; 
Scully 2012). Environmental concerns were not the only concerns expressed by the 
participants in this study and few of them identified primarily, or at all, as environmentalists; 
however environmental concerns were consistently raised as a central issue in both interviews 
and the texts examined.22 In this paper, I have focused on these concerns because of the 
challenge they present to the enduring legal primacy of the landowner in land use planning 
decision-making, often arising in unexpected places. It is not meant to romanticize a 
particular community or way of life or to simplify the messy and contradictory nature of the 
disputes. Rather my aim is to unsettle the notion that such disputes can ever be neatly 
                                                         
22 For example, see the “Resident Comments, Questions and Responses by Key Topic” from the Nelson Quarry 
Joint Agency Review Team Report, available online: 
http://www.halton.ca/planning_sustainability/planning_applications/applications_under_review/nelson_aggregat
e_quarry/. Halton Region, in which the Nelson Quarry was proposed, has a unique Joint Agency Review Team 
(JART) process that brings local and regional planning authorities together to review proposals. The JART 
Reports attempt to provide an accessible summary of key elements of the proposal and reviews of the technical 
information to the public. The Nelson JART Report also breaks down public comments. In this case 70 
comments were received and organized into the following categories: Natural Environment (22), Water (18), 
Noise and Air Quality (16), Blasting (22), Traffic (22), Existing Quarry (8), Rehabilitation (8), UNESCO 
Biosphere Reserve (10), JART Process (3), and, Other (24). While no thematic organized summary is available, 
the author’s assessment of the public comments of the 2012 legislative review reflects a similar mix of issues, 
although several additional concerns were raised in the province-wide hearings, such as First Nations 
jurisdiction and the constitutional Duty to Consult Indigenous communities.  
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categorized as either NIMBY or environmental in order to better engage with the “complex 
relations of attachment, belonging, exclusion and otherness that permeate such conflicts” 
(Woods et al. 2012:568).  
Some participants explained their motivations or their role in the process through 
concepts of advocacy, stewardship or responsibility. One member of a local environmental 
group involved in a licensing appeal pointed to both an interspecies and intergenerational 
sense of obligation:   
One of the problems you have is the Niagara Escarpment can’t stand up for itself; 
it is mute. You and I and all of us have to stand up and defend and that is what we 
are trying to do.”23 
 
A sixth-generation farmer on land adjacent to a proposed mine site whose family rejected 
repeated offers to buy-out his land reflected on his relationship to the surrounding lands and 
waters: 
…we realized when these guys came along, they could destroy all that stuff. We 
didn’t realize what a great spot we have here. We didn’t want to see that done. It is 
deeper than just the money part, eh. A lot deeper.”24 
 
One submission on the Nelson Quarry stated, “we are so fortunate to be stewards of this 
scenic, special land.” (Appendix C, JART Report, 2009, 14). Another noted, “[A]s humans 
we bear an enormous responsibility. While we look for ways to improve our lives through 
development, we must respect all that nature provides us and must use its resources 
responsibly.” (Appendix C, JART Report, 2009, 24). A farming couple collectively pointed 
to the need for a sustainable relationship with the soil: 
 
Participant 1: The big thing is you can’t create soil to grow food in. 
 
Participant 2: No, it is not a renewable resource but produces a renewable crop 
every year and that is the difference. You can't take aggregate and produce a 
new crop every year. … 
 
Participant 1: Yes, look at the cod industry. You spoil it, it doesn't come back in 
a few days.25 
 
                                                         
23 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014. 
24 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014. 
25 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014. 
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Human-environment interdependence was sometimes discussed in the context 
of environmental health. One participant reflected that she was surprised that public 
concern about the quarry proposal was quite limited until people were informed of the 
environmental health issues:  
We started off strong as a group on traffic impacts and property 
devaluation …and it doesn’t seem to have much of an influence…even 
with blasting…but you can’t breathe and your water is contaminated, 
people start to listen.26  
 
This type of framing was seen by other participants as narrowing the ecological perspective 
to centre human concerns. One participant lamented that the “average person” was more 
concerned about their own water and real estate values than the rare bats, butterflies, and 
orchids found on the site, “they are creatures succumbing to the destruction of the 
environment.”27 Another viewed the ecological impact as more of a “case-facing” issue than 
a “community-facing” concern such as traffic.28 For others, the connection between human 
wellbeing and ecological integrity became important to the shift beyond a site-specific 
campaign to engagement with broader debates about land use. One group shifted their focus 
from the particular site to advocating for a regional environmental plan that would recognize 
“the whole region [as] a system of environmental features and functions that work 
together.”29 A leading member of another group talked about rejecting the site-specific 
approach for the “common denominator” of food and water: “Our water is not for sale, our 
water is sacred and not to be polluted, and our foodlands are there for the betterment of this 
province.”30 He reflected on successfully shifting the local fight to support a more broadly 
focused campaign, “It is one of those issues in life that is just the right thing to do.”31  
Interview participants simultaneously emphasized their own knowledge of the places 
involved and a sense of humility about how much they had learned about the complexity of 
ecological systems and connectivity through involvement in the disputes.  For several 
participants the relationship to the place at stake in the dispute changed or deepened through 
engagement with the planning process. One farmer reflected on his new understanding of the 
role of the complex groundwater and hydrogeological features in the area:  
                                                         
26 More-than-owner party, Interview, July 18, 2014. 
27 More-than-owner party, Interview, July 28, 2014. 
28 More-than-owner party, Interview May 23, 2014.  
29 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 7, 2014 
30 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014. 
31 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014. 
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I never knew about the reach of water. I never knew that changing cold water 
fisheries by a couple degrees in temperature could be an issue. I never knew that 
fish that spawned in the Nottawasaga sturgeon became game fish in Lake 
Michigan. We were just farming there doing our stuff. We just don't understand 
the reach of impact things can have. We learned. We talked.32 
 
One participant talked about the proposed mine site beside her long-time family home, and 
having only recently learned about species of rare butterfly that depends on this unique alvar 
habitat:33 “This is a beautiful little alvar that should be saved, part of a disappearing globally 
rare habitat. You would find at least as many alvar indicators to save it [as another protected 
area]…but nobody is looking. The rare species are there but nobody is looking.”34 In several 
cases this learning was, at least partially, the result of engaging with highly technical 
proponent data personally, and often through experts, and finding it lacking. One participant 
described the process of learning about the complex hydrogeology of the site: 
As we were looking it just became more and more gripping because of the fact that 
we found these species, that it was designated provincially significant…how 
precious and vulnerable this aquifer was…The fragility of the system became 
more and more apparent as we learned more.35 
 
For many participants this complexity was not reflected in the complex modelling provided 
by proponent experts, abstracted from the day-to-day experience of a particular place. One 
member of an environmental group familiar with the detailed and time-consuming processes 
of ecological science noted that the ability to contest the expert reports was limited by little or 
no opportunity to collect alternative data about the physical and biological environment on 
the proponent’s property:  
They won’t let you walk around in your rubber boots and eat some sandwiches 
and try to figure out what is going on … You are in there for three hours and then 
you get the hell out.36    
 
Connection to place was also evident in participants’ descriptions of the impact of aggregate 
mining as fundamentally transformative, in marked contrast with its legal construction as an 
                                                         
32 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014. 
33 An alvar is a rare biological landform caused by shallow exposed limestone or dolostone bedrock forming a 
plain with thin or no soil. Alvars support rare plants and animals, particularly mosses, lichens and birds, and are 
found mostly in northern Europe or in the Great Lakes region of North America. More than half of remaining 
alvars occur in Ontario. See the Conserving Great Lakes Alvars: Final Technical Report of the International 
Alvar Conservation Initiative (1999), online: 
http://lakehuron.ca/uploads/pdf/Conserving.Great.Lakes.Alvars.pdf. 
34 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 28, 2014. 
35 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 11, 2014 
36 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014 
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“interim use” in the PPS. The sense that a particular material place would be lost was evoked 
through the image of the “hole” or “crater” that would be left behind: 
…[Y]ou are taking a natural feature which is an escarpment and you are creating 
a gigantic hole which later becomes a deep lake which is not natural on the 
escarpment. There [are] no lakes on top. You are destroying wetlands, you are 
destroying creeks, you are destroying woodlands, habitats…and farmland.37 
 
The loss of something was linked to the particularity of specific places through the rejection 
of highly technical adaptive management plans and environmental compensation mechanisms 
increasingly incorporated into licensing conditions in Ontario. Ambitious plans for the 
rehabilitation of a quarry site to agricultural production were rejected based on experience 
with the particular ecosystems involved: “My experience is it can’t happen….Once it is 
disturbed it is never as good.”38 Another participant distinguished between the “synergistic” 
relationship between the current agricultural use on the site and its “ecologically pristine 
features” and spread of ecological degradation that results from the “wasteland” or 
“moonscape” created by the “dry, barren, dust” landscape of the aggregate mine.39 The legal 
emphasis on the interim nature of the use, and on the requirements for rehabilitation, was 
seen by many as obscuring the material impact of extraction as a loss not simply to a right to 
a particular use or activity, but of a complex and relational place (Graham 2010). This legal 
move reinforces the primacy of property-ownership at the expense of the range of more-than-
ownership relations that might otherwise make such decisions even more complex. 
 
Owners as Planners and Participation as Objection  
There is no other sector that has the … same type of preferential treatment as the 
aggregate sector.40 
 
Legally the process of siting an aggregate mineral mine begins with the Aggregate Resources 
Act. However, the process of land assembly preparation likely begins many years before an 
application is filed. One participant described this pre-planning phase: 
I am confident that the quarry owners were planning this quarry years before 
knowledge of the application surfaced. Whether it is in acquiring the land or 
preparing the plans - the profit is such that the investment is very long term on the 
part of the industry. So they are light years ahead in their planning and their 
                                                         
37 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 7, 2014. 
38 More-than-owner party, Interview, August 8, 2014 
39 More-than-owner party, Interview May 23, 2014. 
40 More-than-owner party, Interview, April 23, 2014) 
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understanding of the citizens before the citizens become aware there is going to be 
a quarry in their back yard.41 
 
The application is premised on the selection of a site by the project proponent, who also 
usually owns the land in question. Unlike other siting disputes, such as landfills, where 
alternative locations are considered through a public environmental assessment process, 
aggregate mine locations are generally fixed by virtue of private ownership. In the words of 
one planner, “the aggregate is where it is; and also, it is private sector owners [who] don't 
really have the opportunity to look at alternatives.42 
 
The Act positions the private landowner as the primary actor who initiates the process at a 
time of their choosing through an application to the Ministry.43 The process is proponent-
driven and as the Provincial Standards and Manual sets out, the Applicant has control of the 
knowledge base upon which the technical, legal and factual decisions are made. The licensing 
process is informed and driven by the information and expertise provided by the proponent, 
with the express purpose of having the application approved. Any subsequent litigation is 
based on this same data, subject only to any independent technical or legal expertise and 
documentation that may be provided by Indigenous governments, municipal actors or 
planning authorities, and third party groups or individuals, likely at their own expense. 
However, independent expert evidence and review of the Applicant’s documentation is both 
logistically and financially onerous, particularly for Indigenous communities, small local 
governments and community groups. It is also risky, given that they may or may not be 
accepted by the Board at a hearing and that access to the proponent’s land may not be granted 
for direct investigation and data review.44 At least one participant noted difficulty retaining 
technical consultants due to expert firms’ relationships with the proponent companies.45 
 
The result is that the story about what is at stake and which relationships matter is effectively 
determined in advance of any adjudicative process. Once the proponent has established the 
narrative – politically, economically, and technically – it is very difficult and onerous to 
change. In at least two of the six denied applications, the more-than-owner parties linked their 
                                                         
41 More-than-owner party, Interview, September 9, 2014) 
42 Planner, Interview, March 7, 2014 
43 Ontario, 1997, “Provincial Standards of Ontario – Category 2 – Class A Quarry Below Water”, at 10-11, s. 
4.1.3 
44 Re Town of Richmond Hill, PL990303, r’vd by Ontario (Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing) v 
Ontario (Municipal Board) 2001, 41 OMBR 257, 20 MPLR (3d) 93. 
45 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12 2014. 
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success to having intervened at the early stages of the application by developing positive 
relationships with local planners and representatives and providing them with independent 
technical information and reviews of proponent data directly. In some cases they had 
provided expert reports before the proponent had even submitted data. Participants described 
this as “driving the agenda” and providing local decision makers with a “counter 
viewpoint.”46 In contrast, one participant in an approved quarry hearing noted that their 
community group was “considered hostile by everybody at [Township].” She noted that the 
company, who already had an existing quarry adjacent to the new site, had successfully 
positioned themselves as ‘local’ and ‘good citizens’: “[They] had all of their ducks in order. 
They invite the community to barbecues, they are the good people, they do things for the 
community centre.”47 
 
However, these parties also identified their success as related to a very specific framing and 
presentation that specifically excluded the affective dimensions of their relations with the 
places at stake. As one more-than-owner party noted, “We have to be as professional, frankly, 
if not more so than the proponent and that has to be our front in everything we do…”48 This 
was described by other participants as focusing on the “facts” or the “science.”49 One 
participant with past government experience linked a lack of success amongst community-
based groups on environmental issues to a failure to adopt this frame: “Many of them spoke 
simply by emotion and not enough by fact and substance.”50  
More-than-owner parties are characterized in Ministerial policy as “objectors” with no formal 
relationship with the land.51 Their relationship in the proponent-led process is with the private 
Applicant – the owner and holder of the rights related to the land. Despite the protection of 
aggregate resources as a matter of “provincial interest” for the benefit of the public, the 
consultations about aggregate application are conducted and controlled by the proponent. The 
Ministry has no role in addressing objections made by citizens and can therefore issue a 
license without formally addressing concerns expressed through either the ARA or the 
                                                         
46 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 23, 2014. 
47 More-than-owner party, Interview, September 9, 2014. 
48 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 23, 2014) 
49More-than-owner party, Interview, May 7; More-than-owner party, Interview, August 23, 2014 
50 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 2014. 
51 ARA, s. 11(3). 
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Environmental Registry process.52 There is no public assistance to interpret and assess the 
application information and little time to do so is provided, with a 45-day window for 
commentary.53 While the Provincial Standards require the proponent to host one public 
presentation in the local area during the notice period, neither the technical experts retained 
by the proponent nor Ministry representatives are required to be at the presentation to assist 
the public in interpreting the reports or to ensure compliance. In fact, the Policy Manual 
directs Ministry staff not to attend meetings unless there are “special circumstances.”54 One 
participant described the proponent-led process this way: “Aggregate has had its way forever 
and a day. They are firmly entrenched and implanted. They can do the things they do because 
they own the process.”55 
 
Multiple participants expressed frustration with the lack of access to Ministry experts and 
decision makers. Despite the designation of aggregate mineral extraction as a matter of 
provincial interest in 1982 (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing & Ontario 
Ministry of Natural Resources 1982), government agencies routinely decline to participate in 
hearings and in at least one case have refused to provide parties with relevant information 
about the application and assessment.56 A participant in that case characterized the Ministry 
as “in effect a facilitator for mining for quarry in Ontario. We don't have enough agency 
resources to police the quarry companies.”57 One planner described the lack of transparency 
in the planning policy process, particularly the role of various provincial and local decision 
makers: 
[T]hey are making those trade-offs in the back rooms and not necessarily in an 
open forum. The thing is now that we have this one window planning act process 
that we have had for quite a while now, it doesn't enable you to identify which 
ministry said what to government. So you don't really know how these trade-offs 
were made.58 
 
He expressed concerns that community groups were filling the gaps left by under-resourced 
or conflicted local governments: “Why is the municipality not protecting their own citizens? 
                                                         
52 One recent case indicates that the Minister can make decisions without formal consideration of EBR 
comments, and prior to the deadline for commentary, see Animal Alliance of Canada v Ontario (Minister of 
Natural Resources), 2014 ONSC 2826 
53 Ministry of Natural Resources, Natural Resources Management Division, Aggregate Resources Provincial 
Standards: 1997, at ss. 4.1.1., 4.2. 
54 A.R. 2.01.02. 
55 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014 
56 More-than-owner party, Interview, July 5, 2014. 
57 More-than-owner party, Interview, July 5, 2014. 
58 Planner, Interview, March 7, 2014. 
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Why do they [citizens] have to spend thousands of dollars to bring their own consultants in?” 
He also noted the imbalance given that aggregate companies can “afford to get the kind of 
expertise they want.” 
 
The proponent continues to set the terms and pace after the initial comment period. Within 
two years, they must “attempt to resolve” objections and submit a list of unresolved 
objections and documentation of attempts at resolution as well as recommendations for 
resolutions to the Ministry and to remaining objectors.59 A 20-day notice period is then 
triggered during which remaining objectors, including government agencies, must submit 
further “recommendations” or they are deemed to no longer object.60 While it is difficult to 
measure, it is possible that without the time, political support, and financial resources to 
obtain legal representation and technical expertise, parties with ongoing concerns may allow 
their objections to be deemed withdrawn. Conversely, one professional conservationist in an 
area of high aggregate development noted that once a proponent has triggered the process 
they have a great deal at stake and become much less likely to withdraw despite the need for 
ongoing consultation:  “Once they start they start the licensing process then they become very 
attached to it and they have invested a lot of money, a lot of money.”61  
 
Where they do go forward, parties tend to focus on narrow grounds that have received some 
legal recognition in the past, limiting their ability to articulate what is really at stake. This 
could include for example focusing on a specific endangered species habitat rather than a 
responsibility to respect the physical limits of particular ecological systems and obligations to 
future generations. Tribunal members routinely thank more-than-owner parties for sharing 
their “concerns” and for participating, while overwhelmingly accepting the “facts” provided 
by the proponent’s privately hired consultants and rarely challenging unsupported assertions 
about social and economic benefits.62   In the words of one planner, “[T]he boards tend to 
kind of fudge on the side of the proponent a lot of the time.”63 
                                                         
59 Manual, ss. 4.3.6, 4.3.3.1. 
60 Manual s. 4.3.3.3. 
61 More-than-owner party, Interview, July 18, 2014. 
62 See for example the majority decision in the Walker Brothers case; Van Wagner, 2013. 
63 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 7, 2014. 
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Presumptive Development, Approvals, and Saying No 
“[T]he issue was never about gravel or limestone, the issue was always about 
planning.”64 
 
Technically, in the context of aggregate extraction, if the land for which a quarry is proposed 
is not currently designated as a “mineral aggregate extraction area” under the applicable 
municipal Official Plan, the proponent will need to apply to local authorities for appropriate 
amendments under the Planning Act.65 However, the local planning requirements are 
constrained by provincial policy. The Policy Statement serves as the guiding document for all 
land use decisions in the province and the Planning Act stipulates that all policy and 
decisions of municipal governments and land use tribunals, including the Ontario Municipal 
Board and the Environmental Review Tribunal, shall be consistent with the Policy Statement 
(Planning Act, s. 3). Since the first version was approved in the 1990s, the Policy Statement 
has consistently prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and development. This 
prioritization has been maintained through to the recently revised 2014 policy. In 2005, the 
Policy Statement was revised to explicitly exclude consideration of the need for the resource 
to be extracted (PPS, S. 2.5).66 The Board itself has noted the exceptional nature of this 
presumption: “[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging Policy Statement 
where need is not required” (Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County), 2010). Planning and 
urban studies scholars have drawn attention to the operation and control of specific discursive 
frames that influence land use and environmental governance. Patano and Sandberg 
specifically note the ‘need’ or ‘demand’ narrative as a frame used by the aggregate industry 
to appeal to decision makers (Patano & Sandberg 2005). 
 
The effect is to limit the ability of local authorities to regulate exploration, extraction and 
operation, including the potential to prohibit extraction, to impose a needs-based analysis into 
the assessment of applications, and to protect features not deemed provincially “significant” 
                                                         
64 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014. 
65 ARA, ss. 12.1(1), 34(1); Planning Act, s.22. 
66 The PPS Aggregate Mineral Extraction section now reads as follows: “As much of the mineral aggregate 
resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as close to markets as possible. Demonstration of 
need for mineral aggregate resources, including any type of supply/demand analysis, shall not be required, 
notwithstanding the availability, designation or licensing for extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally 
or elsewhere.” 
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(Bull & Estrela 2012). One participant described the surprise when community members 
learned about the lack of jurisdiction at the local level: “Whose jurisdiction is it? Why can't 
our local council have a say in a potential industrial development that would totally change 
this community that has been built for five generations? How come we don't have a say? This 
is not okay. What can you do about it to make it okay? Nothing.”67 One planner also 
expressed a concern that the Board often adopts lower ARA standards as compared to the 
more rigorous official plan requirements.68 
 
More-than-owner parties have found that there is no meaningful opportunity to say “no” 
within the licensing process. In the words of an individual involved in one highly contested 
dispute: 
The industry often argues that companies need efficiency, transparency and 
certainty. What about efficiency, transparency and certainty for communities…? 
Surely when all agencies and stakeholders are saying no, the process should be 
able to come to a “no” outcome. To us, it unfortunately seems that the philosophy 
of presumptive development and entitlement prevents this company from 
accepting a no position.69 
 
Presumptive rights to transform and destroy the land at stake are embedded in the guiding 
policy, severing the “resource” from both human and other ecological communities. The 
Policy Statement imposes mandatory protection of aggregate resources for long-term use, 
including the protection of areas with known deposits, areas adjacent to known deposits, 
and/or current operations, from development or activities that would “preclude or hinder” 
extraction.70 This protection extends even to operations that have ceased, despite the repeated 
and ongoing assertion by a range of parties that land containing aggregate deposits is of value 
for agricultural uses, subject to ongoing Indigenous claims and rights, and ecologically 
critical habitat. Indeed, some participants expressed frustration at the lack of recognition that 
the rock to be extracted was an integral part of the ecological system on which the 
agricultural and/or conservation values depend.71 The narratives of exclusivity and the 
inevitability of growth discipline the messy complexity of competing and overlapping claims 
to land and ecological relations. 
 
                                                         
67 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014. 
68 Planner, Interview, March 7, 2014. 
69 More-than-owner party, Submissions to ARA Legislative Review, 2012. On file with author. 
70 ss. 2.5.2.4, 2.5.2.5. 
71 More-than-owner party, Interview, March 12, 2014; More-than-owner party, Interview August 11, 2014; 
More-than-owner party, Interview, July 18, 2014. 
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A specific place with complex networks of relations is transformed into an abstract space to 
be ‘temporarily’ disappeared and then rehabilitated to some other form of ‘use’ when its 
extractive value has been exhausted. The aggregate regulatory regime specifically provides 
for greater exemptions from rehabilitation requirements where quarries are developed in 
ecologically or agriculturally valuable land, based on concerns about efficiency and technical 
feasibility. For example, 2013 amendments to the Endangered Species Act specifically 
exempt aggregate licenses from the permitting regime.72 The sense that approval is presumed 
leads to a feeling that the process was not getting to the ‘right’ decisions because the relations 
considered were so narrow. There is no space for an articulation of a loss of place, something 
different and more profound than the loss of an abstract right. The “public interest” protected 
by the Ministry of Natural Resources, which oversees the licensing process, is explicitly 
linked to economic growth. 
One of our big themes when we talked to the government was the idea of 
presumptive development. One of the things with Hamilton that we kept getting 
scared about over, particularly a city who is trying to encourage industrialization 
and get the corporate tax base up so that the tax pressure is off the resident, is all 
this theme about business is good. We hear it in our politicians all the time. It 
doesn't matter what it is, business is good.73 
 
While the land may be recognized as having natural, social and cultural features, and 
potentially as having an ongoing relationship with non-owner persons and communities for 
food production, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the PPS. Participants 
expressed a view of aggregate sites as places with eco-social relations. But for the purposes 
of law, they are divided into different kinds of space - agricultural fields, ‘natural’ heritage, 
such as forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as trails, and subsurface resources such as 
mineral deposits and groundwater sources. The policy is currently constructed in such a way 
that even where recognized, these other types of relationship to place are trumped by the 
protection of the mineral resource value and economic relations. 
Mitigation, Prevention and Self-Regulation 
This whole business of adaptive management plan is rooted in the approach by the 
aggregate industry that if I don't do all my assessment work ahead of time to get an 
approval, then when I uncover a problem that I haven't anticipated, I will solve it 
then. I don't know what it is. I didn't know how to approach it. But I will solve it. 
                                                         
72 2007, S.O. 2007, c.6 [ESA]. O. Reg. 242/08, s. 23.14(1). 
73 More-than-owner party, Interview May 23, 2014. 
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How ridiculous is that? That is what an adaptive management plan is about. It is a 
non-plan.74 
 
Finally, the recent trend towards approvals on the basis of proponent-designed ‘Adaptive 
Management Plans’ also obscures the relationships of interconnection and dependence 
between the human and more-than-human communities in particular places. While not 
required by law or policy, proposals to mitigate rather than prevent potentially catastrophic 
harm, such as the depletion of the water table, through Adaptive Management Plans have 
been supported and even promoted by the Ministry and the Tribunal while they have largely 
rejected a precautionary approach (Van Wagner 2013). As critics have argued, this type of 
reactive approach to risk in extractive contexts waits until problems reveal themselves and 
attempts to resolve them by trial and error (Randall 2012). Arguably, this voluntary and 
industry-led approach compounds the proponent-driven nature of the licensing process. 
While adaptive management plans have been incorporated into site plans and licensing 
conditions as “an additional layer of oversight,” (Bull & Estrela 2012:29), their enforceability 
has been questioned, as has the potentially improper delegation of the Board’s authority to 
the Ministry (James Dick Construction Ltd. v. Caledon (Town), 2010) However, this concern 
has also been dismissed by other decision makers (Jennison Construction, 2011). 
 
The promotion of mitigation in place of precaution is further complicated by the almost 
universally recognized inability of the Ministry to enforce regulatory requirements and 
increasing reliance on self-monitoring (James Dick Construction and the dissenting opinion 
in Walker), concerns which are routinely dismissed as beyond the scope of the legal decision- 
making process (majority in Walker). As noted above, 2013 amendments to the Ontario 
Endangered Species Act exempt pits and quarries from the requirements to obtain a permit 
for activities that would otherwise be prohibited, including damaging or destroying species 
habitat, instead requiring only mitigation measures and registration of activities with the 
Ministry and without independent monitoring requirements and enforcement capacity. 
Aggregate extraction operations are also exempt from other environmental legislation, 
including any regulations of a local conservation authority under the Conservation 
Authorities Act. Such agencies are empowered to regulate development impacts on wetlands, 
shorelines and watercourses; however, in the context of aggregate they play only an optional 
                                                         
74 More-than-owner party, Interview, May 7, 2014. 
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advisory role to municipalities on issues related to natural heritage and water.75 One 
participant recalled that potential lawyers they interviewed focused on mitigation rather than 
opposition by asking questions such as: “What did we want as our compensation? What did 
we want for a framework document for how the operation would operate?”76 However, to 
many of the participants the stakes were too high to settle for mitigation despite the risks and 
the costs.  
Conclusion 
 
As the above analysis makes clear, the current land use regime in Ontario structures people-
place relations to uphold the primacy of the landowner as planner in the context of aggregate 
extraction. In doing so, law obscures ‘more-than-ownership’ relations with the land. An 
ecological-relational perspective reveals this structural orientation as excluding the complex 
range of relationships in particular places from the decision-making process. This limits the 
transformative potential of planning as alternative articulations of property relations are 
managed in the interests of a narrowly defined public interest in economic growth. By 
examining the use of planning tools and forums by more-than-owner parties in a specific 
setting, I argue that the legal rights to speak, write, appeal and contest land use decisions are 
not enough to reorient land use planning law away from abstract and anthropocentric 
property rights without the creation of space for performances of reciprocal relations with 
place.  
                                                         
75 RSO 1990, c C.27, 22(11); O. Reg 97/04 Content of Conservation Authority Regulations Under Subsection 
28(1) of the Act: Development, Interference with Wetlands and Alterations to Shorelines and Watercourses. 
76 More-than-owner party, Interview, April 23, 2014. 
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Chapter Eight – Law’s Rurality: Land Use Law and the Shaping of People-Place 
Relations in Rural Ontario1 
1. Introduction 
Land use law in Ontario constructs the rural as residual – a boundary space between the urban 
and the natural, between the industrial extractive and protected ecological zones. The 
working landscapes of rural places serve as a buffer to legally protected environmental 
landscapes, but are also offered up as a potential sacrifice zone where resource demands can 
be satisfied. As the space between industrial and environmental zones, rural places serve as 
the spaces in which the ‘balance’ between environmental values and economic growth can be 
established through the promotion of appropriate development and good planning. This 
residuality reinforces the value of rural places as either preserved amenity spaces or sites of 
industrial and extractive development rather than the inhabited sites of ongoing negotiated 
relations between human communities and with ecological systems. Further, it forecloses 
opportunities for the articulation and performance of transformative ecological relations that 
might otherwise emerge as parties negotiate the people-place relations of living with the 
‘more-than-human’ world in rural places.  
 
Decisions about land use are sites of political and legal contestation about social and 
environmental justice in both rural and urban contexts. This paper specifically considers the 
rural context by examining aggregate mineral mining in the Niagara Escarpment region of 
Ontario, Canada, a rural and peri-urban region that borders the Greater Toronto Area.2 
Aggregate extraction provides a strategic context in which to explore rurality as a dimension 
of environmental justice because of both the transformative material impacts of extraction 
and the spatially fixed nature of mineral resources. In this sense, mining can be distinguished 
from many of the other types of siting and locally unwanted land use issues traditionally 
considered by environmental justice scholars. Mining necessarily occurs in particular 
locations where resources are found (Keeling and Sandlos, 2009). As well, extraction is 
                                                         
1Originally published as (2016) Law’s Rurality: Land use law and the shaping of rural people-place relations in 
rural Ontario. Rural Studies 47, 311-325. 
2 Section 1 of the Aggregate Resources Act (RSO 1990, c. A.8), defines “aggregate” as, “gravel, sand, clay, 
earth, shale, stone, limestone, dolostone, sandstone, marble, granite, rock or other prescribed material”. 
Depending on the specific material, a mine is classified as either a “pit” or a “quarry” in Ontario. Mines are 
further classified according to private or Crown lands, tonnage of extracted material, and extraction above or 
below the water table. 
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transformative – a particular place is lost and another is created. While large-scale industrial 
aggregate mining in Ontario takes place largely on private land at the initiative of private land 
owners, the impact of extraction extends to a much wider range of human and more-than-
human communities with relationships to the particular places at stake. In this paper, I 
specifically examine interests asserted by parties without ownership interests in the land 
involved. These ‘more-than-ownership’ interests complicate legal and cultural constructions 
of property as the defining relationship between people and places. Disputes about aggregate 
mining provide one example of the how land use planning law attempts to balance such 
interests with the protection of private property ownership in Anglo-Canadian law. 
 
In the context of Ontario, the fixed location of aggregate mineral resources overlaps with 
networks of conflicting relationships with land: environmental preservation and ecological 
integrity; agricultural and recreational land uses; local and regional infrastructure and 
economic development; and, Indigenous rights and legal orders with respect to land and 
resources. Such relationships are produced through complex and interdependent people-place 
relations that are always being contested and negotiated through political, social, and material 
interactions within and between human and more-than-human communities. The specific 
hydrogeological features of valuable mineral deposits create the conditions for high quality 
agricultural land, historically inhabited and used by Indigenous communities displaced from 
their land through the establishment of settler farming communities and now characterized by 
a growing population of amenity-seeking exurbanites and second home owners. Elsewhere 
the rare species habitat of an alvar landscape, protected by an Indigenous legal order for its 
cultural and spiritual significance and subject to ongoing land claims, may be popular as a 
recreational destination, valuable as pastureland leased to local ranchers, and simultaneously 
privately owned by aggregate developers with plans to extract the uniquely accessible 
mineral resources. This paper examines the role of legal constructions of rurality in 
determining the ordering of these relations. In particular, the legal privileging of an extractive 
model of property over people-place relations that fall outside the boundaries of private 
property ownership is critically examined in the context of rural Ontario. The work that law 
does in structuring relationships with land shapes and constrains the range of ‘more-than-
ownership’ relations that are articulated and recognized in planning processes. In doing so, it 
plays an important role in shaping opportunities for just and equitable environmental relations 
in particular places. 
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2. Methods3 
This paper presents a case study on the unique environmentally-focused Niagara Escarpment 
planning regime that is part of a larger research project examining the law and policy 
governing disputes about aggregate extraction in Ontario between 2001 and 2014.4 An initial 
review of the Provincial Environmental Registry identified 242 decisions on large-scale 
industrial aggregate mines, including approvals, withdrawals, and denials.5 A database of 
the decisions was constructed, including chronologies, location, depth of extraction, volume 
of extraction, objections filed, key issues identified, and, decision makers. 
 
Detailed documentary analysis of legal texts was undertaken, including formal laws and 
regulations, policy and regulatory guidance documents, public submissions, and legislative 
review documents. Specific cases for detailed documentary analysis and in-depth interviews 
were selected through a review of key documents to identify the level of participation by 
members of the public and governmental and non-governmental organizations in the 
regulatory process and the types of issues and concerns about the impact of extraction raised 
by such parties. Cases with high levels of participation or those that presented particularly 
significant concerns, such as unprecedented size, experimental or untested extraction 
methods, or high levels of social and environmental impact were considered for interview-
based qualitative case studies. In selecting specific cases, I focused on applications resulting 
in, or likely to result in, a hearing before the provincial land use tribunal.   
 
Based on the documentary analysis, 18 unstructured in-person interviews were conducted 
with 25 participants involved in aggregate extraction disputes. All the disputes were in places 
deemed ‘rural’ by local or regional plans with the exception of one case study in Northern 
Ontario. For the purposes of this paper, rurality is defined in relation to the legal 
classification of the place involved rather than personal identification as rural or as 
belonging to a rural community. Participants were largely activists in local or regionally-
                                                         
3 This section summarizes portions of Chapter Three, from pages 119-128. Repeated text is italicized. 
4In May 2012, an all-party review of the Aggregate Resources Act was initiated at the Standing Committee on 
General Government (Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Orders and Notice Paper, 1st session, 40th Parliament, 
March 22, 2012). The review included the consultation process, siting, operations, and rehabilitation, best 
practices and industry developments, fees and royalties, and, aggregate resource development and protection, 
including conservation and recycling. 
5 The Environmental Registry is a public online database governed by the Environmental Bill of Rights (1993, 
SO 199s, c 28), where Aggregate Resources Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 8 [the “ARA”]) applications are publicly 
posted, 
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based organizations formed to respond to a specific application or pre-existing organizations 
who chose to become involved with a particular quarry application based on a particular set 
of environmental or social concerns. Participants included farmers, residents of communities 
close to proposed mine sites, non-resident home owners in communities close to proposed 
mine sites, and members of local environmental and conservation groups. 6 In addition, two 
lawyers, one scientific consultant, one policy analyst, one professional naturalist, and two 
planners were also interviewed. All but one of the participants were white, 15 were men and 
10 were women. 
 
Interviews took place in both one-on-one and small group settings. Where possible, 
interviews took place in the area that was the subject of the conflict. Subsequent site visits 
were made by the author in order to achieve a place-based understanding of the participants’ 
perspectives. In two cases, participants provided an extensive guided tour of the proposed 
site following the interview. In other interviews participants provided or referred to maps and 
pictures of the location. In two cases the author is personally familiar with the area. 
 
The data was analyzed through an eco-relational analysis developed by the author to bring 
together the relational analysis of law proposed by Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky 
with the relational-place approach proposed by Pierce et al. Based on this hybrid framework, 
the data was analyzed to identify  “the place-frames central to the conflict” (Pierce et al., 
2011), the place-based relationships and values “at stake” (Nedelsky, 2012) and law’s role 
in shaping and defining the people-place relationships in particular places. .  
 
As explored here, rurality was one of several themes that emerged across these analytical 
categories. This paper specifically considers the legal structuring of rural people-place 
relations in the Niagara Escarpment. As a particular and material place in which 
                                                         
6 At the time of writing, the larger project includes the development of a conceptual framework and an ongoing 
process of relationship building aimed at working with an Indigenous community facing quarry development 
proposals in Ontario, including in the Niagara Escarpment Development Plan Area where enduring Indigenous 
relationships to the land and place-based legal systems are critically components of realizing just sustainability. 
The goal of this work is to engage with Indigenous experiences, perspectives, and legal principles for land use 
governance in the larger project, which requires distinct legal and methodological considerations for the author 
as a white, settler, legal academic. This aspect of the project was not complete at the time of publication and is 
therefore not included in this paper. The discussion below does consider questions and implications related to 
Indigenous land and legal orders as a critical part of a broader discussion about rurality and environmental 
justice in Ontario and Canada and an essential element of ongoing and future research. However, it is not 
reflected in the empirical data discussed below. 
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interdependent human and ‘more-than-human’ interests are engaged by extraction, the 
Escarpment provides a useful case study in which to analyze how law structures people-place 
relations as well as defines and contextualizes what is at stake in land use conflicts. While it 
draws on the larger project’s analysis of generally applicable legal texts and on the themes 
identified in the interviews as a whole, the case study is grounded in the specific legal, 
political, social, and ecological context of the Escarpment through its focus on the Niagara 
Escarpment planning framework.  
3. Placing Law: Preserving and Extracting the Niagara Escarpment 
Ontario’s Niagara Escarpment and its distinctive planning framework provide a particularly 
interesting example of law’s construction of rurality. The region is both ecologically 
significant and legally unique. Indeed, the development of the province’s first environmental 
planning regime under the Niagara Escarpment Development Planning and Development Act 
[“The Niagara Escarpment Act”] (RSO 1990, c N.2) was specifically motivated by the impact 
of the aggregate mining industry on the landscape of this peri-urban and rural region of the 
province (Chambers and Anders Sandberg, 2007; Whitelaw et al., 2008). Rurality is one of 
the defining land use categories through which competing claims to land are negotiated 
through the Niagara Escarpment Act and the policies that flow from it. There is however a 
lack of consistent or explicit definition of the ‘rural’ in planning law and policy. General 
definitions of rurality outside of the planning context tend to construct rurality as a residual 
category – the territory “outside” or “that remains” outside urban or population centres 
(“Rural area (RA) - Census Dictionary”).7 Here I consider how rurality is constructed as a 
residual category in legal decision-making about land use. I consider whether it is 
conceptualized in relation to the ecological relations of particular places; or conversely, 
whether rurality serves to obscure or dismiss ecological relations in contentious land use 
disputes about rural places.  
A. Seeing Law’s Relational Work in Place 
Building on relational approaches to place (Amin, 2004; Massey, 2005, 2004; Pierce et al., 
2011) and relational legal analysis (Nedelsky, 2012), the analysis below examines the role of 
the legal system in Ontario, including formal laws and regulations as well as the daily 
operation of regulatory planning processes. These processes structure the relationships that 
                                                         
7 One of the few contexts in which rurality is defined in Ontario is health care planning, where an “index of 
rurality” focused on population and distance has been developed (Kralj, 2000). 
  340 
constitute rural places and uphold particular values about the more-than-human-world. In 
particular, I build on the relational theory of Canadian legal scholar Jennifer Nedelsky to 
foreground the specific ways in which land use law operates to constitute our relationships 
with the ecological networks of particular places and sustain particular values in relation to 
the more-than-human world. In order to extend Nedelsky’s analysis to more-than-human 
relations, I adopt the language of ‘place’ and ‘people-place relations’ to understand the 
overlapping and nested relationships within the ecology of specific landscapes inhabited by 
human communities alongside complex and layered networks of materials and entities 
(Amin, 2004; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013; Massey, 2005, 2004; Pierce et al., 2011). In doing 
so, I apply an eco-relational analysis of land use law to foreground the complex 
interdependence of relations between human and more-than-human interests at stake, as well 
as the embodied experience of living in particular places.  
 
When we better understand what kind of decisions about our relationships with our 
environment are being made through planning and land law, we are better prepared to 
critically intervene to shape them differently. Through this eco-relational analysis, I aim to 
make visible the values upheld by current legal relationships to place, predominantly defined 
through private-property ownership. In the context of this paper, the eco-relational approach 
also supports moves to shift environmental justice from its anthropocentric roots towards the 
more-than-human elements of places at stake in land use conflicts (Agyeman and Evans, 
2004; Agyeman et al., 2003; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013). As Neimanis et al. argue, the 
capacity of an ecosystem to self-regulate its ability to support all forms of life is essential to 
the realization of social and environmental justice (Neimanis et al., 2012). The integration of 
ecological integrity and environmental justice avoids shifting between anthropocentric and 
ecocentric hierarchies, instead acknowledging more-than-human interests while drawing 
attention to the relational interdependence of human life and ecological systems. 
 
Drawing attention to law’s role in the hierarchical privileging of particular types of 
relationships with land within settler-colonial societies is also an essential part of 
understanding when and how place-connection claims and place-protective behaviours serve 
to reinforce colonial patterns of land use and contribute to social exclusion and patterns of 
environmental inequality (Foster, 2010). Exposing the ways in which legal constructions of 
rurality shape the types of claims asserted and recognized in land use conflicts is central to 
identifying the “way that power works through places to limit the possibilities for human and 
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non-human others” (Gruenewald, 2003, p. 315; Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013). Where law 
obscures embodied experiences and excludes relations of ecological interdependence to 
reinforce hierarchical and exclusionary constructions of place, it operates to limit the 
potential to realize environmentally just people-place relations (Graham, 2010).  
 
The romanticization of farm life and agricultural practices, erasure of Indigenous histories 
and legal orders in rural places, glorification of the rural landscape as an amenity space for 
urban recreation, and the preservation of the rural as an empty or untouched wilderness, all 
impose a problematic binary, colonial, and anthropocentric worldview in which particular 
human bodies exist as separate and apart from ecological relations. Not only does this 
foreclose opportunities to account for the interests and relationships of and with the ‘more-
than-human’ world (Gilbert et al., 2009a; Sandberg et al., 2013; Whatmore, 2002), it also 
upholds the colonial and Eurocentric property relations that justify the dispossession of 
Indigenous lands and the exclusion of Indigenous legal orders, one of the key sites of ongoing 
social and environmental injustice in Ontario and Canada (Agyeman et al., 2010; Alfred, 
2009; Borrows, 1997; Chien, 2010; Porter, 2012; Scott, 2013).  While I adopt the view in this 
paper that mining is a uniquely transformative land use in which a relational place is removed 
from the social and ecological networks in which it was once embedded, I neither presume 
nor reject the possibility that other land uses, such as agriculture, residential development, or 
recreational uses are (potentially) appropriate and just in particular places. Rather, my aim is 
to examine the ways in which rurality is invoked in law and interpreted through legal 
processes in the specific context of aggregate mining. In doing so, I hope to consider 
opportunities for the articulation and practice of alternative and just ecological relations with, 
and within, rural places. Further, I seek to identify strategic opportunities to heed Haluza-
Delay et al.’s call to learn how to “live well together in the land” (2013). In my view, 
critically examining the complex and often contradictory nature of relationships with place is 
crucial to engaging in meaningful debate about how we live together as human communities 
embedded in rich and complex networks of relation in particular material places. Here I argue 
that rurality is one way in which law structures people-place relations that must be considered 
if we are to work towards “a compassionate sense of place as well as a politicized sense of 
justice” (Haluza-Delay et al., 2003, 235).   
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B. Environmental Justice 
The context of competing claims for particular rural places presents a unique opportunity to 
consider whether and how rurality emerges as dimension of environmental justice. My focus 
on parties without legally recognized property interests in the land at stake complicates the 
reductive labeling of rural land use conflicts as NIMBY-ism (Burningham, 2000; Hubbard, 
2006; Mcclymont and O’Hare, 2008; Wolsink, 2006) and avoids the binary of development 
versus preservation towards critical engagement with the “complex relations of attachment, 
belonging, exclusion and otherness that permeate such conflicts” (Woods, 2012, 568).   
Without suggesting a fixed definition of environmental justice, I interpret it as including both 
procedural and substantive dimensions and as attending to positive entitlements to ecological 
integrity alongside concerns about the distribution of environmental harms (Agyeman and 
Evans, 2004; Agyeman et al., 2003; Draper and Mitchell, 2001). From an eco-relational 
perspective, human dimensions of environmental justice are embedded in just relations with 
the ‘more-than-human’ world. A number of scholars have argued persuasively that 
environmental justice scholarship must broaden its scope – in particular the need to move 
beyond race and class as the central analytical categories and sites of injustice. Canadian 
environmental justice scholarship has called for the broadening of voices, worldviews, and 
methodological approaches (Agyeman et al., 2010), as well as the need to shift away from 
anthropocentric notions of justice (Neimanis et al., 2012) to integrate environmental and 
social dimensions of justice and sustainability (Agyeman et al., 2010, 2003; Haluza-DeLay et 
al., 2013). Here, I consider how rurality as a dimension of environmental justice contributes 
to such a broadening in the Canadian context as people in rural places inhabit, negotiate, and 
contest their relationships with land and the more-than-human world.  
 
In debates about regional planning, opposition by farmers to development controls on rural 
land has been characterized as “rooted in the ‘traditional producers’ discourse of 
individualism and property rights” (Bartel et al., 2013; Pond, 2009). Environmental concerns 
expressed by urbanites and rural homeowners have also been characterized as self-interested 
claims to amenity and property values by both proponents and decision makers (Gilbert et al., 
2009b; Sandberg et al., 2013), while dominant environmental narratives have been shown to 
perform the “work of social exclusion and xenophobia” and reinforce colonial narratives of 
land use and landscape (Foster, 2010). These are all valid concerns about the political nature 
of planning and crucial demonstrations of the operation of power through land use decisions. 
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Exclusionary politics of property rights and narrowly framed arguments for environmental 
preservation do emerge as part of land use disputes in Ontario and they do serve to obstruct 
discussion of environmental justice and ecological integrity and even perform or reinforce 
social exclusion and colonialism (Foster, 2010). At the same time, disputes about aggregate 
mineral extraction in rural Ontario reveal the complexity of relationships between agricultural 
land users, property owners, other rural land users, and rural places themselves. As parties 
invoke relationships with the ecological in their opposition to extractive development and 
form unlikely alliances across ideological, territorial, and political boundaries, strategic 
opportunities to contest dominant people-place relations and generate legal change emerge 
(Gilbert et al., 2009b; Sandberg et al., 2013). Careful and critical attention to the range of 
environmental and place-based interests asserted in the context of land use conflicts may also 
provide opportunities for more effective and successful dialogue about progressive 
environmental planning (Bartel et al., 2013; Foster, 2009; Sandercock, 2000). While parties 
can, and often do, express competing and contradictory claims in the context of contentious 
land use conflicts, I argue that nuanced and critical examination of expressions of respect for 
Indigenous histories and legal orders, assertions of place-attachment and place-based 
experiential knowledge, and acknowledgment of shared ties to particular places reveal 
strategic openings for a restructuring of rural people-place relations through law (Bartel et al., 
2013; Foster, 2009; Sandercock, 2000). In this sense, I argue that it is possible to remain 
attuned to the danger of depoliticization and parochialism of place, while simultaneously 
exploring opportunities to build relations of reciprocity with the land (Graham, 2011, 2010) 
and foster progressive planning (Foster, 2010, 2009) as we “learn to live well together in the 
land”(Haluza-DeLay et al., 2013, p. 236). 
4. Locating Law: Aggregate Extraction and Environmental Planning in 
Ontario8 
 
These are the landscapes of a special place. There is a special legislation 
to protect this area and it means a lot to them and they don't want it treated 
lightly. (Planner 2, Interview, September 3, 2014) 
 
In 1962, blasting from the Dufferin Aggregates Milton Quarry accidentally blew a hole in the 
Niagara Escarpment, one of Southern Ontario’s most prominent landscapes. The Escarpment 
is a major limestone outcrop running through a large part of Southern Ontario from Niagara 
                                                         
8 This section summarizes portions of Chapter Three, from pages 210-213. Repeated text is italicized 
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Falls to the Bruce Peninsula. It is simultaneously a site with unique ecological systems 
(Jalava et al., 1996; Kelly and Larson, 2007), prime agricultural lands, high scenic and 
amenity value, proximity to urban centres, and valuable aggregate mineral deposits, as well 
as being the traditional territory of Indigenous communities with particular legal, spiritual 
and historic significance (Borrows, 2001, 1997; CONE, 1998). The visibility of the 
transformed landscape was a catalyst for the development of a fledgling environmental 
movement in the province and the public construction of the Escarpment as a specific and 
valuable landscape (Whitelaw et al., 2008). Growing public awareness of the unique 
ecological and aesthetic features of the area and the impact of aggregate mineral 
development led to a 1968 government-commissioned expert report that mapped and 
documented the entire Niagara Escarpment area (Niagara Escarpment Study Group, 1968). 
In 1973, the resulting landmark Niagara Escarpment Act was approved, bringing about the 
first regional and, “at least symbolically” environmentally focused land use protection plan 
in Canada (Cullingworth, 1987, 230). In 1990, the area was designated as a UNESCO World 
biosphere reserve.9 
The Niagara Escarpment Act passed into law with the express purpose of maintaining 
the Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing only for 
“compatible” development (s.2). The Act was significant in that planning decisions that had 
previously been made at the local level were now regionally determined (Whitelaw et al., 
2008).10 The Niagara Escarpment Plan [“the Plan”], drafted under the Niagara Escarpment 
Act sets out the specific policies related to the management of land and water resources, 
location of industry and commerce, identification of major land use areas, provision of major 
parks and open space, control of pollution and the natural environment, and ensuring 
compatibility of private sector development (s.9). The sense of loss of place following the 
Milton Quarry accident informed the Plan’s unique attention to the preservation of the visual 
landscape alongside the natural and cultural features of the area. 
                                                         
9 See details at the UNESCO website: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-
sciences/biosphere-reserves/europe-north-america/canada/niagara-escarpment/ 
10 The Act created the 18-member Niagara Escarpment Commission [the “Commission”), made up of the 
appointment of a chair, 8 members from escarpment municipalities and 8 members of the public, which is 
responsible for the creation of a land use plan and is now responsible for its implementation, at ss. 5. There are 
no appointments designated for Indigenous governments and representatives. One member of the NEC is a 
representative of the aggregate industry. The current 2005 Niagara Escarpment Plan is available online: 
http://www.escarpment.org/_files/file.php?fileid=fileuRdJDqEnAp&filename=file_NEP_Intro.pdf 
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While the process through which the original Plan was developed was neither collaborative 
nor participatory, environmental groups, community organizations, and aggregate and other 
industry groups were involved in the “adversarial” hearings on the proposed land use plan 
from 1980 to 1983. Critics of the new planning regime, including the aggregate industry, 
private land owners and residential developers, were successful in limiting the scope of the 
plan by over 60% and influencing the planning rules to allow for extractive development 
within the Plan area (Whitelaw et al., 2008).11 As will be discussed below, the legal 
construction of “rural” places within the Niagara Escarpment Plan Area [the “Plan Area”] 
is crucial to the ongoing role of extraction in shaping the Niagara Escarpment, both within 
the boundaries of the Plan Area and outside. Aggregate mining has been, and continues to 
be, one of the most contentious land uses in Ontario, and particularly on the Escarpment. 
 
5. The Legal Creation of Rural Spaces of Extraction: Defining Rurality 
Residuality  
In 2001 a Statistics Canada Rural and Small Town Canada Analysis Bulletin noted, 
“[A]lmost every social, economic and environmental policy issue has a rural dimension” (du 
Plessis et al., 2001). Yet there is little treatment of the concept of rurality in Canadian legal 
scholarship and the role it may play in the legal treatment of land use issues. In part, this is 
reflective of a broader neglect of land use planning in legal scholarship in Canada; however, 
even within the limited legal and socio-legal scholarship in this area, the focus is decidedly 
urban (Blais, 2011; Blomley, 2004; Valverde, 2012, 2005).12  
 
As will be explored in detail below, the legal and policy framework regulating land use 
simultaneously presents the rural as a space of resource extraction, economic growth, and as a 
source of essential ecological services. The ‘balancing’ exercise between these potentially 
contradictory roles and values is performed through the legal processes of land use planning 
                                                         
11 The NEPDA requires the government to review the Plan regularly and now requires that it be reviewed at the 
same time as the Greenbelt Plan under the Greenbelt Act (2005). In 2015 the government undertook a 
coordinated review of these and other Provincial Plans, including the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan 
and the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan. More information about the coordinated review can be found 
on the Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing website: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page10882.aspx. 
See the guiding document for public consultation, (Our Region, Our Community, Our Home, 2014). 
12 For a discussion of the urban-centric focus of legal geography, see (Pruitt, 2013). Canadian socio-legal 
scholar Deborah Curran recently noted the “paucity of academic interest in land use in Canada” in a blog post 
noting Blais and Valverde as important exceptions: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2014/11/destined-to-be-classic-land-use-books-from-canada.html. 
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as parties shape and contest the nature of rurality and rural land. The project of defining 
rurality is fraught and contentious, and its extensive debates are beyond the scope of this 
paper (Halfacree, 1993; Phillips, 1998; Woods, 2012). Rather than engaging in a definitional 
exercise, I adopt the position that rurality is not a fixed category or territorial space, but rather 
a site of contestation and complex interconnection between the social, the temporal, and the 
material more-than-human world. My aim here is to consider the specific role that law plays 
in creating and upholding “structural obstacles to developing mutually enhancing land 
relationships” by upholding particular relationships with place and excluding others 
(Plumwood, 2002). In other words, how does the legal construction of  ‘rurality’ in Ontario’s 
land-use planning process shape and constrain the ongoing and contested ordering of the 
social and ecological interests of people-place relations in rural spaces?  
 
i. The Provincial Policy Statement 
The provincially governed and policy-led regime of land use planning in Ontario relies on 
overlapping and sometimes conflicting constructions of the rural to shape and contain the 
complex relationship between people and places - the rural, urban, northern, and increasingly, 
suburban and peri-urban places, made up of the social, ecological, and political networks of 
human and more-than-human life. Constitutionally, planning falls within provincial 
jurisdiction over municipal institutions and property and civil rights in Canada (The 
Constitution Act, 1867). Though the day to day operation of land use planning falls to local 
and regional governments, the Province provides broad guidance and maintains considerable 
power to constrain local government action through both the Ontario Planning Act (The 
Planning Act, 1990) and the Provincial Policy Statement [the Policy Statement], a policy 
document that “sets the policy foundation for regulating the development and use of land” 
(Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2014).13  
 
The Policy does not define “rural” or “rurality” in the text or in the extensive definitions 
appendix. However, it does define rural areas as “a system of lands within municipalities 
that may include rural settlement areas, rural lands, prime agricultural areas, natural 
heritage features and areas, and resource areas.” ‘Rural lands’ are also defined as “lands 
                                                         
13The PPS is available online: http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page215.aspx. In April 2014 the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing released the 2014 Policy Statement, which took effect on April 30, 2014. 
However, the cases considered here are governed by the earlier PPS from 2005, which can be found here: 
http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Page1485.aspx. 
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which are located outside settlement areas and which are outside prime agricultural areas.” 
Of the 42 references to ‘rural,’ in the PPS, half are to rural lands or rural areas. However, 
the remaining references are to undefined terms, including “character” or “characteristics”, 
“amenities”, “assets”, “land uses”, and “landscape.” This leaves significant scope for 
contestation and interpretation about rurality and land use.  
 
Section 1, ‘Building Strong and Healthy Communities,’ permits and encourages resource-
related uses on rural lands. In fact, it explicitly protects resource-based use and uses requiring 
separation from other uses, invoking the key land use logics of separation and incompatibility 
to secure rural lands for industrial, infrastructure, and extractive developments (ss. 1.1.5.6, 
1.1.5.7, 1.1.6.1). While development “compatible with the rural landscape” is promoted, the 
“rural landscape” is not defined in the Policy (s.1.1.5.4) and read in conjunction with the 
above sections, it appears to include typical infrastructure, locally unwanted, and resource-
based uses. The Policy goes on to link rural communities with the “quality of life” and 
“economic success” of the Province (s. 1.1.4) and to associate the development of a 
“sustainable economy” to leveraging rural assets and amenities and protecting the 
environment as a foundation for a sustainable economy. Under Section 2, separate 
subsections deal with Agriculture (2.3), Natural Heritage (2.1), Cultural Heritage and 
Archeology (2.6), Water (2.2), Minerals and Petroleum (2.4), and Aggregate Mineral 
Resources (2.5).  
 
ii. The Niagara Escarpment Framework14 
The Niagara Escarpment Act and the Plan also play a central role in conceptualizing rurality 
through the creation and maintenance of seven land use designations: Escarpment Natural, 
Escarpment Protection, Escarpment Rural, Escarpment Recreation, Minor Urban, Urban 
and Mineral Resource Extraction. These designations govern the types of uses and activities 
individuals or corporations can engage in as of right, those which require specific 
permission, and those which are prohibited. Each designation is described in detail in the 
Plan, including the “Objectives,” “Criterion for Designation,” and “Permitted Uses” 
associated with such a designation (Niagara Escarpment Plan, 2005, ss. 1.3-19). Through 
these designations, the Plan mediates and controls extraction and industrial land uses based 
                                                         
14 This section repeats portions of Chapter Four, in particular pages 193-201. Repeated text is indicated is 
italicized. 
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on a particular construction of rurality. Escarpment Natural and Escarpment Protection 
designations prohibit any mineral resource extraction. For Escarpment Rural lands, an 
amendment to the Plan is required for extraction over 20,000 tonnes. Such lands are 
described as “essential” yet also peripheral, with their key role being to provide a “buffer to 
the more ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment” (s. 1.5). While not an as of right 
land use, extraction is specifically contemplated for Escarpment Rural lands. In this way, 
particular places – complex networks of eco-social relation designated by the plan as ‘rural’ 
–become the central objects of political and legal decision-making about extraction. 
 
The Plan designates Escarpment Rural areas as an “essential component of the Escarpment 
corridor,” serving this buffer role for protected environmental spaces. It sets out five 
Objectives for Escarpment Rural areas (s 1.5):  
1) To maintain scenic values of lands in the vicinity of the Escarpment corridor;  
2) To maintain the open landscape character by encouraging the conservation of the 
traditional cultural landscape and cultural heritage features;  
3) To encourage agriculture and forestry and to provide for compatible rural land uses;  
4) To provide a buffer for more ecologically sensitive areas of the Escarpment;  
5) To provide for the designation of new Mineral Resource Extraction Areas which can be 
accommodated by an amendment to the Niagara Escarpment Plan. 
 
Therefore, while the Plan does explicitly contemplate extraction, it requires an amendment to 
be approved. As noted above, extraction is not an as of right land use in Escarpment Rural 
areas and section 8 of the Niagara Escarpment Act sets out seven “objectives” that are “to 
be sought in the consideration of amendments to the Plan”:  
a.) to protect unique ecologic and historic areas; 
b.) to maintain and enhance the quality and character of natural streams and water 
supplies; 
c.) to provide adequate opportunities for outdoor recreation; 
d.) to maintain and enhance the open landscape character of the Niagara Escarpment 
in so far as possible, by such means as compatible farming or forestry and by 
preserving the natural scenery; 
e.) to ensure that all new development is compatible with the purpose of this Act as 
expressed in section 2; 
f.) to provide for adequate public access to the Niagara Escarpment; and 
g.) to support municipalities within the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area in their 
exercise of the planning functions conferred upon them by the Planning Act. 
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Amendments must be consistent with these objectives and the purpose of the Act – 
maintaining the Niagara Escarpment as a “continuous natural environment” and allowing 
only for “compatible” development – and the Plan. Amendments must also be justified by the 
Applicant (ss. 6.1(2.1) and 10(6), NEP, s 1.2.2). Further, an applicant must demonstrate the 
purpose and objectives of the Niagara Escarpment Act will not be adversely affected (NEP, s 
1.2.2). 
 
The Niagara Escarpment Planning Area has been designated by regulation (O Reg 826) as a 
‘development control area’ and specific developments must be approved under a permit or 
exempted by regulation.15  The Plan sets out both general and specific Development Criteria 
in Part 2, which must be considered in the permit application process; however, not all 
criteria are applicable to all situations.16 Section 2.11 specifically considers mineral 
resources, with the objective of minimizing the impact of new mineral extraction and 
accessory uses. The Plan requires that operations shall not conflict with the following 
criteria: 
a.) The protection of sensitive ecological, geological, historic and archaeological sites or 
areas. 
b.) The protection of surface and groundwater resources. 
c.) The maintenance of agricultural areas, in accordance with the Agricultural Policies of 
the Provincial Policy Statement (PPS). 
d.) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on 
existing agricultural or residential development. 
e.) The preservation of the natural and cultural landscapes as much as possible during 
extraction and after rehabilitation. 
f.) The minimization of the adverse impact of extractive and accessory operations on 
parks, open space and the existing and optimum routes of the Bruce Trail.17 
                                                         
15 Lands licensed continuously since 1975 under the Pits and Quarries Control Act, 1971, are exempted from 
requirements for a development permit by regulation, which remains significant since aggregate licenses do not 
expire (O Reg 828/90, s 19). 
16 This was also emphasized by the majority of the Board in Walker. 
17 The Section also includes requirements for setbacks from the brow of the Escarpment, screening, progressive 
rehabilitation, the use of off-site material for rehabilitation, accessory uses, and restrictions on new adjacent 
development. The following specific criteria outlined in the Plan may also be applicable to an aggregate 
application: 2.5 New Development Affecting Steep Slopes and Ravines; 2.6 New Development Affecting Water 
Resources; 2.7 New Development Within Wooded Areas; 2.8 Wildlife Habitat; 2.9 Forest Management; 2.10 
Agriculture; 2.12 Heritage; 2.13 Recreation; 2.14 Areas of Natural and Scientific Interest (ANSIs); 2.15 
Transportation and Utilities; 2.16 The Bruce Trail. 
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“Protection” is defined in the Plan as “ensuring that human activities are not allowed to 
occur which will result in the unacceptable degradation of the quality of an environment 
(Appendix 2, at 127). This protective stance differs from proponent-driven approach in the 
Aggregate Resources Act and the presumptive development approach to mineral extraction in 
the Policy Statement. 
6. Structuring Rural Relations for Extraction: The Aggregate Resources 
Act18 
 “Agriculture, forestry, mining and manufacturing sectors contribute greatly to the quality of 
life in Rural Ontario.”  
Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Website  
 
The Aggregate Resources Act [ARA] governs aggregate extraction in the majority of the 
province, including pits and quarries in the Niagara Escarpment Planning Area (1990). The 
ARA came into force in 1990 replacing the former, and highly criticized, Pits and Quarries 
Act 1971. As with the Niagara Escarpment planning protections, the aggregate industry 
lobbied against the passage of the ARA (Baker et al., 2001). Notably, while the ARA received 
first reading in 1979, it was not proclaimed until 1990. During this period the extraction rate 
in the province rose from 131 million tonnes to 197 million tonnes, resulting in “heightened 
awareness of the overall costs of the industry and weaknesses in the policy framework” 
(Aggregate Resources Program: Statistical Update Aggregate Resources Section, 1990; 
Baker et al., 2001). The new 1990 Act did respond to some of the concerns raised by the 
public and municipal governments and brought in a more detailed set of requirements for site 
planning and rehabilitation of quarries and pits. However, amendments to the Act in 1997 
raised further concerns about the regulation of aggregate mining in Ontario (Aggregate and 
Petroleum Resources Statute Law Amendment Act, 1996). The amendments aimed to increase 
industry accountability through the introduction of requirements for public notice and 
circulation of applications and mandatory public consultation. Yet, a central objective of the 
Bill was also to reduce the government’s role in the regulation of aggregate licensing and 
operations by shifting towards a self-monitoring system and the creation of an industry-led 
Aggregate Resources Trust that would be responsible for the rehabilitation of abandoned pits 
and quarries, research activity and fee collection and distribution (ss. 4, 12, 36). This 
                                                         
18 This section summarizes material included in Chapter Four, pages 134-142, 162-192. Repetitive text is 
italicized. 
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proponent-driven approach has persisted, and arguably increased, to the present-day. While 
the Act governs extraction licensing, conflicts are largely focused on the planning approvals 
and amendments required prior to a license being granted. Therefore, the focus on most 
conflicts is on the Provincial Policy Statement. 
A. The Provincial Policy Statement 
While the Policy Statement is to be read as a whole to balance social, economic, and 
environmental values, it has consistently prioritized aggregate resource “preservation” and 
development since the first version was approved in the 1990s. The balancing of social and 
environmental impacts of extraction in the Policy Statement must be considered in light of its 
protection of mineral aggregate resources and operations from “incompatible” development. 
Section 2.5.2.5 requires municipalities to protect known deposits, areas adjacent to known 
deposits, strictly limiting development that would “preclude or hinder” access and 
extraction. Mineral aggregate operations, even those operations that “cease to exist”, must 
be protected from incompatible development (s. 2.5.4.2.) while earlier versions of the Policy 
Statement maintained that “mineral resource needs” should be considered in the licensing 
process. In 2005, the Policy Statement was revised not only to remove consideration of need, 
but to explicitly exclude it: “Demonstration of need … including any type of supply/demand 
analysis shall not be required, notwithstanding the availability, designation or licensing for 
extraction of mineral aggregate resources locally or elsewhere.” Formerly, opposing parties 
and governments used the needs analysis to argue that the material to be extracted was not 
currently required and therefore the site in particular cases should not be approved (Bull and 
Estrela, 2012). After the amendments, those arguments are no longer available. 
 
This presumptive need analysis remains controversial and the NEC along with the provincial 
Environmental Commissioner, amongst other commentators, argued that supply/demand 
analysis should be reintroduced during the most recent five-year-review of the Policy 
Statemen tand the legislative review of the ARA in 2012.19 While the Board has concluded 
that a needs analysis is not required under 2005 (and now 2014 PPS) language, it has 
                                                         
19 For example, Niagara Escarpment Commission. 2010. Re: Five Year Review of the Provincial Policy 
Statement. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario; 111 of 166 comments on the Provincial Policy Statement 
Review can be accessed on the Environmental Registry, Registry Number 011-7070; (Ontario, Legislative 
Assembly, Standing Commitee on General Government and Standing Committee on General Government, 
2012); Statements on file with Author, transcripts of the legislative review hearings can be accessed online. 
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nonetheless been a live issue in several cases.20 As noted by the Board in a recent decision to 
turn down an application, “[a]ggregate extraction is the only use in the wide ranging Policy 
Statement where need is not required.”21 
 
In contrast, a close examination reveals that protection of natural and social-cultural 
features in the Policy Statement is largely limited to features formally deemed “significant” 
by provincial policy and is subject to important exemptions (s 2.5.0). While it provides for 
absolute protection of aggregate resource supplies and existing operations, social and 
environmental impacts are to be “minimized” rather than avoided (s.2.5.2.2). This despite 
s.2.1.1, which states, “[n]atural features and areas shall be protected for the long term”, 
s.2.2.1, which states, “[p]lanning authorities shall protect, improve or restore the quality and 
quantity of water,” and s.2.6.1, which states that significant built heritage resources and 
significant cultural heritage landscapes shall be conserved.22 In 2013, the Ontario 
Endangered Species Act was amended to specifically exempt pits and quarries from the 
requirements to obtain a permit for activities that would otherwise be prohibited, including 
damaging or destroying species habitat. Instead it would only require mitigation measures 
and registration of activities with the Ministry and without independent monitoring 
requirements and enforcement capacity.23 Exemptions for aggregate extraction, such as those 
newly introduced under the ESA, have been the subject of strong criticism from the provincial 
Environmental Commissioner.24  
The Policy Statement attempts to resolve the apparent conflict between the protection of 
natural features and cultural heritage by classifying aggregate extraction as an “interim” 
activity and requiring rehabilitation to “accommodate subsequent land use” (s 2.5.3.1). The 
2014 Policy Statement now encourages “comprehensive rehabilitation” in areas with a 
concentration of mineral aggregate operations. However, the standards for rehabilitation are 
                                                         
20 OMB Case No: PL101197 decision issued 16 December 2011, 2011 Carswell Ont 14192, at para 117-118 
[“Jennison Construction”], but see also James Dick supra note 13, and the dissenting opinion in Walker supra 
note. 
21 Capital Paving at para 16, supra note 13. 
22 The 2014 PPS now draws attention to and explicitly distinguishes between “positive directives” such as shall 
and “limitations or prohibitions” such as shall not which do not allow for discretion and “enabling or supportive 
language” such as should, promote, encourage which, they state, allows for “some discretion,” making the 
close-examination of such language essential to decision-making at the application and adjudicative stages.  
23 , 2007, S.O. 2007, c.6 [ESA]. O. Reg. 242/08, s. 23.14 (1). 
24 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 2013. “Laying Siege to the Last Line of Defence: A Review of 
Ontario’s Weakened Protections for Species at Risk”: http://www.eco.on.ca/index.php/en_US/pubs/special-
reports/2013-special-report. 
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limited to the promotion of “land use compatibility” obscuring the specific and unique 
relationships that adjacent ecological and human communities may have with the land and 
its current use. 
 
This emphasis on one feature of the land, disconnected from its wider ecological and social 
networks, as is compounded by the requirement that “as much of the mineral aggregate 
resources as is realistically possible shall be made available as close to markets as possible” 
(s.2.5.2.1.). The majority of aggregate is used within the Greater Toronto Area and the 
surrounding Greater Golden Horseshoe region. As will be discussed below, the resulting 
concentration in surrounding regions and the cumulative effects of extraction are 
exacerbated both by the Plan’s focus on designated rural places to accommodate extraction 
and the vulnerability of those places left outside of the contested boundaries of the Plan itself.  
The close to market requirement is subject to the “realistically possible” limitation and the 
Ministry has taken the position that this should be considered on a case-by-case basis and 
include consideration of other Policy Statement policies and “other considerations.” There 
has been limited analysis of the section by the Board; however, one case did point to social 
and environmental impacts as part of the “realistically possible test,” finding that the 
proposal was, “not realistic given that the possible environmental impacts have not been 
minimized.”25 Bull and Estrela point out that this is consistent with the purposes of the Act to 
minimize adverse impacts. However, they note that the close to market analysis also suggests 
that some impacts are acceptable (Bull and Estrela, 2012). The focus on mitigation rather 
than avoidance is reflected in the legal analysis, which has been focused on deciding on 
which impacts are acceptable and at what threshold rather than examining the assumptions 
behind claims of economic benefit or considering the ecological and social costs of 
development.26 
 
7. Finding Balance in Rural Places 
 
In 2011, the first denial of an Aggregate Resource Act license in the Plan Area was hailed as 
a historic victory for PERL (Protecting Escarpment Rural Lands), a group of current and 
                                                         
25 Capital Paving, at para 30. 
26 See Capital Paving, and Jennison Construction. 
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former residents and environmentalists, as well as the local governments and planning 
authorities who had opposed the application, including the Niagara Escarpment Commission 
[“the Commission”]. 27 Nelson Aggregates had proposed the large, below the water table 
quarry near Mount Nemo in the Burlington area outside of Toronto, Ontario.28 PERL 
opposed the mine based on the ecological, agricultural, and cultural significance of the site 
and provided substantial evidence to decision makers through their own expert reports, 
resulting in the designation of an endangered species habitat for the Jefferson salamander and 
recognition of a watershed complex, and ultimately rejection by the Board.29 However, on the 
heels of the victory in Nelson, the Niagara Escarpment Commission and a locally organized 
group of residents, environmentalists, and second home-owners, suffered an equally 
significant defeat when the Walker Aggregates large-scale quarry extension was approved 
within the Escarpment Plan Area. 30   
 
When the Commission and a coalition of community members and organizations formally 
opposed Walker’s proposal for a large quarry adjacent to a quarry grandfathered under the 
ARA in Duntroon, the vulnerability of rural escarpment lands in the Plan Area was exposed. 
At one of the highest points of the escarpment, the site is hydrogeologically significant, is 
home to habitat for endangered species, and is adjacent to recreational use areas. After the 
Commission denied the Plan amendment and development permit applications, the proponent 
                                                         
27 Nelson Aggregate Co., Re, 2012 CLB 29642, [Nelson]. See (Van Wagner, 2013) for a detailed discussion of 
the Nelson decision. 
28 The Application materials and reviews by the Joint Agency Review Team (JART), a unique collaborative 
review model in Halton Region, are available on the Halton region planning website: 
http://www.halton.ca/planning_sustainability/planning_applications/applications_under_review/nelson_aggregat
e_quarry/. JART Report lists the following PERL Consultant submissions as having been considered: PERL 
Consultant submissions: Natural Resources Solutions Wetland Evaluation; Letter from Wilf Ruland (P.Geo.) to 
PERL dated April 23,2005, Re: review of October 2004 report titled “Hydrogeological and Water Resources 
Assessment of the Proposed Nelson Quarry Co. Extension; Letter from Wilf Ruland (P.Geo.) to JART dated 
December 23, 2006 Re: further review of the May 2006 submission from Golder Associates titled “Additional 
Work Programs, Proposed Nelson Aggregate Co. Extension, Burlington, Ontario”; Blackport Hydrogeology 
Inc., prepared by Ray Blackport, P. Geo. for PERL, Re: Review of Hydrogeology and Water Related Issues 
Proposed Nelson Quarry Expansion (December 17, 2007); Ray Blackport powerpoint presentation to JART on 
water hydrogeological issues. 
29 PERL maintains a website and Facebook group: < http://www.perlofburlington.org/>. A Toronto-based 
environmental group Lake Ontario Waterkeeper who formally objected to the Nelson proposal maintained a 
blog with links to the reports and notes from the hearings: < http://www.waterkeeper.ca/wordpress-import-
blog/19261?rq=Aggregate>  
30 Re Walker Aggregates Inc. (Re), 2012 CLB 16274 [Walker], aff’d Niagara Escarpment Commission v 
Ontario (Joint Board), 2013 ONSC 2496, 12 MPLR (5th) 51 [Walker Appeal], 4, 18. 
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land owner appealed.31 A two member majority of the three-person Joint-Board in Walker 
rejected the “environmentally-focused” approach set out in the Plan. They interpreted the role 
of the Niagara Escarpment Act and the Plan as “balancing” or “resolving” the conflict 
between “the protection and development of aggregate resources” and the “protection of the 
Niagara Escarpment.” Based on the lack of “definitive guidance” and definition in the Plan, 
the majority chose to apply the Policy Statement standard of “no negative impact” to 
environmental impacts rather than the “protection” of “unique ecological areas” required by 
the Plan.  While provincial plans like the Niagara Escarpment Plan prevail in the event of a 
conflict with the broadly applicable Policy Statement, the majority characterized their 
decision as a preference for the Policy Statement test rather than finding it conflictual, 
thereby bypassing the higher standard.  
 
This finding, and the result, was upheld on appeal to the Ontario Divisional Court despite a 
lengthy and detailed dissent by the sole ERT member at the hearing (Van Wagner, 2013). 
While decisions at the tribunal level do not bind the Ontario Municipal Board, Environmental 
Review Tribunal and the combined Joint Board as administrative decision makers, the 
findings of the judicial review in Walker do set a precedent for future cases. By upholding the 
majority decision in Walker, the Divisional Court has signaled a move away from a 
precautionary and environmentally-focused approach to planning adopted in some notable 
recent decisions, 32 and has placed a substantial burden on those seeking to establish the non-
extractive value of rural places and work towards a just sustainability in people-place 
relations (Van Wagner, 2013). Walker demonstrates how the residuality of rural areas in the 
Plan area creates an opening for the lower standard that reinforces the primacy of both private 
                                                         
31 Review of planning decisions in Ontario is divided between the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) and the 
Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT), ostensibly dividing “land use” from “environmental” decisions despite 
the environmentally-focused nature of many objections to planning decisions (Sandberg et al., 2013; Van 
Wagner, 2013). Notably the two quasi-judicial administrative bodies have recently been formally linked as part 
of the Environment and Land Tribunals cluster but it is too early to determine any substantive outcomes of the 
restructuring, See, (Sossin and Baxter, 2012). However, in the context of the NEPA, appeals related to aggregate 
development are heard by a Joint-Board made up of three members from the two appellate bodies, Consolidated 
Hearings Act, RSO 1990. c C.29. As administrative ‘expert’ decision makers, the Joint Board, the OMB and the 
ERT are all given considerable deference by reviewing courts and it is very difficult to overturn their findings as 
appeal is granted only on errors of law. 
32 Nelson, supra note 27; James Dick Construction Ltd. V. Caledon (Town), [2010] OMBD No. 905 [James Dick 
Construction]; Capital Paving Inc v. Wellington (County), 2010 Carswell, Ont 697, OMB Case No: PL080489, 
January 19, 2010, [Capital Paving]. 
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ownership and extractive land uses in the interests of finding ‘balance’ between the 
environment and economic growth. 
 
The places at stake in aggregate disputes are embedded in and constituted by complex 
networks of eco-social relations, but for the purposes of Ontario’s guiding planning policy, 
they are divided into different kinds of space - agricultural fields, the natural heritage zones 
of forests or wetlands, recreational sites such as hiking trails, and subsurface resources such 
as mineral deposits and groundwater. While the land may be recognized as having natural, 
social and cultural features, its value as a commodity is clearly prioritized by the Policy 
Statement. The structure of the Policy Statement provides basic recognition of ecological and 
social relationships with places. However, the hierarchical protection of the mineral resource 
value and economic relations to land lead to a presumption of development which ultimately 
undermines people-place relations.  In the Walker decision, the Board’s ‘balancing’ exercise 
was enabled by the adoption of the Policy Statement rather than the more protective and 
precautionary environmentally-focused Plan framework. The resulting reductionist account 
of the complex eco-social places of Escarpment Rural lands fails to account for the embodied 
people-place relations of particular places. By narrowly defining the story about what is stake 
in disputes about places, the structure of relations upheld by the legal process limits the 
nature of people-place relations that can be realized through land use planning. The research 
examined below explores alternative articulations of the place-relations engaged by aggregate 
extraction disputes from the perspective of parties with more-than-ownership interests in the 
land. By critically examining these alternative accounts of what is at stake, I consider the 
strategic potential for a shift towards an environmentally just construction of rural people-
place relations. 
8. Discussion and Results  
A. Extraction, Compensation and the Transformation of Place 
 
Relational legal analysis aims to expose what is really at stake in a particular dispute in order 
to determine whether law can, and should, structure relationships differently (Nedelsky, 
2012). Interview participants in aggregate extraction conflicts consistently expressed concern 
about the environmental harms resulting from the transformative nature of extractive land 
use. This is consistent with submissions to ARA licensing processes and to the legislative 
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review process by a range of parties. The sense that a particular, material place would be lost 
was repeatedly captured by the image of the ‘hole’ left behind by extraction: “… [T]he loss 
of natural habitat which is caused by the new Quarry [Duntroon] is an absolute loss and the 
lake provides no significant replacement except as visual compensation instead of a great 
hole in the earth” (BMWTF, 2011), One participant characterized the impact of a proposed 
quarry on the Escarpment as “unavoidable destruction of the landscape”: 
[S]o you are taking a natural feature which is an escarpment and you are 
creating a hole which later becomes a lake which is not natural on the 
escarpment. It is up on the top. There [are] no lakes on top. You are 
destroying wetlands, you are destroying creeks, you are destroying 
woodlands, habitats. And farmland (Interview, May 7, 2014). 
 
For some participants environmental concerns were linked with a sense of connection with, 
obligation to, or dependence on, the land. One farming couple collectively pointed to the 
need for stewardship of the soil to ensure on ongoing and sustainable relationship: 
 
Participant 1: No, it is not a renewable resource but produces a renewable crop 
every year and that is the difference. You can't take aggregate and produce a 
new crop every year. … 
 
Participant 2: Yes, look at the cod industry. You spoil it, it doesn't come back in 
a few days. (Interview, August 8, 2014) 
 
A member of an environmental group involved in opposing a licence application expressed a 
sense of intergenerational and interspecies obligation:  
“The Niagara Escarpment to me is a thing that I meant to protect for my 
kids. One of the problems you have is the Niagara Escarpment can’t stand 
up for itself; it is mute. You and I and all of us have to stand up and 
defend and that is what we are trying to do” (Interview, August 8, 2014, 
Collingwood). 
 
Connection with the land was sometimes linked to experiential knowledge and living or 
working with the land, particularly for farmer participants (Interview, August 8, 2014; 
Interview July 18, 2014). However, it was also described by many participants as the result of 
the rich learning about the ecological, historical, or cultural features of a particular place 
through their engagement in the decision-making process. In particular, several participants 
described learning about the connectivity and interdependence of the social and ecological 
systems within and between places.  One farmer reflected on his new understanding of the 
role of the complex groundwater and hydrogeological features in the area:  
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I never knew about the reach of water. I never knew about changing cold 
water fisheries by a couple degrees in temperature could be an issue. I 
never knew that fish that spawned in the Nottawasaga sturgeon became 
game fish in Lake Michigan. We were just farming there doing our stuff. 
We just don't understand the reach of impact things can have. We learned. 
We talked. (Interview, March 12, 2014) 
 
One participant pointed to the alvar ecosystem in the proposed site beside her long-time 
family home, and having only recently learned about species of rare butterfly and bat that 
depend on this unique habitat (Interview, August 28, 2014). Another participant whose 
childhood home was impacted by a proposed mine described gaining a renewed appreciation 
for the place she grew up through her involvement with a local residents group:  
It [the proposed site] become more of a presence to me the more I learned 
about it, and before they put the “no trespassing signs on it, the more I 
walked around it and thought more about it…It’s just beautiful and I had a 
distinct memory of coming home when this just started to unfold and 
seeing it, and going, ‘that’s as good as it gets’. (Interview, August 11, 
2014) 
 
One submission to the 2012 legislative review stated: “The soil can’t be separated from the 
substrate or from the atmosphere or from the water or anything else. This is something we 
understand” (ARA Submission, June 2012, on file with author). In some cases, participants 
also linked learning about Indigenous history, worldviews, and relationships with the land at 
stake with a deepened connection to place (Interview, August 11, 2014; Interview, August 8, 
2014; Interview August 28, 2014). These participants reflected on the need to learn from 
Indigenous approaches to environmental issues and cited the importance of working with 
Indigenous communities based on their experiences in opposing aggregate applications. One 
participant went on to actively support Indigenous opposition to other types of development 
based on her experience opposing a local aggregate mine (Interview, August 11, 2014). 
 
Participants also strongly refuted the idea that extraction could be a “temporary” land use, as 
it is characterized by the Policy Statement. One naturalist characterized the impact as “a 
transformation of the landscape” (Interview July 18, 2014), while another participant 
reflected that something “precious and vulnerable” would be lost (Interview, August 11, 
2014). The sense of loss was linked to the idea of compensation for negative impacts on 
ecological features, which was rejected by those participants who discussed it. As one 
planner noted, in the context of the Niagara Escarpment: 
We don’t use net gain: ‘sorry, I took that away but I am giving you 
this.’…Ours is maintain and enhance, not take away and compensate. But 
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with the quarry, there is not much you can do other than compensate 
because you are obviously losing what was there.” (Interview, September 
3, 2014, NEC) 
 
A key concern about the Walker decision is that it opens the door to the net gain 
compensation approach, even in the context of the environmentally focused Plan. This raises 
serious concerns about the capacity for the legal process to account for the specificity of 
ecological systems and the materiality of particular places and to appreciate the 
transformative impact of mining. Viewed in the context of the prioritization of aggregate 
under the Policy Statement, the significance of the Walker decision extends beyond the loss 
of the socio-ecological place at stake to concerns about the integrity of the Plan itself. As 
noted by the NEC staff report to the Commission:  
The concern and issue is not with respect to the Majority preferring the 
evidence and opinions of the witnesses of the Applicant, but rather that in 
staff’s opinion, the Majority appears to disregard key terms and objectives 
of the NEP related to the protection of natural features and areas on the 
basis that they are not defined (or not clearly defined), and defer to the 
Provincial Policy Statement in making their findings (Staff Information 
Report Re: Joint Board Decision Office of Consolidated Hearings Case 
No.: 08-094 ̶.Walker Aggregates Inc., 2012, p.1). 
 
Concerns about this shift away from the unique environmental focus of the Plan reflect 
broader concerns about the integrity of the proponent-driven decision-making process.  
 
In the shadow of the loss in Walker, the 2015 statutory review of the Plan and the other 
Provincial Plans began with a series of conversations at the Commission on key issues. In 
September 2014, the Commission considered a staff report on whether, 30 years later, the 
aggregate mineral policies had realized the goals and intentions of the Act, or whether 
changes were required to achieve protection of the Escarpment (Niagara Escarpment 
Commission, 2014). Many of the groups who participated in this research also made 
submissions on the aggregate policies, calling for an end to, or moratorium on, aggregate 
extraction in the Plan Area. Despite the modest recommendation by planning staff to “review 
and improve existing policies and development criteria”, the Commission voted 7 to 5 to end 
aggregate extraction in the Plan Area. Commissioners characterized the staff recommended 
options as “business as usual” and concluded, “[I]t is time to get back to first principles. 
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There has been a long period of accommodating aggregate extraction. It is time to transition 
and phase this use out of the NEP.”33 
B. Trust, Power, and Knowledge: Ownership and Control 
An overall lack of lack of trust in both the decision-making system and the proponents 
themselves was evident throughout the interviews. Participants identified concerns related to 
site selection and alteration as well as a lack of trust in the knowledge base on which 
decisions were made. In Ontario, aggregate planning is largely determined by private land 
ownership, such that the siting of aggregate mines is driven by the acquisition of the land 
rather than an assessment of the relative suitability of alternative sites. Some participants 
expressed concerns that corporate landowners had acquired lands without being “honest” or 
“transparent” about the intended land use (Interview, March 12, 2014; Interview, August 8, 
2014). Others noted that a change of ownership allowed the new owners and operators to 
evade the commitments made to neighbours or local governments by previous owners with 
respect to expansions (Interview, May 7, 2014; August 11, 2014) or the establishment of an 
asphalt plant (Interview, August 28, 2014). Rather than contesting the appropriateness of 
private ownership of the land, participants’ concerns indicated a sense of unease about the 
extent of the proponents’ rights and powers flowing through ownership. 
 
This was particularly evident where interview participants had observed or had knowledge of 
proponents damaging or altering their land to remove ecological or cultural features that 
could impact the approval of the licence, such as habitat for endangered species. Participants 
simultaneously understood this as being legal based on the proponents’ ownership of the 
land, but nonetheless wrong, as it had the effect of shifting the baseline for assessment of the 
impact of extraction. An experienced NEC planner observed that there is a suspicion of 
inevitability by members of the public (Planner, Interview, September 3, 2014). In their 
submission to the legislative review, Friends of Rural Communities and the Environment 
(FORCE), which had organized against the Flamborough quarry proposal, questioned 
whether proponents would accept a ‘no’ in the process (on file with author). Another 
participant described the perception that it was an approval process rather than a decision-
making process: 
                                                         
33 Personal correspondence, October 7, 2014. NEC discussion papers and Minutes NEC policy meeting are 
available online: http://www.escarpment.org/planreview/NECDiscussionPapers/index.php. See the September 
17 minutes for the decision referenced here. 
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They had done the political legwork and under the Aggregate Resources 
Act knew they could muscle this thing through. Couldn't care less what the 
community wanted. This was strictly a play on money because they 
wanted to be in, get the licence, sell the whole thing and have tremendous 
shareholder return (Interview, March 12, 2014). 
 
Exploratory excavation and testing are exempted from permitting requirements in the Plan 
Area, allowing landowners to undertake preliminary studies before making any applications 
(s.5). In the case of aggregate mineral extraction, such preliminary studies can lead to 
significant expenditures of money and time and compound a proponent’s sense of entitlement 
to approval, characterized by one participant as “because we want it, we get it done” 
(Interview, March 12, 2014). 
 
Experiential knowledge of particular places was contrasted with that of proponents’ technical 
experts, which was widely mistrusted by participants as biased or unreliable. In several cases, 
interview participants had produced or procured alternative knowledge and expert data to 
counter the factual record established by the application materials for planning authorities and 
litigation. Notably, in two cases where this third party data was provided to decision makers 
and planners in advance of legal proceedings, participants saw it as determinative to the 
ultimate findings that the land was ecologically significant and the risks of the proposal 
outweighed the benefits (Interview, May 7, 2014; Interview, April 23, 2014). However, the 
barriers to accessing such expertise are significant and raise important concerns about which 
communities can, and do, succeed in contesting the proponent’s narrative about the place at 
stake in aggregate conflicts. In addition to the financial barriers, participants pointed to 
problems retaining the same types of experts that work with proponents (Interview, March 
12, 2014). One environmental group participating in a hearing reported being unable to hire a 
hydrologist who was concerned that it would limit future work opportunities with proponents. 
Further, they expressed concern that evidence provided by the naturalist they hired was given 
less weight because he was “just a biologist that has spent 100 years walking through the 
bushes, a field guy” and not a “scientist” with a PhD (Interview, August 8, 2014). 
Additionally, as the private land owner, proponents can and do exclude other parties from the 
site and therefore limit their access to data and ability to review and produce independent 
data. This is particularly significant where ecological features may be temporally or 
seasonally variable:  
They won’t let you walk around in your rubber boots and eat some 
sandwiches and try to figure out what is going on. They don’t let you do that. 
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You are in for three hours and then you get the hell out. When you are going 
to do environmental surveys, in my experience anyway, there is timing on 
this. There [are] times you go in and see stuff and there [are] times you don’t 
see diddly squat. (Interview, August 8, 2014)  
 
The role of this alternative data can be significant in the outcome of particular cases, as it was 
in the rejection of the Nelson quarry. However, as one planner pointed out, this demonstrates 
the failure of the licensing process when the burden of effective assessment falls to private 
individuals and groups (Interview, March 7, 2014). This burden is of particular concern in the 
context of a fixed resource and the concentration of extractive development. 
9. We’ve Done Our Share: Concentration and Cumulative Impacts  
The fixed nature of aggregate resources raises particular concerns about concentration and 
cumulative impacts on specific ecological and spatial communities. Mining occurs where the 
resource is – “it does not discriminate in terms of place” (Anders Sandberg and Wallace, 
2013, 68). When the restrictions on Escarpment Protected and Escarpment Natural lands are 
layered onto the fixed location of the resource, extractive developments proposals within the 
NEP are necessarily concentrated in areas designated as Rural. In Walker and other decisions 
within the Plan Area, proponents and decision makers have used existing extractive uses and 
prior environmental damage on adjacent land to establish the compatibility of new, or 
significantly expanded, extractive land uses. One naturalist who has observed the aggregate 
industry for many years noted the “creeping motion” of aggregate licensing:  
Somebody comes in for an application … for a very small site which is 
relatively easy. And then they come back five or ten years later and say it 
is already there, the service is already there, let's make it bigger, make it 
below the water table now. Or in the world of limestone, ‘we are only 
taking off ten feet or something like that... Inevitably when they have done 
that, they come back and say the service is already there, they have 
already taken away the environmental features [on] the top. Let's make it a 
regular quarry,” (Interview, July 2014). 
In this sense, the buffer function of rural lands actually creates an opening for further 
extraction once it is established on adjacent lands. The same participant went on to observe 
that the issue is exacerbated by the unwillingness of decision makers to contemplate future 
land use in the legal process: “Even though you may suspect and believe in your soul that is 
what they are doing, you can't prove it. You can't prove intent,” (Interview, July 2014). While 
this narrowing of focus on the current proposals may be legally correct, it is notable that 
decision makers do rely on prospective planning by proponents in Adaptive Management and 
Rehabilitation Plans put forward in the application process. In the face of scientific 
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uncertainty both are at least somewhat speculative by definition. Neither of these preclude 
current or future owners from applying for extensions or permission to use the site for other 
controversial uses, such as a landfill or sewage site, and yet they may substantially influence 
approval in a particular case where mitigation is determined to resolve environmental or 
social impacts.34 
 
Despite the imposition of a development control system, Patano and Sandberg found that the 
NEC approves the overwhelming majority of overall development applications (2005). In the 
case of large-scale aggregate extraction, while the NEC has turned down a handful of high 
profile applications in recent years, only the decision in Nelson has survived appeal. When 
Walker was being argued, the Ontario Municipal Board was approving another down the 
road, just outside the Plan boundaries.35 Several interview participants pointed to the ‘close-
to-market’ requirement as a major factor in the concentration of extraction in particular areas. 
This implicitly places the burden of aggregate resource protection and development on a 
specific geographic area within the province, including rural areas in the Plan Area. An 
Ontario Bar Association presentation by a leading proponent council summarized the 
justification for the policy as follows:  
Transporting aggregates longer distances increases the cost to the user and 
the cost of the final products that use aggregate as inputs, such as public 
infrastructure projects and housing. Therefore, there is a public interest in 
ensuring that aggregate resources are extracted as close to market as 
possible in order to support the Provincial economy (Bull and Estrela, 
2012). 
 
The aggregate industry has also emphasized the environmental benefits of this 
requirement in reducing production-related emissions and contribution to climate 
change (Sandberg and Wallace, 2013; Bull and Estrela, 2012). However, several 
interview participants were critical of industry’s environmental claims and connected 
climate change and environmental crisis with the presumption of perpetual growth 
                                                         
34 At the time of writing an appeal of a decision to allow industrial sewage dumping in a lake created in an old 
quarry site by Oxford County and a residents’ group, Oxford People Against the Landfill (OPAL) was rejected 
by the Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal: “Appeal by County and OPAL Rejected”, 104.7 HeartFM 
News, 29 October 2015, <http://www.1047.ca/news/local-news/appeal-by-county-and-opal-rejected/> 
35 The MAQ quarry was approved by the Ontario Municipal Board in 2013: MAQ Aggregates Inc., v Grey 
Matters, OMB Case No. MMO90038.  
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and development and ongoing demand for aggregate resources (Interview, July 5; 
Interview July 17, 2014; Interview August 8, 2017).   
 
While some concentration of extraction is inevitable with a fixed resource like aggregate, the 
clustering of this type of transformative land use makes a cumulative impact assessment 
relevant, particularly where exacerbated by policy requirements (Interview, May 9, 2014).36 
One community group representative summed up the sentiment in areas with multiple large 
aggregate developments: “We are doing our share” (Interview, May 23, 2014). Neither the 
process under the Act, the PPS, nor the municipal amendment processes, require a cumulative 
impacts analysis. The Provincial Environmental Commissioner has expressed concern about 
the lack of cumulative impact analysis in aggregate applications (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario, 2012).  
 
Cumulative impacts are of particular importance for communities in Rural Escarpment areas. 
However, they are also increasingly significant for those that fall outside of special planning 
regimes like the Plan, the Greenbelt or the Oak Ridges Moraine regimes as proponents 
attempt to bypass the costly and prohibitive regulatory requirements of Plan areas. For 
example, the Carden Plain area and parts of Dufferin, Grey, and Bruce Counties adjacent to 
but excluded from the politically negotiated boundaries of the Plan Area, and First Nations 
territories in parts of Southern Ontario and Manitoulin Island are all facing increasing 
pressure from aggregate extraction proposals. Opponents to the now abandoned Melancthon 
mega quarry proposal, which fell just outside of the Greenbelt and the Plan Area, obtained an 
internal memo to investors by the American hedge fund land owner stating that they had 
specifically chosen the site based on the lack of regulatory oversight. Notably the memo also 
cited the small population, leading some observers to conclude that the proponents did not 
expect the organized opposition they eventually faced (Interview, March 12, 2014). Just as 
the rural parts of the Plan Area serve as a kind of sacrifice zone in the search for balance 
between competing land uses in the Niagara Escarpment, areas outside of the politically 
negotiated boundaries of provincial planning regimes uphold the protection of the legally 
                                                         
36 See also, Environmental Commissioner of Ontario. 2009. “The Swiss Cheese Syndrome: Pits and Quarries 
Come In Clusters”: 
http://www.ecoissues.ca/index.php/The_Swiss_Cheese_Syndrome:_Pits_and_Quarries_Come_in_Clusters 
[ECO, “Swiss Cheese”]. 
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protected lands within them. The political nature of these legally enforceable boundaries has 
significant implications for the relationship between rurality and environmental justice. 
Further, the desire to protect Plan Area land can result in a desire to shift impacts elsewhere 
without regard to the consequences for human and more-than-human communities elsewhere. 
While some aggregate development is likely inevitable in Ontario’s future, determining the 
‘right’ place for extraction and its impacts must be part of an inclusive and progressive 
planning process in which a wide range of rural people-place relations are recognized, 
challenged, and reconfigured. If place-protective behaviours in rural land use activism serve 
to compound existing environmental burdens and colonial land use patterns, they will 
undermine environmental justice and the potential for transformative alliances for just 
sustainability.  
 
A. Put It Up There: Layers of Rurality and the Colonial Potential of Place  
 
Given the likelihood of ongoing demand for aggregate, some participants indicated that they 
were not opposed to aggregate extraction, instead commenting that it was an appropriate land 
use elsewhere (Interview, March 12, 2013; May 23, 2014). Some pointed to other proposals 
that were preferable to their own without reflecting on the consequences for other ecologies 
and human communities in that place (Interview, August 8, 2014). The potential for this 
impact shifting has clear implications for places outside the boundaries of the Plan, 
particularly Indigenous communities and those with less financial resources and political 
power. From an environmental justice perspective, the potential for particular communities to 
bear the burden of extraction as a result of reduced regulatory oversight is significant. This is 
compounded by the relative power of some communities to mobilize opposition and reinforce 
regulatory boundaries while others are presumed to be willing hosts, or in the case of 
Indigenous communities, are continuing to fight for recognition of their jurisdiction in 
relation to lands and resources.  
 
Some participants specifically emphasized a distinction between the role of rural Southern 
Ontario as agricultural land and the North as the appropriate place for extraction. The drive to 
protect farmland and agricultural communities in southern Ontario was simultaneously 
connected to both instrumental interests and to the sense of interdependence and reliance on 
the land. The desire to shift extraction elsewhere was coupled with a sense that extractive 
  366 
activity was more “appropriate” on land outside of agricultural areas and the implication that 
the impacts on people-place relations in such places would be less significant. This desire to 
shift extractive development ‘somewhere else’ exposes the uneasy relationship between rural 
agricultural areas and ‘the North’ in Ontario. There are important legal, political, economic, 
geographical, and cultural reasons to see the southern and northern parts of the province as 
distinct (Stark et al., 2014). However, unless opposition to aggregate disputes in Southern 
Ontario includes a rejection of the construction of the North as the “appropriate” site of 
extractive activity, it will compound the social and environmental injustices faced by 
Indigenous communities (Agyeman et al., 2010; Stark et al., 2014).  
 
Detailed analysis of the complex issues surrounding extractive industries in Indigenous lands 
and the role of mining in Northern Ontario are outside the scope of this paper; however, it is 
essential to note that the Rural-Northern relationship is an important dimension of any 
consideration of rurality and environmental justice in Canada. The following brief discussion 
of the legal construction of this relationship points to the need for further research, 
particularly on the role of Indigenous perspectives and legal jurisdiction in Ontario’s land use 
planning framework. The Far North Act, 2010 (SO, 2010, c. 18) now imposes a distinct land 
use-planning regime for the Far North, which purports to balance the rights of Indigenous 
communities with environmental conservation and mining interests. In fact it reinforces 
provincial authority, providing a “public interest” veto for development and resource 
decisions, and upholds the hierarchical privileging of extractive rights (Gardner et al., 2012; 
Pardy and Stoehr, 2012; Wilkinson and Schulz, 2012). The construction of the North as the 
appropriate space for resource development is also upheld in the 2014 Policy Statement 
which simultaneously presents an inclusive rurality while distinguishing the working 
agricultural landscapes of the South from the natural North in section 1.1.4: “Across rural 
Ontario, local circumstances vary by region. For example, Northern Ontario’s natural 
environment and vast geography offer different opportunities than the predominately 
agricultural areas of southern regions of the Province.” This resource-based distinction is also 
emphasized by the Government’s departmental structure – for example, the division between 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs, and the Ministry of Northern 
Development and Mines. While the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing is responsible 
for the Planning Act and planning related issues generally and the Ministry of Aboriginal 
Affairs guides provincial relationships with Indigenous communities, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Forestry deals with community based land use planning for First Nations.  
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The Aggregate Resources Act itself applies only to very limited and specific parts of the 
province outside Southern Ontario (O. Reg 244/97). While there may be legitimate concerns 
that a regime developed for the context of extraction in the South may not serve the needs of 
the diverse communities and ecosystems of the North, the exclusion of the majority of land in 
Northern Ontario from regulation under the Aggregate Resources Act licensing process 
means that municipal Planning Act approvals are the only mechanism for review in large 
parts of the province where Indigenous lands and rights may be impacted.37 In Ontario, the 
exclusion of the North from the Aggregate Resources Act regime has been compounded by 
the silence in the Planning Act and until 2014, the Policy Statement, on the duty to consult 
and accommodate Indigenous Peoples. At the time of writing it remains unclear what the 
implications of the 2014 Policy Statement’s recognition of the duty to consult and 
accommodate Indigenous communities are for municipal decision-making in Ontario.38 
Given the powerful role of the Policy Statement in decision-making by both municipal 
governments and the Ontario Municipal Board, this explicit provincial delegation of the duty 
to consult and accommodate to municipalities is significant. However, the failure of the 
Aggregate Resources Act and associated policies to clarify how the duty to consult should be 
fulfilled, and by whom, leaves First Nations, municipalities and proponents with many 
questions about how to proceed with the complex steps of aggregate planning. With the 
exception of a lawyer working with Indigenous communities, the professional interviewees 
all declined to comment on the duty to consult as outside their expertise.  Pressing concerns 
about financial support for First Nations to participate in consultations and resources for 
municipalities to understand and carry out their obligations are evident within the Plan Area. 
The communities of the Saugeen Ojibway Nation report facing complex and sometimes 
multiple consultations and have pointed to the need for financial support for staffing and 
technical expertise for consultation (Ritchie, 2013, pp. 427–428). This remains a significant 
                                                         
37 Notably the limited application in Northern Ontario is the direct result of one highly controversial proposal for 
a large aggregate mine in Michipicoten Bay on the Lake Superior Coast.  See the Ontario Municipal Board 
decision in Citizens Concerned for Michipicoten Bay v Wawa and Superior Aggregates Company, PL040025, 
November 30, 2009.  
38 The duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous Peoples in Canadian law is beyond the scope of this paper, 
see for example: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, at para. 168 [Delgamuukw]; Haida 
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] SCR 511 [Haida], at para. 35; Taku 
River Tlingit First Nations v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 
[Taku River]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388, 2005 
SCC 69 (Canlii), 259 DLR (4th) 610, [2006] 1 CNLR 78 [Mikisew]; Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario 
(Natural Resources) 2014 SCC 48.  
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challenge facing First Nations involved with the aggregate licensing processes. Similar to 
other types of mining, it involves the review and interpretation of complex technical reports 
including planning, natural heritage, hydrology, geology, hydrogeology, archeology and 
cultural heritage and often air quality, as well as requiring independent expertise to provide 
advice and expert evidence in any legal proceedings. 
 
The consistent privileging of extractive land uses in the Policy and the Far North Act could 
align Indigenous and non-Indigenous rural interests in efforts to realize a place-based 
approach to land use planning. However, such opportunities cannot be realized if even the 
most active and informed opponents of aggregate development elsewhere in the province 
frame extraction “up there” or “up North” as appropriate or preemptively acceptable 
(Interview, September 9, 2014). While the 2011 proposal for a mega quarry in the 
agricultural community of Melancthon Township in Southern Ontario met with international 
criticism and solidarity from urbanites and First Nations, the massive recent expansion of the 
Lafarge Meldrum quarry beside Sheshegwaning First Nation on Manitoulin Island was 
approved with little outcry. The aforementioned quarry will now be the largest in Canada and 
was approved despite minimal engagement with the First Nation who have a constitutional 
right to be consulted and accommodated with respect to development on their territory during 
the licensing process (Interview, September 5, 2014). A just and sustainable dialogue about 
the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ places for aggregate mines must not only respect the constitutional 
rights of Indigenous Peoples with respect to land and resources in the context of land use 
planning, it must go much further to take enduring Indigenous legal orders as a starting point 
for a transformative politics of place and relationswith land.  
10. Conclusions: Towards a Just Politics of Rural Places 
The way law structures rurality and rural places has important material consequences for the 
human and more-than-human inhabitants of particular places. Disputes over aggregate 
extraction in Ontario’s Niagara Escarpment demonstrate the way law shapes and constrains 
our relationships with place. I have argued elsewhere that the structural privileging of 
ownership in the operation of land use law undermines the progressive potential of planning 
(Van Wagner, 2013).  Here, I have demonstrated how the legal construction of the rural as a 
residual space produces rural places as sacrifice zones between spaces of environmental 
protection and economic growth. Engagement with the embodied experiences of rural people-
place relations demonstrates that they are complex and sometimes contradictory, at once 
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instrumental and affective, exclusionary and reciprocal (Foster, 2009). In my view, this 
engagement in those places that are socially and legally constructed as rural can contribute to 
a broadened conception of environmental justice focused on the mutual interdependence of 
living in the land. If this broadened notion of environmental justice requires us to learn and 
practice new ways of living in, working with, and caring for the land as we pursue social 
inclusion and decolonization, the perspectives explored here serve as a tentative starting point 
for difficult, unsettling and necessary dialogue about the future of Ontario’s rural places.   
 
While land use planning conflicts can, and do, result in narrow and exclusionary politics of 
the ‘local’, it is cautiously argued that they may also serve as strategic openings for the 
articulation of alternative social and ecological relationships.  As a starting point, participants 
in rural land use conflicts must strengthen and deepen the transformative potential of their 
movements through meaningful engagement with the theories and practices of environmental 
justice. In Ontario, this is particularly relevant to hopes for building relationships of 
solidarity, respect, and reconciliation between rural land users, environmental movements, 
and Indigenous communities.  Rural land use activism plays a role in redefining rural people-
place relations through meaningful engagement with enduring, place-based Indigenous legal 
orders and a progressive politics of environmental health and social inclusion. However, this 
requires careful and critical attention to both the structural obstacles and the cultural 
assumptions underlying narratives of property ownership, appropriate development, and  
hierarchies of land use, as well as a rejection of colonial and exclusionary place-protective 
politics. As Alexa Scully argues, places can serve as the “literal common ground” necessary 
for the kind of “rich dialogue and understanding across perspectives” required for 
decolonization (Scully, 2012). Ongoing relationships with First Nations that were developed 
durng the Melancthon mega quarry campaign are hopeful developments that should be 
sustained (Interview, August 8, 2015). As well, the Coalition on the Niagara’s Escarpment’s 
policy on working with First Nations, which includes commitments to self-education about 
Indigenous rights and perspectives and a prioritization of relationships with First Nations was 
notably developed in collaboration with Indigenous environmental and legal experts Henry 
Lickers and law Professor John Borrows.39  
 
                                                         
39 Aboriginal Policy for CONE: 
<http://www.niagaraescarpment.org/images/docs/cone_aboriginal_policy_final.pdf> and on file with the author. 
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Opposition to aggregate extraction in Ontario is often characterized as site- and issue-
specific, and this is sometimes the case. However, there are also important examples of 
parties shifting their focus to broader campaigns about regional land use planning and 
environmental decision-making. For example, the province-wide Food and Water First 
campaign evolved from the opposition to the Melancthon mega quarry and continues active 
engagement in law and policy reform and electoral politics. One organizer described the 
evolution as follows, noting the opportunity for solidarity and transformative politics:  
The way this conversation changed from a potential […] quarry application to 
engaging tens of thousands of people on the common denominator that our water 
is not for sale, our water is sacred and not to be polluted, and our food lands are 
there for the betterment of this province, this food and water first in our thinking 
tore away all other lines of difference. It is to me the sleeping giant in elections 
from here on forward, federally or provincially, the protection of water and food 
lands is raising up what people are willing to take action on (Interview, March 12, 
2014). 
 
Organizing the Nelson quarry opposition included efforts to bring the regional communities 
together to articulate a proactive and long term “community vision” for the region. That 
grassroots exercise became the basis for local government efforts to develop a regional rural 
vision:  
That had enough influence on the city that they came after a couple years later 
and had council create what they call the rural vision. They did the same process 
as we had done and workshops and all that and had people design how the rural 
area would look in the future vision. This work is to form part of the municipal 
Official Plan, thus formally identifying the value of preserving rural agricultural 
and natural areas (Interview, May 7, 2014). 
 
These campaigns serve as strategic opportunities to link rural land use activism with 
environmental justice goals in order to negotiate and articulate alternative conceptions of 
rurality. The 2015 Plan review serves as another key moment for intervention to remove 
structural obstacles and foreground relationships with place. At the time of writing, the 
review is ongoing and ultimately the Province will determine the revisions to the Plan 
regardless of the Commission’s recommendations. Nonetheless, the Commission’s strong 
affirmation of an environment-first and values-led interpretation of the Act should be seen as 
an opening for the assertion of alternative and transformative relations with rural places. In 
particular, it creates conceptual space in which a critical politics of rural place could shift the 
way law structures rural people-place relations. This requires rejection of exclusionary and 
individualistic site-specific opposition to development in particular places. Instead, it must be 
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replaced with an active, humble, and critical engagement with a wide range of the human and 
more-than-human actors inhabiting, or seeking to inhabit, the conceptual and literal common 
ground of rural places.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion – An Eco-Relational Approach to Land Use Law 
 
1. A Summary of Research Findings: Placing Private Property in Ontario’s 
Land Use Law 
 
This final chapter weaves the findings and arguments in the preceding chapters together to set 
out an eco-relational approach to land use law, built on my study of Ontario’s quarry 
conflicts. This dissertation has examined aggregate mineral extraction in order to understand 
how we might transform the way we resolve disputes about how we use, and live with, the 
more-than-human world. Here I summarize the findings of the study by returning to my 
ecological adaptation of Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational rights analysis introduced in Chapter 
Five as a framework to think through how we might start to “live well together in the land.”1 
Informed by critical ecological property theorists, particularly Nicole Graham, and legal 
geographers, such as Nicholas Blomley and Sarah Whatmore, I apply my eco-relational 
analysis to foreground the people-place relations at stake in aggregate extraction conflicts. 
Informed by the articulations and assertions of alternative people-place relations uncovered 
through this research, I consider the potential for an eco-relational approach to land use 
disputes to bring about transformative change in Ontario’s land use law.  
 
First this section summarizes the existing legal relations of aggregate mineral extraction in 
Ontario. Based on the documentary and interview data collected in this project, I then 
consider the place-based values at stake for the more-than-owner parties involved in 
aggregate conflicts and discuss how the people-place relationships uncovered in this research 
uphold these values. Finally, in considering the “institutional and rhetorical means of 
expressing, contesting, and implementing” that could uphold these place-based values and 
relations, I propose specific changes to the legal and policy framework, and argue 
transformative changes are required to the way we make land use decisions in Ontario.2 This 
research demonstrates that participatory rights are not enough to realize environmental justice 
and just sustainability. Without meaningful opportunities to negotiate, contest, and shape the 
                                                         
1 Randolph Haluza-Delay, Michael J DeMoor & Christopher Peet, “That We May Live Well Together in the 
Land...: Place Pluralism and Just Sustainability in Canadian and Environmental Studies” (2013) 47 J Can Stud 
Détudes Can 3 226. 
2 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 236. 
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values and assumptions at the heart of property and planning law, the process remains closed 
to the full range of people-place relations at stake in aggregate mineral extraction conflicts. 
Rather, we require a fundamental reorientation of property relations in which ownership is 
not only decentred but also reconceived as one of a broader range of people-place relations 
with private land. Finally, I observe that future research about the role of Indigenous 
jurisdiction over land use decisions, as well as substantive engagement with Indigenous legal 
concepts in land use law, are a necessary part of re-shaping Ontario’s people-place relations 
towards just sustainability. 
 
A. Enacting the Ownership Model: Understanding the Legal Relations of 
Ontario’s Aggregate Minerals 
 
This dissertation has examined the relationship between private property and public land use 
planning. I have demonstrated how, despite participatory opportunities for a range of parties 
in the planning process, private ownership remains a powerful and central force in shaping 
Ontario’s land use law. The chapters above examine why and how the ownership model of 
property-relations is achieved and sustained in the province. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four and discussed in Chapters Five through Eight, the structure 
of Ontario’s land use law and policy gives priority to particular forms of use and 
development. Chapter Four provides a detailed description of how aggregate mineral 
extraction is constructed as one such privileged land use. It demonstrates how aggregate 
minerals are produced as resources, severed from and valued above all other physical, 
ecological, social, and cultural features of a particular place. Chapter Six demonstrates how 
the people-place relations of ownership are enrolled to uphold a utilitarian vision of the 
public good as development and economic growth while the much broader range of more-
than-owner relations with the land at stake are severed, and therefore excluded, for the 
purposes of legal decision-making. This structure of legal relations has consequences that 
extend beyond the boundaries of a particular site-specific dispute, and even beyond the 
particular case of aggregate mineral regulation, as the messy socio-materiality of people-
place relations is “placed outside the frame” of land use law.3 The dominant ownership model 
                                                         
3 Nicholas Blomley, “Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing” (2014) 10 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 1 133 
at 136. 
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of property is upheld and successfully performed despite the ongoing and creative assertion 
of alternative people-place relations.4  
 
An emphasis on the exclusivity and alienability of private property underpins the narrow 
view of the state evidenced in the proponent-driven land use regime governing aggregate 
extraction and the increasing reliance on self-compliance and monitoring. As demonstrated in 
Chapter Six, in addition to the temporal privilege to initiate the events in the application 
process, the owner has the spatio-temporal power to shape the site prior to extraction and 
determine what more-than-human entities and material relations will or will not exist for the 
purposes of the legal process. The severability of land from its wider relations is reinforced 
by the primary role of the legal land owner in the consultation process through which the 
more-than-ownership relations engaged by the proposed development are asserted and shaped 
for the purposes of the subsequent litigation. As demonstrated in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
the material and social consequences of transformative extraction are trivialized or even 
deemed irrelevant to decisions about how private land should be used. The documentary 
analysis and interviews set out in Chapters Six through Eight expose a significant 
discontinuity between the more-than-ownership people-place relations at stake and the legal 
regulation of the places produced as sites for aggregate development.5 
 
As I contended in Chapter Four, the work of hierarchically ordering land uses is done through 
the guiding planning policy in the Provincial Policy Statement and by the inversion of the 
broader municipal planning inquiry and the provincial licensing approvals regime. Chapter 
Six described how this inversion shifts the primary analysis from a broad planning inquiry 
into whether a particular development should proceed to a managerial aggregate licensing 
inquiry and about how it should proceed. The mandatory protection of the resource and 
aggregate operations from other land uses in the Policy Statement is compounded by the 
explicit exclusion of analysis about whether and where the resource is needed, the close-to-
market requirement, and the treatment of extraction as interim use regardless of the impacts 
and the form of rehabilitation. By hierarchically ordering both the physical features and uses 
of a particular place, the Act and the Policy Statement produce aggregate extraction sites as 
alienable commodities and attempts to sever more-than-owner and non-instrumental people-
                                                         
4 Nicholas Blomley, “Performing Property, Making the World” (2013) 26 Can J Law Jurisprud 24 23. 
5 Deborah Martin, Alexander Scherr & Christopher City, “Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the 
Production of Space” (2010) 34 Progress in Human Geography 2 175. 
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place relations for the purposes of land use decision-making. As Chapter Seven argued, the 
exclusion of these relations upholds a dualistic view of nature and culture that precludes 
responsibility and interdependence. Further, as Chapter Eight demonstrated, it produces and 
upholds the legal construction of rural places as residual – the potential sacrifice zones 
between the urban and the natural. As commodities to be used for the benefit of those 
exercising the dominium of ownership are enrolled in a vision of the provincial interest 
privileging extraction, places can be harmed and even destroyed with only minimal 
requirements for mitigation or reactive ‘adaptive management’ to address the significant and 
even irreversible transformation or loss of a place and its relations.   
B. Listening to the Heart: Creating Space for More-Than-Owner Values and 
Relations in Ontario’s Land Use Planning System 
 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight provide insight into the values at stake for the more-than-
owner parties and the relations that can uphold these values. As I note in Chapter Seven, the 
values and relationships asserted by more-than-owner parties are messy – all at once 
instrumental and affective, conservative and transformative, exclusionary and reciprocal. As 
on more-than-owner party reflected: “The water, the land, the air, the alvar, those are 
important. I don't know which is more important. It depends on whether it is your land.” Few 
raised concerns about property values directly; however, several did note concerns about 
traffic and noise or vibration impacts on their property or raised such concerns in the 
planning process. One planner noted that she often hears concerns related to the “loss of 
enjoyment of their property” or damage from blasting; however, she simultaneously observed 
that people engage in Niagara Escarpment planning processes because they “really value that 
it is a special place.” In this study, all participants raised concerns about ecological impacts 
during the interviews and in the consultation or litigation materials, both in terms of human 
dependence on ecological systems and the importance of relations within the more-than-
human world. In uncovering what was at stake for the more-than-owner parties who 
participated in this research, two strong themes emerged which disrupt the dominant legal 
structure of people-place relations set out above: responsibility and humility.  
 
While these were not the only values and relations articulated, I have emphasized their 
potential to disrupt dominant property relations and perform alternative people-place relations 
through land use law. It is necessary, in my view, to foreground these assertions and reject 
simplistic characterizations of rural land use conflicts while remaining attuned to, and 
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critically addressing, the exclusionary potential of ‘local’ politics of place in rural land use 
conflicts. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter Eight, we must do both in order to reshape rural 
people-place relations towards a practice of environmental justice with ecological integrity at 
its core. 
 
Responsibility emerged in the context of both intergenerational and interspecies relations. 
This was linked to a sense of emergent and dynamic sense of belonging to places in relation 
to other beings, both human and more-than-human.6 A more-than-owner party involved in 
litigation over a site on the shore of one of the Great Lakes noted his lifelong passion for the 
lake.7 Another lamented the potential industrialization of the “longest stretch of wilderness 
shore line on any of the Great Lakes.” One more-than-owner party described the 
interconnected ecological systems and species on her childhood home, adjacent to a proposed 
extraction site, which include fields and a woodlot, as well as complex hydrogeological 
systems:  
Mostly it's an upland deciduous forest, lots of maple, beech, there's some pine and 
definitely there are some evergreens. It is the top mountainy ledge above, so it's a 
recharge zone so there's no water coming from anywhere. It's the high ground and it's 
an outlier on the top of the escarpment so it relies entirely on snow and rain for its 
water supply, and yet there are all these springs that are poking out at the top of this 
plateau. The hydrogeology up there is really impossible to model because of the 
limestone karst, which is rock that has been worn down for 400 hundred million years 
and has all these channels and fissures, and caves. [It] is known for its caves. There are 
springs and there are sinkholes. It's really cool. There are big depressions in the forest 
floor.8  
 
She recalled searching for frogs and snakes as a child and went on to describe the intersection 
of her family property with the proposed extraction site: “…[W]here all the properties meet at 
the back there it's paradise-like, it really is.” Reflecting on arriving home after learning of the 
proposal: “I had a distinct memory of coming home and when this was just starting to unfold 
and seeing it going, ‘that's as good as it gets.’ That's world-class beauty and nature.”9 
 
Several more-than-owner participants talked about particular species, such as the Jefferson 
salamander, the bobolink, the butternut tree or Hart’s tongue fern, or specific ecological 
                                                         
6 Davina Cooper, “Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the Productive Life of 
Property” (2007) 32 Law Soc Inq 3 625 at 329. 
7 Interview, August 23, 2014. 
8 Interview, August 11, 2014. 
9 Ibid. 
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systems, such as forests, alvars, wetlands, and geological formations. One professional 
naturalist described how cattle grazing by local farmers maintained boblink habitat because 
they require short grasses, and had observed that aggregate companies would strategically 
end grazing arrangements on their land in advance of applications to erase potential obstacles 
to approval. Another more-than-owner party expressed a sense of awe about the bat habitat 
created by the fissures in the karst rock system and the pristine alvar environment on the 
proposed site. That alvar is home to an endemic silver butterfly species and several rare plant 
species, such as the ram’s head lady slipper, which grow in very few other places in the 
world. Others emphasized the importance of connectivity between various parts of wetland 
complexes within or adjacent to the proposed extraction sites, for example one more-than-
owner party noted: “The property in total is a very rich ecological myriad of wetlands and 
rich with species of critters, flora and fauna.” Another lamented how two simultaneous 
quarry applications on nearby lands failed to consider the interconnected wetlands running 
through and between each site. As one more-than-owner party put it when describing the 
wetlands and forests adjacent to the proposed extraction site, as well as the species that rely 
on them, , “[i]t is an ecosystem. You have to look at it as an ecosystem.” Farmers who 
participated in the study emphasized the relationship between the high quality soil in the area 
and the hydrogeological functions of the limestone underneath which creates the conditions 
for crops to survive in both wet and dry weather. To understand this unique soil, one farmer 
noted, “you have to get out and feel it and smell it.”10 In his view, few proponents or decision 
makers ever did so. 
 
As noted in Chapter Eight, at times social responsibility was also linked to solidarity with 
other communities built through alliances as urban and rural or Indigenous and settler parties 
came together. These alliances were often new and unexpected, as a specific place became 
“the common ground” for an alternative story of what was at stake in the dispute.11 In my 
view, these have the potential to serve as key starting points for conversations and 
negotiations we need to have about how we want to live together as human communities 
embedded in the social and ecological complexity of particular material places.12 As Graham 
notes, it is the landscapes themselves, so long deemed invisible and irrelevant to law, we 
                                                         
10 Interview, August 13, 2014. 
11 Alexa Scully, “Decolonization, reinhabitation and reconciliation: Aboriginal and place-based education” 
(2012) 17 Canadian Journal of Environmental Education 148. 
12 Ibid. 
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must look to in order to remind ourselves of our interdependence and our limitations as we 
negotiate the complex socio-materiality of place.13 A southern Ontario farm may 
simultaneously reveal the grid of the colonial survey and Crown land grants, ongoing 
contestation about the jurisdiction of an Indigenous legal order over land use decisions, and 
the licenced extraction area for a future quarry that will one day become a lake on top of the 
Niagara Escarpment. When we see the materiality of legal relations as continually produced, 
and contested, through places we are better positioned to shape and reshape law to reflect 
relations of care, connection, and interdependence with the more-than-human world. 
 
In my view, relations of guardianship or stewardship have the potential to decentre ownership 
within people-place relations and to uphold articulations of responsibility towards places, 
even those constituted by private land. While the specific content of these concepts must be 
developed and contested in relation to place, by emphasizing interdependence and connection 
with the more-than-human world these relations could foster the necessary humility to 
account for a much wider range of relations, both human and more-than-human. In my view, 
humility is required both with respect to our ability to know and change the more-than-human 
world, and therefore to manage it; but, also to develop a much richer conception of need that 
accounts for the embeddedness of a particular resource in ecological and physical systems. In 
this way, the needs of owners, as well as those of more than owners and more than humans, 
are understood as part of an interdependent network of relations, but are not given 
presumptive primacy by virtue of legal ownership. As with Arnold’s web of interests, the 
point is not to erase human activity from the landscape nor prohibit use of the more-than-
human world, but to make visible the material consequences of particular people-place 
relations, and make possible a contextual place-based assessment of sustainability. 
Ownership, therefore, would emphasize particular responsibility to attend to the people-place 
relations, rather than the unilateral power to shape them. 
 
A shift towards having relationships with places rather than to others in relation to place, or 
even to the land itself, has the potential to centre foreground relations of responsibility and 
reciprocity. This requires us to contemplate what the legal relations of land use planning 
would look like if, in James Penner’s words, we were “condemned to having to deal” with 
                                                         
13 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, Environment, Law (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 206. 
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“things.” What if, in contrast to Penner, we understood the things as having much to say 
about their relations, and us as having the responsibility to take this into account? 14 Notably 
this research revealed that the process of engaging in a planning conflict changed, and often 
deepened participants’ instrumental relations with the places at stake. In the context of the 
potential or actual loss of place, people described a renewed sense of wonder and humility as 
they learned about the complexity and connectivity of ecological systems and came to 
appreciate the social and material limits of the places at stake. At the same time, they 
emphasized the value of experiential knowledge developed slowly over time through 
interaction with the land, contrasting this with the technical expertise procured by the 
proponent through ‘people from away’ and sophisticated modeling programs. This research 
revealed not only a sense of responsibility to deal with the more-than-human world, but the 
possibility that key sources of knowledge and experience were left unrecognized and 
unheard. Concerns about the neglect of experiential knowledge were linked to new or 
increased concerns about sustainability and the ecological integrity of specific places. Indeed, 
descriptions of the impact of aggregate mining as irreversible loss were in marked contrast 
with its legal construction as an “interim use” as if the unique and complex place-based 
features and values could be removed and replaced without the integrity of ecological 
systems and people-place relations being transformed. 
C. Finding our Place: The Institutional and Rhetorical Means of Expressing, 
Contesting, and Implementing People-Place Relations in Ontario’s Land Use 
Law 
I have taken a critical view of the existing structure of land use law in Ontario in this project. 
Nonetheless, I maintain land use planning decisions can be strategic sites for the assertion of 
more-than-owner relations with place. Concepts such as the precautionary principle, 
stewardship, and place-based analysis of the impacts of land use have emerged to play key 
roles in recent quarry cases, demonstrating the potential to identify and exploit strategic 
openings and disrupt dominant people-place relations. However, to face the challenges of the 
contemporary environmental crisis in just and sustainable ways, we must seek more 
transformative change of our decision-making structures. An eco-relational approach to land 
use planning requires both a reorientation of land use decision-making away from the 
primacy of private ownership and a redefined conception of ownership. This would create 
space to conceptualize and implement new patterns of relationship with the more-than-human 
                                                         
14 James E Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 79. 
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world, including relations based on humility, interconnection, and reciprocity. Thinking this 
through is a humbling and possibly never-ending, task. In my view, it requires a range of 
responses from changes to the existing regulatory structure to a fundamental rethinking of 
ownership in Anglo-Canadian property law. 
 
In the aggregate context, this would start with a very practical shift towards meaningful 
participation in decisions by making consultation a public process rather than a private duty.  
This would entail a publically-driven, prospective planning process that explicitly includes 
place-based analysis of needs and limitations and removes ownership from the site selection 
analysis. Instead, as called for by commentators,15 aggregate planning would occur through a 
publically-driven, open, strategic planning process informed by both independent experts and 
experiential place-based knowledge. Aggregate mineral resources are deemed required in the 
provincial interest and should therefore be subject to a site-selection process in which 
alternatives are formally considered in light of the benefits and impacts and any 
environmental justice considerations about the distribution of harms and benefits. Without 
endorsing current “willing-host” and environmental assessment processes, which also exhibit 
problematic elements of the proponent-driven approach, aggregate extraction siting should 
include the formal and public consideration of alternatives like other controversial land uses. 
 
Consultation and participation in both the broader aggregate planning process and site 
specific applications should be the responsibility of provincial and municipal governments 
rather than the proponent. While proponents should be required to respond to concerns, 
objections, and critiques brought forward by interested parties, meaningful consultation 
requires engagement with the decision makers themselves. This would necessarily also 
include a meaningful opportunity to say “no” to a specific proposal, regardless of the scale or 
timeline of investment for a proponent. In other words, the process must be a process of 
decision-making, rather than mere approval. By shifting the work of contestation from a 
private burden to a public obligation we can also better safeguard against communities with 
fewer resources shouldering a greater burden of resource production and protection; and, 
ensure no communities are filling the gaps for under-resourced state actors and enforcement 
mechanisms. In particular, knowledge production and procurement of expertise must be 
                                                         
15 Mark Winfield & Amy Taylor, Rebalancing the Load: The Need for an Aggregate Conservation Strategy for 
Ontario (Toronto: Pembina Institute, 2005); Matt Binstock & Maureen Carter-Whitney, Aggregate Extraction in 
Ontario: A Strategy for the Future (Toronto: Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, 2011). 
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publically driven and independent from the outset, both throughout the process and the life of 
a mine site, such that the narrative about the relationships and values at stake are not 
predetermined. In addition, funding for participation by a range of parties would guard 
against artificial narrowing of more-than-owner intervention by reducing barriers to gaining 
legal and technical expertise and making full party status accessible to all before the Board. 
 
In many ways the nature of the task itself reinforces the role of a precautionary approach 
because to be humble and responsible we need to slow down and learn, both technically, but 
also ethically. In this sense requiring a precautionary approach to aggregate decision-making 
is an appropriate legal means of upholding relations of interdependence and connection. This 
is relevant in both the scientific sense that fosters respect for ecological integrity and the 
complexity and limits of the material world, but also in a broader sense that calls for the 
humility to learn from and with places and each other, even where there is uncertainty and 
discomfort. Statutorily requiring a needs-based analysis and the application of the 
precautionary principle to all aggregate licensing proposals would be a critical starting point. 
In addition, requirements for cumulative effects analysis for all extractive development 
should be incorporated into the aggregate minerals framework and into planning decisions 
more broadly. 
 
Beyond these specific suggestions for regulatory changes, an essential component of the 
centering of responsibility and fostering humility in land use law is a much greater role for 
Indigenous legal orders. This is both a central part of meaningful commitment to the ongoing 
project of reconciliation in the Canadian context, but also a practical approach to shifting 
towards place-based relations with land. Respect for enduring legal principles and tools 
shaped by relations in particular places can be realized not only through direct jurisdiction 
over land use decisions but also through collaboration and partnership based on solidarity, 
intergenerational responsibility and place-based alliances. The recent recognition of the Duty 
to Consult and Accommodate in the Provincial Policy Statement is a starting point for this 
work at the day-to-day operational level of land use governance in Ontario. However, this 
also requires much more transformative work with respect to foundational concepts in 
Canadian law, including the creative rethinking of property relations and ownership in 
particular. It must go beyond consultation and participatory inclusivity to affirm and respect 
jurisdiction over a range of land use decisions, and to create space for a sophisticated 
engagement with substantive concepts, principles, and processes from Indigenous legal 
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orders – even, and perhaps especially, when they challenge the dominant settler-colonial 
property relations.  
 
At the same time, an eco-relational re-structuring of people-place relations in Anglo-
Canadian land use law requires us to directly confront the conceptual baggage of ownership 
in Anglo-Canadian law.  It requires a shift to view private ownership of land as including 
limited contextual rights of private use and benefit. These rights would be part of a broader 
set of more-than-ownership relations, including duties and obligations with the land itself, as 
well as with others (both human and other beings) who may also have rights and obligations 
in relation to the land. In this construction of property relations, there is no full bundle of 
rights because property could never be understood as simply a private relation. It is always in 
relation with, and responsible to, place. There could be no presumptive rights to fundamental 
transformation, substantial harm, or destruction of the land automatically flowing from legal 
title. Rather, as discussed in Chapter Four, the onus would be on owners to demonstrate how 
extractive activity would have no negative impact; or, where negative impacts cannot be 
avoided, how they are demonstrably outweighed by benefits to the place as a whole, not 
simply presumptive flow-on effects of economic activity such as employment and local 
taxation income. 
 
Private ownership would not presumptively include rights to exclude others from the shared 
and interconnected material and ecological aspects of private land, requiring ongoing 
negotiation and debate about the limits of land uses in particular places. Rather, more-than-
ownership relations of guardianship or stewardship could serve to balance rights of access, 
use, and benefit by centering responsibility and reinforcing ecological integrity as a core 
element of people-place relations. In this sense, our autonomy would be enhanced by our 
ability to construct reciprocal and sustainable people-place relations rather than our power to 
exclude human or more-than-human others from the sphere of our control. Property 
ownership would constitute a form of negotiated belonging in the more-than-human world – 
a living together well in the land. 
 
This is necessarily a work in progress. The articulation and identification of values and 
relationships that matter must be place-based – informed by the complex and negotiated 
socio-materiality that constitutes a particular place. Reorienting ownership will require 
transformative change – social and political, as well as legal change, and this will often feel 
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out of reach. Yet, the messy complexity of disputes over the seemingly mundane extraction 
of gravel from Ontario’s rural places demonstrates that while the primacy of private property 
in environmental decision-making endures, it is also actively and creatively contested in 
unsuspecting places. As Carol Rose reminds us, moments of cultural and political recognition 
of alternative property relations can be transformative.16 The decisions examined in Chapter 
Four expose these conflicts as strategic openings through which to engage in the difficult and 
challenging work of telling new stories about our place in the world. The values and 
relationships uncovered in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight demonstrate how rural people-place 
relations can challenge the dominant ownership model of property in surprising and 
unexpected ways. What I have argued here leaves us with much more work to be done. It will 
be difficult, uncomfortable and confronting, involving as much unlearning as learning, 
particularly for those of us who are settlers in the lands that make up Ontario. However, in 
my view, doing this work provides us with a vital opportunity to tell new stories about 
ourselves and about who we are as more-than-owners living well, together, with the places 
we inhabit. 
 
2. Coda: Possibility Lives in Places 
A relational reorientation of ownership is an essential part of my eco-relational framework 
for land use law. However, I also acknowledge there may be contexts in which even this 
reconstituted ownership will not reflect the people-place relations of a particular place. 
During the final years of this project I have been privileged to live in Aotearoa New Zealand 
where I have learned a great deal about the potential for legal creativity, and the importance 
of negotiation and contestation in the context of land use law and Indigenous-settler relations. 
I have had the honour of teaching natural resource and planning law while the Whanganui 
River became recognised as a legal person in law,17 and as a number of creative co-
management arrangements with Māori communities unfold under Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements.18 During the final days of my dissertation, the Te Urewera Board released the 
draft Te Kawa o Te Urewera,19 the plan created to implement the landmark Te Urewera Act 
                                                         
16 Carol M Rose, “Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and 
Ecosystems” (1998) 83 Minn Law Rev 129 at 141. 
17 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, (NZ) 2017/7 [Te Awa Tupua]. 
18 Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Maori Law (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2016). 
19 The Te Urewera Board, Te Kawa o Te Urewera (Draft) (2017). 
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enacted as part of the Tūhoe Treaty of Waitangi settlement.20 Under the Act, the lands cease 
to be a national park and Te Urewera is vested in itself as its own legal identity, owning itself 
in perpetuity.21 The Board, which will eventually be made up of majority Tūhoe members, is 
empowered to speak as the voice of Te Urewera and act in the interests of the land. At the 
outset of Te Kawa the Chair, Tāmati Kruger, explains the role of the plan as “about the 
management of people for the benefit of the land – it is not about land management.” The 
plan goes on to explain,  
Te Kawa is not intended to operate in the same way as a usual management 
plan which focuses on rules. Rather, Te Kawa records principles as law, and 
traditions and beliefs as the sense of a better future. As in life, virtues shape 
our responsibilities and choices guiding Te Urewera Board decisions on 
appropriate and responsible activities in Te Urewera.22  
 
Te Kawa explains the application of Te Urewera’s legal personality as follows: 
The Act does not establish the Te Urewera identity rather it liberates it from 
human speculation in order that nature and the natural world return to its 
primal role, revered and served by those of her children she has given life to. 
 
The use of property rights by the western legal system has hidden from view 
the concept of nature; rendered her parts as natural resources now capable of 
rival priorities competing with other household choices. These human granted 
rights have displaced our devotion for Papatūānuku with ownership now 
serving individual advantage. These motives suppress the vision of Te 
Urewera as distinct life. Yet, property rights do not give life nor do they 
encourage the connectedness of all living things for life. In this altered 
relationship people struggle to unify to perceive the whole which is nature 
collectively. Needlessly our fracturing of nature has sponsored our own 
fragmentation. The use of property rights to regulate human disputes arising 
from human society is no longer permissible in and of Te Urewera. Te 
Urewera may never again be owned by people.23 
 
Kawa is a contested term within Maoridom; however, it generally means the customary 
protocol or procedures to be followed on a particular marae, which is the gathering place for 
a Maori community – a “place for the feet to stand” in connection with the ancestors and the 
                                                         
20 Carwyn Jones, “Tūhoe-Crown Settlement – Tūhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014; Te Urewera Report of the 
Waitangi Tribunal” (2014) October Maori Law Rev 13; Jacinta Ruru, “Tūhoe-Crown settlement – Te Urewera 
Act 2014 at Māori Law Review” (2014) October Maori Law Rev, online: 
<http://maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/10/tuhoe-crown-settlement-te-urewera-act-2014/>. 
21 Te Urewera Act 2014, 2014/51. 
22 Te Kawa, supra note 19 at 6. 
23 Ibid at 17. 
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land, introduced above.24 In this sense, Te Kawa is the product of a specific material, social, 
and historical context. It reflects the unique eco-social personality of Te Urewera, the violent 
and troubled history of Crown-Tūhoe relations, and Tūhoe tikanga, the ethical framework, 
customary practices, and legal order developed over generations.25 As such, I do not present 
it as a model or blueprint for Ontario or other jurisdictions to adopt. We must all do our own 
hard work of re-shaping our people-place relations with the more-than-human world in which 
we are embedded. Rather, it serves as an example of both the recognition of Indigenous legal 
jurisdiction with an existing and enduring place-based system for land use decision-making, 
and, of a sophisticated and creative engagement with Indigenous legal concepts offering ways 
to break with destructive structural legal relations. In particular, the assertion of connection 
and responsibility in place of the severability of resources from their context and of 
individual owners from the collective points to the possibility of a structure of legal relations 
that transcends the dualism of anthropocentrism or ecocentrism to centre reciprocal people-
place relations. What possibilities might we uncover if we look to our own places with the 
humility and creativity required to reshape our people-place relations? 
                                                         
24 Hirini Moko Mead & Sidney M Mead, Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (Auckland: Huia Publishers, 
2003) at 71, 110. 
25 Ibid at 19. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 Interview Guide – More-than-owner parties 
 
1. How did you first learn about the proposal for the quarry? 
a. Please describe where you found the information. 
b. Please describe your initial reactions. 
c. Please describe where you went for help/guidance or to get more 
information. 
 
2. Please describe why it was important to you to be involved in this process. 
a. How would you describe what was at stake in this decision? 
b. Please describe the land where the quarry was proposed. 
 
3.  Please describe how you become involved in opposing the quarry. 
a. Who did you work with? 
b. Who did you/do you see as the decision maker in the licensing process for 
the quarry? 
 
4. How familiar were you with the aggregate decision making process prior to your 
involvement, if at all? 
a. Please describe your impressions of the decision-making process when 
you first become involved. 
b. Has your view of the process changed? In what ways? 
 
5. Please describe what your involvement in the process looked like. 
a. What avenues of participation/objection/assertion did you use? 
i. Why did you choose these particular forms of involvement? 
ii. How effective would you consider these forms of involvement? 
b. What was the role of legal counsel? 
c. Please describe how you approached different forums or audiences. 
 
6. What, if any, aspects of the process did you find most challenging? 
a. Were there particular stages or parts of the process that you felt you could 
or could not assert your interests as you would have liked? 
 
7. What, if any, aspects of the process did you find most rewarding/satisfying? 
a. Were there particular stages or parts of the process that you felt your 
concerns and interests were particularly well understood and responded to? 
 
8. Please describe whether you think your involvement in the process had any impact 
on the decision. In what ways? 
a. Please describe whether other factors and influences impacted the decision 
in your view. 
 
9. What values or priorities do you think the decision reflected? 
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10. Please describe whether your involvement has had any impact on the way you 
think about the quarry land.  
  
  xxxix 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Expert Interview Guide 
 
1. Please describe your understanding of the key environmental issues raised by 
aggregate extraction in Ontario. 
a. Why are these decisions so contentious in your view? 
b. What is at stake for the communities involved? 
c. How would you characterize the groups and/or individuals who get involved 
in aggregate disputes? 
 
2. Please describe your view of the opportunities for participation in the aggregate 
extraction licensing process. 
a. What is the role of the EBR and the ER? 
b. What, if any, are the challenges that third parties face in participating? 
c. What do you consider the most successful participation strategies? 
 
3. How do you think the recent Legislative Review and Government Response dealt 
with the concerns of third parties? 
a. Do you think the Review’s report and the government response dealt with the 
concerns you raised in the submissions? 
i. If not, what was missed? 
 
4. What has changed for aggregate planning with the new Policy Statement 2014? 
a. Endangered species habitat (ESA reforms) 
b. Agricultural land 
c. Duty to Consult – First Nations 
 
5. What are the key reforms that could be made to the governance structure? 
a. Legal & Policy? 
i. PPS 
1. Interim? 
2. Close to market? 
3. Needs assessment? 
4. Agricultural land? 
ii. Broad provincial strategy? 
b. Oversight? 
i. Role of MNR and resources? 
c. Participatory? 
i. Standing and appeal rights? 
ii. Funding and access to expertise 
d. Screening-out mechanism? 
 
6. Why are so few applications turned down? 
a. Role of OMB? 
b. Role of MNR? 
c. Role of Municipalities? 
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7. Recently a few key applications have been turned down by government or the 
OMB/Joint-Board, what do you think influenced these decisions? 
a. ERT members? 
b. Public objection? 
c. Participation of third parties? 
d. Municipal involvement? 
 
8. What, if anything, do you think the impact of the St. Mary’s settlement and/or the 
NAFTA claim will have on the regulation of aggregate in Ontario? 
a. On the use of MZOs? 
b. On role of community groups? 
 
9. Should the JART-model be the standard for applications?  
a. What is the relationship between JARTs and community groups? i.e. invitation 
to POWER 
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APPENDIX C 
Coding Guide 
 
1. The decision making process 
a. Relationships with decision makers; 
b. Organizing/Activism; 
c. Law and legal practices; 
i. Jurisdiction 
d. Planning policy and practice; 
i. Balance 
e. Experts and the role of science; 
i. Knowledge 
f. Enforcement; 
i. Adaptive management 
ii. Rehabilitation 
 
2. Place 
a. Descriptions of place 
b. Characterizing participants 
c. Land ownership 
d. Land use 
e. Knowledge about place 
f. Framing 
g. Rurality; 
i. Definition 
ii. Law 
iii. Planning 
iv. Rural-urban relationship 
v. Agriculture, economy 
h. Temporality 
i. Indigenous knowledge, jurisdiction, and land use 
 
3. What was at stake: values, rights, relationships 
a. Environmental; 
i. Water 
ii. Land use 
b. Economic; 
i. Jobs 
ii. Development 
iii. Property values 
c. Social; 
i. Health 
ii. Relationships/community 
 
 
 
